The EU and Dispute Settlement within the WTO:

a strategy for the protection of the Union’s autonomy

in the domestic regulation of goods? by Bonavita, Valeria
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna 
 
 
 
DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN 
 
DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA 
 
Ciclo XXIV 
 
Settore Concorsuale di afferenza: 12/E1 
 
Settore Scientifico disciplinare: IUS/14 
 
 
 
 
The EU and Dispute Settlement within the WTO: 
a strategy for the protection of the Union’s autonomy 
in the domestic regulation of goods? 
 
 
Tesi di dottorato in cotutela con l’Université de Strasbourg 
 
 
 
Presentata da: Valeria Bonavita 
 
 
 
Coordinatore Dottorato        Relatori 
 
Prof.ssa Lucia Serena Rossi     Prof. Luigi Costato 
       Prof.ssa Frédérique Berrod 
 
 
 
 
Esame finale anno 2012
 2 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
A coloro che non tollerano recinti intorno al pensiero 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………….11 
 
 
CHAPTER I - The European quest for regulatory autonomy within the SPS and 
TBT regime……………………………………………………………………………13 
 
Section I – National regulatory autonomy as a counterbalance to the liberalisation 
and integration of marketplaces……………………………………………………...13 
1.1 Defining the issue of regulatory autonomy 
1.2 The distinction between market access and domestic regulation under GATT 1994 
1.2.a Measures restricting market access versus domestic regulations under the GATT 
1.2.b Comparison with the EU Treaty and the US Dormant Commerce Clause 
1.3 Interaction between GATT market access and domestic regulation disciplines 
1.3.a Domestic regulation that applies to both domestic and imported products is subject 
to GATT article III 
1.3.b Mutually exclusive scope of articles III and XI 
1.4 Abating tariff barriers within the EU and WTO 
1.5 Legal versus political considerations 
 
Section II - The defence of regulatory autonomy in the EU and WTO……………31 
2.1 The EU approach to national regulatory autonomy and the free movement of goods 
2.1.a The proportionality test 
2.2 National regulatory autonomy and the GATT 
2.2.a Justifying a breach 
2.3 Balancing national regulatory autonomy and trade liberalisation 
2.4 Final considerations 
 
Section III – Mutual Recognition Agreements………………………………………41 
3.1 Defining mutual recognition as a way out from the “liberalization-domestic 
regulation” dichotomy and an alternative to litigation 
3.2 Relevant WTO rules 
3.2.a In the SPS Agreement 
3.2.b In the TBT Agreement 
3.2.c Preliminary observations concerning the SPS and TBT discipline on mutual 
recognition 
3.3 The evolving EU’s approach to harmonization and mutual recognition 
3.4 Mutual Recognition Agreements 
3.4.a The relation between mutual recognition activities and general GATT principles 
 6 
3.5 Overview of EU’s Mutual Recognition Agreements 
3.5.a Extent of mutual recognition 
3.5.b Basic structure and sectoral coverage 
3.6 The EU-US Mutual Recognition Agreement  
 
Concluding remarks…………………………………………………………………72 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II - The European Union as respondent in SPS and TBT related 
disputes: five trade wars on domestic regulatory autonomy……………………….75 
 
Section I – Measures Affecting Livestocks, Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones)…………………………………………………………………………….75 
1.1 Introduction to the dispute 
1.2 Article 2.2 SPS: the appropriate level of protection and the definition of sufficient 
scientific evidence 
1.3 Claims under articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement: the assessment of the risk  
 
Section II - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-containing 
Product………………………………………………………………………………...81 
2.1 Introduction to the dispute: the contested French ban 
2.2 Main claims by the parties 
2.3 The EC defence on TBT-related claims 
2.3.a Non applicability of the TBT agreement to general prohibitions such as the one 
contained in the Decree 
2.3.b Article 2.1 TBT as a specific application of articles I and III GATT 
2.3.c Contentions under article 2.2 TBT 
2.3.d Contentions under article 2.4 TBT 
2.3.e Contentions under article 2.8 TBT 
 
Section III – Trade Description of Sardines…………………………........................95 
3.1 Introduction to the dispute: EC Regulation 2136/98 and Codex Stan 94 
3.2 Main claims by the parties 
3.3 The EC defence on TBT-related claims 
3.3.a Allocation of the burden of proof 
3.3.b Whether the EC Regulation is a technical regulation 
3.3.c Application of the TBT Agreement to measures adopted before 1 January 1995 
3.3.d Article 2.4 of the TBT agreement 
3.3.e Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement 
 7 
 
Section IV – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuff…………………………………….................110 
4.1 The contested 1992 EC Regulation on geographical indications and the parties' 
allegations 
4.2 The EC defence on TBT-related claims 
4.2.a The denial of the technical nature of Regulation 2081/92 
4.2.b The compatibility of article 12(2) of Regulation 2081/92 with article 2.1 TBT 
4.2.c The compatibility of articles 4, 10, and 12(1) of Regulation 2081/92 with article 
2.2 TBT 
 
Section V – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
(GMOs)………………………………………………………………………………119 
5.1 The contested EC regime for approval of biotech products and the Member States’ 
safeguard measures restricting the marketing of biotech products 
5.2 The EC defence on SPS and TBT-related claims 
5.2.a Preliminary and horizontal issues 
5.2.b The product-specific delays 
5.2.c The general suspension (moratorium) 
5.2.d The EC member State safeguard measures 
5.2.e Article XX of the GATT 1994 
 
Concluding remarks…………………………………………………………………132 
 
 
CHAPTER III - Effects of multilateral trade rules and DSB decisions within the 
EU legal order and the Union’s liability for breach of WTO law………………...133 
 
Section I - ECJ case-law denying direct effect to GATT 1947 and to WTO 
Agreements………………………………………………………………………...…135 
1.1 Issues of ECJ jurisdiction 
1.1.a Overview 
1.1.b The ECJ jurisdiction in relation to WTO law 
1.1.c The mandate of article 19 TEU and WTO obligations 
1.2 Direct effect of international agreements under EU law 
1.3 Effects of multilateral trade rules in the EU legal order  
1.3.a The “rule”: the ECJ case-law denying direct effect to GATT 1947 
1.3.b The confirmation of the ECJ’s GATT 1947 case-law after the entry into force of 
the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation 
1.3.c WTO rules and judicial review of EU law 
 8 
1.3.d The exceptions to the denial of direct effect 
1.3.e Towards further elaboration? 
 
Section II - Legal status and effects of decisions adopted by international 
organisations and bodies in the EU legal order……………………………………168 
 
Section III – Legal nature of WTO adopted Panels and Appellate Body 
reports………………………………………………………………………………...170 
3.1 Judicial nature of WTO Panels and Appellate Body 
3.2 The absence of direct effect of DSB decisions 
3.3 The relevance of DSB decisions for the EU 
 
Section IV – DSB decisions and judicial review of EU law………………………..177 
4.1 The doctrine of limited judicial enforceability of WTO law as applied to DSB 
decisions: the Van Parys case-law 
 
Section V – DSB decisions and actions for damages……………………………….180 
5.1 DSB decisions and the EU courts’ case-law: the Biret cases and their precedents5.2 
The Chiquita Brands International case 
5.3 EU non-contractual liability for lawful acts 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS………………185 
 
1 - A EU strategy towards SPS and TBT disputes?.................................................185 
 
2 - The CCP in the broader framework of the Union’s external action…………188 
2.1 CCP principles and objectives under the Community Treaty  
2.1.1 The uniformity principle  
2.1.2 The objective of liberalising trade and non-trade aims 
2.2 CCP principles and objectives under the reformed EU Treaty 
2.2.1 Uniformity principle 
2.2.2 The reformed objective of liberalisation 
2.2.3 The CCP under a common constitutional framework of EU external relations   
2.2.4 Legal consequences 
 
3 - Commercial disputes and fundamental rights: a real constraint?....................198 
 
4 - The impact of the External Relations institutional reform on the strategic 
management of commercial disputes and the need for coordination…………….203 
 9 
4.1 The HR/VP, the EEAS and the need for coordination 
4.2 The European Parliament 
4.3 The Court of Justice 
 
5 - Concluding remarks……………………………………………………………...210 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………211 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 11 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of the present research is to enquiry as to the position of the European 
Union vis-à-vis trade disputes concerning non-tariff barriers to trade within the World 
Trade Organisation. Non-tariff barriers are generally construed as obstacles which 
produce their trade-restrictive effects beyond borders and customs and, more precisely, 
when the product is marketed into the importing country. Against this background, the 
research aims at exploring the hypothesis of the existence of a EU strategy on trade 
disputes falling within the scope of the relevant WTO agreements on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). 
The concept of strategy refers to the adoption of measures aiming to continue one or 
more predefined objectives. The demonstration of a relation between instruments and 
objectives allows to assert the existence of a Union’s strategy in facing disputes in the 
SPS and TBT domains. 
The notion of strategy implies the need to structure the research plan along its 
constitutive lines. The first part of the research aims to identify the objectives of the 
strategy, while the second part puts forth an understanding of the means chosen to 
implement such strategy and put them in relation with the above-identified objectives. 
The resulting structure shows the existence of an EU strategy on SPS and TBT disputes 
and defines the latter’s content. 
The first part of the research deals therefore with the objectives of the EU. In this 
context, the challenge represented by the defense of the EU’s regulatory autonomy is 
crucial. In relation to that, the research deals with the practice of the Union to prevent 
the rise of disputes through the conclusion of bilateral Mutual Recognition Agreements 
(MRA). The analysis of five disputes concerning violations, alleged or established, of 
SPS and TBT provisions represents the core of research. 
The second part aims at identifying the means by which the EU’s strategy is concretely 
implemented. This is done through the analysis of the status of WTO rules within the 
Union legal order, including the issue effects of the decisions of the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) and of the EU responsibility for breach of WTO law. 
The present research raises scientific interest under many profiles. First, the scholarship 
lacks a systematic study linking, on one side, the Union's position in the disputes within 
the WTO, namely the interpretation of multilateral trade agreements and in particular of 
SPS and TBT provisions that the EU puts forward during a dispute and, on the other, 
the internal dimension that WTO dispute settlement implies, namely the issue of the 
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effects which the reports issued by Panels or the Appellate Body produce within the EU 
legal order after adoption by the DSB. Irrespectively of whether or not the said relation 
allows to affirm the existence of an EU strategy on trade disputes on SPS and TBT 
provision, this study aims to fill in the existing gap. Second, the analysis of the 
objectives of the strategy, namely the defense of the EU regulatory power, and the 
means used for this purpose, including the ECJ case-law regarding the effects of WTO 
law largo sensu, led to further reflections about the openness of the Union’s legal order 
vis-à-vis one of the legal system potentially more invasive of the Union’s autonomy, 
namely the one established by the WTO agreements. Finally, the analysis of the Union’s 
strategy might be considered necessary in the light of consequences regarding the legal 
position of individuals through the balance - or imbalance - that the strategy implies 
between the EU and fundamental rights recognized in the Union’s legal order. In this 
regard, the issue of EU responsibility for breach of WTO becomes relevant. 
Details on the methodology are needed due before broach the subject. First, it is worth 
noting that the choice to analyse SPS and TBT disputes is justified in light of the 
interest raised by the concept of EU regulatory independence. Second, the analysis in 
Chapter II is confined to disputes, on the one hand, concerning the Union as such and 
not individual member states and, on the other, making the object of a decision by the 
DSB. This criterion has brought five disputes under the spotlight, namely the ones that 
have concerned hormones, asbestos, sardines, geographical indications and GMOs. The 
circumstance whereby disputes analysed saw the European Community as a party, what 
makes the use of a pre-Lisbon Treaty jargon necessary, this does not preclude that the 
conclusions of the present research also apply to the Union as the Community’s 
successor within the meaning of public international law. 
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Section I - National regulatory autonomy as a counterbalance to the liberalisation 
and integration of marketplaces 
 
1.1 Defining the issue of regulatory autonomy 
 
Leading to closer interdependence during the last decades, recent economic dynamics 
have also caused policies and regulations once thought of as domestic to become subject 
to international trade negotiations and rules. One of the very reasons for the creation of 
the WTO was to extend the domain of trade rules behind the border with a view to 
ensure that internal regulations, such as health and safety rules, would not become a 
substitute for tariffs and quotas. Particularly after the conclusion of the Agreements on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
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as an integral part of the multilateral regime on trade in goods, the remit of the trade 
agreements extended beyond trade itself and is currently touching on the core areas of 
states’ regulatory sovereignty. 
There is in fact an inevitable trade-off between national regulatory autonomy and 
market opening, left alone market integration: the stricter the discipline on ‘barriers to 
trade’1, the greater the danger that perfectly reasonable measures are caught by rules 
meant to counter disguised protectionist purposes2. The interface between trade and 
domestic policy is therefore necessarily controversial since it results in the imperative to 
balance sovereignty and liberalisation. 
WTO non-discrimination-related principles can be applied to domestic regulations in 
order to minimize their impact on trade in goods. The basic GATT most-favoured-
nation (MFN) principle applies not only to custom duties but also to domestic rules3. 
                                                
1 For the purpose of the present analysis, the term ‘barrier to trade’ will be preferred to ‘trade barriers’. 
The reason lied in that, as it is known, barriers to commercial exchanges can be devised, not only as 
properly commercial measures, but also as non-commercial (non-trade) ones. 
2 Holmes, P., Young, A.R., “European lessons for multilateral economic integration: a cautionary tale”, in 
Drabek, Z. (ed.), Globalisation under Threat: The Stability of Trade Policy and International 
Agreements, Chelternham, Edward Elgar, p. 203-226. See also Holmes, P., “Trade and domestic policies: 
the European mix”, in Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 13, n. 6, September 2006, p. 815-831, p. 
816. 
3 GATT article I extends the scope of the MFN principle ‘to all rules and formalities in connection with 
importation and exportation, and […] to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of article III’. The 
object and purpose of GATT article I has been cleared up in Canada — Autos. In support of its 
interpretation of provisions contained therein, the Appellate Body maintained that: “Th[e] object and 
purpose [of article I] is to prohibit discrimination among like products originating in or destined for 
different countries. The prohibition of discrimination in aicle I:1 also serves as an incentive for 
concessions, negotiated reciprocally, to be extended to all other Members on an MFN basis.”; see 
Appellate Body Report on Canada — Autos, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, 31 May 2000, para. 
84. 
As far as the scope of application of art. I is concerned, still in Canada — Autos, the AB reviewed the 
Panel’s finding that the Canadian import duty exemptions granted to motor vehicles originating in certain 
countries were inconsistent with art. I:1. The Appellate Body found the prohibition of discrimination 
under the latter provision to include both de jure and de facto discrimination, by stating that “In 
approaching this question, we observe first that the words of article I:1 do not restrict its scope only to 
cases in which the failure to accord an ‘advantage’ to like products of all other Members appears on the 
face of the measure, or can be demonstrated on the basis of the words of the measure. Neither the words 
‘de jure’ nor ‘de facto’ appear in article I:1. Nevertheless, we observe that article I:1 does not cover only 
‘in law’, or de jure, discrimination. As several GATT panel reports confirmed, article I:1 covers also ‘in 
fact’, or de facto, discrimination. […] Like the Panel, we cannot accept Canada’s argument that article I:1 
does not apply to measures which, on their face, are ‘originneutral’.”; see Canada — Autos, above, para. 
78. Moreover, in EC — Bananas III, in support of the proposition that GATS article II prohibits de facto 
discrimination as well as de jure discrimination, the Appellate Body noted that, in past practice, GATT 
article I applied to de facto discrimination. This case concerned the European Communities appeal 
against the Panel’s finding on the GATT compatibility of the EC bananas import regime. The appeal was 
grounded, inter alia, on the consideration that the Panel erred in concluding that the European 
Communities violated article I:1 by maintaining the so-called activity function rules. Under these rules, 
importers of bananas from certain countries qualified for allocation of the tariff quota only if they 
fulfilled requirements which differed from those imposed on importers of bananas from other countries. 
The Appellate Body stated that “[…] the Panel found that the procedural and administrative requirements 
of the activity function rules for importing third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas differ from, 
and go significantly beyond, those required for importing traditional ACP bananas. This is a factual 
finding. Also, a broad definition has been given to the term ‘advantage’ in article I:1 of the GATT 1994 
by the panel in United States — Non-Rubber Footwear. It may well be that there are considerations of EC 
competition policy at the basis of the activity function rules. This, however, does not legitimize the 
CHAPTER I – THE EUROPEAN QUEST FOR REGULATORY AUTONOMY 
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Applied at the border, the MFN rule allows a WTO member to implement any rule it 
wishes but requires that, while the content of domestic regulation may discriminate 
against foreigners, it must treat the latter all in the same fashion, in other words 
domestic provisions must apply to all foreigners indistinctly. On the other hand, 
national treatment (NT) requires that, however different national rules and regulations 
may be from those of the trading partners, they cannot be applied so as to discriminate 
between domestic and foreign suppliers with a view to affording shelter to national 
producers vis-à-vis international competitors. Of course, the threat of discriminations is 
not altogether defused by the NT principle to the extent that, while prohibiting de iure 
(facial) discriminations, such rule cannot counter de facto (non-facial) differential 
treatments. However, if the principle is intende to as to ban any regulatory difference 
that in practice makes sales harder for foreigners, it risks becoming potentially intrusive 
of national sovereignty4. This puts the above mentioned trade-off back into the 
spotlight. 
The evolution of the EU was based on different premises in that obstacles to trade are 
not simply confined to traditional border barriers, such as tariffs or quotas. The 
founding Treaty recognise the need for harmonisation of national rules where regulatory 
differences could hinder trade5. Therefore, for several decades, a major driving force of 
the EU has been the attempt to minimize, via a rich legislative activity, the extent to 
which domestic regulations could be used as a way to hamper the establishment of the 
internal market6. Nevertheless, progress in this direction was and remains slow when 
the domestic regulations in question are politically sensitive. Moreover, in case of 
legislative stalemates, the ECJ tended to step in. 
The political difficulties of securing agreement, especially under the unanimity 
requirement, led to the development of the mutual recognition principle7. The difficulty 
with mutual recognition is that, unless full confidence in all partners’ regulatory 
regimens is granted, it can lead to worries about loss of control over what is sold on the 
domestic market. An obvious compromise is the new approach of harmonised 
minimum standards8 and mutual recognition of different rules that conform to these 
                                                                                                                                          
activity function rules to the extent that these rules discriminate among like products originating from 
different Members. For these reasons, we agree with the Panel that the activity function rules are an 
‘advantage’granted to bananas imported from traditional ACP States, and not to bananas imported from 
other Members, within the meaning of article I:1. Therefore, we uphold the Panel’s finding that the 
activity function rules are inconsistent with article I:1 of the GATT 1994.”; see Appellate Body Report on 
EC — Bananas III, WT/DS27/AB/R, 25 September 1997, para. 206. 
4 Holmes, P., op. cit., p. 817. 
5 See articles 26(1) and 114(1) TFEU. 
6 Examples of harmonisation are the ‘old approach cars’ and the ‘euro-sausages’ Directives. 
7 ECJ, Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (‘Cassis de Dijon’), 
judgment of 20 February 1979, [1979] ECR 00649, para 14. The Court thereby states that the sale on the 
German market of a spirit originating from France could not be subject to a legal prohibition on the 
marketing of beverages with an alcohol content lower than the limit set by the national rules. The ECJ 
considered that, since the product at stake had been lawfully produced and marketed in one of the 
Member States (France) and being there no other valid reasons to justify the German trade-restricting 
measure, the product itself had to be allowed into any other Member State, including Germany. 
8 Set out in the Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a new approach to technical harmonisation and 
standards (OJ C 136, 4.6.1985, p. 1), the EU new approach consists in the agreement on minimum 
requirements plus reference to standards. For a comprehensive analysis of the new approach, see further 
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benchmarks. Nonetheless, even agreement on minimum standards can be hard to 
achieve where regulatory approaches are fundamentally different9. 
More recently the pendulum has therefore swung a little in the direction of hesitation 
towards deregulation both within the EU and externally. From the internal point of 
view, it is so because more sensitive areas of national sovereignty are involved as a 
result of the increased degree of sensitiveness of national regulations under “attack”, 
which depends in turn on the progressive EU enlargement and consequent 
diversification. The EU has therefore started to question the balance between national 
regulatory sovereignty and the goal of trade liberalisation within the single market. 
Consistently with such developments, the ECJ also seems to show greater awareness of 
national sensitivities. 
Externally, the core difference between the EU and the GATT 1947 was that, whilst the 
latter stressed non-discrimination as the core principle, the EU went further in treating 
any regulatory difference, even if non-discriminatory, as potential obstacles to trade. 
Within the European single market even indistinctly applicable measures came to be 
considered harmful to intra-Community trade when analysed according to an obstacle-
oriented approach. However, the Uruguay Round agreements and the way the DSB has 
interpreted rules contained therein have pushes the WTO closer to the EU approach. 
This has come about through the introduction of certain specific obligations, notably in 
the SPS and TBT Agreements. Although not going as far as to require harmonisation, 
these Agreements have contributed to moving the GATT philosophy from negative 
integration to WTO more positive integration, while at the same leaving basically 
untouched the old rule-making process. 
Although the EU single market philosophy has been advocated as a model for the global 
trading system10, the transferral of its evolving trends to the WTO is not to be seen 
without side-effect, particularly insofar as, just as it was the case for the obstacle-
oriented approach to the creation of the EU single market, also the multilateral trade 
regime runs into the ambiguity that even most sensitive barriers to trade have both 
protections and protective aspects. 
If the failure of the EU to secure agreement in the WTO to even start negotiations on all 
but one of the so-called “Singapore issues”11 reveals the limits of projecting the EU’s 
                                                                                                                                          
in this Chapter, section III. An example is the Council Directive 88/378/EEC of 3 May 1988 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning the safety of toys (OJ L 187, 16.7.1988, p. 
1), which set out only the essential safety requirements with regard to toys as adopted by the European 
Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation 
(Cenelec) in accordance with Directive 98/34/EC of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the 
provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations (OJ L 204, 21.7.1998, p. 37). 
Conformity with harmonised standards so set provided a presumption of conformity with the 
requirements of Directive 88/378/EEC. Although by July 2013 Directive 88/378/EEC will be entirely 
repealed by DIRECTIVE 2009/48/EC of 29 June 2009, its above basic principles will be maintained 
nonetheless. 
9 Holmes, P., ibid. 
10 See in this sense Evans, D., Holmes, P., Rollo, J., Young, A.R., Zahariadis, Y., Global norms creation 
and norms competition, Report for DG Trade, Brussels: European Commission, 2001; Nicolaïdis, K., 
Mutual recognition of regulatory regimes: some lessons and prospects, Jean Monnet Working Paper, 
1997/07. 
11 Named after the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference during which they have been inscribed into the 
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own visions of the link between internal and external policies outside its borders, the 
global trading system has nonetheless at least recognised that domestic regulation can 
affect trade. Whilst it has made rules to address the issue, it remains debatable whether 
these rules are complete and precise. Standing the almost absence of legislative action 
within the WTO, it has been left to the intervention of the DSB to fill the gaps. 
However, from the legitimacy viewpoint, the WTO as a whole, including the DSB, 
lacks the legitimacy to fill the blanks in the same way the ECJ did. This is the reason 
why leaving it to judges has not depoliticised the issue of the balance between 
regulatory autonomy and trade liberalisation. Nonetheless, by telling WTO members 
what they cannot do, the DSB has in practice begun to create case-law to the extent that 
the indication of prohibitions sometimes narrows down the range of options of what is 
lawful. 
 
1.2 The distinction between market access and domestic regulation under 
GATT 1994 
 
Unlike more integrated trade liberalisation schemes such as the EU or the US, the 
degree of flexibility of trade liberalization under the GATT depends on how measures 
operating market interventions are classified. In this respect, the most relevant 
distinction is the one between governmental interventions labelled as “market access 
restrictions” and those defined as “domestic regulation”. To construe trade-related 
policies as market access restrictions, whilst they are in fact domestic regulations, has 
major legal consequences in so far as the GATT provides for different applicable 
disciplines. 
Taking the form of quota or tariffs higher than those foreseen in the relevant schedules 
of concessions, market assess restrictions are in principle prohibited by the GATT 
regime. In contrast, domestic regulation, such as internal taxes, health standards and 
safety requirements, is treated with more deference. They are subject to broad 
regulatory autonomy and result in a violation of GATT norms only when they entail 
discrimination against imports or when they are deemed to be more trade restrictive 
than necessary. Depending solely on how a government measure is categorized, the 
measure at stake may be therefore permitted or prohibited under GATT law. 
Notwithstanding these major legal consequences, the distinction between the two 
categories of measures remains largely blurred12. The crux of the issue lies precisely in 
                                                                                                                                          
world trade agenda with the consequent establishment of new working groups, the so-called “Singapore 
issues” include four subjects: trade and investment, competition policy, transparency in government 
procurement and trade facilitation, namely the simplification of trade procedures. 
12 Pauwelyn, J., “Rien ne Va Plus? Distinguishing domestic regulation from market access in GATT and 
GATS”, in World Trade Review, vol. 4, n. 2, 2005, p. 131-170, p. 132-133. The author also highlights the 
consequences of such distinction for negotiations, particularly in relation to trade in services. If the scope 
of market access restrictions is defined too broadly, as Pauwelyn maintains it as been the case in US-
Gambling (US-Measures affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
WT/DS285/AB/R, 7 April 2005), scores of domestic regulations would already be prohibited and the 
ongoing negotiations would lose much of their purpose. Although trade in services is not encompassed in 
the scope of the present work, it is nonetheless worth noting that similar consequences might equally 
affect negotiations relating to trade in goods. 
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the criteria to operate the distinction between these two sets of measures. The 
importance of a correct classification of trade policy instruments under GATT law lies 
in the wide spectrum of market interventions, ranging from health to national security, 
whose WTO-compatibility depends precisely on such distinction. Misinterpreting and 
misapplying such distinction entails the risk that GATT violations are established where 
the drafters of the Agreement intended to endow members of broad regulatory 
autonomy. In this respect, some have observed that a domestic regulation should not be 
regarded as a market access restriction simply because it has the effect of banning 
certain imports13, on the ground that to do otherwise risks seriously to undermine the 
regulatory autonomy of WTO members beyond the intentions of the drafters of the 
Agreements14. 
 
1.2.a Measures restricting market access versus domestic regulations under the GATT 
 
Under the GATT the crucial dividing line amongst policy instruments that have trade-
restrictive potential is between, on the one hand, measures imposed at the border or 
upon importation and, on the other, measures affecting imports only after they have 
cleared customs. The first – usually referred to as “border measures” or “market access 
restrictions” – are covered by GATT articles II and XI, addressing respectively custom 
duties and other duties or charges imposed on or in connection with importation15 and 
quantitative import prohibitions or restrictions16. The second – commonly referred to as 
“behind the border measures” or “domestic regulation” – are dealt with in article III 
addressing internal taxation (such as VAT or sale taxes) and other internal regulations 
(such as safety requirements or sales regulations)17. 
When a measure is found to be a border measure subject to art. XI, it is prima facie 
prohibited whereas, when it is qualified as a domestic regulation under art. III, it can 
                                                
13 This coincides with the ECJ obstacle-oriented approach in the context of the single market. 
14 Pauwelyn, J., op. cit., p. 133. 
15 GATT art. II:1(b) provides that “The […] products of territories of other contracting parties, shall […] 
be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein. Such products 
shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with the 
importation […]”. Such exemptions apply to product-lines that are enlisted, and under the conditions 
specified, in the country-specific schedules of concessions, which are disciplined by GATT art. II:1(a). 
16 GATT art. XI:1 provides that “No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, 
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or 
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other 
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any 
other contracting party”. 
17 GATT art. III:1 and 2 respectively state that “1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes 
and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for 
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations 
requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be 
applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production. […] 4. The 
products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party 
shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in 
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of 
differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the 
means of transport and not on the nationality of the product”. 
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only be found afoul of GATT rules when it is discriminatory18. By this distinction 
GATT parties meant to spare their sovereign prerogative to autonomously set domestic 
regulation, on the sole condition that such regulation does not favour domestic products 
over imports. Besides, as it is know, violations of both  XI and III can be justified under 
specific GATT exceptions. Significantly tough, the list of exceptions available under 
art. XI is longer than the one under art. III. The former include in fact not only general 
and security exceptions, respectively under art. XX and XXI, but also those enlisted in 
XI:2, those related to the safeguard of the balance of payments under art. XII and 
exceptions referring to discriminatory and non-discriminatory quotas under artt. XIII-
XIV. In this respect, it has been maintained that to construe a measure as an art. XI 
restriction not only benefits the complainant insofar as the more sovereignty-deferent 
art. III does not apply. It also offers more leeway for the party enacting the measure in 
that, although an art. XI measure is prima facie prohibited, the list of potential 
justification which are applicable is broader19. 
The distinction operated within the GATT between art. XI and art. III measures is 
grounded on both economic and political considerations. In economic terms, border or 
market access measures by definition only apply to imports and can therefore be 
presumed to be imposed for protectionist purposes. The economic wastefulness of 
protectionist measures20 is a strong incentive to prohibit them, as in the case of 
quantitative restrictions such as quotas, or at least to gradually reduce them, as it is the 
case for tariff barriers which, according to art. II, are subject to progressive reduction 
according to the relevant schedules of concessions. On the other hand, domestic 
regulations most often serve legitimate, non-protectionist purposes, such as consumer 
protection, safety or health. As a result, in the midst of the GATT drafting it appeared 
convenient to foresee the overruling of such measures only when they are proven to be 
protectionist, notably when they discriminate against imports by imposing so-called 
deadweight costs on foreign firms that are not equally imposed on domestic firms21. 
As for the political reasons, whilst most border measures serve purely economic 
interests, in particular the protection of national industries, much domestic regulations 
go to the social and political core of a country’s sovereignty, addressing sensitive areas 
such as health and consumer protection, environmental concerns and income 
redistribution through taxation. Consequently, WTO members felt more at ease 
committing to the elimination or reduction of tariffs and quantitative import restrictions 
than tying their hands in the politically more sensitive field of domestic regulation. As 
market access restrictions can be seen as pure trade measures, they fall squarely within 
the mandate of the GATT remit. The WTO, in turn, has little to say about how nations 
assess domestic market failure as long as they do so in a non-discriminatory fashion22. 
                                                
18 Discrimination is the final implication of affording protection to domestic products, as of art. III:1. 
19 Pauwelyn, op. cit., p. 134. 
20 International economic theory shows that protectionism is harmful to both foreign producers, which are 
prevented from selling on stranger market, and domestic consumers, whose option range both in terms of 
products’ features and prices is narrowed to domestically manufactured products. 
21 Pauwelyn, op. cit., p. 134-135. 
22 Ibid. 
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Only with the conclusion of the 1994 WTO Agreements on SPS and TBT did the 
multilateral trade discipline on domestic regulation move beyond the non-discrimination 
rule, going even further than the EU discipline on de facto discrimination . Under the 
SPS and TBT Agreements, even a measure that is not discriminatory, that is a measure 
that treats imports and domestic products alike both de iure and de facto, can still be 
found WTO-incompatible if it is, for example, not based on a risk assessment23 or if it is 
more trade-restrictive than necessary to protect human health24 or to fulfil any other 
legitimate, non-protectionist objective25. However, as GATT continues to apply in 
tandem with SPS and TBT Agreements and enjoys a broader scope than the latter, the 
distinction between market access and domestic regulation remains crucial26. 
 
1.2.b Comparison with the EU Treaty and the US Dormant Commerce Clause 
 
The GATT distinction between market access and domestic regulation stands in sharp 
contrast to the more uniform liberalization of trade in farther integrated regimes such as 
the EU and the United States. 
The TFEU does not have a separate provision dealing with domestic regulation which is 
be comparable to GATT art. III:4. In contrast to GATT art. II, which only prohibits 
tariffs that exceed a country’s bindings, the TFEU bans customs duties and “all changes 
having equivalent effect” altogether27 so that clearing customs at the EU external border 
means that imported manufactures are put into free circulation without, in principle, any 
further formality to be carried out within the territory of the importing Member State. 
The Treaty also prohibits the discrimination of imports, both direct and indirect, through 
internal taxation28. However, it lumps together the distinction made in the GATT 
between quantitative import restrictions (art. XI) and domestic regulations affecting 
trade (art. III). It does so through the formula of art. 34 TFEU that prohibits 
“quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect”. The 
latter notion has been broadly interpreted and the ECJ crystalized such interpretation  
into a formula including “all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable 
of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade”29. 
The Dassonville formula therefore came to include also trade-restricting domestic 
regulation into the prohibition laid down in art. 34 TFEU. 
                                                
23 Article 5.1 SPS. 
24 Article 5.6 SPS. 
25 Article 2.2 TBT. 
26 Pauwelyn, J., “Cross-agreement complaints before the Appellate Body: a case study of the EC–
Asbestos dispute”, in World Trade Review, vol. 1, n. 1, 2002, p. 63–87, p. 63. 
27 Art. 34 TFEU, under which “Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent 
effect shall be prohibited between Member States.” 
28 Art. 110 TFEU states that “No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of 
other Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on 
similar domestic products. Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on the products of other Member 
States any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other products”. 
29 ECJ, Case 8-74, Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville, judgment of 11 July 1974, [1974] 
ECR 00837, pnt. 5. 
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Similarly, the so-called ‘Dormant Commerce Clause’ in the US Constitution30 can, in 
principle, cover all state measures that hamper the flow of interstate commerce, whether 
they take the form of border measures or internal regulation. If the measure facially 
discriminates against interstate commerce, it is deemed ‘virtually per se invalid’31. 
However, even when there is no facial discrimination, the measure can be struck down 
if the burden imposed on inter-state commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefit32. 
The reason why the EU and US internal market laws do not give much weight to the 
difference between market access and domestic regulations lies in that these are much 
more integrated systems than the WTO. In those contexts, the remit to strike down 
domestic regulation based on its trade effect is less controversial precisely because, 
contrary to the WTO, both the EU and the US founding norms include the 
harmonization of domestic regulation amongst the tasks they are entrusted with. 
 
1.3 Interaction between GATT market access and domestic regulation 
disciplines 
 
Since the qualification of a measure as either a market access restriction or a domestic 
regulation can determine its consistency with WTO rules, it is of utmost importance to 
circumscribe the scope of the two relevant sets of GATT provisions. Whereas there is 
no doubt that certain measures belong to one or the other of the two above categories33, 
for a considerable number of trade instruments classification difficulties do arise34. 
In order to overcome such difficulties, issues of interaction between GATT articles XI 
and III are to be analysed. 
 
                                                
30 US Constitution article I, § 8, clause 3, which expressly grants the Congress the power to regulate 
commerce among the several states. 
31 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 511 US 93, 99 (1994), as reported by 
Pauwelyn, J., “Rien ne Va Plus?”, op. cit., p. 140. 
32 Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 US at 142. Because of their broad coverage – including market access 
restrictions and domestic regulation, discriminatory and non-discriminatory measures – the exceptions 
available under EU and US law to justify facially prima facie measures are much broader than those in 
the exhaustive lists of GATT articles XX and XXI. In the EU, measures that are not discriminatory do not 
violate art. 30 TFEU if they are necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements, essentially any 
legitimate policy objective, under the sole condition of proportionality. Case law under the US Dormant 
Clause refers to any legitimate local public interest. The additional disciplines for domestic regulation 
under the TBT Agreement have an equally open list of justifiable policy objectives (TBT article 2.2). 
Crucially, however, if WTO panels were to male domestic regulation subject to the per se prohibition of 
quantitative restriction in GATT article XI, the limited list of justifiable policy objectives would be vastly 
inappropriate, much more so than it currently is. Moreover, unlike the ECJ or the US Supreme Court, the 
WTO Appellate Body would find particularly hard to widen the list of article XX exceptions though case-
law without legislative input from WTO members themselves. This makes the scope of available 
exceptions another important factor to consider before blurring the line between market access and 
domestic regulation. 
33 As it is the case for custom duties or value-added tax on sold goods, of which specific mention is made 
respectively in GATT art. II and III:2. 
34 It is worth noting that, to further complicate the picture, one and the same measure may fall under both 
GATT and GATS and be classified differently under each of those Agreements. See in this regard, 
Pauwelyn, J., Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 399-
405. 
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1.3.a Domestic regulation that applies to both domestic and imported products is 
subject to GATT article III 
 
The relationship between GATT articles XI and III is partially clarified by the Ad Note 
to the latter provision, under which: 
‘Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or requirement of the 
kind referred to in paragraph 1 which applies to an imported product and to the like 
domestic product and is collected or enforced in the case of the imported product at the 
time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or other 
internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1, 
and is accordingly subject to the provisions of Article III.’35 
The Note clarifies that even a trade restrictive measure that is applied at the time or 
point of importation and which could therefore be classified as a border measure subject 
to art. XI, must nonetheless be analysed as a domestic regulation under art. III whenever 
the measure is designed to be applied to both imports and like domestic products. This 
means that, for measures applied to both imports and domestic manufactures36, art. III is 
granted preference over art. XI. 
The rationale is that the objectives behind domestic regulation apply to all products put 
on the market, be they domestically produced or imported. The sole fact that, in relation 
to imports, the regulation in enforced when the manufacture crosses the border, which is 
the only or most efficient time to do so, should not transform the domestic regulation as 
it applied to imports into a border measure that under art. XI is, in principle, banned. 
Otherwise, all domestic regulations, when applied at the border, risk being transformed 
into prohibited market access restrictions, irrespectively of whether they do or do not 
pursue protectionist purposes. 
In other words, the mere fact that a qualitative measure also has the effect of restricting 
the quantity of imports does not make that measure a quantitative import restriction. If 
the measure at stake is to be applied indistinctly, it would rather be subject to art. III 
GATT and, consequently, it can be found in breach of the latter provision only if 
applied so as to afford protection to domestic production. Because of the Ad Note to art. 
III, the prohibition of art. XI only prevents quantitative restrictions which are solely 
imposed on imports. Allowing for a broader application of such prohibition, including 
to domestic regulations on the sole ground that they have the effect of restricting 
imports, would be out of kilter with the presumption in favour of the regulatory 
autonomy of the members contained in art. III GATT and would deprive the latter of its 
effet utile37. 
 
1.3.b Mutually exclusive scope of articles III and XI 
 
                                                
35 Text of Ad Note to GATT article III, emphasis is added. 
36 In the ECJ’s jargon these would be indistinctly applicable measures. 
37 Pauwelyn, J., “Rien ne Va Plus?”, op. cit., p. 143-144. 
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Although the Ad Note does not explicitly state so, it not only gives way to the 
application of art. III to measures in relation to which art. XI could be deemed relevant 
in the first place38. Pauwelyn asserts that, by implication, it must be read as also doing 
so at the exclusion of art. XI39. In other words, when the Ad Note applies to the benefit 
of art. III application, the measure at issue cannot be at the same time also subject to art. 
XI. In this sense, the scope of application of articles III and XI does not overlap. Quite 
to the contrary, at least to this extent, it is mutually exclusive in favour of art. III40.  
When a trade-related instrument can be qualified as a domestic regulation in the sense 
of art. III and is non-discriminatory both de jure and de facto, to find that it violates art. 
XI simply because it has the effect of restricting imports (albeit as much as domestic 
products) would indeed nullify the basic distinction made in GATT between border 
measures, which are strictly regulated, and domestic regulation, where broad regulatory 
autonomy was reserved to WTO members. 
 
1.4 Abating tariff barriers within the EU and WTO 
 
Non-tariff barriers to trade can disguise protectionist policies. Historically, this label 
was applied to manifestly discriminatory regulations, as for instance the 1980 Japanese 
ban on the imports of foreign skis, which was based on the alleged peculiarity of the 
Japanese snow. In recent years it has become clear that the biggest problems do not lie 
in the realm of blatantly protectionist measures but rather in measures having both 
legitimate and protectionist effects. Although not conceived with a view to restricting 
trade and thereby to protecting local producers at the expenses of consumers, such 
domestic measures may nonetheless adversely affect trade. These negative side-effects 
caused domestic regulation to be a concern whom the EU has been struggling against 
since the 1960s and the multilateral trade system has been addressing since 1995, 
namely with the entry into force of the SPS and TBT Agreements. 
Any product standard or regulation may be a barrier to trade if it is set in such a way as 
to be easier for local firms to comply with than for foreign ones. In order to avoid 
manifest breaches of the national treatment principle, it is common for governments to 
avoid explicit discrimination by adopting rules that are in practice easier for domestic 
firms to comply with. The art of non-tariff protectionism lies in setting regulations that 
are not de jure discriminatory but which nevertheless make it harder for foreign 
                                                
38 On the ground that the measure itself is enforced at the time or point of importation. 
39 Pauwelyn, J., “Rien ne Va Plus?”, op. cit., p. 145 and 168. 
40 This reading of the interaction between the two GATT provisions would apply irrespectively of 
whether the measure at stake relates to the physical characteristics of the product or its process or 
production method, as demonstrated by the GATT’s Council putting aside the Tuna-Dolphins reports 
(United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R, unadopted, 3 September 1991 and DS29/R, 
unadopted, 16 June 1994). In that case, the panels found that the Ad Note to article III, and hence article 
III itself, only applies to domestic measures that regulate the physical characteristics of the restricted 
product as such; in view of those panels, the Ad Note does not apply however to measures that regulate 
the way in which the product was processed or produced. In fact, the AB, in particular in its report on EC-
Asbestos, has made it clear that even regulations that distinguish between products based on factors other 
than physical characteristics can be justified under art. III (EC-Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, 12 March 
2001, para. 101). 
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substitutes to compete or even to access the alien market. Thus the crux of the issue lies 
in the definition of ‘likeness’ and in the exceptions to the non-discrimination rule. 
In order to ensure the effectiveness of a ban on discrimination, which can be described 
as the lowest degree of impingement on national regulatory autonomy, three things are 
required: first, a body that can decide what are like products and if they have been 
treated differently; second, a body that can judge whether there is a legitimate reason for 
such discrimination; third, a mechanism that can enforce its judgments. Before 1995, 
the GATT was very limited in its capacity to enforce anti-discrimination rules since the 
adoption of panel decisions was subject to the consensus rule and, in any case, there was 
no mechanism to ensure compliance. The GATT system had rules that impinged on 
national sovereignty, but it had no credible means of enforcing those rules41. 
Quite to the contrary, the Rome Treaty endowed the Community with more effective 
means to deal with technical barriers to trade in goods, in terms of both legislative 
harmonization and dispute adjudication42. Within the single market, the European 
Commission and the ECJ are able to assess the discriminatory character of Member 
States’ measures and to possibly impose a tougher test than discrimination as such. The 
distinction between technical standards, technical regulation and conformity assessment 
is crucial for understanding the EU assault on technical barriers to trade in goods in the 
making of the single market as well as, more generally, the issue of non-tariff barriers 
resulting from domestic regulations. 
Technical standards are in principle simply standardized technical specifications and are 
intended to facilitate business inasmuch as divergences in technical standards may 
require recognition procedures and therefore slow down commercial exchanges. In fact, 
since adherence to standardized technical specifications by producers is generally 
voluntary, standards only become a trade problem when they are associated with some 
form of binding compliance requirement in the form of regulations. Regulations may 
specify certain testing and certification procedures to prove conformity with the 
mandated standards, which might be costly. It is sometimes the case that even after 
agreement has been reached on standards, testing and certification procedures generate 
further negotiation problems43. 
In the EU, the original impetus for the link between domestic regulation and trade 
policy came via the issue of technical standards and regulation for trade in goods. 
Designed to cope with the traditional difficulties in harmonizing regulations, the EU 
‘new approach’ created a presumption that goods would be acceptable throughout the 
EU if they conformed to standards that incorporated politically agreed objectives44. This 
                                                
41 Holmes, P., “Trade and ‘domestic’ policies”, op. cit., p. 820. 
42 Such means include judicially developed EU law fundamental principles such as supremacy and direct 
effect, in addition to more single market-related ones. Moreover, at the decision-making end of the 
governance spectrum, by exercising its harmonisation powers, the Council has the capacity to fill the 
legal gap that may arise if national measures are struck down, and perhaps more importantly in cases 
where a national law is held valid in the absence of EU legislation, notwithstanding its non-sizeable 
negative potential upon the single market. 
43 Holmes, P., op. cit., p. 821. 
44 Pelkmans, J., Mutual Recognition in Goods and Services: An Economic Perspective, ENEPRI Working 
Paper n. 16, 2003. 
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lightened the burden on the executive/legislature and divided responsibility between the 
political and technical authorities. Reference to standards meant that technicalities did 
not have to be discussed in political fora and the European standards bodies did not 
have the task of drawing up technical specifications, also referred to as ‘harmonized 
standards’, while at the same time meeting the essential requirements of political 
directives.  
The WTO as an organization, however, could not possibly be a legislative or technical 
body that decided on either technical matters or on social values that should underlie the 
former. Hence the simple solution of broadly laying down principles which should 
govern the relationship between national rules and international standards within the 
WTO, as in the TBT and SPS Agreements. If products are made to standards emanating 
from recognized international standard bodies, there is a “rebuttable presumption”45 that 
such goods are suitable for sale in all WTO members. Furthermore, WTO members are 
requested to base their regulations on such standards, albeit with certain qualifications. 
Nonetheless, members of the WTO do enjoy some right – whose boundaries are still 
quite uncertain - to use different standards from those set by international standard 
bodies. 
However, WTO members are freer than EU Member States to choose independently 
what objectives they seek to achieve. In the EU, in those fields where no harmonisation 
has yet occurred, the ECJ has the sole authority to assess whether exceptional 
circumstances allow for departures from the EU single market discipline. The freedom 
of manoeuvre with regard to regulatory objectives embedded in WTO rules represents 
precisely the leeway used by the Union – just as by all other members - within the 
international trade regime. 
The TBT and SPS Agreements require that international standards must be used where 
possible. The SPS Agreement is somewhat more specific in stating that WTO members 
may have a different base for their regulations, if they have scientific evidence to show 
that a more restrictive standard or regulation can increase the level of food safety above 
that implied by international standards46. The TBT Agreement is less precise in stating 
                                                
45 Rebuttable presumptions of compatibility of domestic regulation with WTO law are embedded in TBT 
article 2.5, according to which “Whenever a technical regulation is prepared, adopted or applied for one 
of the legitimate objectives explicitly mentioned in paragraph 2 [such legitimate objectives are, inter alia: 
national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or 
safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment.], and is in accordance with relevant international 
standards, it shall be rebuttably presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade”. 
The same presumption is made by SPS article 3.2, which states that “Sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
which conform to international standards, guidelines or recommendations shall be deemed to be 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant 
provisions of this Agreement and of GATT 1994.” 
46 SPS article 3.3 allows “Members [to] introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which 
result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by measures based 
on the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a scientific justification, 
or as a consequence of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be 
appropriate in accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of article 5”. A note to 
this provision clarifies that “For the purposes of paragraph 3 of article 3, there is a scientific justification 
if, on the basis of an examination and evaluation of available scientific information in conformity with the 
relevant provisions of this Agreement, a Member determines that the relevant international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations are not sufficient to achieve its appropriate level of sanitary or 
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that members shall base regulations on international standards unless this is 
inappropriate47. The lack of accuracy affecting these Agreements lies precisely in that 
they leave the question open as to what is inappropriate, which ultimately invests the 
Dispute Settlement Body of the responsibility to decide on the adequacy of international 
standards to achieve national objectives, which are in turn per se unquestionable. 
The structure of these agreements clearly parallels the EU regime and its exceptions as 
laid down articles 34 and 36 TFEU48 on disciplines and exceptions. However, as it has 
been underlined several times, differences between the EU and the WTO are more 
conspicuous than similarities. In addition to the very nature of the obligation and to the 
burden of proof, which in the WTO context lies on the member challenging the 
regulation, one of the most remarkable differences is the nature of standard setting 
procedures. 
Within the EU, the Council of Ministers can set the regulatory objectives before leaving 
the technical issues to national standards agencies and bodies such as the European 
Committee for Standardization (CEN) or the European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standards (CENELEC). These are private bodies, but they are subject to political and 
legal pressures from within the EU. Thus EU and national standards bodies have 
reasonably effective representation from consumer groups and their deliberations can be 
monitored49. 
The WTO Agreements recognize the right of certain international standards bodies to 
set standards, which WTO members are enjoined to accept. The food standards body, 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, is an agency of the United Nations’ Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and of the World Health Organization (WHO) and has 
a formal consumer accreditation procedure. The international product standard bodies – 
the International Organization for Standards (ISO) and the International Electrical 
Commission (IEC) – are international non-governmental organizations answerable only 
to their members, the national standards bodies, but not to national governments. In all 
cases national representation is likely to be dominated by producers interests. The ISO 
has an active consumer consultative body, the ISO Consumer Policy Committee 
(COPOLCO), but consumer representatives have no right of access to national 
delegations participating in stakeholder meetings. Also, the policy-setting and 
governance bodies of the ISO are closed to the public. The IEC Council and Boards are 
equally closed, documents are not publicly available and there is no specific provision 
or consumer participation. This makes WTO standard setting procedures less 
transparent than EU ones. 
                                                                                                                                          
phytosanitary protection”. 
47 As far as the TBT Agreement is concerned, article 2.4 thereof requires members to use relevant 
international standards as a basis for their technical regulations “except when such international standards 
or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate 
objectives pursued”. 
48 Article 34 forbids all quantitative restrictions on trade between member states and ‘measure having 
equivalent effect’, i.e. any domestic regulation that restrict trade. Article 36 however provides a brief list 
of exceptions which may be invoked to justify such measures as long as they are not ‘arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction to trade’. 
49 Holmes, P., op. cit., p. 822. 
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Standards bodies cannot make law for their members50, nor can the WTO directly make 
laws or set standards. As mentioned, however, the principle of rebuttable presumption 
creates a curious system under which WTO rules give implicit legislative power to 
standard bodies, without there being any intermediary political decision-making system. 
 
1.5 Legal versus political considerations 
 
A decision-making process which is arguably more integrated than the WTO 
intergovernmental one has not awarded the Union an infallible capacity to resolve all of 
its conflicts over trade and regulation by political means. Quite to the contrary and as it 
will be shown in section II, for many years it was the ECJ, rather than the Commission 
or the Council, to set the agenda in determining the balance between market opening 
and national regulatory sovereignty. A similar process can be observed within the 
WTO, where the constraints of unanimity have been even tighter than in the early years 
of the EU51, but where a powerful DSB has sometimes been able to act in the absence of 
a political consensus, with the risk that the judicial process be itself politicised. Thus, in 
both the EU and WTO, clarification of the rules has come about as a result of litigation, 
namely economic agents or other governments challenging alleged trade-restricting 
measures before the competent judicial authorities52. 
The process of European integration was strongly affected by the ECJ’s 1979 Cassis de 
Dijon judgment53, which sorted out two problems. First, the political, legislative process 
to remove national rules that were directly or indirectly discriminatory against foreign 
goods was excessively slow. So there was a need for something like mutual recognition 
to accelerate the creation of a single market in goods. Moreover, there was a need for a 
broader class of legitimate exceptions to the sweeping ban on all trade-restricting 
measures as art. 30 TCE (now art. 36 TFEU), drafted in 1957 did, not include a number 
of important public policy objectives, such as protecting consumer health and the 
environment54. 
The ECJ developed an ‘obstacle-based’ approach as opposed to the ‘discrimination-
based’ one55. Accordingly, any differences in regulations, even if facially non-
discriminatory, may in fact constitute obstacles to trade. In a series of judgements the 
ECJ thus created a very fine net that potentially catches any domestic measure by 
assessing, first, if it affects trade (whether in a discriminatory fashion or not) and then, 
in case hindrance is proven, whether the trade-restricting measure can be justified. The 
Court put the onus on the Member States adopting the measure to show that, where 
                                                
50 Ibid. 
51 The difficulties linked to the WTO procedural requirements add to the incapacity of the Uruguay 
Round negotiators to decide on the relationship between trade liberalisation and regulatory autonomy in 
the first place. 
52 Shaffer, G., “What's new in EU trade dispute settlement? Judicialization, public-private networks and 
the WTO legal order”, in Peterson, J., Young, R.Y. (guest eds.), The European Union and the new trade 
politics, special issue of Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 13, n. 6, 2006, p. 815 ff. 
53 ECJ, Case 120/78, above. 
54 Weiler, J.J.H., “The constitution of the common marketplace”, in Craig, P., de Búrca, G. (eds.), The 
Evolution of EU Law, Oxford: OUP, 1999, p. 349-376. 
55 Ibid.
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differences in regulations could obstruct trade, there is a good reason for national 
differences. If the ECJ upholds the national government’s reason, because the EU has a 
harmonising agenda, it creates presumption for some need of harmonisation56, i.e. 
devising a common solution to the problem that the national policy addresses57. 
The most relevant element of the ECJ’s approach is, however, the formulation of the 
mutual recognition principle. However, while mutual recognition was an intellectual 
breakthrough, in practice it was a market failure because, in order for the common 
market to be created, there had to be a period during which the ECJ judged ‘guilty till 
proved innocent’ every national measure capable of interfering with trade58. Weiler 
considers that this tough approach has largely done its job. In fact, more recently, the 
ECJ, most notably in the Keck case59, has shown greater acceptance of national rules 
even if they did create obstacles to trade. 
Weiler draws some sharable conclusions concerning similarities between the evolution 
of obligations and exceptions in the EU and in the WTO, although there are also major 
differences. The GATT’s approach to policy measures was effectively based on the idea 
of non-discrimination (art. III), which does not require rules to be the same everywhere, 
but merely apply equally to domestic and foreign goods. As the WTO has developed, 
however, we have witnessed a shift towards an ‘obstacle-based’ approach. Elements of 
the Uruguay Round (the SPS Agreement, for instance) go beyond the requirement of 
non-discrimination. Moreover, thank to the reformed DSM, it has become possible to 
effectively challenge a variety of domestic rules on the grounds that they amount to 
obstacles, and the AB has proven its inclination to undertake this kind of judicial review 
of domestic measures. 
Yet there is no place in the WTO for a legislative harmonisation process other than 
recognition of the work of international standards bodies. If a measure is acceptable 
under GATT’s general exception clause contained in art. XX, the challenge against it 
must end there. Legitimate national rules which fragment markets must continue to be 
allowed even if they obstruct trade because the WTO does not legislate common rules – 
although its SPS and TBT provisions require acceptance of international standards. The 
absence of a legislative follow-up to a judicial decision on a national measure is the key 
difference between the GATT and the EU regime. 
Until recently, where there was a legitimate justification for their implementation, the 
AB has been quite cautious in establishing the unlawfulness of regulatory measures 
which represented actual barriers to trade. In the Asbestos case, the Appellate Body 
deliberately stepped back from a ruling by the Panel that construed a wide interpretation 
of a ‘like-product’ which, if accepted, would have caused a very broad class of domestic 
regulations to be judged as trade barriers, hence subject to scrutiny as to whether they 
fell under the legitimate exceptions clause. In the Beef Hormones case, the AB struck 
                                                
56 Ibid. 
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58 Weiler, op. cit., p. 371. 
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down the EU’s ban on the sale of all beef (wherever produced) that had been treated 
with certain growth-promoting hormones, which however had been approved earlier by 
the Codex Alimentarius. The AB, however, stressed that the EU had the right to set 
tougher safety standards than the Codex one. The crux of the legal dispute was whether, 
as prescribed by SPS rules, the EU had any evidence that food safety was improved by 
the ban on such hormones. Precisely on this ground, namely the lack of any scientific 
evidence supporting the EU thesis, the AB based the establishment of the SPS breach 
by the Union. 
The jurisprudence of the AB has been evolving, particularly in the way the recent case 
law subtly differs as between the more general case of rules and exceptions in art. III 
and XX, and the slightly different structures of the TBT and SPS Agreements that apply 
to measures that contain no explicit discrimination elements. The AB has been 
gradually clarifying the ‘gateways’ that allow countries to set regulations which are not 
based on international standards or which otherwise create barriers to trade in the name 
of domestic regulatory aims. For example, the SPS Agreement provides that food 
standards that are different from those agreed by the Codex may be justified by showing 
that there is some scientific evidence that their use will reduce risk to health, in which 
case they are acceptable even if they restrict trade. The TBT Agreement lays down 
certain general procedural requirements for rules deemed to fall under its scope. When 
applying such rules, the AB has in fact shown sensitiveness to national regulatory 
objectives60. Where it is recognised that there is a legitimate goal, the AB has never 
asked a member state to trade off trade restrictiveness against effectiveness of a 
measure. This contrasts with the ECJ’s use of proportionality. Yet the AB is on 
occasion called upon to decide what constitutes a ‘legitimate’ regulatory goal in terms 
of what is permitted under the exception clauses of GATT art. XX and of the TBT and 
SPS Agreements. 
Many observers have argued that the AB had broadly got it right in that it has allowed 
states fairly generous leeway to derogate from the obligations to base their domestic 
regulations on international standards, when they can show that they have a moderately 
reasonable case for doing so and have used rational procedures for setting the rules. But 
where a country has not merely different but also discriminatory rules, a tougher 
standard of justification must be met. 
The WTO jurisprudence letting down domestic regulation have been said to 
demonstrate the degree to which trade law is about reinforcing the commercial logic at 
the expenses of the wider socio-political and cultural logics. Such a stance however 
overlooks the Panels and AB’s stress on the need that trade law does not stand alone 
and must, instead, be read in the context of public international law in general and that 
domestic non-trade concerns must be duly taken into account when applying it. They 
have carefully explored the escape clauses allowing trade restrictive measures to be 
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adopted for domestic regulatory purposes. The question then is: are these escape clauses 
adequate to afford the flexibility needed to cope with the overlapping scope and 
potentially contradictory effects of national regulatory autonomy and international trade 
law? 
In 2004, then Trade Commissioner and now WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, 
expressed concerns that despite the deference the AB was consistently showing to 
legitimate national objectives, problems could still arise. He called for a ‘safeguard 
clause’ whereby states could introduce regulations which have no objective basis but 
which reflect powerful, albeit sometimes irrational, public concerns (‘collective 
preferences’). The proposed safeguard clause would encompassed two provisions: first, 
it would be necessary to demonstrate that there really was a coherent underlying social 
demand and that the measure adopted was consistent with that demand in order to avoid 
that legal responses misrepresent the social demand; second, it would be necessary to 
demonstrate that the measures adopted did not restrict trade more than other measures 
capable of satisfying the same underlying demand. 
However laudable, this proposal has been soon labelled ad unrealistic at least in two 
respects. On the one hand, the consequence of the application of the first provision 
would be entrust the WTO judicature with the assessment of the internal political 
legitimacy of the social demand at stake, which significantly differs from its present 
mandate to assess national measures in the light of WTO provisions. Furthermore, more 
generally, a safeguard clause so designed would open the Pandora’s box of – often ill-
founded – public concerns, what would hamper the functionality of rules such as the 
one requiring scientific evidence in view of the broader objective to make international 
trade subject to the rule of law. 
There are three ways to deal with the tension between trade and regulatory objectives: 
negotiation, legislation and litigation. The failure of the EU to secure agreement in the 
WTO to even start negotiations on all but one of the ‘Singapore issues’ indicates either 
very poor bargaining tactics on the part of the EU, or the limits of projecting the EU’s 
own vision of the link between internal and external policies to the rest of the world. 
There have been very few decisions in the WTO that correspond to legislative action 
thus leading to a heavy reliance on case-law. Signalling problems of global regulatory 
governance without being able to resolve them, the AB’s evolving jurisprudence is 
confronted with the manifest unwillingness of the WTO members to sign new 
commitments that explicitly constrain domestic regulations which might affect trade. 
These ‘new trade issues’ are an unavoidable part of the new trade diplomacy. Moreover, 
leaving it to judges has not depoliticised the issue. 
The global trading system has recognised that domestic regulations can affect trade. It 
has designed rules to address this but they are incomplete and imprecise, hence the 
intervention of the DSB. However, the latter lacks the political legitimacy to fill the gap 
just the way the ECJ did. The DSB case-law so far only tells countries what not to do, 
but sometimes by implication this narrows down the range of options of what can be 
done. As it will be shown in Chapter II, the EU has invested much in WTO litigations 
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concerning non-tariff barriers to trade with a view to safeguarding its regulatory 
autonomy. 
 
 
Section II - The defence of regulatory autonomy in the EU and WTO 
 
As discussed in the previous section, in order to define and defend the limits of national 
regulatory autonomy the key question is how to distinguish between unlawful barriers 
to trade and legitimate national regulation. Such distinction has preoccupied the EU for 
decades, particularly since the Dassonville case in1974. It is an issue which has also 
posed significant challenges within the WTO, manifesting itself under GATT law in, 
inter alia, Tuna-Dolphin, Us-Shrimp and Brazil-Retreated Tyres. However, the EU and 
the WTO have so far applied different approaches, which arguably represent the 
outcome of different integration profiles. Reviewing the latter will shed light on the 
reason why drawing the line between legitimate national regulation and economic 
liberalisation may not always be a smooth operation. 
 
2.1 The EU approach to national regulatory autonomy and the free movement of 
goods 
 
The free movement of goods and services in the EU is carried out with a view to the 
creation of an ‘internal market’, described in art. 26 TFEU. The key provision 
concerning free movement of goods and national regulations are artt. 34 and 36 TFEU 
(ex artt. 28 and 30). art. 34 prohibits national regulations which imposes quantitative 
restrictions on imports and measures having equivalent effect to the former. Art. 36 
provides an exhaustive list of grounds of exceptions, on the basis of which, subject to 
the requirement of proportionality, a Member State can justify a restricting measure. 
Whereas defining ‘quantitative restrictions’ has proved relatively straightforward, the 
definition of ‘measures having equivalent effect’ became crucial for determining the 
scope of art. 34 TFEU. The broad definition given in Dassonville came to include 
national regulatory measures that treat domestically produced goods and imported 
products in the same way. Underlying this is the recognition that even indistinctly 
applicable measures, i.e. those applying without distinction to both domestically 
produced and imported goods, may hinder imports. This indicates that art. 34 TFEU 
provides for the removal not just of discriminatory measures but more generally of any 
measure potentially posing an obstacle to trade which cannot be justified, i.e. both 
distinctly and indistinctly applicable measures. However, that any measure which may 
potentially hinder trade is within the scope of art. 34 TFEU, and therefore prima facie 
prohibited, poses serious questions as to the remaining extent of Member States’ 
regulatory autonomy. 
A mitigation of Dassonville wide reach, the Cassis de Dijon ruling reinforced national 
regulatory autonomy through the introduction of the ‘rule of reason’ and of the concept 
of mandatory requirements. Under the rule of reason, where there is no Union 
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harmonisation, a Member State can set its own regulatory standards, protecting interests 
of particular concern (mandatory requirements). The onus falls upon the regulating state 
to demonstrate both that the particular measure is introduces in pursuit of a mandatory 
requirement and that it is a proportionate means by which to achieve that end. If a 
measure can be justified with reference to a mandatory requirement, it falls outside the 
scope of art. 34 TFEU. Thus, there is no breach and no question of justification by 
reference to art. 36 derogations. If the measure cannot be justified by a mandatory 
requirement, it would breach art. 34 unless it can be justified under art. 36 TFEU. The 
rule of reason is itself balanced by the principle of mutual recognition: that a product 
which is lawfully manufactured and marketed in one Member State should be accepted 
and permitted to be marketed in all other Member States. 
Significantly, in introducing the concept of mandatory requirement the Court 
distinguished the treatment of distinctly (overtly discriminatory) and indistinctly 
(facially neutral) applicable measures. While the former could only be justified by 
reference to the derogations listed in art. 36, the latter are justifiable by a broader range 
of objectives (namely derogations plus mandatory requirements), reflecting individual 
States’ priorities. In developing the rule of reason and the concept of mandatory 
requirements the Court reinforced national regulatory autonomy. 
Following the Dassonville and Cassis rulings, the scope of art. 34 TFEU remained very 
wide and, in a number of cases, traders invoked it in order to challenge domestic 
measures of market regulation which only had an indirect effect of reducing imports. A 
classic example concerns the English Sunday Trading series of cases. In accepting the 
premise that measures such as a ban on Sunday opening were within the scope of art. 
34, the Court permitted the latter provision to be used to challenge national regulatory 
legislation with a view at enhancing access to other member states’ marketplaces rather 
than specifically as a tool of market integration. 
In Keck, however, frustrated with ‘the increasing tendency of traders to invoke article 
30 of the Treaty (now art. 34 TFEU) as a means of challenging any rules whose effect is 
to limit their commercial freedom even where such rules are not aimed at products from 
other Member States, the Court explicitly over-ruled its previous approach. 
Consequently, the Court developed a distinction between measures affecting the product 
as such, which are within the scope of art. 34 TFEU and measures concerning ‘certain 
selling arrangements’, which were held to fall outside the scope of art. 34 prohibition, 
subject to the proviso that these affect imported and domestically produced goods in the 
same manner in law and in fact. In doing so the Court reined in the use of art. 34 as a 
deregulatory instrument by which to pursue market freedom. The distinction established 
between selling arrangements and measures concerning product characteristics can be 
characterized as a distinction between measures regulating the operation of the market 
and measures affecting access to the market. The former were to be taken outside the 
scope of art. 34 TFEU. 
Following Keck, however, a series of cases has demonstrated that measures concerning 
‘selling arrangements’ can, like regulation of product standards, affect access to the 
market. Keck itself recognises and allows for this, in the emphasis placed upon 
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discrimination within the proviso. Those selling arrangements which affect market 
access and are discriminatory in their effect (in law or in fact) are within the scope of 
art. 34 TFEU and will fall under art. 34 TFEU unless they can be justified by reference 
to a mandatory requirement or to art. 36. 
The fundamental question that emerges through the pre-Keck case law, Keck itself and 
the aftermath is whether art. 34 TFEU should be seen as a tool for market integration or 
an instrument guaranteeing free and unfettered access to market. This tension finds its 
origins in Dassonville and manifests itself in particular in relation to genuinely non-
discriminatory measures, which nonetheless affect market access. If art. 34 is an 
instrument by which to gain unfettered access to a market, then any measure affecting 
market access should be within its scope, regardless of discriminatory effects. If 
however art. 34 is a tool for market integration, for the removal of nationality-based 
barriers to trade, then it is arguable that any non-discriminatory measures which affect, 
but do not prevent, market access should not come within its scope. 
In his Opinion in Alfa Vita, Maduro AG concludes that the central issue in finding a 
breach of art. 34 TFEU is the existence of discrimination against the exercise of 
freedom of movement. Maduro’s characterisation of discrimination includes both direct 
and indirect discrimination and measures which have a differential impact upon access 
to the market. Discrimination undoubtedly plays a role in the operation of art. 34. A 
distinctly applicable measure breaches art. 34 unless it can be justified by one of the 
derogations laid down in art. 36. In contrast, an indistinctly applicable measure may be 
justified by one of the broader range of mandatory requirements. 
Maduro also characterised as discriminatory those indistinctly applicable measures 
which impose additional costs on imported goods, without taking into account the 
different position of those imported goods compared with domestically produced goods, 
notably that imported goods already comply with rules applying in the state of origin. In 
contrast, some commentators argue that in Dassonville and Cassis the ECJ has gone 
beyond discrimination, applying a market access or ‘obstacle-based’ approach. While 
Maduro’s characterisation of such measures as discriminatory holds some appeal, the 
difficulty of applying a discrimination-based analysis lies in the need to find a like or 
similar domestically produced good against which to compare the imported product in 
order to establish the discrimination. 
Although the Court has explicitly established an approach based upon both 
discrimination and market access in cases such as Gourmet International, it has been 
criticised for the loose nature of its analysis, particularly for the failure to rigorously 
identify likeness criteria and for the consequent incapacity to establish actual 
discrimination. Moreover, the Court did not establish a test of ‘substantial hindrance to 
market access’. 
In any case, the key norm with regard to indistinctly applicable measures is thus 
proportionality, since if the measure is deemed proportionate to the declared objective it 
will not breach art. 36 TFEU. Consequently, the question whether there is 
discrimination may appear largely superfluous. However, if the underlying purpose of 
the Treat rules relating to free movement of goods is indeed to remove nationality-based 
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barriers to trade, discrimination should be the key norm. In contrast, if the purpose of 
the rules is to provide unrestricted access to the market, discrimination has little 
relevance, the question rather being whether there is an obstacle to such access. Thus, 
any obstacle to market access must be justified, including with regard to its 
proportionality. If the key test was one of discrimination, a State would not be required 
to demonstrate the proportionality of its regulatory measures unless that measures was 
found to be discriminatory in its effect. Thus, it is undoubtedly the case that market 
access approach restrains national regulatory autonomy to a greater extent than a 
discrimination-based approach. 
 
2.1.a The proportionality test 
 
Measures which directly discriminate on the ground of nationality may only be justified 
by reference to the derogations set out in art. 36 TFUE. Measures which do not directly 
discriminate, but which may breach art. 34, can be justified by reference to mandatory 
requirements in the context of the same provision. To be successful, any justification, be 
it pursuant to express derogations or mandatory requirements, must be proportionate to 
the end pursued. The definition and application of ‘proportionality’ are thus central to 
the extent to which national regulatory autonomy is preserved. 
Proportionality is traditionally conceived of as a three-part test comprising, first, the 
suitability of the measure to achieve the objective; second, the necessity of the measure, 
namely that it is the least restrictive means by which to achieve the stated objective; 
third, the proportionality strictu sensu, which requires that the measure does not have an 
excessively restrictive effect. Curiously, in applying the proportionality test, the Court 
generally avoids engaging with the third element, i.e. proportionality strictu sensu, but 
applies and rules upon the basis of the first two elements, appropriateness and least 
trade restrictiveness. 
Particularly in relation to indistinctly applicable measures proportionality has become 
the determining criterion of compatibility with Community law. As such, 
proportionality is seen to be both an instrument of integration and, at the same time, a 
weapon in the protection of individual rights, in that it cans strike down restrictions on 
the enjoyment of the fundamental freedoms. More recently, in Schidberger and Omega, 
the potential of proportionality as a toll in the protection of individual rights can be seen 
to operate in two directs: both in preventing disproportionate restrictions on the 
fundamental freedoms and also in ensuring that exercise of the fundamental freedom 
dos not disproportionately encroach upon the protection of fundamental rights. 
In contrast, in relation to distinctly applicable measures, the fundamental norm is the 
ban on discrimination: unless the measure is found to be justifiable by reference to a 
stated derogation and proportionate to achieve that end, it will breach art. 34 TFEU. 
The application of the principle of proportionality is clearly of crucial importance in the 
EU inasmuch as it constitutes both a tool in the protection of individual rights and a tool 
of market integration. That being the case, it is significant that the application of 
proportionality is relatively lacking in transparency or consistency. When the Court 
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engages in a balancing exercise between the objectives pursued by the national measure 
and the adverse effects of that measure upon market integration or upon individuals’ 
enjoyment of their fundamental freedoms, it essentially reviews a Member States’ 
regulatory choices. Since this raises legitimacy questions, the Court tends to base its 
decisions upon the first significances of the proportionality test, the suitability and the 
necessity test. These two elements are indeed more objective than proportionality strictu 
sense, which introduces a rather more subjective element. While the Court has been 
reluctant to strike out a trade restricting national measure on the basis of its lack of 
proportionality, it has been willing to engage in a balancing of interests, proportionality 
strictu sensu, in certain cases where it has ultimately upheld the trade restrictive national 
regulatory measure, notably in Schmidbeger. 
Between legitimate national regulation and unacceptable restrictions to trade the Court 
has thus drawn a line that, thank to an obstacle-based approach grounded on the 
inclusion of indistinctly applicable measures within the scope of art. 34 prohibition, 
would in principle give preference to market integration. The development of the 
concept of ‘mandatory requirements’ has softened the Court tough obstacle-based 
approach. Absent such possibility to justify indistinctly applicable measures, art. 34 
TFEU would pose major a restriction to national regulatory autonomy. 
 
2.2 National regulatory autonomy and the GATT 
 
Unlike the TFEU, the GATT does not provide a right of free movement. It rather 
pursues the progressive reduction or removal of tariffs and other border measures. 
Consequently, since WTO members’ policies that affect trade are not subject to any 
general norm of free market access, it is relatively easy for a member to undermine, or 
reduce the value of, its concessions to others by subsequently adopting a substitute 
policy that has trade-restricting effects comparable to the tariff rates that it had legally 
bound itself to reduce. 
One response to cope with this challenge is the requirement of national treatment 
embedded in GATT art. III, whose first paragraph sets out a principle of non-
protectionism, which informs the remaining provisions of the article. In particular, art. 
III:4 applies national treatment to internal laws, regulations and requirements. The 
application provides that imported products must be treated no less favourably than 
domestically produced like products as regards all laws. Regulations and requirements 
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or 
use. It is worth noting that GATT art. XI prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports, 
taking the form of quotas, import or export licenses or other measures. While this 
provision might at first glance appear to be the relevant provision for present purposes, 
the Note Ad Article III indicates that national regulatory measures, which apply to 
domestic products and like imported products and which are enforced at the border for 
imported products should be dealt with under art. III. Thus, the latter provision is the 
key one for drawing the line between national regulatory autonomy and market access. 
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Pursuant to art. III the key issue to be considered in determining whether national 
regulation is GATT-compliant is whether the measure treats imported goods no less 
favourably than like domestic products. Therefore, focusing upon a comparison of the 
treatment of like products, the provision puts discrimination at its heart, what stands in 
sharp contrast to the EU approach. Whereas the ECJ has been criticised for the loos 
nature of its discrimination analysis, in particular, the failure to identify products that 
are actually the subject of discrimination effect in the market place, the WTO Panels 
and Appellate Body have put considerable effort into the development of a criteria for 
the determination of likeness. 
By virtue of joined provisions of art. III paragraphs 1 and 4, a measure challenges under 
art. III.4 must affect domestic and imported goods in a protectionist manner. For this to 
be the case, the domestic and imported goods must be in a competitive relationship of 
such a nature that protectionism could arise. Thus, in EC-Asbestos, the AB held that a 
competitive relationship is central to a finding of ‘likeness’. Regan noticed that they 
seem to treat it as necessary and sufficient. In exploring the criteria for likeness in this 
case, the AB noted that this was the first case in which it had considered the definition 
of ‘likeness’ in the context of art. III:4, although it noted that it had of course previously 
considered it in many other contexts, including in relation to different provisions of art. 
III:2. The AB repeated its pivotal assertion on likeness: 
[T]here can be no one precise and absolute definition of what is ‘like’. The concept of 
‘likeness’ is a relative one that evokes the image of an accordion. The accordion of 
‘likeness’ stretches and squeezes in different places as different provisions of the WTO 
Agreement are applied. The width of the accordion in any one of those places must be 
determined by the particular provision in which the term ‘like’ is encountered as well as 
by the context and the circumstances that prevail in any given case to which that 
provision may apply. 
The AB turns first to the ordinary meaning of ‘like’, which indicates shares 
characteristics or qualities. However, the AB goes on to note that this does not divulge 
which characteristics should be taken into account or the degree of similarity required to 
indicate likeness. On this point, the AB upheld an approach based upon the criteria laid 
down in the Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments and in subsequent 
case law, that is, the properties, nature and quality of the products; the end-uses of the 
products: consumers’ tastes and habits; and the tariff classification of the products. 
Further, and crucially, whereas the Panel had held that health concerns and risks were a 
matter only under GATT art. XX, the AB held that these do fall for consideration under 
art. III:4. 
The approach of the AB has been labelled as heavily relying upon a market analysis of 
the relationship between the products under comparison. The essential question raised 
by this case is what weight of economic evidence could overturn the very marked 
differences between the products in terms of their impact on health, namely the 
carcinogenic nature of chrysotile asbestos fibres, which PCG fibres seemed not to 
produce. In future cases, what weight of other, e.g. health related, evidence could 
outweigh evidence of a comparative relationship between products. 
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Some scholars have maintained that regulatory intents should be considered as part of 
the likeness analysis. Since the purpose of art. III is to prevent protectionism, when 
considering the likeness of two products, the purpose of the very regulation which 
distinguishes them should be considered and must be given preference even over 
considerations of market substitutability. Beside, since the GATT imposes major 
restrictions upon members’ regulatory autonomy, which go beyond economic related 
regulatory powers, it is implausible that the parties would have intended the scope of 
interference with their regulatory powers to be solely determined by economic criteria 
limited to notions like competitive relationship. 
The effects of such an approach bear a fairly strong resemblance to the recognition and 
role of the rule of reason in the EU context, namely that in the absence of harmonisation 
Member States are free to regulate and where such regulation risks hindering the free 
movement of goods it may nonetheless justified by reference to a mandatory 
requirement, subject to satisfaction of the proportionality test. 
One obvious objection to a test that incorporates consideration of regulatory purposes is 
that it can be difficult to establish what they are meant to be. However, in the EU 
context for instance, the burden of proof lying on the regulating Member State 
discourages the latter from abusing the invocation of mandatory requirements. 
Furthermore, proportionality provides a safety net in evaluating the legitimacy of 
mandatory requirements. Should such an approach be accepted, it would thus be 
desirable to incorporate such a requirement with regard to regulatory purpose 
considerations in the determination of likeness under GATT art. III. 
 
2.2.a Justifying a breach 
 
A measure that breaches GATT art. III can only be saved by general exceptions set out 
in art. XX, or the security exceptions provided for in art. XXI, subject to the chapeau 
requirement that it is not applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised 
restriction on international trade. 
Article XX exceptions variously require that measures must either be ‘necessary for’ or 
‘relate to’ the objective pursued. Thus, art. XX(b) provides an exception for measures 
‘necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health’, and letter (g) 
provides for exceptions for measures ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources’. The interpretation of these requirements is crucial to the balance struck 
between national regulatory autonomy and economic liberalisation, and the related 
jurisprudence has been the subject of considerable academic comment. 
One question concerns the extent to which proportionality plays a role in relation to art. 
XX exceptions. This depends to some extent upon what is meant by proportionality. As 
seen above, the proportionality test applied by the ECJ is generally confined to the 
review of the appropriateness of the measure to pursue the stated objective and of its 
least trade restrictiveness, and does not go into an exam of proportionality strictu sensu. 
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As regard appropriateness, in the context of GATT art. XX, the AB has explicitly held 
that it is for the members to determine their chosen level of protection. The requirement 
of necessity has been interpreted as essentially requiring that the measures can 
contribute to the achievement of the objective pursued, that no alternative exists which 
the member can resort to with a view to the came aim and that it is not inconsistent (or 
entails the least possible inconsistency) with other GATT provisions. 
The question of reasonable availability of alternatives has proven contentious: in Korea-
Beef both the Panel and the AB held that WTO law ‘could well entail higher 
enforcement costs for national budget’. The AB further adjusted the test slightly by 
stating that: 
determination of whether a measure, which is not ‘indispensable’, may nevertheless be 
‘necessary’ within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in every case a process 
of weighting and balancing a series of factors which prominently include the contribution 
made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the 
importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the 
accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports. 
[…] In our view, the weighting and balancing process we have outlined is comprehended 
in the determination of whether a WTO-consistent alternative measure which the Member 
concerned could ‘reasonably be expected to employ’ is available, or whether a less WTO-
inconsistent measure is ‘reasonably available’. 
Significantly, whilst the weighting and balancing applies to both the necessity analysis 
and the availability of reasonable alternatives, the chosen level of protection is entirely 
up to the members and is not questioned, so that it is not to be weighted against the 
trade restrictiveness of degree of GATT inconsistency. However, the contribution of the 
measure to the desired objective is explicitly to be considered. 
It is therefore apparent that necessity does not require that the Panel or AB engage in 
the balancing the objective pursued and its trade restrictive effects, that is in a 
proportionality review stricto sensu. Rather, it resembles the second limb of EU-fashion 
proportionality review: whether the measure is the least trade restrictive means by 
which to pursue the objective, although clearly focusing in this case upon the GATT-
inconsistent means as opposed to least trade restrictive. Thus, just like in the EU 
context, also within the WTO there is some reluctance to engage in a review of the 
proportionality stricto sensu. 
In Brazil-Retreated Tyres, the AB stated that: 
the fundamental principle is the right that WTO Members have to determine the level of 
protection that they consider appropriate in a given context. Another key element of the 
analysis of necessity of a measure under Article XX(b) is the contribution it brings to the 
achievement of its objective. […] To be characterised as necessary, a measure does not 
have to be indispensable. However, its contribution to the achievement of the objective 
must be material, not merely marginal or insignificant, especially if the measure at issue 
is as trade restrictive as an import ban. Thus, the contribution of the measure has to be 
weighted against its trade restrictiveness, taking into account the importance of the 
interests or the values underlying the objective pursued by it.  
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Consequently, even an unknown but presumed positive and material contribution to an 
objective like health, such as in the case at issue, was sufficient to render the measure 
necessary. In this context therefore there is no balancing of the measure and its effects. 
Brown and Trachtman observe that, whilst the AB found it necessary to consider less 
trade-restricting alternatives providing an equivalent contribution to the achievement of 
the objective, the lack of evaluation of the measure contribution makes such application 
of the least GATT-inconsistent reasonably available alternative test impossible which 
would require an evaluation of equivalence of the contribution offered respectively by 
the challenged measure and by the reasonably available alternatives. 
The relationship requirement (‘relating to’ as under art. XX(g)) has been more 
straightforwardly interpreted as involving a different sort of connection, namely there 
must be some causal relationship between the measure adopted and the objective 
pursued. This unquestionably amounts to a very soft review of the exercise of its 
regulatory autonomy by a WTO member. 
Should the necessity and the relationship requirements be fulfilled, the additional test 
prescribed by the chapeau of art. XX must nonetheless be satisfied. Desmedt has 
highlighted the consequent distinction between the legitimacy of the measure itself, 
regulated by the subparagraphs of art. XX, and the manner of its application, which is 
regulated by the chapeau. Still in the Brazil-Retreated Tyres report, the AB held that 
there is arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination when a measure provisionally justified 
under a paragraph of Article XX is applied in a discriminatory manner ‘between countries 
where the same conditions prevail’, and when the reasons given for this discrimination 
bear no rational connection to the objective falling within the purview of Article XX. 
However, in the context of the ‘relating to’ requirement, the AB has examined under the 
chapeau whether less trade-restrictive alternatives were available as well as whether the 
restrictiveness was ‘disproportionate’ in view of the costs imposed by the measures 
which were not imposed upon domestic producers. Thus, a ‘necessity’ test appeared to 
be imposed by the chapeau, where it had not been imposed by art. XX(g). This blurs the 
above mentioned line between the legitimacy of the substance of the measure and the 
manner of its application. Further, in US-Shrimp the AB referred explicitly to the 
chapeau as a ‘balancing’ requirement ‘between the right of a Member to invoke one or 
another of the exceptions of article XX […] on the one hand, and the substantive rights 
of the other Members under GATT 1994, on the other hand’. However, such a 
requirement necessitates the review of a member’s policy preferences by an external 
body, in this instance the DSB, which poses no few difficulties in that such review is 
difficult to accord with the prerogative of the members to choose their own level of 
protection. 
Article XX exceptions play a similar role to those under art. 36 TFEU so that parallels 
can be drawn. In this respect, Reid maintains that the necessity and relationship 
requirements in the WTO context equate to what in the EU is applied as a 
proportionality test in relation to art. 34 TFEU, both in respect of the mandatory 
requirements and in the justification of a breach. 
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In the GATT context, however, such review only comes into play in respect of 
measures that do not satisfy the requirement in national treatment. De facto 
discrimination, whereby a measure which is facially neutral has the effect of treating 
imported products less favourably, is recognised in the WTO context, just as indirect 
discrimination or the dual burden of indistinctly applicable measures are in the EU 
context. However, the AB has emphasised that ‘less favourable treatment’ relates to the 
competitive relationship between the imported and domestic ‘like’ products rather than 
where ‘the detrimental effect is explained by factors or circumstances unrelated to the 
foreign origin of the product’. Crucially, a non-discriminatory regulatory measure will 
not breach art. III, notwithstanding its impact upon access to the market. National 
regulatory autonomy thus remains relatively free, subject to the limitations in the 
definition of ‘likeness’. The definition of like products is therefore key to both the scope 
of art. III and the corollary extent of national regulatory autonomy. In the light of this, it 
is not surprising that the WTO legal system has not experienced the introduction of 
concepts like mandatory requirements. However, this turns upon the approach taken to 
likeness. As noted above, it may be desirable to introduce considerations relating to the 
regulatory purpose of the measures into this determination. The effect of such 
development would in fact be similar to the effect of recognition of mandatory 
requirement. 
 
2.3 Balancing national regulatory autonomy and trade liberalisation 
 
In both the EU and the WTO, the balance between economic liberalisation and national 
regulatory autonomy must reflect the context and the objective of the rules. Are these 
organisations pursuing simply the removal of national-based barriers to trade, or are 
they seeking to eradicate regulatory heterogeneity? The latter aim requires removal of 
all measures constituting restrictions to market access. There is little in the text of the 
WTO Agreement, including in the GATT and in the other Agreements on trade in 
goods, to suggest that such a task was entrusted to the Organisation by its members. 
In turn, the EU, whose final aim is a deeper integration, might be more likely to pursue 
this end. It is not a case that, whereas in the WTO liberalisation is achieved through 
mutual concessions with no individual rights being created to such aim, the EU 
common market consists of fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, the EU has the 
possibility to adopt harmonisation measures to fill the vacatio legis caused by 
deregulation. Yet, the EU’s legislative history reveals that achieving harmonisation can 
be a protracted process and the prevalence of minimum harmonisation, leaving Member 
States discretion to impose higher standards has posed problems for the EU in respect of 
its international obligation. Furthermore, while the EU pursues deeper integration, it is 
also committed to non-economic objectives, such as environmental and consumer 
protection. On occasion, such concerns have led the ECJ to justify prima facie 
discriminatory national measures by virtue of the invocation of relevant mandatory 
requirements or to avoid the issue of the discriminatory nature of the measure. The 
outcome, namely allowing partitioning of the market along national lines, demonstrates 
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the dangers inherent in abandoning consideration of discrimination in this context. Both 
cases suffer from inadequate reasoning arising from the Court’s reluctance to condemn 
national measures pursuing a ‘legitimate’ objective which was, however, not provided 
for in art. 36 TFEU. The diversity of the EU objectives requires a nuanced approach 
facilitating the balancing of interests, which would be allowed by a proportionality test 
strictu sensu, which is however seldom applied. Thus, it has been noted that while the 
deeper level of integration pursued in the EU might appear to merit stricter review of 
national regulation than might be appropriate in the WTO context, this difficultly 
coexists with the breadth of objectives pursued by the Union. 
 
2.4 Final considerations 
 
Exclusive reliance on market access risks catching otherwise legitimate market 
regulation which has an indirect effect upon market access and would produce 
essentially deregulatory outcomes. 
In the EU context, mandatory requirements mitigate the deregulatory effects of the 
market access approach, notwithstanding a burden is imposed upon the MS to justify 
national regulatory measures. In the WTO context, where there is no possibility of 
mandatory requirement-type justification, and where the market analysis necessary to 
effectively apply the discrimination test is well established, the reasons to retain 
discrimination analysis and, in so doing, protect national regulatory autonomy are 
compelling. 
The key question, in both the WTO and EU context, concerns the purpose of economic 
liberalisation. It is to remove any barriers to market access or trade and therefore to 
remove any heterogeneity of standards, or is it to remove nationality-based barriers to 
trade? If it is indeed the removal of any barrier to market access, the broad approach to 
market access restrictions would be appropriate. However, in view of its impact upon 
national regulatory autonomy, such an approach would surely require explicit 
expression to ensure its accountability and legitimacy. It the absence of this, it appears 
appropriate to draw the line between national regulatory autonomy and economic 
liberalisation rather less intrusively, pursuing primarily the removal of measures which 
discriminate against trade or free movement, thus adopting a discrimination-based 
analysis. 
 
 
Section III - Mutual Recognition Agreements 
 
3.1 Defining mutual recognition as a way out from the “liberalization-domestic 
regulation” dichotomy and an alternative to litigation 
 
Previous sections have shown how progressive removal of traditional tariff-barriers to 
international trade resulted in domestic regulatory policies, generally not bound by 
commitments to tariff-lowering, coming to the forefront as the most relevant obstacles 
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to the free flow of goods61 and a source of distortion of international competition. The 
proliferation of different standards and regulatory requirements, accompanied by 
different conformity assessment procedures, constitutes one of the most serious 
constraints to international trade in goods.   
The most used standards of international treatment, namely the most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) and the national treatment (NT) principles, have revealed their inadequacy to 
cope with the issue of non-tariff barriers, i.e. domestic measures which, intentionally or 
not, do affect international trade. Such inadequacy of MFN and NT standards to ensure 
further effective liberalization in the current situation of low tariffs have prompted the 
use of other concepts and methods, such as harmonization, transparency and mutual 
recognition, in order to fill in the gaps between divergent domestic policies and 
multilateral trade liberalization. In turn, the Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade 
and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures have reinforced, clarified and extended the 
scope and coverage of multilateral rules and procedures on standards and conformity 
assessment. However, the amount of disputes in which SPS and TBT rules have been 
invoked so far to challenge or justify domestic measures unequivocally disclose the 
limits of such Agreements in containing the adverse effects of domestic regulations on 
international trade.  
As Sacerdoti underlines, there is a compelling need to distinguish between, first, 
regulations potentially or actually affecting foreign goods more severely than domestic 
ones and, secondly, between those that are objectively justified by the need to protect 
paramount general interests and objectives from those whose discriminatory effects are 
not balanced by those needs. Furthermore, one should consider whether those interests 
and objectives are internationally shared, if they are properly relevant from an 
individual country point of view and if the means to achieve those objectives are not 
unduly restrictive62. 
National measures’ conformity to international technical yardsticks, where existing, 
or the elaboration of such standards – namely through harmonization - may offer a 
solution in some domains. However, in a world of sovereign states, having different 
policies, priorities and interests, the elaboration of common standards for trade 
liberalization purposes to be applied in the regulation of domestic economy, when these 
regulations are meant to protect other interests and concerns, can only be the result of 
negotiations based on shared values and aims. Difficulties in reaching this goal increase 
when the negotiation of requirements and conditions concerns areas where trade 
considerations, or the hindrance thereof, are deemed of minor importance if compared 
to other domestic policies that national regulation making the object of bargaining are 
                                                
61 It is worth recalling that the scope of this research does not go beyond trade in goods, this being the 
reason why issues relating to non-tariff barriers to trade in services, however significant, are not herein 
considered. 
62 Sacerdoti, G., “Standards of Treatment, Harmonisation and Mutual Recognition: A Comparison 
between Regional Areas and the Global Trading System”, in Demaret, P., Bellis, J.F., García Iménez, G. 
(eds.), Regionalism and multilateralism after the Uruguay Round – Convergence, Divergence and 
Interaction, Brussels, 1997, p. 613, at 620. 
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designed to pursue or that, more generally, would be affected by change and possibly 
loosened. 
On the other hand, increasing reciprocal interferences of uncoordinated domestic 
policies and their negative impact on global welfare have to be faced. The ensuing 
tensions and diseconomies indeed justify the view that minimal harmonization of such 
policies is appropriate whenever national regulations cause distortions in foreign 
markets and in international investments patterns. 
Methods such as harmonization, transparency and mutual recognition can be 
conceived as preventive - rather than alternative - options to litigation before the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body insofar as they set a legal framework whose purpose is 
precisely to enhance compliance with WTO rules. This being so, mentioning the above 
preventive options in the present research seems justified and even necessary in order to 
outline the underlying principles of a EU’s strategy towards the management of 
commercial disputes falling within the scope of the SPS and TBT Agreements. Along 
with the determination to face litigation as such, the choice to prevent disputes in the 
first place can well be a component of a coherent strategy. 
Neither harmonization nor mutual recognition are however generally within the 
scope of the WTO Agreements. In contrast to the EU, the WTO is not directly involved 
in standard setting and harmonization, and many discretionary escape clauses are 
included in the Agreements. Harmonization in the WTO system is limited to measures 
directly concerning trade in goods and it does not concern domestic policies that may 
indirectly affect it. In this respect, the institutional framework to ensure compliance is 
also relevant. On the one hand, the inherent absence of a cohesive institutional structure, 
i.e. of organs endowed with the competence to push ahead a harmonization process, 
makes it cumbersome to pursue such an objective. On the other hand, the DSB does not 
match the compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction with binding effects which 
characterises the European Court of Justice. 
Transparency arrangements, which account to unilateral autonomous harmonization 
of technical standards or adoption of such standards as developed by the producing 
countries and industries, is also a reality and a method. This approach does not however 
entail international obligations and controls. It lacks therefore stability and 
predictability. 
The very narrow mandate that the WTO has received with regards to harmonization 
and the inherent limits of transparency related methods leave us with only one viable 
option to prevent disputes related to non-tariff barriers, namely reliance on mutual 
recognition. Although unlike the ECJ jurisprudence, the WTO system does not feature 
recognition of national standards as a binding judicial principle which operates 
alongside MNF and NT, both the SPS and TBT Agreements encourage WTO members 
to autonomously or mutually recognize the equivalence of domestic regulations and 
conformity assessment procedures of other members, where they can be relied upon by 
trade operators. 
Whereas unconditional trust towards alien domestic regulations is the precondition 
for autonomous recognition, political – i.e. bilaterally negotiated – mutual recognition 
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has got potential with regard to the equalization of the legal requirements of domestic 
markets. The contractual element inherent in Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs), 
whereby a product compliance with the importing country’s regulations or standards 
can be assessed in the country of export, addresses the challenge confronting political 
leaders wishing to cope with non-tariff barriers to trade, namely to reduce redundant 
regulatory barriers, where possible, without sacrificing democratic choices regarding the 
appropriate allocation of risks and the appropriate procedure for addressing them. 
Although limits deriving from mutual trust and possible lack thereof also act in relation 
to such agreements, they can be more easily overcome precisely through mutual 
concessions. This makes MRAs key tools to facilitate international trade insofar as they 
establish the economic, legal and technical conditions necessary to enhance market 
access, promote trade liberalization efforts on a bilateral, regional or plurilateral basis 
and set a framework for improvements in future multilateral rounds. 
Recognizing the potential benefits of moving beyond the WTO framework at a faster 
pace than other signatories, the EU has tried to extend its mutual recognition activity 
from the single market to its trade relations with third countries, by concluding MRAs 
in circumscribed production sectors with seven third countries. In this respect, the case 
of the 1997 EU-US MRA is emblematic since such Agreement represents the first non-
litigation attempt at addressing, at least in selected domains, transatlantic trade issues 
which had meanwhile increasingly become regulatory ones. 
Divergent regulatory cultures and procedures not only restrain trade and thus 
competition, but they can also do so in an asymmetrical discriminatory manner. 
Assessing the EU’s practice with regard to MRAs constitutes a variation on the broader 
question of how to reconcile the Union’s trade and regulatory objectives, that is how to 
reduce or eliminate the trade impact of differences in national regulations without 
sacrificing legitimate regulatory objectives. A central question facing national 
legislators, executives and administrative officials is therefore how to govern bilateral 
economic interdependence while maintaining social standards responsive to their 
respective constituencies’ demands, in other words how to ease the tension between the 
goal of domestic regulatory protection and liberalized trade. In this context, although 
obviously unique, the model of the European internal market has offered a benchmark 
as it has favoured the convergence of the Union’s partners towards European regulatory 
practices. 
This section is organized as follows. First, relevant WTO rules concerning mutual 
recognition will be analysed in order to see what is the legal background MRAs are 
concluded against. The section will then deal with the evolution of the EU approach 
towards domestic regulation within the internal market. In the third part account will be 
given of the MRAs as a peculiar category of international contractual obligation. 
Finally, an overview of MRAs concluded by the European Union will be offered. In this 
context, particular attention is paid to the 1997 EU-US Agreement. 
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3.2 Relevant WTO rules 
 
Earlier in this Chapter, it has been recalled earlier63 that the GATT 1994 provisions 
affecting product standards are article I relating to the MFN treatment and III on 
national treatment, together with the general exceptions concerning, on the one hand, 
health, welfare, public morals (article XX) and, on the other, national security (article 
XXI). These provisions are complemented by the two specific Agreements on SPS 
measures and TBT which, in spite of the different scope, enshrine the same basic 
principles. 
MRAs concluded to date by the EU only fall within the scope of the TBT Agreement, 
more precisely to conformity assessment procedures64. So far, the EU has indeed never 
negotiated mutual recognition with regard to sanitary and phytosanitary issues. This 
circumstance raises questions as to the very feasibility of mutual recognition in this 
field, questions that will be dealt with at a later stage in the present section. Yet, 
although the lack of empirical data forces to put an emphasis upon TBT provisions in 
order to define the legal framework of MRAs in force, a parallel survey of the SPS 
norms is nonetheless possible by virtue of the similarities between TBT provisions and 
SPS ones. 
The two Agreements lay down a set of rules intended to discipline the effects of WTO 
members regulatory autonomy on international free trade. As such, they do not deprive 
members of their regulatory competence in areas of legitimate public interest, such as 
public health and consumer protection. Nevertheless they pose limits on the exercise of 
this competence, in order to prevent an abusive, because unnecessary, use of regulatory 
power65. Therefore, the responsibility for legislating on products and production 
requirements rests with the members, and the limits posed by WTO rules will come into 
play only when states’ regulations create unnecessary barriers to trade66. 
As for the scope, the TBT Agreement deals with all types of product regulations and 
standards, adopted for reasons such as national security, prevention of fraud, public 
health or the protection of the environment, and therefore has got a general scope. The 
concept of product specification includes not only requirements referring to the product 
                                                
63 Cfr. para. 1.2, 1.3 and 1.5 in this Chapter. 
64 See infra, paragraph 3.5. 
65 This is clearly expressed in the first Report issued by the Appellate Body in which, after condemning 
some aspects of the US rules on gasoline for their inconsistency with art. III.4 and XX GATT, it stated 
that this does not mean “that the ability of any WTO Member to take measures to control air pollution or, 
more generally, to protect the environment, is at issue”, and added “WTO Members have a large measure 
of autonomy to determine their own policies on the environment – including its relationship with trade – 
their environmental objectives and the environmental legislation they enact and implement. So far as 
concerns the WTO, that autonomy is circumscribed only by the need to respect the requirements of the 
General Agreement and the other covered agreements”. WTO, Appellate Body - United States - 
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, AB-1996-1, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, 29/04/1996, part V, last paragraph. 
66 For an analysis of the balance between national regulatory objectives and WTO’s purpose to establish a 
legal framework respecting the legitimate exercise of domestic regulatory autonomy whilst minimizing 
regulatory differences between members, see Roessler, F., “Increasing Market Access under Regulatory 
Heterogeneity: The Strategies of the World Trade Organisation”, in OECD, Regulatory Reform and 
International Market Openness, 1996, p. 117-129. 
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as such, but also those relating to processes and production methods. Apart from 
governmental regulations, the Agreement also covers voluntary standards issued by 
public or private standardisation bodies. By contrast, the SPS Agreement is limited to 
governmental sanitary and phytosanitary measures specifically intended to protect 
human and animal life and the preservation of plants. 
As previously reviewed, notwithstanding the difference in scope, the basic rules 
embodied in these Agreements are quite the same: when adopting and implementing 
product regulations, members must respect non-discrimination and proportionality. The 
non-discrimination requirements should be understood in the light of GATT article III.4 
which prescribes national treatment for imported goods in the application of internal 
regulations, and article XX allowing for general exceptions to the NT principles, subject 
to the condition that they are not applied in a manner that would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction to international trade. In turn, the proportionality 
requirement aims at encouraging the adoption of the least trade-obstructing measures 
capable of attaining the desired level of protection. 
Technical and scientific regulations should be based on available scientific evidence and 
states must be able to justify the content of their domestic regulations, particularly when 
they negatively affect trade with other countries. members have the right to demand 
explanations about other members’ regulations. In addition the Appellate Body has 
confirmed that the burden to prove that a discriminatory measure can be justified under 
one of the exceptions afforded by art. XX(b) GATT rests on the Party invoking the 
exception. 
The TBT and SPS Agreements acknowledge a significant role to international 
harmonisation, which is intended as a means of reducing technical obstacles to trade in 
goods. This is done by “encouraging” members to base their product regulations on 
existing international models insofar as this does not hamper the attainment of the 
legitimate domestic policy which the measure is designed to pursuit. A presumption of 
reasonableness of the measure and of the latter’s conformity with the Agreements’ 
prescriptions is associated with the adoption of international standards, guidelines and 
recommendations. 
Regulations being neutral and in conformity with international rules is not a sufficient 
guarantee that they will not be applied in an arbitrary or unfair manner. Hence, the 
importance of national rules governing the practical implementation of domestic 
regulations by setting up assessment and control procedures. For this reason, the SPS 
and TBT Agreements also deal with conformity assessment activities, such as testing, 
inspection, type approval or certification. WTO members are asked to comply with the 
general rules of non-discrimination and proportionality also when operating conformity 
assessment procedures. In addition, they must ensure procedural guarantees in favour of 
traders and importers in order to avoid arbitrary or protectionist attitudes. The latter 
include, inter alia, the prohibition of unjustified delays or excessive fees, the duty of 
confidentiality, the applicants’ right to be informed an any details of the procedure and 
the right to lodge appeals. 
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Finally, although it should be clarified that rules laid down in the Agreements only bind 
central government authorities, they indirectly affect local authorities nonetheless since 
the former are obliged to take all possible measures to ensure that the latter comply with 
the requirements of the Agreements. 
It is unlikely that, just as it was the case within the European internal market, the above 
set of WTO rules would evolve to generate a recognition principle, notwithstanding two 
developments could be raised to suggest otherwise. First, the TBT and SPS Agreements 
now press members to use applicable international standards when setting domestic 
regulations and provides for a presumption of validity of the latter vis-à-vis the 
Agreements when they do so. However, the harmonisation intent enshrined in articles 
2.4 to 2.6 TBT and 3 SPS should not be seen to provide a basis for recognition. 
Although a balancing test may determine which measure poses unnecessary obstacles to 
trade, this does not create a presumption of invalidity for the non-harmonised measures 
when legislative objectives are legitimate and the means provided are indistinct67. 
Secondly, the GATT’s obligation to accord national treatment to imported products may 
also have been given a more lucid basis to challenge indistinct protectionist measures. 
This follows from the Japan-Alcoholic Beverages appellate report finding that GATT 
art. III:1, requiring measures not to be applied “so as to afford protection”, shall also 
“inform” the balance of article III’s provisions. Thus, GATT art. III:4, requiring no less 
favourable treatment may be implicitly interpreted in this larger context. Although this 
would suggest that a panel will examine factors beyond the indistinct treatment 
accorded to products in order to determine a protectionist design or application, this 
possibility does not mean that indistinct measures will now be invalidated when a 
protectionist application is not apparent68. 
For the GATT to take a step towards mutual recognition, the notion of NT would seem 
to require an overall interpretation that protection has been afforded solely because 
foreign producers have incurred an additional expense to modify or test their product for 
qualification abroad. It is questionable that such a proposition could or should be draw 
from the GATT provisions and its panel interpretations69. The comparison required for 
the purposes of indistinct product measures is likely to remain more centred upon the 
actual treatment accorded between products rather than as between producers looking at 
the GATT for a mandate for international level playing field70. Restraint remains likely 
where a legitimate domestic objective is acknowledged. It is true indeed that in the end, 
GATT is merely the sum of its members and they are unlikely to countenance 
incursions on their legitimate regulatory powers71. GATT national treatment should 
therefore not be pushed into an interpretative frame that would mandate recognition. 
                                                
67 Farber, D.A., Hudec, R.E., “GATT Legal Restraints on Domestic Environmental Regulations”, in 
Bhagwati, J., Hudec, R. (eds.), Fair Trade and Harmonisation, Vol. 2, Legal Analysis, Cambridge: MIT 
Press, p. 59-93, at 79. 
68 Mathis, J.H., “Mutual Recognition Agreements. Transatlantic Parties and the Limits to Non-tariff 
Barrier Regionalism in the WTO”, in Journal of World Trade, vol. 32, n. 6, 1998, p. 5-31, at 9-10. 
69 Ibid., at 10. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Farber, D.A., Hudec, R.E., “GATT Legal Restraints…”, at 80. 
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This being so, recognition practices are to be expected within the limits of the TBT and 
SPS requirements. Relevant provisions of both Agreements do not bind members to 
recognise other Members’ technical and sanitary regulations or conformity assessment 
procedures. Whereas autonomous and mutual recognition are encouraged, the 
Agreements acknowledge at the same time members’ regulatory autonomy by explicitly 
conceding that confidence in other members’ regulations is a pre-condition for 
recognition. All in all, if recognition were unconditionally mandated, or if GATT 
provisions could be interpreted so as to make it so, no disputes related to non-tariff 
barriers would have arisen and, even if so, those would have smootly be settled.  
 
3.2.a In the SPS Agreement 
 
(i) Autonomous recongnition 
Starting with the SPS Agreement, article 4.1 requires members to accept foreign 
sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, however different from their own, only if the 
exporting members whose regulations are at stake demonstrates that its measures do 
guarantee the achievement of the level of protection set by the importing member. 
Autonomous recognition of foreign sanitary measures, i.e. unilateral acceptance thereof, 
is thus made conditional to the acknowledgment of equivalence with own regulations 
and such acknowledgement is for the importing country to make, account being taken of 
its desired level of protection. Recognition of equivalence may therefore depend both on 
the objective demonstration of the measures’ potential for achievement of the importing 
country’s level of protection and on the confidence that the latter puts in the exporting 
country’s capacity to implement domestic regulation so as to achieve its desired level of 
protection. 
At its meeting of 26 October 2001, the SPS Committee adopted a Decision on the 
Implementation of article 4, hereinafter “Decision on Equivalence” 72. The Preamble of 
the Decision on Equivalence notes that the concept of equivalence requires acceptance 
of alternative measures that meet an importing member’s appropriate level of sanitary 
or phytosanitary protection, but not duplication or sameness of measures. Paragraph 1 
of the Decision provides: 
“1. Equivalence can be accepted for a specific measure or measures related to a certain 
product or categories of products, or on a systems-wide basis. Members shall, when so 
requested, seek to accept the equivalence of a measure related to a certain product or 
category of products. An evaluation of the product-related infrastructure and programmes 
within which the measure is being applied may also be necessary [73]. Members may 
further, where necessary and appropriate, seek more comprehensive and broad-ranging 
agreements on equivalence. The acceptance of the equivalence of a measure related to a 
single product may not require the development of a systems-wide equivalence 
                                                
72 WTO, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Decision on the Implementation of Article 
4 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, G/SPS/19, 26 October 
2001. 
73 Product-related infrastructures and programmes refer to testing, inspection and other relevant 
requirements specific to product safety. 
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agreement.” 
In order to demonstrate the equivalence of its own measures, the exporting member 
must be allowed to collect all relevant information concerning the level of protection 
required by the importing member. Thus, in order to facilitate the implementation of the 
provisions of article 4, the Decision describes the elements to be included in an 
explanation of the sanitary and phytosanitary measures taken by an importing member, 
when so requested by an exporting member: 
“2. [T]he importing Member should explain the objective and rationale of the sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure and identify clearly the risks that the relevant measure is intended 
to address. The importing Member should indicate the appropriate level of protection 
which its sanitary or phytosanitary measure is designed to achieve [74]. The explanation 
should be accompanied by a copy of the risk assessment on which the sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure is based or a technical justification based on a relevant 
international standard, guideline or recommendation. The importing Member should also 
provide any additional information which may assist the exporting Member to provide an 
objective demonstration of the equivalence of its own measure.” 
The Decision on Equivalence provides a list of requirements and recommendations 
regarding the procedure to be followed for recognition. First, importing members are 
required to timely respond to any application for recognition of equivalence. To this 
aim, the Decision sets a reasonable period of six-month time75. In turn, to support an 
objective demonstration of equivalent protection, the exporting member is required to 
provide appropriate science-based and technical information. This information may 
include, inter alia, reference to relevant international standards, or to relevant risk 
assessments undertaken by the importing member or by another member. In addition, 
the exporting member shall provide reasonable access to the importing member for 
inspection, testing and other relevant procedures for assessing equivalence76. 
Paragraph 5 of the Decision establishes an accelerated procedure for the determination 
of equivalence that the importing member are requested to apply with respect to those 
products which it has historically imported from the exporting member. As clarified in 
the Addendum 1 to the Decision77, the rational behind such procedure is that 
                                                
74 In doing so, members should take into account the Guidelines to Further the Practical Implementation 
of Article 5.5 adopted by the SPS Committee at its meetings of 21-22 June 2000. See WTO, Committee 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Guidelines to Further the Practical Implementation of Article 
5.5, G/SPS/15, 18 July 2000. 
75 WTO, G/SPS/19, para. 3, which states that a timely response to a request for consideration of 
equivalence should be issued “normally within a six-month period of time”. Such wording clearly leaves 
some leeway with respect to the six-month deadline. 
76 Ibid., para. 4. Para 7 of the Decision complete the requirement list with regard to the procedure for the 
recognition of equivalence by stating that: “When considering a request for recognition of equivalence, 
the importing Member should analyse the science-based and technical information provided by the 
exporting Member on its sanitary or phytosanitary measures with a view to determining whether these 
measures achieve the level of protection provided by its own relevant sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures”. 
77 Paragraph 13 of the Decision on Equivalence asks the SPS Committee to develop a specific programme 
to further the implementation of article 4. At the Doha Ministerial Conference, members also instructed 
the SPS Committee to develop the same specific programme (see WTO, Ministerial Conference, Fourth 
Session, Doha, 9-14 November 2001, Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, Decision of 14 
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/17, 20 November 2001, para. 3.3). At its meeting of 21 March 2002, the 
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information already available to the importing member should not be sought again as 
this may result in an unnecessary obstacle to trade78. 
The Decision on Equivalence also governs the interim period between the request of 
recognition and the decision on equivalence. A duty for the importing state not to 
interrupt or suspend ongoing imports of a specific product, pending a decision on 
equivalence, is clearly established at Paragraph 6. Nevertheless, Addendum 1 clarifies 
the provision by striking a balance between the right of the exporting member not to see 
its exports cut and that of the importing one to achieve its desired level of protection. 
On the one hand, since a request for recognition of equivalence does not in itself alter 
the way in which trade is occurring, there is no justification to disrupt or suspend trade. 
If an importing member were to do so solely because it had received a request for an 
equivalence determination, it would be in apparent violation of its obligations under the 
SPS Agreement, particularly of the principle of necessity and the prohibition of use of 
SPS measures as disguised restrictions of international trade under SPS article 279. 
However, on the other hand, a request for recognition of equivalence does not preclude 
an importing member from taking any measure it may deem necessary to achieve its 
appropriate level of protection, including in response to an emergency situation. This 
being said, if the decision to impose some additional control measure were to coincide 
with consideration by the same member of a request for recognition of equivalence, this 
might lead an exporting member whose trade is affected to suspect that the two events 
were linked. To avoid any misinterpretation of this kind, the Committee recommends 
that the importing member should give an immediate and comprehensive explanation of 
the reasons for its action in restricting trade to any other member affected, and that it 
should also follow the routine or emergency notification procedures established at 
paragraphs 5 to 10 of Annex B to the SPS Agreement80. 
                                                                                                                                          
SPS Committee thus adopted a specific Programme for Further Implementation of Article 4. The 
programme established the timetable and the agendas of the meetings for the discussion of the Decision 
on Equivalence; see WTO, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Equivalence - 
Programme for Further Work, Decision by the Committee, G/SPS/20, 21 March 2002. 
As foresees by the Programme and in order to clarify paragraph 5 - and paragraph 6 - of the Decision on 
Equivalence, the SPS Committee adopted another Decision at its meeting on 7–8 November 2002, 
hereinafter Addendum 1 to the Decision on Equivalence. See WTO, Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, Decision on the Implementation of Article 4 of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Addendum 1, G/SPS/19/Add.1, 15 November 2002. 
A second addendum of was agreed upon by the SPS Committee at its 24–25 June 2003 meeting for the 
purpose of clarifying paragraph 7 of the Decision on Equivalence. See WTO, G/SPS/19/Add.2, 15 July 
2003. A further clarification of paragraph 5 on the accelerate procedure for recognition of equivalence 
was agreed by the Committee at its meeting of 17–18 March 2004; see WTO, Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, Decision on the Implementation of Article 4 of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Addendum 3, G/SPS/19/Add.3, 26 March 2004. 
78 In Addendum 1, para. 2, the SPS Committee notes that the importance of knowledge based on historic 
trade reasons has been fully recognized by other international organizations and international agencies: 
“This information and experience, if directly relevant to the product and measure under consideration, 
should be taken into account in the recognition of equivalence of measures proposed by the exporting 
Member. In particular, information already available to the importing Member should not be sought again 
with respect to procedures to determine the equivalence of measures proposed by the exporting Member”. 
79 G/SPS/19/Add.1, para. 5. 
80 Ibid., para. 6. Paragraph 8 of the Decision on Equivalence provides further that, in line with article 9 of 
the SPS Agreement, members shall give full consideration to requests for appropriate technical assistance 
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(ii) Mutual recognition 
If article 4.1 SPS deals with the autonomous recognition of equivalence, paragraph 2 of 
the same provision encourages members to conclude bilateral and multilateral 
agreements on recognition of equivalence of specific SPS measures. More specifically, 
the provision encourages to enter into consultation to this aim. This reiterates the 
reference to confidence as a pre-condition for any sort of recognition that has already 
been seen with reference to unilateral recognition. 
The Decision on Equivalence does not extensively deal with MRAs, which are only 
mentioned by two provisions. First, in accordance with paragraph 12, members should 
regularly inform the SPS Committee of their experiences concerning the 
implementation of article 4, including in particular of the successful conclusion of any 
such equivalence agreements. Second, in relation to notification procedures, at its 
meeting of 26 October 2001, the SPS Committee adopted the following provision 
relating to the notification of the conclusion of equivalence agreements between 
members: 
“The Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures shall revise its recommended 
notification procedures to provide for the notification of the conclusion of agreements 
between Members which recognize the equivalence of sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures [original footnote to WTO, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, Revision of Recommended Notification Procedures, G/SPS/7/Rev.1, 26 
November 1999]. Furthermore, the procedures shall reinforce the existing obligation in 
paragraph 3(d) of Annex B of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures for national Enquiry Points to provide information, upon request, 
on the participation in any bilateral or multilateral equivalence agreements of the Member 
concerned”81. 
In both provisions, the focus is ensuring that concluded MRAs are made public rather 
than on the very content thereof. This can be explained by taking into account that the 
                                                                                                                                          
to facilitate the implementation of article 4, especially when those requests come from developing 
countries: “ […] This assistance may, inter alia, be to help an exporting Member identify and implement 
measures which can be recognized as equivalent, or to otherwise enhance market access opportunities. 
Such assistance may also be with regard to the development and provision of the appropriate science-
based and technical information referred to in paragraph 4, above”. 
Moreover, In order to improve international cooperation in this sphere outside the WTO, paragraph 9 of 
the Decision on Equivalence advises active participation of members in the ongoing work in the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission and in any work related to equivalence undertaken by the Office International 
des Epizooties and in the framework of the International Plant Protection Convention. 
Paragraph 10 of the Decision on Equivalence outlines a number of actions to be taken by the SPS 
Committee in this regard: “10. The Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures recognizes the 
urgency for the development of guidance on the judgement of equivalence and shall formally encourage 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission to complete its work with regard to equivalence as expeditiously as 
possible. The Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures shall also formally encourage the 
Office International des Epizooties and the Interim Commission on Phytosanitary Measures to elaborate 
guidelines, as appropriate, on equivalence of sanitary and phytosanitary measures and equivalence 
agreements in the animal health and plant protection areas. The Codex Alimentarius Commission, the 
Office International des Epizooties and the Interim Commission on Phytosanitary Measures shall be 
invited to keep the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures regularly informed regarding their 
activities relating to equivalence”. 
81 WTO, G/SPS/19, para. 11. 
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reminder of the Decision already interprets the concept of equivalence, which in turn 
applies to MRAs. As regard procedures for recognition, they represent the crucial 
difference between autonomous and mutual recognition. Whereas autonomous 
recognition is granted through the detailed procedures mentioned above, mutual 
recognition is the result of negotiations, typically not bound by procedural 
requirements. Nevertheless, the limits affecting a procedure for autonomous 
recognition, namely the objective demonstration of the equivalence of regulations by 
the exporting member in view of the achievement of the designed level of protection of 
the importing country, are not alien to the conclusion of a MRA. Quite to the contrary, 
whereas the issue of confidence operates in just one direction in the first case since the 
importing country is solely in the position to trust the exporting one and then grant 
recognition, in case of MRAs it does so in both directions, in that all the parties to the 
prospected agreement are importing and exporting countries at the same time. 
 
3.2.b In the TBT Agreement 
 
In terms of dedicated provisions, the TBT Agreement devotes much more attention to 
the issue of recognition than the SPS Agreement does. However, the record of 
jurisprudence or decisions by the TBT Committee in this respect is in fact less 
conspicuous than the one relating to art. 4 SPS. It is surprisingly so account being taken 
of the number of MRAs concluded in relation to technical regulations and, conversely, 
of the almost complete absence of such agreements in the sanitary field. 
Equivalence related provisions of the TBT Agreement can be grouped in three 
categories: recognition of technical regulation, recognition of conformity assessment 
procedures (CAPs) and inclusiveness of previously concluded MRAs. It is worth noting 
that, just as it is the case in the SPS field, also the TBT Agreement distinguishes 
between autonomous and mutual recognition and imposes different obligations 
accordingly. 
Firstly, reference to recognition of technical regulations is solely expressed as an 
encouragement to give positive consideration to accepting as equivalent regulations in 
force in other members, however different from one country’s owns. Article 2.7 thus 
establishes an exhortation to autonomous recognition of technical standards, which is 
however made conditional to the fulfilment of the usual confidence precondition. 
Positive consideration shall be accorded to foreign regulations as long as the importing 
country is persuaded that these regulations are capable to achieve the same objectives 
for which comparable national regulations have been designed. This is equivalent to 
demanding the fulfilment of the criterion of capability to attain the level of protection 
chosen by the importing country under art. 4 SPS. 
Secondly, art. 6 TBT provides that conformity assessment procedures can be the 
object of both autonomous and mutual recognition by central government bodies. 
Consistently with articles 2.7 TBT and 4 SPS, the first paragraph of the provision 
confirms the conditionality of unilateral recognition of exporting member’s CAPs on 
the assurance of the latter’s conformity “with applicable technical regulations and 
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standards equivalent to [the importing country’s] own procedures”. Furthermore, the 
provision recognise that prior consultations may be necessary to achieve a mutually 
satisfying understanding82. In this context, the issue of confidence in the reliability of 
foreign conformity assessment results is explicitly mentioned. In particular, such 
consultations might indeed regard, on the one hand, adequate and enduring technical 
competence of the relevant conformity assessment bodies (CABs) in the exporting 
country83 and, on the other, limitation of the acceptance of conformity assessment 
results to those produced by designed - that is accredited bodies - in the exporting 
country84. 
The encouragement to conclude agreements for the mutual recognition of results of 
national CAPs is contained in paragraph 3. Unlike art. 4.2 SPS, which remains silent on 
the matter of mutual confidence, art. 6.3 TBT explicitly admits that such agreements 
must fulfil the criterion of the assurance of conformity and give mutual satisfaction with 
regard to their potential for trade facilitation. Moreover, members are encouraged to 
grant a MFN treatment in relation to participation in their conformity assessment 
procedures to CABs of members which are not party to a given MRA85. Finally, art. 
10.7 TBT governs the existence of MRAs by prescribing notification to other members 
through the WTO Secretariat86 and by encouraging members that are already part of 
such an agreement to favour the extension of the participation thereto or the conclusion 
of analogous agreements through consultation with other non-concerned WTO 
members. 
 
3.2.c Preliminary observations concerning the SPS and TBT discipline on mutual 
recognition 
 
Some remarks can be made in relation to the SPS and TBT discipline on equivalence 
recognition. 
First, autonomous recognition always requires confidence in the other’s technical and 
sanitary regulations and conformity assessment procedures thereto. 
Second, mutual recognition is negotiated. Therefore, even though mutual trust is also 
crucial to the conclusion MRAs and even more so since it operates bi-directionally, this 
option is reasonably perceived my States as less risky than autonomous recognition. 
The mutual character of recognition indicates that the reallocation of regulatory 
authority is reciprocal and simultaneous87. This is due to the contractual nature of the 
                                                
82 Art. 6.1 SPS. 
83 Art. 6.1.1 SPS. 
84 Art. 6.1.2 SPS. 
85 Art. 6.3 SPS. 
86 The TBT Committee agreed on a notification format concerning MRAs on issues related to technical 
regulations, standards or conformity assessment procedures. The format requires indication of: the 
notifying member; the title of the bilateral or plurilateral agreement; the parties thereto; the date of entry 
into force; the products covered; the subject matter covered by the agreement, be it technical regulations, 
standards or conformity assessment procedures; a brief description of the agreement. See WTO, 
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Decisions And Recommendations Adopted By The 
Committee Since 1 January 1995 - Note by the Secretariat, G/TBT/1/Rev.8, 23 May 2002, p. 24. 
87 Nicolaïdis, K., Mutual recognition of regulatory regimes: some lessons and prospects, Jean Monnet 
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perspective obligations which are to be entered into, which affords viable walk-away 
options for the parties to the negotiation and thus turn mutual recognition from its 
“pure” EU-style form, entailing full unhindered rights of access to other parties’ 
markets reflecting full allocation of regulatory authority from the importing to the 
exporting country, into “managed mutual recognition”, which is applicable to specific 
goods and includes more or less restrictive constraints and caveats88. 
Finally, whereas the dichotomy autonomous versus mutual recognition is present in 
relation to both sanitary measures and procedures for assessment of conformity with 
technical regulations, no trace can be detected of references to mutual recognition in 
relation to technical regulations as such. Articles 2.7 only encourages unilateral 
recognition. Does this apparent contradiction suggest anything? Some have construed 
relevant TBT provisions so as to consider MRAs lawful to the extent that they only 
govern CAPs and do not also touch upon technical regulations and standards. However, 
first, since MRAs in this field are not expressly forbidden, they must be considered 
WTO-compatible; second, art. 10.7 requires notification of, inter alia, MRAs 
concerning technical regulations and standards. This is confirmed in the notification 
format agreed upon by the TBT Committee. 
 
3.3 The evolving EU’s approach to harmonization and mutual recognition 
 
There exist three primary options for easing regulatory barriers to trade: harmonisation, 
mutual recognition and national treatment. Conceptually these can be considered as 
alternative approaches to trade liberalisation89. Under a policy of harmonisation, 
regulators in separate jurisdictions agree to adopt identical substantive standards and 
procedures. Such policy facilitates both cross-border trade and further regulatory 
cooperation because of regulators’ greater comfort with uniform standards. Under a 
policy of mutual recognition, regulators retain own regulations and standards for 
internally-manufactured products, but agree to recognise the other jurisdictions’ 
regulations and standards for imported products, albeit – as said – subject to significant 
conditions and sometimes control due to the regulator’s unfamiliarity and unease with 
divergent foreign regulations. Under a policy of national treatment, each jurisdiction 
maintains its own standards and is proscribed only from applying more stringent 
standards to foreign products with a view not to unduly hamper trade. As such, a 
national treatment regime, as it was the one resulting from the original GATT 1947, 
removes fewer regulatory barriers particularly since it is not able to affect those which 
are prima facie non-discriminatory. 
                                                                                                                                          
Working Paper, 1997/07, retrieved at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-07.html, para. 1. 
88 Ibid. Nicolaïdis further describes the managed nature of mutual recognition as enshrined in MRAs by 
referring to the fact that the latter vary in their regulatory scope, they usually leave residual powers to the 
importing state, they involve mutual monitoring between regulatory authorities well as enhanced 
cooperation and require stringent ex-ante and ex-post conditions. 
89 Nicolaïdis, K., Mutual recognition of regulatory regimes…, op. cit., at para. 8. See also same author, 
“Regulatory Cooperation and Managed Mutual Recognition: Developing a Strategic Model”, in Bermann, 
G., Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation, 2001, p. 596. 
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Historically, however, mutual recognition has come about as a residual alternative to 
either of the other two, as it is best illustrated by the history of its progressive 
emergence in the EU. To support this assertion, Nicolaïdis recalls the traditional 
distinction between negative economic integration, consisting in the removal of 
discriminatory elements, and positive economic integration, under which different 
polities resort to the transfer of public market-rule-making and policy-making powers to 
the supranational level. Trade liberalisation in Europe rather quickly came to be seen as 
requiring a mix between national treatment and harmonisation as the operative norms 
corresponding to negative and positive integration respectively. For a long time, under 
the so-called old approach, approximation of laws was seen as requiring detailed 
harmonisation and, pending such harmonisation, national treatment was policed by the 
Commission and the European Court of Justice in an increasingly constraining manner, 
namely in the form of mutual recognition principle as stated in the 1979 Cassis de Dijon 
ruling. 
Judicial mutual recognition is one of the cornerstones of the EU new approach to 
technical regulations and standards. If it operated as a stimulus to cope with the 
shortcomings of the old approach90, it caused at the same time preoccupation amongst 
Member States about the potential loss of control on domestic markets. In fact, by 
setting a course which led to a mandated recognition of other Member States’ 
regulations, the Court of Justice made it incumbent upon them to agree on the minimum 
regulatory requirements than could be reasonably imposed on trade, and to likewise 
enunciate positively a criterion for qualifying systems of certification. Court action was 
translated into legislative action and, since 1985, the internal market has therefore 
developed as a result of what are termed the new and the global approach to technical 
regulation91. Such approaches constitute both an alternative to the former methods of 
harmonisation and a tool for the containment of mutual recognition potentially invasive 
effects vis-à-vis national regulatory autonomy. 
Under the new approach to technical harmonisation, EU institutions only mandate 
essential requirement for manufactures, delegating the determination of more-detailed 
standards to quasi-public European standards organizations. Under the global approach 
to conformity assessment, the EU coordinates quasi-public national certification bodies 
                                                
90 Mathis, J.H., “Mutual Recognition Agreements”, op. cit., at 11. The old approach to harmonisation 
proved slow and inadequate. For some products it took more than a decade to lay down harmonised rules, 
which were sometimes outdated by the time they entered into force. In the vast majority of cases, detailed 
harmonisation was hindered by the applicable unanimity rule. Furthermore, the problem of divergent 
industrial standards, which are of private and voluntary nature, but are nonetheless able to operate as 
barriers to trade, was left largely unaddressed. See also Beynon, P., “Community mutual recognition 
agreements, technical barriers to trade and the WTO's most favoured nation principle”, in European Law 
Review, vol. 28, n. 2, 2003, p. 231-249, at 233, where the author maintains that the Cassis judgment of 
the ECJ was the legal basis for the new approach; Eeckhout, P., The European Internal Market and 
International Trade: A Legal Analysis, Oxford: OUP, 1994, p. 265 and 270-275 as referenced to in 
Jiménez García, G., Gardeñes Santiago, M., “Technical Standards in a Context of Regional Integration 
Agreements”, in Demaret, P., Bellis, J.F., García Iménez, G. (eds.), Regionalism and multilateralism after 
the Uruguay Round – Convergence, Divergence and Interaction, Brussels, 1997, p. 631, at 641. 
91 See European Commission, Guide to the Implementation of Directive Based on the New and Global 
Approach, 2000, retrieved at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/documents/blue-
guide/index_en.htm, last visited in August 2011. 
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to certify products manufactured in any of the Member States for sale throughout the 
internal market. 
In 1985, the European Commission issued a Communication setting forth its new 
approach to technical harmonisation in response to the market-distorting and market-
segregating impact of multiple national standards and the difficulty to appropriately 
overcome those at the European level solely through the obsolete old approach92. Under 
the new approach, the Council enacts framework directives for technical standards 
covering essential requirements to which products have to conform. Accordingly, 
harmonisation is no longer aimed at completeness and approximation of national laws is 
confined to these essential requirements. The combination of qualified majority rule, 
introduced by the 1987 single European Act as the ordinary voting procedure for the 
adoption of internal market legislation, and the reduction of EC-prescribed standards to 
essential requirements, together with the highly publicised push to complete the internal 
market by 1992, lead to the adoption of a series of EC harmonisation directives93. 
The new approach entails delegation of the task to draw up more detailed standards 
to industrial standardisation bodies operating under the umbrella of three European 
standards organisations: CEN, CENELEC and ETSI94. These organisations are 
comprised of national standards bodies that, in turn, include representatives from 
national governments, industries and other social groups. The simple majority voting 
procedure in use within such bodies facilitates the adoption of non-essential technical 
standards, which are however not internally binding on Member States, so that the latter 
retain some de jure autonomy. Nonetheless, agreed standards have become de facto 
harmonised requirement for selling products within the EU marketplace by virtue of the 
presumption of conformity - to the essential requirements laid down in the relevant 
directives - which the new approach affords to products manufactured in accordance 
with harmonised standards set by the above private bodies95. 
                                                
92 European Commission, Technical Harmonisation and Standardisation: a New Approach, 
COM(1985)19 final, Bull. EC-1-1985, not published in the Official Journal and Council Resolution of 7 
May 1985 on a new approach to technical harmonization and standards, OJ C 136, 4.6.1985, p. 1–9. 
93 Egan notes the adoption of 21 “new approach” harmonisation directives between 1985-2000 covering a 
wide range of manufacturing fields and giving rise to 2905 standardisation acts ratified or in the process 
of preparation or approval by standards organisations as of June 1997. See Egan, M., Constructing a 
European Market: Standards, Regulation and Governance, Oxford: OUP, 2001, p. 166-167. The EC’s 
1988 Toy Safety Directive is a good example of the application of the new and global approaches. See 
note 9 to this Chapter. See also Majone, G., “Market and Regulatory Competition in the European Union: 
Lessons for the Integrating World Economy”, in Moravcsik, A. (ed.), Centralisation or Fragmentation? 
Europe facing the Challenges of Deepening, Diversity and Democracy, Council of Foreign Relation, 
1998, p. 94, at 107-108. At present, Commission DG Enterprise and Industry website lists some 30 new 
approach-related directives, whose subject matters range from low voltage to energy efficiency 
requirements for ballasts for fluorescent lighting. These directives are either new approach directives 
providing for EC marking, or directives based on the principles of the new approach or the global 
approach, but which do not provide for CE marking, or finally directives simply based on some principles 
of the new approach and the global approach. See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/european-
standards/documents/harmonised-standards-legislation/list-references/#h2-4 (last visited Aug. 23, 2011). 
94 The Comité Européen de Normalisation (CEN) was founded in 1961; the Comité Européen de 
Normalisation Electrotechnique (CENELEC) in 1959 and the European Telecommunications and 
Standards Institute (ETSI) in 1988.  
95 This is confirmed by the Council Guidelines for a New Approach to Technical Harmonisation and 
Standards, where the Council outlines the four fundamental principles on which the new approach is 
CHAPTER I – THE EUROPEAN QUEST FOR REGULATORY AUTONOMY 
 57 
The new approach did little to solve obstacles associated with conformity assessment 
because, even when the underlying product requirements were the same, there was the 
typical lack of confidence in testing and certification mentioned above. This led the 
European Commission to start a new system under the EC’s global approach to 
conformity assessment96, aimed at developing homogeneous certification structures 
throughout Europe and at creating legal marks to prove conformity with EC – now EU - 
directives97. Under the global approach products may be tested and certified within any 
of the Member States in order to receive a “CE” – now “UE” - marking, which indicates 
that they comply with Community norms. All Members must recognise these 
certifications as required by mandatory mutual recognition, so that certified products 
may circulate freely throughout the EU market. Such approach is termed global 
precisely because once a competent notified body98 certifies that a product meets EU 
standards, the product may be marketed in all other Member States. In 1990, the EC 
Member States founded the European Organisation for Testing and Certification 
(EOTC) to coordinate national bodies engaged in the certification process and thereby 
help assuring national authorities of the reliability of tests concluded in other Member 
States99. Each Member State must approve and its responsible for overseeing the 
certification bodies within its jurisdiction and must notify its approvals to the 
Commission DG Enterprise and Industry. These testing and certification laboratories are 
consequently referred to as “notified bodies”. Member States authorities periodically 
meet and exchange information about process’ operation through working groups and 
committees created pursuant to the relevant directives. They thereby attempt to build 
                                                                                                                                          
based: first, legislative harmonization is limited to the adoption, by means of Directives, of the essential 
safety requirements (or other requirements in the general interest) with which products put on the market 
must conform, and which should therefore enjoy free movement throughout the Community; second, the 
task of drawing up the technical specifications needed for the production and placing on the market of 
products conforming to the essential requirements established by the Directives, while taking into account 
the current stage of technology, is entrusted to organizations competent in the standardization area; third, 
these technical specifications are not mandatory and maintain their status of voluntary standards; finally 
at the same time, national authorities are obliged to recognize that products manufactured in conformity 
with harmonized standards are presumed to conform to the essential requirements established by the 
Directive. This signifies that the producer has the choice of not manufacturing in conformity with the 
standards but that in this event he has an obligation to prove that his products conform to the essential 
requirements of the Directive. See Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a new approach to technical 
harmonization and standards, cit., Annex II. 
96 European Commission, A Global Approach To Certification And Testing Quality Measures For 
Industrial Products, COM/89/209FINAL - SYN 208, OJ C 267, 19.10.1989, p. 3. 
97 See Council Directive 93/68/EEC of 22 July 1993 amending Directives 87/404/EEC (simple pressure 
vessels), 88/378/EEC (safety of toys), 89/106/EEC (construction products), 89/336/EEC (electromagnetic 
compatibility), 89/392/EEC (machinery), 89/686/EEC (personal protective equipment), 90/384/EEC 
(non-automatic weighing instruments), 90/385/EEC (active implantable medicinal devices), 90/396/EEC 
(appliances burning gaseous fuels), 91/263/EEC (telecommunications terminal equipment), 92/42/EEC 
(new hot-water boilers fired with liquid or gaseous fuels) and 73/23/EEC (electrical equipment designed 
for use within certain voltage limits), OJ L 220, 30.8.1993, p. 1–22. See also Council Decision 
93/465/EEC of 22 July 1993 concerning the modules for the various phases of the conformity assessment 
procedures and the rules for the affixing and use of the CE conformity marking, which are intended to be 
used in the technical harmonization directives, OJ L 220, 30.8.1993, p. 23–39. 
98 For a definition of notified body see further in this paragraph. 
99 Shaffer, G., “Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The prospects and Limits of New Approaches 
to Transatlantic Governance through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbour Agreements”, in Columbia 
Journal of European Law, vol. 9, Fall 2002, p. 29-77, at 6. 
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and retain confidence in the system100. The EU system can therefore be characterised as 
governance by coordinated cross-border public-private networks101. 
Moves to extend the Community’s mutual recognition activity, broadly conceived, to 
its relations with third countries began in the late 80s. In 1989, the Commission 
announced it would allow conformity assessment bodies of third countries to participate 
in the European system of conformity assessment on the same basis as European bodies, 
in an effort to promote the elaboration of mutual recognition agreements with its trading 
partners. In 1992, the Council concretised what can be defined as the beyond internal 
market approach by adopting a Decision authorising the Commission to negotiate 
MRAs concerning conformity assessment. Subsequent negotiating directives in 1994 
and 1998 authorised negotiations on a bilateral basis. Talks were opened first between 
the Commission and the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and further 
negotiations followed with Switzerland, Japan and Israel. 
The suggestion at the core of this approach is that the EU recognition techniques 
have sufficient evolved internally to be considered as a viable instrument for external 
application and as a basis for international agreements which would serve to exchange 
the benefits of internal free movement for the like-treatment of EU goods within the 
counterparts’ territory102. In so doing, the need for the EU and other low-tariff territories 
to cope with indistinct internal measures is addressed and the European choice of an 
instrument to advance this goal in international trade is precisely that of MRAs. In this 
context, two questions should be considered. First, how the WTO law might 
accommodate such agreements as they develop on a bilateral basis. Secondly, to what 
extent the EU succeeded in exporting its own substantial and procedural product 
requirements thank to the conclusion of agreements carrying a nuanced – because 
negotiated – version of the mutual recognition principle. 
 
3.4 Mutual Recognition Agreements 
 
Whereas in the regional integration context the EU represents the most developed 
scenario of harmonisation as opposed to other regional organisations which are still 
falling behind, at the multilateral level the TBT and SPS Agreements require WTO 
members to participate actively in international standardisation bodies and to make use 
of available international standards and conformity assessments systems, unless there is 
a reasonable justification not to do so. This forces the parties to articulate why 
international standards would either be irrelevant or inadequate in relation to domestic 
objectives. As it has been seen, a second best solution is put forward at art. 2.7 TBT and 
4.1 SPS where both Agreements encourage WTO members to recognise the equivalence 
                                                
100 Shaffer notes that firms and laboratories remain subject to post-marketing members’ regulatory 
controls as well as market reputational constraints. See ibid., note 23. 
101 Dehousse, R., “Regulation by networks in the European Community: the role of European agencies”, 
in Journal of European Public Policy, n. 4, 1997, p. 246. See also Egan, op. cit., at 12 and, with regard to 
the significance of mutual recognition in terms of transnational governance, Nicolaïdis, K., Shaffer, G., 
“Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance without Global Government”, in Law and 
Contemporary Problems, vol. 68, 2005, p. 263 ff. 
102 Mathis, J.H., “Mutual Recognition Agreements”, loc. cit. 
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of technical regulations of other members, irrespectively of the differences that might be 
existing as to the substance but nonetheless provided that each acknowledging member 
is sufficiently satisfied concerning whether and how foreign regulation are such as to 
achieve the objectives pursued by its own regulatory measures. Furthermore, art. 4.2 
SPS and 6.3 TBT encourage members to conclude bilateral and plurilateral mutual 
recognition agreements regarding, respectively, each other’s measures and the outcomes 
of national conformity assessment procedures. Therefore, the TBT and SPS Agreements 
encourage harmonisation when it is possible and mutual recognition when the former is 
not. 
It has been argued that mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) would have been at the 
heart of the trade diplomacy in the first decade of the XI century103, on the ground that 
they do represent not only an effective approach to trade-restricting consequences of 
differences in national regulatory systems but also a powerful impetus for coordinating 
and improving such systems through regulatory cooperation. More than a decade after 
its rise to fame in the European context with Cassis and with the above recalled 
provisions having been enshrined in relevant WTO legal texts, mutual recognition 
proved contagious. MRAs have been negotiated or at least considered on both a 
bilateral, plurilateral104 and regional basis105. The results of the negotiations for a 
bilateral MRA between the EU and the US were particularly awaited as a possible 
model in this regard. 
Mutual recognition can be defined as a contractual norm between governments whereby 
they agree to the transfer of regulatory authority from the host jurisdiction where a 
transaction takes place, to the home jurisdiction from which a product originates106. 
This in turn embodies the general principle underlying mutual recognition whereby if a 
product can be lawfully commercialised in one jurisdiction, it can also be 
commercialised in any other participating jurisdiction without having to comply with 
the regulations of the latter. The recognition involved here is of the equivalence, 
compatibility or at least acceptability of the counterparts’ regulatory system, whereas 
the mutual nature of recognition indicates that the reallocation of authority is reciprocal 
and simultaneous107. Finally, MRAs are specific instances of application of this general 
                                                
103 Nicolaïdis, K., Mutual recognition of regulatory regimes: some lessons and prospects, para. I. 
104 Consideration was given to the conclusion of an MRA among the Quad countries. In the WTO jargon, 
the latter term is employed to describe the four major industrialised-country markets, i.e. the US, Canada, 
the European Union and Japan. 
105 Within APEC, ASEAN, NAFTA and the FTAA. 
106 Nicolaïdis, K., loc. cit. 
107 On the relation between harmonisation, national treatment and mutual recognition, Nicolaïdis put 
forward an argument reversing the usual perspective and proposing mutual recognition as the core 
paradigm for trade liberalisation. She maintains that: “contrary to the traditional view that mutual 
recognition should be turned to as a residual option if policed national treatment is not enough and full 
harmonisation not feasible, commercial diplomacy should adopt mutual recognition as the core paradigm 
for dealing with regulatory barriers to trade. The creation of transnational jurisdictions is the only way to 
provide transnational actors with a single authority of control or conformity assessment. Liberalisation 
exercises need to adopt mutual recognition as their starting assumption, even while some degree of 
residual host country control or prior harmonisation may be deemed necessary. Such a transversal 
perspective implies that it is policed national treatment and harmonisation that ought to be considered as 
deviations from the core MR paradigm”, ibid., para II.2.  
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scheme between specific parties, applying to specific goods and including more or less 
restrictive constraints and caveats. 
The negotiation and implementation of these agreements are in fact bound to be a 
source of tensions and even conflict between states in so far as differences of view may 
arise on their desirable scope and on the best way in which they can accommodate long 
lasting differences in regulatory traditions that such agreements are not in any case 
designed to eradicate. As a matter of fact, MRAs in force do not generally apply mutual 
recognition in its pure form, namely consisting in unhindered rights of access reflecting 
full reallocation of authority from the host to the home jurisdiction. Instead, they 
operate a principle that has been referred to as “managed mutual recognition”108. As it 
will be shown, MRAs usually leave residual powers to the host state, involve mutual 
monitoring between regulatory authorities as well as enhanced cooperation and require 
stringent ex-ante and ex-post conditions. 
So far, MRAs have been envisaged by the Union in the field of conformity assessment 
procedures for industrial products. These agreements are based on the premise that if 
the product of a sector covered by the agreement is successfully tested in one country, 
the results of the test should also be acknowledged by the other parties to the agreement, 
thus establishing a “once tested, accepted everywhere” principle109. A key element is 
therefore that acceptance of tests and certificates from the other party is granted 
irrespective of whether the two parties have or not equivalent regulations governing the 
product concerned110. The crux of the issue lies precisely in that, however desirable, it is 
not necessary for countries to have harmonised their respective regulatory requirements 
prior to the conclusion of a MRA. This is why mutual recognition agreements are 
considered as a viable alternative to the achievement of harmonisation of regulatory 
requirements. In fact, given both the practical limits to harmonisation and the political 
imperative of subsidiarity at the world level, the fundamental choice is not between 
regulatory heterogeneity and regulatory homogeneity across states. Quite to the 
contrary, the key point lays in taking for granted regulatory heterogeneity and focus on 
the extent to which mutual recognition should be introduced or, as Nicolaïdis puts it, to 
what extent should a decentralised approach to regulation be accompanied by a 
reallocation of jurisdiction authority operated through a MRA111. 
Benefits resulting from the conclusion of MRAs are at first sight undisputable and all 
account for improvements of market access and trade facilitation. First, participating 
states agree to recognise the result of each other’s product inspection, testing or 
certification procedures issued by agreed bodies in the country of origin, thus 
eliminating double testing and certification in the importing countries. By eliminating 
the costs and delays connected to double inspections, market access is improved. 
Second, the importing country will not dispose of any margin for applying domestic 
                                                
108 Ibid. 
109 Jiménez García, G., Gardeñes Santiago, M., “Technical Standards in a Context of Regional Integration 
Agreements”, op. cit., p. 652. 
110 See Clarke, J., “Mutual Recognition Agreements”, in International Trade Law and Regulation, n. 2, 
1996, p. 31-36. 
111 Nicolaïdis, K., loc. cit. 
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testing and certification procedure in a protectionist or discriminatory manner. As a 
result, trade is facilitated and competition and efficiency are stimulated. Also, exporters 
avoid the risks of an importing country carrying out reverse engineering, infringing in 
intellectual property rights and engaging in unauthorised technology transfer through 
the process of evaluating the performance of imports. Finally, MRAs contribute to 
enhance transparency and promote harmonisation of standards and regulatory systems. 
Such potential benefits vary with the actual compliance costs, themselves a function of 
differences in applicable national regulations. An assessment of the judicial 
enforceability of mutual recognition or of the political desirability of a MRA involves 
weighting regulatory costs against trade benefits. Even if for trade purposes the case in 
favour of mutual recognition can be made effortlessly, positions need to be more 
nuances when we turn to regulatory and political implications of mutual recognition. 
From the regulatory point of view, three broad arguments can be invoked in favour of 
mutual recognition. First, MRAs introduce freedom of choice for consumers, extending 
the traditional argument in favour of free trade to the freedom to choose amongst rules. 
Some consumers will derive greater benefits from stringent regulations even at higher 
costs while others will favour lower price/lesser quality packages. Second, regulatory 
competition introduced by mutual recognition is likely to increase the efficiency of 
regulations by acting as means of discovery and even lead to convergence towards 
optimal outcome through the arbitrages of consumers and firms rather than 
bureaucracies. Third, mutual recognition can improve regulatory practices directly 
through better division of labour and enhanced cooperation between regulators or 
private regulatory bodies112. 
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to deny that pure mutual recognition does have 
regulatory costs. At a minimum, the primary rationale for domestic regulation, e.g. to 
correct market failures which include externalities such as asymmetric information, is 
put into question. First, because states hold very different notions of what markets 
failures are and how they should be corrected. Second, market failures may actually be 
magnified under a mutual recognition regime: information asymmetries may be greater 
between consumers and suppliers from different countries. Third, home state regulatory 
and conformity assessment bodies alone may not have the capacity to effectively 
enforce the counterpart’s regulation or their owns across jurisdictions. Fourth, mutual 
recognition risks introducing a new basis for “unfair competition”113. Fifth, mutual 
recognition may create incentives for deregulatory competition and a race-to-the-bottom 
between regulators. 
The extent to which these arguments justify limiting the adoption of MR has been 
extensively debated, in particular in European circles. The outcome of these debates and 
deals between regulators and bodies with delegated authority have formed the basis for 
the “managed” character of mutual recognition in the EU context, including various 
                                                
112 Ibid., para. III.2. 
113 The strength of this argument is nuanced if consideration is given to the negotiated and therefore 
managed nature of MRAs. Unfair competition would be the outcome of recognising the equivalence of 
permissive conformity assessment procedures. The negotiated nature of MRAs allows choosing what to 
include into the agreement’s scope and with whom concluding it. 
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degrees of prior harmonisation, reduction in regulatory scope and progressive expansion 
of such scope, safeguard clauses for the host state and provisions for mutual oversight 
between regulatory bodies. 
The ultimate argument in favour of mutual recognition is political. It is a way to ensure 
subsidiarity at the world level in an era when citizens feel increasingly alienated by the 
economic forces of globalisation and homogenisation. Subsidiarity here is a 
synonymous of the protection of state sovereignty and of the diversity of local and 
national traditions114. While the argument is valid, it is crucial to stress its limits. If 
mutual recognition falls short of a supranational transfer of power, it nevertheless 
constitutes a transnational transfer of power that may with time come to be seen as 
much of an infringement on sovereignty. Furthermore, a horizontal rather than vertical 
transfer affords less control over the delegated authority. In turn, mutual recognition 
puts into question democratic models of representation, as citizens will not necessarily 
perceive it as an instance of “nearness”. In fact, should a citizen be harmed by a drug or 
a machine approved by a foreign regulatory authority recognised as competent by the 
home state, who is to be hold ultimately accountable? Political accountability may be 
better guaranteed by overlapping jurisdictions through harmonisation than by 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Hence the paradox whereby mutual recognition can be both 
advocated and contested in the name of subsidiarity. 
 
3.4.a The relation between mutual recognition activities and general GATT principles 
 
A preliminary issue to be dealt with before offering an overview of MRAs concluded by 
the Union is the one of compatibility of such agreements with WTO provisions at large. 
Is has been see that mutual recognition is actually encouraged by the SPS and TBT 
Agreements. The latter are nonetheless subject to general principles such as enshrined in 
the GATT, namely NT and MFN. This being so, the question seems to be how much 
latitude is granted to the parties to the negotiations of an MRA under WTO obligations 
and according to what conditions, if any, should other WTO members have a basis to 
claim the benefits resulting from such agreements. For the sake of answering this 
question, an overview of how the above general GATT principle relate to recognition 
activities in order to identify the position of third parties must be provided. 
Starting with national treatment (NT), this principle operates to compare imported 
products to domestic ones in regard to the treatment provided. However, such a 
comparison is not a stake in the case of MRAs. Instead, each contracting party should 
be understood to be granting a waiver from the application of a domestic requirement 
that would otherwise be lawful to impose. Thus, if jurisdiction A waives an internal 
requirement to the benefits of goods originating from B, but yet continues to impose its 
requirements upon its own goods, then there has not been a denial of NT to the goods 
originating from a third jurisdiction C. The latter indeed continue to receive NT after the 
conclusion of a MRA between A and B as their relationship to domestic treatment has 
not been altered in any way. 
                                                
114 Ibid., para. III.3. 
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Recognition can however be construed as preference inasmuch as it does infer that some 
kind of benefit has been accorded, what brings the MFN principle under the spot light 
as enshrined in article I GATT, which in turn relate to NT as expressed in article III. In 
this respect, article I GATT should be construed to apply: first, to any advantage or 
favour in connection with importation; second, to extend NT to all WTO members; and 
third, in connection with any treatment that is accorded after importation in respect to 
the imposition or non-imposition of any internal public requirement. The latter point is 
to say that the granting recognition to only one party amounts to according a preference 
and, without reference to some exception to be found in the GATT or WTO Agreement, 
it is controlled by the MFN obligation. 
Two consequences can be drawn. First, if the grantor determines not to extend 
recognition through MFN, an exception to the principle should be identified and 
invoked in order to avoid a challenge of nullification or impairment under GATT article 
XXIII. Second, the control of MFN should serve to provide the context by which 
provisions affording recognition may be interpreted by panels, as exceptions to the 
general GATT obligations tend to be narrowly interpreted. Thus, where the excepting 
provision does not clearly delineate between favouring a multilateral rather than a 
plurilateral/conditional approach, or a plurilateral rather than a bilateral approach, the 
MFN contractual obligation should operate in favour of the more participatory regime. 
In the excepting provision is unclear in the manner in which it limits the rights of third 
parties, panels may not choose to assign these rights to the narrower context solely on 
the ground that the provision affords or perhaps encourage recognition, or because the 
parties to the MRA have chosen to make a bilateral and reciprocal exchange. 
Against this background, it is worth recalling the TBT provisions referring to 
recognition of conformity assessment procedures in order to ascertain whether ant to 
what extend, by affording the above mentioned exceptions, they do accord WTO 
members latitude to form MRA without incurring potential challenges by third parties. 
In particular, consideration must be given to how article 5.1.1 TBT applies to the rights 
of WTO members in the case where an existing domestic assessment requirement has 
been waived as to the goods originating from another party. Where domestic goods 
remain subject to the home country procedure, MFN should also apply as, account 
being taken of its wording, article 5.1.1 TBT also relates to all matters covered by 
article III GATT. Therefore, MFN must be afforded not only on the basis of NT but also 
in relation to any other benefit that has been afforded internally. 
With regard to autonomous recognition, the “whenever possible” condition foreseen at 
article 6.1 TBT is noted as a qualification to the MFN obligation based on the idea that 
conformity assessment recognition related directly to the receipt of verifiable assurance 
that another country’s procedures are adequate to insure legitimate domestic 
requirements for health and safety. A primary conceptual distinction is hereby 
introduced between the waiver of an internal requirement and the granting of an 
external preference: the waiving of an internal assessment procedure in favour of 
another’s procedure suggests that a capacity to do so depends significantly upon the 
above-mentioned assurances as to the quality of the counterpart’s procedures. This is to 
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say that the nature of recognition is conceived to be necessarily individualised and 
therefore may appear to proceed on a member-by-member basis. 
Concerning mutual recognition, article 6.3 TBT is the primary provision that must be 
raised to accord an MFN exception which would permit, and not only encourage, parties 
to form MRAs. However, it is not clear from the provision itself whether MRAs may be 
formed in the most restrictive sense, without requiring benefits to be extended to any 
other member under any circumstance; or less restrictively, by requiring the MRA 
parties to provide a basis for conditional participation upon the request of other 
members; or least restrictively, by an application of unconditional MFN. As to the most 
restrictive scenario, it would appear possible only if art. 6.3 TBT could be divorced 
from other terms of art. 6.1 and from the MFN requirement in art. 5.1.1. For article 6.1 
TBT, this possibility is admitted as the provision for autonomous recognition are 
designed to be without prejudice to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4. In addition, 
article 6.3 provides that members may require that MRAs fulfils the criteria of 
paragraph 1 but does not state that they are required to do so. 
In conclusion, although it is arguable that MRAs could act to serve the goals expressed 
by article 6.1 TBT, if they do not operate as to exclude other parties from participation, 
such participation, although clearly encourages, cannot appear to be compelled115. 
 
3.5 Overview of EU’s Mutual Recognition Agreements 
 
In its memorandum on the global approach to certification and testing, the European 
Commission declared its intention to conclude agreements for mutual recognition of 
test, reports, certificates and marks with third countries. In its subsequent resolution on 
the global approach, the Council announced its willingness to allow third country CABs 
to participate in the European system on the same basis as European bodies116. 
The Union’s campaign in favour of extending its internal mutual recognition activities 
to its commercial relations got started when exploratory talks with the Unites States on 
mutual recognition of conformity assessment began in 1992. The final objective was to 
facilitate reciprocal access to markets for private business through the mutual 
                                                
115 Mathis opines that WTO members should designate art. XI GATT as the legal basis for recognition as 
this is the provision which contains the GATT’s general prohibition against the use of measures other 
than duties, taxes and charges on the import ant export of goods. In his view, other measures would 
encompass internal indistinct requirement as well, where they had the effect of hindering trade. This 
would have the effect of invalidating an indistinct measure ant then subjecting such a measure to 
justification either according to GATT general and security exceptions under respectively article XX and 
XXI GATT, or by other designated requirements as determined within the context of a framework 
agreement. On this ground he closes up by proposing an “Article XI Understanding”. Cf. Mathis, J.H., 
“Mutual Recognition Agreements”, op. cit., at 28 and 30 
116 Council Resolution of 21 December 1989 on a global approach to conformity assessment, OJ C 10, 
16.1.1990, p. 1–2. For the Community’s competence to conclude such agreements, their relationship with 
existing agreements providing for mutual recognition of certification and testing concluded by individual 
Member States with third countries and the proposed content of these agreements, see Eeckhout, P., The 
European Internal Market and International Trade: A Legal Analysis, Oxford: OUP, 1994, p. 265 and 
270-275 as referenced to in Jiménez García, G., Gardeñes Santiago, M., “Technical Standards in a 
Context of Regional Integration Agreements”, in Demaret, P., Bellis, J.F., García Iménez, G. (eds.), 
Regionalism and multilateralism after the Uruguay Round – Convergence, Divergence and Interaction, 
Brussels, 1997, p. 631, at 653. 
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acceptance of the counterpart’s product test results, inspections and product 
certifications. In 1994 negotiations officially begun during which both parties assessed 
in which cases mutual recognition would apply unconditionally and in which ones it 
would be subject to further regulatory convergence. The prospected MRA with the US 
was estimated to remove barriers to bilateral trade worth $40 billions and was expected 
to eliminate up to 80% of compliance and testing costs. Despite certain obstacles, due 
mainly to differences over the transition period on pharmaceutical products and medical 
equipment, the two sides early reached agreement in principle on standards for 
telecommunications terminal equipment, information technology, electoral products 
requirements, veterinary biologics and pleasure boats. 
In 1994 negotiations on MRAs were also launched with Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. Negotiations with Switzerland and Japan followed in 1995 and similar 
negotiations for MRAs with other countries in Asia, Central Europe and Latin America 
– namely with Mercosur, Chile and Mexico – may follow in the future depending on the 
fulfilment of a number of preliminary conditions117. 
Priority given to standards and TBT issues in bilateral trade relations thus became a 
major component of the New Market Access Strategy118, which, together with the 
strengthening of the multilateral trading system and the consolidation of WTO rules, 
proposes the use of the bilateral level in certain areas to achieve quicker results in 
market opening and set the starting point for further liberalisation on a global basis. To 
date, bilateral MRAs have entered into force between the EU on the one hand and seven 
different commercial partners, namely Australia119, New Zealand120, Canada121, the 
US122, Israel123, Japan124 and the Switzerland125, on the other. 
                                                
117 These conditions mainly refer to: membership to the TBT Agreement; obtaining guarantees that the 
competence of conformity assessment bodies in the partner country are on a par with those in the EU; 
confining the extent of mutual recognition to tests, certificates and marks of conformity; the agreements 
presenting a balanced situation concerning all aspects of conformity assessment; and the agreements 
having the status of formal treaties concluded between governments. See European Commission, A guide 
to European Community Negotiations with third Countries concerning the Mutual Recognition of 
Conformity Assessment, Brussels, 1996.  
118 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The Global 
Challenge of International Trade: A Market Access Strategy for the European Union, COM/96/0053 
Final.  
119 Agreement on mutual recognition in relation to conformity assessment, certificates and markings 
between the European Community and Australia, OJ L 229 of 17.8.1998, p. 3; entered into force on 
January 1, 1999. 
120 Agreement on mutual recognition in relation to conformity assessment between the European 
Community and New Zealand, OJ L 229 of 17.8.1998, p. 62; entered into force on January 1, 1999. 
121 Agreement on mutual recognition between the European Community and Canada, OJ L 280 of 16 
October 1998, p. 3; entered into force on January 1, 1999. 
122 Agreement on mutual recognition between the European Community and the United States of 
America, OJ L 31 of 4 February 1999, p. 3; entered into force on December 1, 1999. 
123 Agreement on mutual recognition of OECD principles of good laboratory practice (GLP) and 
compliance monitoring programmes between the European Community and the State of Israel, OJ L 263 
of 09 October 1999, p. 7; entered into force on May 1, 2000. 
124 Agreement on mutual recognition between the European Community and Japan, OJ L 284 of 29 
October 2001, p. 3; entered into force on January 1, 2002. 
125 Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on mutual recognition in 
relation to conformity assessment, OJ L 114 of 30 April 2002, p. 369; entered into force on June 1, 2002. 
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The preambles of the above MRAs mention various, thought not always identical, 
public policy objectives that are pertinent to the adoption of technical trade measures. 
Also expressly mentioned, except in the MRA concluded with Israel, is the market 
access objective as well as those obligations under the TBT Agreement that the parties 
are called to abide by as WTO members. These provisions capture the triangular 
dynamic between national regulatory systems, market access and WTO obligations. 
First, the adoption per se of technical regulations affects the degree of market access 
granted by one country or trading block to another. Under art. 2.2 TBT, these 
regulations cannot be more trade-restrictive than necessary. Secondly, access for 
producers of a particular country’s market depends on the level of technical regulation 
applying in its territory, and on the restraining provisions of the TBT Agreement. Third, 
as already stated in section I and II of the present Chapter, the WTO tries to strike a 
balance between international trade liberalisation and the right of its members to 
implement public policy through regulation. 
 
3.5.a Extent of mutual recognition 
 
Mutual recognition agreements concluded by the EC - currently binding the EU after 
the international succession triggered by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and 
the consequent inheritance of the EC’s obligations by the Union - do not extend to 
recognising substantive regulations and standards. Instead, they have been limited to 
conformity assessment procedures. These are defined generally in Annex 1 to the TBT 
Agreement as: 
“any procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine that relevant requirements in 
technical regulations or standards are fulfilled”. 
The nature of MRAs in the area of conformity assessment is such that two independent 
parties agree to recognise the inspection results, test reports and/or certificates of 
conformity issued by the agreed and accredited bodies located in the territory of the 
other party, in respect of the products and sectors covered under such agreement. The 
products are tested and certified before export and, therefore, can be placed on the 
market of the importing country directly, without having to undergo further controls. 
With the exception of the EU-Israel MRA, the scope of the agreements is limited, from 
the Union’s point of view, to accepting designated CABs of the other party as being 
competent to test, certify and mark in accordance with Union’s legislative requirements, 
and for the nominated bodies within the EU to do the same according to the legislative 
requirements in force within the jurisdiction of the other contracting party (and vice 
versa). The agreements do not extend therefore to the mutual recognition of products for 
sale in the Union, which have been tested, certified and marked to the third country’s 
requirements. 
The EU-Israel MRA differs from the other in that the parties do not recognise 
conformity assessment results in accordance with each other’s regulations and 
standards. Instead, the parties have agreed to recognise the equivalence of each other’s 
Good Laboratory Practices (GLPs) compliance monitoring programmes, and in turn to 
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accept studies and data produced by testing facilities participating in the Good 
Laboratory Practices compliance programme of the other party126. The GLPs principles 
of both parties must be based on those adopted by the OECD. 
Union’s MRAs generally provide that designating authorities must be given the 
necessary power and competence to designate, monitor, suspend, remove suspension 
and withdraw designation of conformity assessment bodies. Moreover, such agreements 
contain provisions on mutual monitoring of authorities involved, as well as 
“reversibility clauses” whereby one party can take back regulatory power if it is not 
satisfied by the other’s performance under the MRA. The EU- Canada and EU-US 
MRAs provide that the relevant regulatory authority of each party retains all power 
under their applicable laws to interpret and, subject to certain conditions, enforce their 
respective legislative and regulatory provisions127. Similarly, the EU-Japan MRA 
reserves the right to the parties to take appropriate measures for protecting health, 
safety, the environment or preventing deceptive practices128. 
 
3.5.b Basic structure and sectoral coverage 
 
The basic structure of each MRA consists of a Framework Agreement and various 
Sectoral Annexes. The former establishes the principles and procedures governing 
mutual recognition whereas the latter detail, for each sector covered, the scope in terms 
of products and operations, the respective legislation involved, any specific procedures, 
designated CABs, the procedures and authorities responsible for designating these 
bodies and, if applicable, transitional periods129. 
There is a variation in the sectors covered by the different MRAs concluded by the 
Union, which can be explained on the ground of the divergent interests underlying their 
negotiations. Nonetheless, further Sectoral Annexes can be added progressively to a 
given MRA, as and when appropriate. At present the sectors covered range from 
automotive products to electromagnetic compatibility, low voltage equipment, 
machinery, medical devices, pressure equipment, radio and telecommunication terminal 
equipment, electrical safety, recreational aircraft, Good Manufacturing Practices 
(GMPs) and Good Laboratory Practices (GLPs) requirements130. 
                                                
126 EU-Israel MRA, article 2. 
127 EU-Canada MRA, article XIV; EU-US MRA, article 15. 
128 EU-Japan MAR, article 10. 
129 The EU-Israel MRA’s Sectoral Annexes are limiter to the products, legislation of the parties and 
monitoring bodies covered. Transitional periods are provided for in the MRAs with Canada, US and 
Israel. They are intended to allow the relevant authorities of the parties to establish confidence and 
understanding of each other’s procedures for designated conformity assessment bodies and to evaluate the 
ability of conformity assessment bodies to carry out their duties. In the case of the EU-Israel MRA, the 
transitional period was required especially due to the lack of a Good Laboratory Practice monitoring 
authority in Israel. The mutual recognition obligations were intended to apply only after successful 
completion of the respective transitional periods. 
130 The MRA between the EU and Australia is operational for the following sectors automotive products, 
EMC, low voltage equipment, machinery, medical device, pressure equipment, TTE. The MRA between 
the EU and New Zealand is operational for the following sectors: EMC, low voltage equipment, 
machinery, medical devices, pressure equipment, TTE. In the MRA between the EU and Canada, a 
transitional period was established for exchange of information between the parties, and to build 
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With regard to the implementation of each MRA, a Joint Committee has been set up to 
oversee its functioning. In practice, mutual recognition becomes operational when 
proposed CABs are confirmed by the respective Joint Committee. 
 
3.6 The EU-US Mutual Recognition Agreement 
 
By the mid-90s, the issue of technical obstacles to transatlantic trade became 
increasingly important to firms engaged in exchanges of goods between the two sides of 
the Atlantic for two primary reasons. Firs, as transatlantic tariffs barriers decreased, 
firms became more concerned with duplicative regulatory compliance costs and so they 
started to lobby for their removal. Second, when the EC achieved to the completion of 
the single market, US firms started to claim that the EC was erecting a fortress Europe 
in which Member States would use common EC standards and certification procedures 
to prejudice US competitors. For instance, US firms feared that they would be 
disadvantaged because, under the EC’s global approach, only notified bodies located 
within the Community could test and certify products for marketing within the common 
market. Whereas prior to the global approach US-based laboratories acted as 
subcontractors for the testing of products under EC’s Member States standards, firms 
feared this option might be foreclosed once the global approach was implement. 
Already prior to the conclusion of the MRAs between then EC and the US, firms and 
laboratories had in fact adapted to differing regulatory requirements through entering 
into sub-contracting arrangements and many businesses continue to operate under to the 
latter. Still today, private testing bodies often test products in the manufacturer’s place 
of production on one side of the Atlantic in accordance with requirement set on the 
other, and then have these test results certified by an accredited body in the importing 
jurisdiction. The domestic testing body operates under a sub-contracting arrangement 
with the responsible certification body in the importing jurisdiction131. Consequently, 
the Sectoral Annexes to the bilateral MRA do not represent a significant change for 
many businesses but rather a slight extension of sub-contracting practices that had 
already stemmed from regulatory and commercial developments. In fact, subcontracting 
is specifically contemplated in some of the MRA’s Annexes such as the one on 
                                                                                                                                          
confidence and understanding of each other's procedures for designation of CABs and evaluate the ability 
of the CABs to carry out their duties. Passage from the transitional to the operational phase has taken 
place for the following sectors: EMC, Electrical Safety, Recreational Craft and R&TTE as from 
01/10/2001, GMP as from 01/02/2003. In the MRA between the EU and the USA, a transitional period 
was also established for the same purposes. Passage from the transitional to the operational phase has 
taken place for the following sectors: recreational craft as of 01/06/2000, EMC and telecom as of 
14/12/2000. The MRA between the EU and Japan is operational for the following sectors: electrical 
products and R&TTE. The MRA between the EU and Switzerland is operational for the following 
sectors: machinery, personal protective equipment, toys medical devices, gas appliances and boilers (hot 
water boilers), pressure vessels, equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially 
explosive atmospheres, electrical equipment, measuring instruments and pre-packages, motor vehicles, 
agricultural and forestry tractors, Good Laboratory Practice – GLP, medicinal products, Good 
Manufacturing Practice (GMP), inspection batch and certification, construction products. 
131 Egan, M, “Mutual Recognition and Standard Setting: Public and Private Strategies for Governing 
Markets”, in Pollack, M., Shaffer, G., Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy, 2001, p. 179 ff, 
at 187-188. 
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telecommunications equipment, which provides that CABs in one jurisdiction my 
subcontract testing to laboratories in the other132. 
EC-US negotiators initially discussed negotiating mutual recognition in eleven sectors 
but ultimately whittled this down to six, namely telecommunication equipment, 
electromagnetic compatibility, electrical safety, recreational crafts, medical devices and 
pharmaceutical GMPs133. As with all negotiations, the EC and the US were both 
concerned that the final results either favour their own export industries or be balanced. 
The US wished therefore to conclude an agreement on telecommunication equipment 
first, but the EC refused because it felt that US firms would have benefitted more if the 
agreement had only covered this sector. The EC thus used its political leverage by 
threatening not to sign any MRA involving telecommunication equipment had the US 
not agreed to also include medical devices and pharmaceutical GMPs to the Framework 
Agreement. 
The concluded MRA thus consists of a Framework Agreement and six Annexes, each of 
which is in fact a separate agreement for a separate sector covering defined categories 
and lists of products. The Agreement does not cover recognition of the adequacy or 
equivalency of transatlantic standards, but is rather much less ambitious. First, no 
negotiation has been carried out with regard to the harmonisation of transatlantic 
standards for the sectors concerned134. Second, although every Annex is unique, each of 
those only addresses mutual recognition by CABs located in the exporting jurisdiction 
in accordance with the importing party’s requirements and procedures. Since none of 
the contracting parties relinquished sovereign control over the substance of their 
standards, transatlantic trading firms still must meet the separate requirements of the 
world’s two largest markets. Third, even these assessment evaluations are subject to 
varying pre-approval and post-approval conditions135. For example, in the case of 
                                                
132 See Section VII of the Telecommunications Equipment Annex. 
133 Given the amount of Annexes to the Framework Agreement, the negotiation of the MRA required the 
involvement of multiple executive agenticies on both sides. The Office of the US Trade Representative 
and the Commission DG Trade led the negotiations of the Framework Agreement. Each of the Annexes 
however was negotiated by the regulatory agency responsible for the sector concerned. On the European 
side this wa a simpler process because of the centralisation of the responsible agency officials within the 
Commission’s DG Enterprise and these officials’ long experience with coordinating the twins goals of 
regulatory protection and free trade within the single market. On the US side, in contrast, separate 
independent federal agencies negotiated the annexes, who traditionally have focused only on protecting 
public health and safety and thus were less receptive to arguments concerning trade facilitation. The 
involvement of both trade officials and regulatory officials resulted in intra-US agency conflicts, as well 
as transatlantic ones. Trade officials more aggressively pushed for an agreement and US regulatory 
officials, in particular the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), were reticent about accepting foreign certification of safety standards. In this 
respect, the relative independence of US agencies such as the FDA and OSHA have arguably not 
facilitated but rather hindered a coordinated partnership amongst transatlantic authorities. 
134 The sole minor exception to date is the MRA on marine equipment whose article 4(1) on “Equivalence 
of technical regulation” reads as follows: “The mutual recognition obligations [of certificates of 
conformity issued by each party] are based on the determination by the Parties that the technical 
regulations applicable to each product listed in Annex II are equivalent”; see, Agreement between the 
European Community and the United States of America on the Mutual Recognition of Certificates of 
Conformity for Marine Equipment, OJ L 150 of 30.4.2004, p. 46. 
135 For example, Section VII.2 of the Telecommunication equipment Annex provides for post-market 
surveillance (including via labelling and numbering requirements) and border and internal checks, 
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medical devices, the relevant agencies need not accept the tests from foreign 
certification bodies if they find the reports deficient and delineate why, thus reducing 
businesses’ incentives to use these bodies. In the case of pharmaceutical GMP, tests are 
performed by regulatory bodies and not private laboratories, and again the agency in the 
importing jurisdiction may reject reports where it deems they are deficient. 
The MRA sets up a new transatlantic structure for overseeing its implementation. First, 
it creates a Joint Committee, which consists of US and EU trade officials who meet 
twice annually. Second, the Annexes create Joint Sectoral Committees to oversee the 
annexes’ implementation. The former are of the greatest importance for implementing 
the MRA since they consist of the actual regulatory authorities that must oversee the 
protection of health and safety on each side of the Atlantic. On occasions, however, 
those authorities are not effectively collaborating, such as in the domains of electrical 
safety, medical devices and pharmaceutical GMPs. 
As of September 2011, only the three Annexes of greatest interest to the US negotiators 
were fully operational, namely those covering telecommunications equipment, 
electromagnetic compatibility and recreational crafts136. In contrast, implementation of 
the Annexes for electrical safety equipment137, medical devises138 and pharmaceutical 
GMPs139 remain in dispute. The transitional period for the medical devices Annex was 
further extended for two years140 but actual implementation never came about. 
Regarding the pharmaceutical Annex, the US FDA maintained that it was willing to 
recognise the equivalency of only two EU Member States regulatory systems, namely 
the UK and Ireland’s ones, by the end of the 2001 transitional period, and it set no fixed 
date for reviewing the others. The EC, which had to act on behalf of all then fifteen 
Member States, rejected the offer because it would have prejudiced manufacturers of 
the thirteen other Member States who would have still been subject to duplicative EC 
and FDA inspections. The Commission, displeased that the unimplemented Annex were 
those that the EC initially imposed as conditions for the MRA, had been reviewing its 
options, including the termination of the entire MRA or suspension or withdrawal from 
certain Sectoral Annexes. The EC actually suspended its obligations under the electrical 
safety Annex, with effect from January 2003, claiming the OSHA’s continuing failure 
to comply with its terms141. 
The significant institutional asymmetries between the US’s and the EU’s respective 
regulatory systems and cultures create a major challenge for transatlantic regulatory 
                                                                                                                                          
provided that the latter are not done in a discriminatory manner. 
136 For updates concerning the sectors covered by each MRA, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/international-aspects/mutual-recognition-
agreement/index_en.htm (last visited in February 2012). 
137 Shaffer, G., “Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals”, op. cit., at 15-16. 
138 Ibid., at 17-18. 
139 Ibid, at 18-19. 
140 Decision No 16/2002 of 16 April 2002 of the Joint Committee established under the Agreement on 
mutual recognition between the European Community and the United States of America on amending the 
Sectoral Annex on Medical Devices, OJ L 302, 6.11.2002, p. 30. 
141 Council Decision on suspending the Community obligations under the Sectoral Annex for Electrical 
Safety of the Agreement on Mutual Recognition between the European Community and the United States 
of America, OJ C 20E of 28.1.2003, p. 359–363. 
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cooperation and the implementation of the MRA. Where regulators adopt similar 
regulatory structures and systems, and enact similar substantive standards, they more 
easily understand and accept each other’s regulatory determination. Regulatory 
symmetries facilitate trust and confidence, enabling regulatory cooperation to occur. For 
example, US and the EC regulatory authorities each have supported a more 
decentralised process for pre-marketing approvals of telecommunications equipment, 
which explains the relative ease of this annex’s implementation. 
Although the US system is often characterised as fragmented and decentralised, its 
actual nature varies by sector. At times, the US system is relatively highly decentralised, 
as when the Congress delegates regulatory authority to an independent federal 
regulatory body, such ad the FDA. At other times, the US system is more fragmented, 
with regulation consisting of a patchwork of federal, state and private voluntary 
standards with no overarching framework. Significant to the implementation of the 
MRA, US private standard-setting bodies remain highly fragmented, since the 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), which is the closest to a national 
standards body, does not serve ad an administrator or coordinator of private standard-
setting142. 
Moreover, the challenge of implementation also stems from the US and the EU 
regulators working in different regulatory cultures, which resulted in the European 
institutions showing a greater adaptation attitude. EU institutions and European national 
regulators operate under the dual mission of ensuring free circulation of goods within 
the internal market and at the same time granting public safety. They are thus quite 
accustomed to interacting with foreign regulators and testing bodies. In contrast, the US 
FDA for instance traditionally has defined its role solely as that of protecting US public 
health and does not operate under a dual mission of also facilitating market exchanges, 
which resulted in the Administration’s relative isolation from other regulators. This 
accounts for both the FDA considering its practices as superior and for its anxiety to 
protect its regulatory autonomy, an aspiration which is therefore not peculiar to the EU 
regulatory bodies. 
It is worth noting that, beside difficulties related to the implementation of the Annexes 
which the EU cares more about, a bright side does exists in terms of trends inaugurated 
by the MRA with the US. Although transatlantic regulatory adaptation has been only 
partial and in any case particularly slow, where it occurred it has been in fact rather 
unidirectional in that it has been the US who made most of the changes. In particular, 
the US have done so by adopting international standards that mirror EU ones, by 
delegating testing and certification responsibilities to private laboratories thus reflecting 
the EU’s global approach and by coordinating and overseeing these laboratories under a 
new US national program analogous to those operating in the EU for over a decade. In 
this sense, the EU institution’s and European regulatory bodies’ experience in working 
under the above dual mission of ensuring at the same time the functioning of the 
                                                
142 Shaffer, G., “Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals”, op. cit., at 23. 
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internal marker and public safety did offer a model to be considered and adapted for the 
transatlantic context143. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Consciously or not, the EU has been exporting its system globally. What is more, this 
has occurred regardless to the appropriateness of the EU’s model to bilateral regulatory 
governance and on account of the significant market leverages that the EU is able to 
exercise due to the size of its single market. As in the case of the MRA with the US, 
firms that desire access to the European market can pressure their national officials to 
adapt their national regulatory systems to accommodate a reciprocal trading 
arrangement. As the EU entered into MRAs with other common trading partners and as 
these countries adapt to their systems to interact with the European governance 
structures, a domino effect has been ignited to the benefit of the EU model and the 
pressure on the US to adapt its own regulatory structures augmented. 
However, the analysis of seven MRAs concluded by the EU so far also allows to 
submit that, notwithstanding the prospected advantages in terms of socialisation 
amongst CABs and the potential with regard to the diffusion of the EU model, the 
negotiation of mutual recognition remains affected by several limits that undermine the 
ability of such tool to prevent disputes. 
First, it has been noted from an early stage that MRAs have been concluded by the 
EU only in the domain of technical barriers to trade. Sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations and standards are thus left aside, and not even applicable conformity 
assessment procedures made the object of negotiations with a view to achieve mutual 
recognition. The differential treatment of TBT and SPS measures vis-à-vis recognition 
might be explained by the different weight in terms of public sensitiveness that the two 
sets of measures do bear. Stated otherwise, whereas EU institutions are in a position to 
envisage a cautious opening to negotiated mutual recognition in the field of electric or 
automotive equipment, the managed nature of mutual recognition is still not a sufficient 
reassurance when it comes to recognising even only conformity assessment procedures 
for plants and foodstuff. 
Secondly and more specifically, within the TBT domain, mutual recognition 
obligations have been established only with regard to conformity assessment 
procedures, thus leaving the mutual recognition of internal standards and regulations 
unspoken. This shows in turn that both the EU and its partners are not willing to 
surrender their own substantive regulations and standards. This is all the more true if the 
mechanisms of equivalence recognition is taken into account, whereby the two parties 
to one of the above MRAs do not even recognise each other’s conformity assessment 
procedures but limit themselves to landing their owns to the CABs operating in the 
counterpart’s jurisdiction with a view to have them applied by the latter. In this respect, 
mutual recognition as devised so far only serves the cause of easing obstacles to market 
                                                
143 Egan, M., Constructing a European Market, op. cit., at 255-256. 
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access but has been unable to truly favour convergence towards shared technical 
regimes. This of course limits the benefits in terms of dispute prevention that MRAs are 
able to produce inasmuch as substantive regulation can still make the object of 
litigation. 
Finally, a survey of the Union’s counterparts in MRAs shows that the EU tends to 
negotiate such agreements only with commercial partners whose CABs afford high 
guarantees with regards to their ability to perform their duties under the terms of the 
agreement, i.e. to correctly apply EU technical regulation and standards. Being it as 
such guarantees are more likely afforded by partners whose own standards and 
regulations show a high degree of similarity with those of the EU, the conclusion of 
MRAs by the Union with countries other than developed ones is just improbable. 
The above limits affecting the practice of MRAs negotiation leave room to litigation 
as an alternative – not to say the only - means for the EU to preserve its regulatory 
autonomy. 
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Section I – Measures Affecting Livestocks, Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)  
 
1.1 Introduction to the dispute 
 
As it is well known, the dispute opposing Argentina, Canada ad the US to the EC 
concerned a number of EC directives affecting the marketing of hormones grown meat 
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on the Community market, namely Directive 81/602/EEC1, Council Directive 
88/146/EEC2 and Council Directive 88/299/EEC3. 
Directive 81/602/EEC prohibited the administering to farm animals of substances 
having a thyrostatic action or substances having an oestrogenic, androgenic or 
gestagenic action; the placing on the market or slaughtering of farm animals to which 
these substances have been administered; the placing on the market of meat from such 
animals; the processing of meat from such animals and the placing on the market of 
meat products prepared from or with such meat. The Directive provided two exceptions 
to the prohibition: one for substances with an oestrogenic, androgenic or gestagenic 
action when they are used for therapeutic purposes and administered by a veterinarian, 
other exception for five growth promoting hormones4 when they were used for growth 
promotion purposes and their use was governed according to the individual regulatory 
schemes maintained by member States. This exception was made pending an 
examination of the effects of these hormones on the health of consumers and the 
adoption of an EC rule. 
Directive 88/146/EEC extended the prohibition imposed by Directive 81/602/EEC to 
the administration to farm animals of two of the above five hormones for any purpose, 
and of the remaining three for fattening purposes. However, the Directive maintained 
the permission to administer these three natural hormones to animals for therapeutic and 
zootechnical purposes under prescribed conditions. In particular, therapeutic treatment 
was defined to mean the administering to an individual animal of any of the substances 
which are authorized to treat a fertility problem diagnosed on examination by a 
veterinarian. 
The importation from third countries of animals and meat from animals to which have 
been administered substances with thyrostatic, oestrogenic, androgenic or gestagenic 
action was prohibited. However, under certain conditions, article 7 of Directive 
88/146/EEC allowed trade in those animals and meat from those animals treated for 
therapeutic or zootechnical purposes, including imports from third countries. Article 4 
of Directive 88/146/EEC explicitly required that undertakings in the EC Member States 
producing the prohibited hormones, those companies authorized to market these 
hormones for whatever purposes and undertakings producing pharmaceutical and 
veterinary products based on those substances, kept a detailed register recording the 
quantities produced or acquired and those sold or used for the production of 
pharmaceutical and veterinary products. 
Directive 88/299/EEC laid down the conditions for applying the derogations, provided 
for in article 7 of Directive 88/146/EEC, from the prohibition on trade in certain 
categories of animals and their meat. The first derogation of the Directive required 
                                                
1 Council Directive 81/602/EEC of 31 July 1981 concerning the prohibition of certain substances having 
a hormonal action and of any substances having a thyrostatic action OJ L 222 du 7.8.1981, p. 32–33. 
2 Council Directive 88/146/EEC of 7 March 1988 prohibiting the use in livestock farming of certain 
substances having a hormonal action, OJ L 70 du 16.3.1988, p. 16–18. 
3 Council Directive 88/299/EEC of 17 May 1988 on trade in animals treated with certain substances 
having a hormonal action and their meat, as referred to in Article 7 of Directive 88/146/EEC, OJ L 128 du 
21.5.1988, p. 36–38. 
4 Oestradiol-17β, progesterone, testosterone, trenbolone acetate and zeranol.
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Member States to authorize trade in animals intended for reproduction and reproductive 
animals at the end of their career (and of meat of such animals) which, during their 
reproductive career, had undergone one of two categories of treatments involving the 
use of the banned hormones. 
Directive 96/22/EC5 would have replaced Directives 81/602/EEC, 88/146/EEC and 
88/299/EEC as from 1 July 1997. It would maintain the prohibition on the use of 
hormones for growth promotion purposes; extend the prohibition on the use of beta-
agonists; restrict the use of the hormones at issue for therapeutic or zootechnical 
purposes, reinforcing in particular the role of the veterinarian and reinforce the 
provisions on control and testing. Penalties and sanctions in case of violations were to 
be increased where checks detected the presence of prohibited substances or products or 
residues of substances administered illegally. Such substances or products would be 
confiscated and any treated animals or meat placed under official supervision until 
penalties had been applied. 
 
1.2 Article 2.2 SPS: the appropriate level of protection and the definition of 
sufficient scientific evidence 
 
The EC noted that article 2.2 required that SPS measures must be based on scientific 
principles, as opposed to non-scientific ones. If a measure was aimed at reducing or 
eliminating a risk to health, then it must actually address that risk in a manner which 
could be scientifically justified. Canada had not shown that the measures complained 
against were not based on scientific principles. A logical consequence of the 
requirement for measures to be based on scientific principles was that they must not be 
maintained without scientific evidence. The EC claimed that all WTO members had 
measures in place before the SPS Agreement was drawn up, and in the absence of this 
requirement it could have been argued that the requirement for basing measures on 
scientific principles could not be applied retrospectively. 
The EC noted that the SPS Agreement had not defined the term “scientific evidence” 
since its content was relative in terms of time and was dependent on the principles, 
methods, experiments and data used. What might be an acceptable scientific method for 
one scientist might not satisfy another, who might be more interested in certain other 
scientific principles or aspects totally neglected or partially examined by the first 
scientist. For that reason the SPS only required “sufficient”, not clear or certain, 
scientific evidence, the former term “sufficient” being also nowhere defined in the SPS 
Agreement. The EC argued that it was generally agreed that sufficient could not mean 
other than the minimal level of scientific evidence required. 
Moreover, the EC noted that the SPS Agreement also required WTO members, in their 
risk assessment, to take into account “available scientific evidence” and argued that 
from the “available” scientific evidence, a Member was entitled to rely on that which its 
                                                
5 Council Directive 96/22/EC of 29 April 1996 concerning the prohibition on the use in stockfarming of 
certain substances having a hormonal or thyrostatic action and of ß-agonists, and repealing Directives 
81/602/EEC, 88/146/EEC and 88/299/EEC, OJ L 125 of 23.5.1996, p. 3–9. 
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own scientists said was appropriate and sufficient and disregard other available 
evidence. Against this background, the EC concluded that neither the Panel nor any 
other member might judge the adequacy of the scientific evidence upon which a 
member based its measure in order to achieve its level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection. In other words, if the weight of available scientific evidence indicated that a 
substance was not dangerous to human health, but another part of available scientific 
evidence indicated that there might be potential hazards to human or animal health, a 
member would be entitled under the SPS Agreement to take a precautionary approach 
and base its measure on the latter part of the available scientific evidence. It was 
sufficient if the government maintaining the measure had a, read any, scientific basis for 
it. However, the EC stressed that this did not mean that members were obliged to 
demonstrate a scientifically confirmed adverse effect from a particular hazard before 
they might take measures. The SPS Agreement could not have been intended to operate 
in such a way that members must wait until people were actually sick or dying before 
being allowed to take measures. 
The EC noted that the closest the SPS Agreement came to defining sufficient scientific 
evidence was in the footnote to Article 3.3, where the concept of a scientific 
justification was defined as follows: 
For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 3, there is a scientific justification if, on the 
basis of an examination and evaluation of available scientific information in conformity 
with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, a Member determines that the relevant 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations are not sufficient to achieve its 
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection. 
It followed that scientific justification required an examination and evaluation of 
available scientific information, based on scientific principles. However, at the end it is 
still the prerogative of the member in question to decide whether the international 
standard, guideline or recommendation is sufficient to achieve its appropriate level of 
sanitary protection. The level of protection is decided by the member alone and it was 
not a judgment that must be based on scientific principles or scientific evidence. 
 
1.3 Claims under articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement: the assessment of 
the risk 
 
The EC observed that Canada did not appear to argue that the challenged measures had 
no scientific basis, but that they were not based on an appropriate risk assessment for he 
maintenance of a higher level of protection than that afforded by a Codex standard such 
as explicitly allowed by article 3.3 SPS. 
The EC responded that the SPS Agreement requires Members to take into account risk 
assessment techniques developed by relevant international organizations. However, in 
the EC’s view, back then the Codex Alimentarius Commission was far from developing 
any such techniques as it was still trying to agree on definitions. A WTO member was, 
therefore, free to make an assessment of the risk as it thought correct and as was 
appropriate to the circumstances prevailing in its territory. Article 5.2 laid down the 
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elements a WTO member should take into account in an assessment of the risk: 
available scientific evidence, relevant processes and production methods, relevant 
inspection, sampling and testing methods, prevalence of specific diseases, etc. For the 
EC, each of the three words "available scientific evidence" has a distinct meaning: the 
evidence a member took into account for its risk assessment had to be scientific, i.e. it 
must have the minimal attributes of scientific inquiry, and it should be part of the body 
of scientific knowledge in the area of concern, even if it was not the prevailing view 
among scientists 
The EC recalled that “assessment of the risk” was defined in Annex A to the SPS 
Agreement as follows: 
“the evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human or animal health arising 
from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease causing organisms in 
food, beverages or feedstuffs” 
The EC noted that there were, therefore, three different concepts to distinguish: the 
“adverse effect”, the “risk” and its “assessment”. The EC argued that the concept of 
“risk assessment” in the SPS Agreement is predominantly a scientific process, whose 
purpose was to establish the strictly scientific basis for the regulatory measure the WTO 
member would take. In the view of the EC, the concept of risk assessment was 
composed of two parts: the scientific assessment of the risk and the management of that 
risk. The approach of the SPS Agreement was also conformity with democratic 
regulatory procedures, where frequently a dichotomy was operated in the decision 
making process between risk assessment and risk management. The first established 
strictly the scientific basis for regulatory action. The second (risk management) was the 
process by which the competent authority of a Member decided what action to take in 
the face on the assessment submitted to it by the scientists. Such action was based on 
factors such as public health and environmental protection, relevant legislation and legal 
precedent, application of social, economic and political values and consumer concerns. 
In a democratic legislative system, the risk management phase, therefore, expressly 
recognized the importance of social value choices. In the management of the risk 
therefore elements other than strict science entered into consideration. 
Moreover, the SPS Agreement did not prescribe a quantitative risk assessment. The EC 
considered that there must exist “a potential risk for adverse effects”, i.e. it was implicit 
that in order to need a level of protection there must be some hazard against which a 
member needs to protect. However, this only implies the identification of a hazard, not 
an assessment of the probability that it would cause damage. The SPS Agreement left 
members free to define the level of probability they wanted to assume: this might range 
from zero to infinite; it also left them free to decide the type of measure they might 
choose to ensure that the level of protection they considered to be appropriate was 
achieved. A risk assessment might help in setting a standard designed to limit the 
probability that a human developed cancer after a lifetime of exposure to a particular 
chemical substance to no more than one chance in a million. By contrast, the choice of 
defining a threshed as opposed to relying on statistic chance was a choice of public 
policy, as such not of scientific nature.  
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The EC claimed that the competent institutions had performed a risk assessment in the 
sense of articles 5.1 to 5.6 SPS by taking into account the available scientific evidence 
of risks to humans and animals; relevant processes and production methods; and 
relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods. These latter two elements confirmed 
that risk assessment for the purposes of the SPS Agreement was not a purely scientific 
matter; the practicalities of actual application must also be taken into account. The EC 
observed that none of the available scientific reports had concluded in favour of an 
unqualified use of these hormones for animal growth promotion. Based on such 
assessment, the EC institutions had been concluded that a ban on the use of hormones 
for growth promotion would be less trade-restrictive than the imposition of the control 
system which would otherwise be required. The EC argued that, therefore, it had based 
its measures on the risk assessment it had conducted for that purpose. 
The phrase “as appropriate to the circumstances” in art. 5.1 SPS in the EC view must be 
referred to the circumstances of the Member carrying out the risk assessment. In the 
case of the EC, assessment of risk was part of the complex EC legislative process, with 
its comprehensive consultations, checks and balances involving a proposal by the EC 
Commission, the opinions of the Economic and Social Committee and the European 
Parliament, and the adoption by the Council of Ministers. According to the EC’s, if 
these words meant “the state of scientific and technical knowledge in the area of 
concern”, the remaining phrase in article 5.1 “taking into account risk assessment 
techniques developed by the relevant international organizations” would serve no useful 
purpose. For the EC, the phrase "as appropriate to the circumstances" is usually 
required, as here, to bring close to the concrete circumstances of application the concept 
under examination. In this case, the risk assessment should take into account the nature 
of the substances and the type of risks they posed to human and animal health in the 
territory of each WTO member. A substance might not be viewed as posing very serious 
risks in a country, whereas the same substance might be viewed as posing a serious risk 
to humans in the EC. 
Moreover, the EC stressed that there did not exist yet risk assessment techniques 
developed by the relevant international organizations. Codex was still discussing 
different concepts, but there was no agreement yet on these techniques. A Member was, 
therefore, free to make an assessment of the risk as it thought correct and as was 
appropriate to the circumstances prevailing in its territory. Canada's definition of the 
phrase "as appropriate to the circumstances" would devoid it of any useful meaning. 
Article 5.2 laid down the elements a Member should take into account in an assessment 
of the risk: available scientific evidence, relevant processes and production methods, 
relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods, prevalence of specific diseases, etc. 
Each of the three words "available scientific evidence" had a distinct meaning: the 
evidence a Member took into account for its risk assessment had to be scientific, i.e. it 
must have the minimal attributes of scientific inquiry, and it should be part of the body 
of scientific knowledge in the area of concern, even if it was not the prevailing view 
among scientists. 
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1.4 The precautionary principle 
 
 The EC stressed that the difference in degree of regulation with respect to the 
complaining parties was due to the greater attachment of the EC to the precautionary 
principle, which reflected the different levels of consumer protection. Where there 
existed a doubt over the safety of a product, the EC had given the benefit of doubt to the 
consumer, especially in cases where the potential risks might affect very large parts of 
the population, whereas in the EC’s view the complainants had, in the case of growth 
hormones, given it to the producer. 
The so-called precautionary principle inscribed in the EC Treaty itself, of which then 
article 130R on the protection of the environment provided, inter alia: 
Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into 
account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Community. It shall be 
based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should 
be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that 
the polluter should pay. Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into 
the definition and implementation of other Community policies […] 
The EC contended that the essential features of the principle or approach were well 
known and widely accepted so as to say that it had reached the status of a generally 
accepted principle of international law, particularly in the area of prevention of risks to 
human or animal health or the environment. The hazard having been identified in this 
case, the lack of scientific knowledge on the exact mechanisms by which it operated 
was not a sufficient excuse for failing to take strict measures to prevent it. 
The EC observed that there was a wider angle from which these risks might be 
examined and within a broader regulatory context. Whereas the EC used science in their 
regulatory process and promoted its role internationally, such use of science had its 
limitations. Scientific certainty in a regulatory process being difficult to achieve and 
regulation having to be done in this context of uncertainty, the question was how much 
of that uncertainty a legal system was prepared to accept. The EC precautionary 
approach was required to avoid situations as those portrayed by many cases of health 
hazards which only became apparent long after substances or products had been 
assumed to be safe. 
 
 
Section II - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-containing Products 
 
2.1 Introduction to the dispute: the contested French ban 
 
The asbestos dispute6, particularly the AB report, is better known for the interpretation 
therein given to the concept of likeness under art. III:4 GATT, than for the 
                                                
6 WTO, DS135, European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing 
Asbestos; request for the establishment of a Panel by Canada WT/DS135/3 of 9 October 1998; Panel 
report WT/DS135/R of 18 September 2000; AB report WT/DS135/AB/R of 12 March 2001. 
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interpretation of TBT requirements. XXX mentions indeed the disappointment of 
academia due to the lack of the long awaited ever first report on interpreting key issues 
of the TBT agreement, such as the definition of technical regulation and of relevant 
international standards, as well as the putting forward of a necessity test under art. 2.2 
TBT. Such hopes were frustrated because the Panel did not consider the French 
provision at the origin of the dispute as a technical regulation in the first place, thus 
excluding it from the scope of application of the agreement and avoiding analysing 
claims thereunder. On appeal, the Appellate Body was therefore not in position to 
decide on the TBT-related claims made by Canada, notwithstanding the AB reversed 
the Panel’s finding in considering the measure at stake as a technical regulation. 
Irrespectively of the final findings, the asbestos dispute is essential to the reconstruction 
of the EU objectives in dispute settlement as long as submissions by the EC put forward 
a wide range of TBT-related legal arguments. 
The measure at the origin of the dispute between Canada and the EC is French Decree 
96-1133 of 24 December 1996 implemented pursuant to the Labour Code and the 
Consumer Code, banning asbestos in all of its forms without distinguishing between the 
different varieties of it and providing for temporary exceptions to such ban7. 
On the one hand, article 1 of the Decree establishes a general ban in that it prohibits the 
manufacture, processing, sale, import, exportation, placing on the domestic market, 
possession for sale, offer, sale and transfer under any title whatsoever of all varieties of 
asbestos fibres shall be prohibited, regardless of whether these substances have been 
incorporated into materials, products or devices, thus prohibiting also any product 
containing asbestos fibres8. 
On the other hand, the Decree provides for temporary exceptions at article 2. Subject to 
an administrative procedure set forth at article 3 of the Decree9, article 2 which excludes 
                                                
7 Official Journal of the French Republic of 26 December 1996. The Decree entered into force on 1 
January 1997. 
8 Article 1 of the Decree reads as follows: 
“I. For the purpose of protecting workers, and pursuant to Article L. 231-7 of the Labour Code, the 
manufacture, processing, sale, import, placing on the domestic market and transfer under any title 
whatsoever of all varieties of asbestos fibres shall be prohibited, regardless of whether these substances 
have been incorporated into materials, products or devices. 
II. For the purpose of protecting consumers, and pursuant to Article L. 221.3 of the Consumer Code, the 
manufacture, import, domestic marketing, exportation, possession for sale, offer, sale and transfer under 
any title whatsoever of all varieties of asbestos fibres or any product containing asbestos fibres shall be 
prohibited. 
III. The bans instituted under Articles I and II shall not prevent fulfilment of the obligations arising from 
legislation on the elimination of wastes.” 
9 Article 3 provides that: 
“I. The manufacture, processing, importation and domestic marketing of any of the materials, products or 
devices falling into one of the categories mentioned on the list envisaged under Article 2 shall be subject 
to a statement, signed, as appropriate, by the head of the business establishment, the importer or the party 
responsible for domestic marketing, which should be addressed to the Minister for Labour.  This 
statement shall be filed in January of each year or, as appropriate, three months before the start of a new 
activity or the alteration of an existing production activity, by means of a form decreed by the Ministers 
for Labour, Consumption, Industry and Agriculture. 
The statement shall be accompanied by all the supporting documents in the possession of the declaring 
party making it possible, considering the state of scientific and technological progress, to determine that 
as of the date of signature of the statement, the activity covered by the statement meets the conditions set 
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from the general ban existing materials, products or devices containing chrysotile fibre 
when, to perform an equivalent function, no substitute for that fibre is available which, 
considering the state of scientific and technological progress, poses a lesser 
occupational health risk than chrysotile fibre to workers and provides all technical 
guarantees of safety for users10. 
 
2.2 Main claims by the parties 
 
A manufacturer and exporter of chrysotile asbestos fibres and of products containing 
these fibres, such as asbestos cement, Canada first requested consultations with the EC 
under the DSU and subsequently requested the establishment of a Panel. Canada 
demanded that the Panel addressed recommendation to France to make the Decree 
compatible with a number of its obligations under the TBT agreement and the GATT 
199411. 
In its request for the establishment of the Panel, Canada claimed, firstly, that the Decree 
was a technical regulation covered by the TBT agreement and that, as such, it was 
incompatible with paras. 1, 2, 4 and 8 of article 2 thereof. I Canada requested the Panel 
to find that the French Decree banning asbestos was incompatible with the TBT 
agreement insofar as it was a technical regulation that created an unnecessary obstacle 
to international trade (contrary to the provisions of article 2.2 TBT); it was not based on 
effective and appropriate international standards nor was it in compliance with them 
(contrary to the provisions of article 2.4 TBT); it was not based on orders relating to 
chrysotile and chrysotile-containing products with respect to the product performance of 
                                                                                                                                          
forth in Article 2.I. 
II. Activities that have not been the subject of a full statement submitted within the set time-frame may 
not benefit from the exception granted under Article 2. 
III. The Minister for Labour may at all times convey to the author of the statement such information as 
may seem to him to establish that the material, product or device in question, although falling into one of 
the categories on the list mentioned in Article 2, does not meet the conditions laid down in paragraph I of 
that same Article.  After requesting comments from the declaring party, he may serve notice to said party 
to cease manufacture, processing, importation or domestic marketing and to observe the ban instituted 
under Article 1. He may make such notification public.” 
10 Article 2 reads as follows: 
“I. On an exceptional and temporary basis, the bans instituted under Article 1 shall not apply to certain 
existing materials, products or devices containing chrysotile fibre when, to perform an equivalent 
function, no substitute for that fibre is available which: 
- on the one hand, in the present state of scientific knowledge, poses a lesser occupational health risk than 
chrysotile fibre to workers handling those materials, products or devices; 
- on the other, provides all technical guarantees of safety corresponding to the ultimate purpose of the use 
thereof. 
II. The scope of application of paragraph I of this Article shall cover only the materials, products or 
devices falling within the categories shown in an exhaustive list decreed by the Ministers for Labour, 
Consumption, the Environment, Industry, Agriculture and Transport.  To ascertain the justification for 
maintaining these exceptions, the list shall be re-examined on an annual basis, after which the Senior 
Council for the Prevention of Occupational Hazards and the National Commission for Occupational 
Health and Safety in Agriculture shall be consulted.” 
11 In its request for the establishment of a panel, Canada also claimed that the Decree was inconsistent 
with the EC (and therefore France) obligations of the under articles 2 and 5 of the SPS agreement. 
However, Canada did not pursue this claim in its written or oral arguments before the Panel. 
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chrysotile (contrary to the provisions of article 2.8 TBT); and it violated the national 
treatment disciplines and the most-favoured-nation clause of article 2.1 TBT. 
Moreover, the complaining party claimed that the Decree was incompatible with 
Articles XI and III:4 of the GATT 1994 in that it created a prohibition or a restriction on 
the import of chrysotile and chrysotile-containing products (contrary to the provisions 
of article XI.1) and favoured the national industry of products like chrysotile fibre and 
chrysotile-cement products (contrary to the national treatment disciplines of 
article III:4). 
Lastly, Canada requested that, should the Panel have been unable to find a violation of 
Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994 resulting from the respondent failure to carry out 
its obligations under the said agreement, it nevertheless found that the provisions of 
Article XXIII:1(b) GATT applied and so that, irrespectively of the its compatibility with 
GATT, the application the Decree by France nullified or impaired advantage accruing to 
Canada from the WTO agreement or impeded the attainment of an objective thereof. 
Acting as respondent in the place of France, the European Community reject all the 
arguments put forward by Canada. In particular, it asked the Panel to find that the 
Decree was not a technical regulation, therefore not covered by TBT provisions and 
that, in any case, it complied with those provisions. 
With regard to the GATT 1994, the EC maintained that the Decree was not to be 
considered as a quantitative restriction to the importation or exportation of asbestos and 
related products. Accordingly, it asked the Panel not to examine the measure in relation 
to the scope of article XI GATT. 
It also demanded the Panel to confirm that either the Decree did not establish less 
favourable treatment for Canadian chrysotile fibres than for domestically produced 
asbestos, within the meaning of Article III:4, or that, in any event, it was necessary to 
protect human health within the meaning of Article XX(b). Should not be examined in 
relation to the scope of Article XI of the GATT 1994. 
Lastly, the EC asked the Panel to establish that no non-violation nullification or 
impairment of Canada’s rights under the WTO agreement occurred Article XXIII:1(b) 
GATT. 
 
2.3 The EC defence on TBT-related claims 
 
The EC tried to subtract the Decree from the application of TBT provisions by limiting 
the scope of the agreement through a narrow interpretation of the definition of technical 
regulation contained in Annex 1 thereto12. Furthermore, should the Decree be actually 
considered a technical regulation for the purpose of the applicability of the TBT 
agreement, the EC argued that the French measure abided by the latter’s provisions by 
asserting WTO members’ freedom to chose the level of protection of human health they 
                                                
12 The ensuing considerations on the EC line of defence are partically based on the comparative analysis 
of the following documents presented by the EC before the AB, and available on the website of the 
Commission DG Trade: European Communities – measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products (WT/DS135/R) (AB-2000-11), Appelee Submission by the European Communities pursuant to 
Rule 22 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Reviews, Geneva, 1 December 2000. 
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deem appropriate and by distinguishing their obligation to based domestic technical 
regulations in relevant international standards from their faculty to make them comply 
with those. 
 
2.3.a Non applicability of the TBT agreement to general prohibitions such as the one 
contained in the Decree 
 
The European Communities maintained that the TBT agreement did not apply to the 
Decree on account of the argument that the French measures could not be qualified as a 
technical regulation. The EC pointed at the general nature of the measure in order to 
support its argument. The Decree could not be construed as a technical regulation 
within the meaning of the TBT agreement because the latter does not cover general 
prohibitions, such as the one contained in the Decree, on the use of a product for 
reasons that have to do with the protection of human health. 
After recalling that treaty interpretation must be carried out in the light of customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law, in particular those arising from the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties13, the EC contended that TBT 
agreement does not cover general prohibitions by arguing that its fundamental objective 
is to monitor the adoption and application of the standards and technical regulations that 
cover the detailed characteristics of products or their methods of production. In the EC’s 
view, this follows from the third and fifth paragraphs of the preamble, from the 
background to the agreement and from the actual wording of several of its provisions. 
On the other hand, it is not the object and purpose of the TBT agreement to deal with 
general prohibitions such as that applied by the Decree. This would mean shifting the 
purpose of the agreement from dealing with technical regulations and standards to 
market access problems. The EC based this assertion on the wording of Annex 1 to the 
agreement, which gives the definition of what should be understood by “technical 
regulation” as a document which lays down the characteristics or processes and 
production methods with which a specific, identified product must comply, in particular 
if it is to be released for free circulation on a given market. A measure cannot fall within 
the TBT Agreement unless it satisfies, in particular, the definition of “technical 
regulation” contained in Annex 1 to the Agreement. The definition means that the TBT 
Agreement cannot apply to the Decree in that the latter consists of a prohibition 
measure that cover all products of that kind. In the EC’s view, however, this does not 
result in a legal vacuum for measures of this type since they continue to be covered by 
the GATT alone. To adopt any other approach would be equivalent to nullifying the 
                                                
13 As it is well known, those rules call for an examination of the ordinary meaning of the terms of a treaty, 
read in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty considered. The Appellate 
Body has indicated in this regard that “A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of 
the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their 
context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought”, United States – 
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB Report, WT/DS58/AB/R, 6 November 
1998, para. 114. Therefore, an interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing 
whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility, United States - Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, AB and Panel Report, WT/DS2/9, 20 May 1996. 
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effect of certain provisions thereof, in particular articles I and III, which are applicable 
in cases of general prohibitions. 
The EC therefore interpreted the TBT agreement as the specific application of the 
principles of the GATT 1994 to technical regulations. In its view, negotiators of the 
TBT agreement did not wish it to apply in every case to Members’ regulatory measures 
affecting products, and in particular to general prohibition measures14. Therefore the EC 
distinguishes between regulatory measures and technical regulation and establishes a 
univocal relation between the two: whereas a technical regulation is always a regulatory 
measure, the contrary is not necessarily so depending on the very content of it. 
Proving that the Decree was not a technical regulations, the general scope of the ban 
therein established was in turn demonstrated, according to the EC, by the circumstance 
whereby the purpose and the effect of the Decree was to specify neither the 
characteristics nor the production processes and methods for asbestos fibres and 
asbestos-containing products nor the products exempted from the prohibition. 
With regard to product characteristics, whilst Canada maintained that the fundamental 
characteristic laid down by the Decree was the absence of asbestos fibres and that the 
products covered were materials, products and devices that were placed on the French 
market, the EC rejected the argument that the words “the absence of asbestos fibres” 
served to characterize products placed on the French market. The absence of asbestos 
fibres did not constitute a characteristic, much less the characteristic of products placed 
on the French market. In other words, the EC denounced a critical weakness of Canada's 
argument laying in the fact that the latter failed to link “the characteristics” and “a 
product” through the possessive connective “of”. For the Decree to be able to lay down 
the characteristics of a product, it would have had in one way or another to designate the 
product(s) to which the said characteristics related. However, the Decree did not spell 
out any specific product but limited itself to lay down the principle of prohibition that 
has a general scope. Therefore, insofar as it simply prohibited their use on French 
territory, neither did the Decree lay down the characteristics of asbestos fibres nor did it 
specify those of asbestos-containing products. 
Furthermore, the EC asserted that the Decree did not lay down production processes15 
and methods16 relating to a product. The Decree did not indeed lay down any means or 
                                                
14 The EC supported its reasoning with the position taken by referring to the Panel report on United States 
- Gasoline, which noted that “The United States argued that the TBT Agreement had been designed to 
elaborate on the disciplines of Article III of the General Agreement for a very specific subset of measures 
(technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures).  The fact that a measure was in 
writing, mandatory and applied to products did not make it a technical regulation.  Excise taxes, for 
instance, met all these criteria but were not ‘technical regulations’. Similarly, the term ‘technical 
regulation’ was not so broad as to cover all government regulatory actions affecting products.  For 
example, government regulations requiring factory smokestacks to have devices to reduce emissions were 
not technical regulations, though they were in writing, mandatory and specified ‘characteristics’. [....] The 
United States concluded that the complainants were interpreting the term ‘technical regulation’ out of 
context and such an interpretation, if accepted, would introduce into the TBT Agreement many measures 
which were in fact not intended to be covered”, United States – Gasoline, AB and Panel Report, 
WT/DS2/9, adopted on 20 May 1996, para. 3.77. 
15 Account being taken of the fact French was the original language of the proceeding, the EC referred to 
the definition of process given by the Larousse French dictionary, whereby process is defined as “means, 
a practical method of doing something, of obtaining a result”. 
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ordered set of rules governing the production, i.e. the extraction and processing, of 
asbestos fibres. The prohibition applying to asbestos fibres, it was in fact not possible to 
determine how they should have been produced because they may no longer be 
produced. The same was true of asbestos-containing products. 
The EC also emphasized that, contrary to what is required by the definition of technical 
regulation given by Annex 1 to the TBT agreement, the Decree did not identify the 
products that must not contain asbestos.  All products, without more precise 
identification, were subject to the ban. Whereas a technical regulation presupposes that 
the product concerned can always be supplied on the market, the general prohibition 
contained in the Decree eliminated targeted products from the French market. 
Consequently, it could not be maintained that the Decree laid down the characteristics 
of a product which no longer existed on the market.  The same applied to the production 
processes and methods for the product, which are linked to its characteristics. 
The EC reaffirmed its conclusions that the TBT Agreement is not applicable also in 
relation to the provisions of the Decree concerning exemptions from the ban. The EC 
maintained that the Decree did not define the technical characteristics of the products 
that may enjoy an exemption from the general prohibition inasmuch as such products 
may or may not contain asbestos. In addition, the EC pointed out that this very limited 
number of products would anyhow be phased out as soon as substitute products that can 
ensure a lower level of risk and guarantee the same security for users would become 
technically available. Nor did the Decree define, in the EC’s view, the production 
processes and methods for the products that may be exempted from the general ban for 
the very same reason that such products may or may not contain asbestos. 
Finally the EC rejected any relevance of notifications to the determination of whether a 
given measure falls within the scope of the TBT agreement. The fact that France had 
notified the Decree to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade in no way 
prejudged, in the EC’s view, the applicability of the agreement. Whereas the French 
notification was made in good faith and for the sake of transparency, a wide-ranging 
interpretation of such practice would create additional obligations for WTO members 
and would induce them to discontinue, or at least reduce, notifications of their general 
legislation to WTO Committees. 
 
2.3.b Article 2.1 TBT as a specific application of articles I and III GATT 
 
The EC pointed out that Article 2.1 of the TBT agreement may be considered as a 
specific application to technical regulations of articles I and III of the GATT 1994. As 
the EC show in the section relating to the application of Article III:4 of the GATT, the 
Decree does not discriminate between imported products and like national products. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
16 According to the same dictionary source, method is a “logically ordered set of principles, rules or 
stages making it possible to reach a result”. 
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2.3.c Contentions under article 2.2 TBT 
 
According to the EC, the Decree met the two basic criteria enabling a WTO member to 
adopt a restrictive technical regulation under article 2.2 TBT. First, there must first be a 
legitimate objective, such as the protection of human health. Second, the member’s 
technical regulation must not be more trade-restrictive than is necessary to fulfil this 
legitimate objective, taking account of the risks that non-fulfilment would create. In this 
context, a strong similarity between article 2.2 TBT and XX(b) was asserted by the EC, 
particularly in regard to the necessity test required under both provisions. 
 
(i) Legitimate objective 
The EC claimed that, as it emphasized in connection with article XX(b) of the GATT, 
the aim of the French measure was to halt the spread of the risks associated with the use 
of asbestos fibres and asbestos-containing products and thus to reduce the number of 
deaths among the French population. The Decree is therefore perfectly in keeping with 
policies designed to protect human health. 
In the view of the EC, each member of the WTO benefits from a large measure of 
autonomy in establish the level of health protection it deems appropriate in its 
territory17. The question might nonetheless arise whether this appropriate level is 
limited by the word “necessary” or by the fact that the measure must not be applied in a 
manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on 
international trade. In this respect, the EC made a distinction between the level deemed 
appropriate by the Member and the measure taken to achieve the chosen level. The EC 
noted that, in the context of article XX(b) GATT which it equates to article 2.2 TBT 
with respect to the test of necessity, all the panels which have examined the concept of 
necessity have concluded that it was not the necessity of the objective pursued by the 
measure concerned that should be examined but whether or not it was necessary to 
submit the imported products to the measure contested in order to achieve the chosen 
level of protection18. 
                                                
17 In this connection, the EC pointed out that, for example, the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the TBT 
agreement states that members are free to choose the level of health protection they deem appropriate. 
This principle was also noted by the Appellate Body, which pointed out that “WTO Members have a 
large measure of autonomy to determine their own policies on the environment (including its relationship 
with trade), their environmental objectives and the environmental legislation they enact and implement.  
So far as concerns the WTO, that autonomy is circumscribed only by the need to respect the requirements 
of the General Agreement and the other covered agreements”, WT/DS2, United States – Gasoline, AB 
Report, 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, in particular pp.30 and 31. 
18 In US-Gasoline, the Panel noted that “[…] the term ‘necessary’ had been interpreted in the context of 
Article XX(d) by the panel in the Section 337 case which had stated that: a contracting party cannot 
justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT provision as ‘necessary’ in terms of Article XX(d) if 
an alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent 
with other GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent 
with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the 
measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT 
provisions”, WT/DS2, United States – Gasoline, AB and Panel Report, 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/9, paras. 
6.22-6.24, in particular 6.24. In this connection, the Panel on United States - Restrictions on Imports of 
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In other words, the EC maintained that the chosen level of protection cannot be 
questioned. Only the measure adopted to achieve that level of protection can. More 
specifically, whereas the trade measure that makes it possible to achieve the desired 
objective must satisfy certain conditions, there is no restriction on the level of protection 
chosen. Accordingly, the EC considered that France was free to choose the level of 
protection it deemed appropriate, i.e. in the instance at issue to halt the spread of the risk 
linked with the use of asbestos fibres and products containing such fibres. 
Finally, the EC pointed out that, irrespectively of the correspondence of the tests of 
necessity under article 2.2 TBT and article XX(b) GATT, and even thought the latter 
provision places it on the respondent, the burden of proof within the context of the TBT 
agreement remains with the party which invokes a specific provision of the agreement 
to establish the inconsistency. 
 
(ii) Necessity test 
On the issue of necessity, Canada made a distinction between, on the one hand, the need 
to determine whether the Decree permitted the fulfilment of the objective cited by 
France and, on the other, whether the effects of the technical regulation were necessary, 
taking account of the risks that non-fulfilment would create. 
The EC, in turn, responded by asserting once again the correspondence between articles 
2.2. TBT and XX GATT. The concept of necessity under article XX(b) GATT is similar 
to that in Article 2.2 TBT. The criterion of necessity under the latter provision is also 
based on whether or not the measure adopted is more restrictive than necessary to fulfil 
a legitimate objective. In this sense, article 2.2 echoes the test of necessity in article 
XX(b) GATT which involves, inter alia, examining whether a measure consistent or 
less inconsistent with the GATT, and hence less trade-restrictive, is available and could 
be employed to fulfil the member’s objective. 
As for the second sentence of article 2.2 TBT, concerning the risks non-fulfilment 
would create, the EC considered that, here again, this is an integral part of the 
implementation of the test of necessity under Article XX(b) GATT. In fact, according to 
the EC, a restrictive measure is “necessary” only if there are risks associated with the 
non-adoption of the measure in question. 
Thus, in the Community’s view, the wording of article 2.2 shows that the necessity test 
laid down therein is in line with that used in connection with Article XX of the GATT19 
and developed by Panel practice, according to which a dual examination has to be 
carried out: first, to determine whether the measure is the only one that allows the 
                                                                                                                                          
Tuna had already stated, in relation to GATT 1947, that “[…] Article XX(b) allows each contracting 
party to set its own human, animal or plant life or health standards. The conditions set out in Article 
XX(b) which limit resort to this exception, namely that the measure taken must be ‘necessary’ and not 
‘constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade’, refer to the trade measure requiring justification under Article XX(b), not however to the life or 
health standard chosen by the contracting party”, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, report 
circulated on 3 September 1991, not adopted, BISD 39S/155, para. 5.27. See also, United States – Section 
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, adopted on 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345, para. 5.26; Thailand – Import 
Restrictions and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, adopted on 7 November 1990, BISD 37S/200, para. 75; 
19 As it will be shown in Section IV of this Chapter, the EC an opposite stance in the EC-Sardines 
dispute. 
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objective set by the member to be attained, or whether there is a less restrictive measure 
whereby this objective can also be achieved; second, to assess the risks which a failure 
to take the measure concerned would create, account duly being taken of available 
scientific and technical information or end-uses of products. 
The EC claimed that, applied to the Decree, these two criteria showed that the measure 
is compatible with article 2.2. On the one hand, the prohibition of asbestos and 
asbestos-containing products altogether was the sole measure that would enable the 
objective set by the French authorities to be achieved. Less trade restrictive measures 
pointed out by Canada, namely the safe use of asbestos, were insufficient20 and 
ineffective21 to halt to spread of risks associated to exposure to asbestos in both 
productive and non-productive environments22. In other words, according to the 
Community, once products are placed on the market, there is no longer any realistic 
means of monitoring the use of asbestos, and in particular the everyday operations, such 
as cutting, sawing, etc. in which many persons may be engaged. The EC maintained that 
the safe use principle advocated by Canada was therefore not inapplicable and did not 
enable the legitimate objective set by France to be achieved. 
Moreover, in the light of the available scientific and technical information and of the 
end-uses of asbestos and asbestos-containing products, risks resulting from the non-
implementing the measure concerned, i.e. the failure to ban the items at issues, 
consisted in creating risks for human health. The EC assert that Canada, who bore the 
burden of the proof in this respect, failed to that the replacement of the horizontal 
prohibition by “safe” use would not create risks to human health. Nor could the 
complaining party discharge the said burden by trying to justify the safe use of asbestos 
by reference to out-dated texts23 which did not guarantee an adequate level of 
protection, given the health objectives adopted by the vast majority of countries. The 
EC emphasized in this connection that recent texts, not quoted by Canada, confirmed 
the ineffectiveness of such safe use24. 
                                                
20 According to the EC, safe use would be insufficient to halt the spread of the risks linked to exposure to 
asbestos in the production and processing industries because, even though the number of workers in those 
industries were limited and they were therefore, in principle, easy to supervise and monitor, safe use 
would not guarantee a decrease in the excess of mesotheliomas affecting workers. 
21 The ineffectiveness of the principle of safe use was particularly referred to occasional and unwitting 
exposures to asbestos, in relation to which it was impossible to ensure and monitor safe use among do-it-
yourself enthusiasts and those exposed to para-occupational risks. The principle, the Community 
maintained, could not apply where the risks affect a range of very varied occupations operating in a wide 
variety of situations. 
22 The EC noted that, in their written and oral replies, the scientific experts all agreed that banning the use 
of all types of asbestos, including high-density asbestos-containing cement products, was in fact the only 
real option available to France to achieve its legitimate objective of protecting human health. 
23 Such as ISO 7337:1984, Asbestos reinforced cement products - Guidelines for on-site work practices. 
24 The EC contented that in the mining and processing industries, in principle the easiest to monitor, the 
limits to the safe use of asbestos were apparent. To support this argument, it quoted the 1996 study of the 
British HSE, finding a significant excess of deaths due to mesothelioma among workers who began 
working in asbestos mines after the introduction of safe use. In the para-occupational and domestic 
context as well hundreds of thousands of persons were exposed, very often unwittingly, to asbestos and 
might even have been subject to exposure levels greatly in excess of the foreseen limit values for asbestos 
dust. The EC pointed out that a 1992 study by the Quebec CSST showed that the risk of mesothelioma 
had been rising steadily in Canada since 1967, chiefly among repair and maintenance workers. This 
finding was even more relevant to those persons exposed to asbestos inhalation in a non-occupational 
CHAPTER II – THE EU AS A RESPONDENT IN SPS AND TBT DISPUTES  
 91 
Finally, also with regard to the necessity test, the EC pointed out that, albeit the test 
should be applied in the same way in article 2.2 TBT and XX(b) GATT, the distribution 
of the burden of proof is the not same under each of these provisions. As opposed to 
article XX(b) GATT, within the context of article 2.2 TBT, the burden is on the 
complaining party to first establish a violation. Article 2.2 cannot be understood as an 
exception to another provision of the TBT Agreement. In this respect, the EC 
considered it appropriate, in view of the structure and context of the TBT agreement, to 
mention the Report of the Appellate Body in the Hormones25. In fact, the complaining 
member must first demonstrate the availability of a consistent or less inconsistent 
alternative measure that can be employed to achieve the level of protection deemed 
appropriate by the defending member26. The EC considered that, for the reasons above, 
Canada had not shown that the French measure was not necessary, within the meaning 
of Article 2.2 TBT, to protect human health in accordance with the level of protection 
deemed appropriate by France. 
 
2.3.d Contentions under article 2.4 TBT 
 
In relation to the alleged inconsistencies between the Decree and relevant international 
standards, the European Community contended that international texts referred to by 
Canada (the ILO, WHO, ISO texts) do not meet the definition of the term “standards” 
given in Annex 1 to the TBT agreement in the first place. Furthermore, by arguing that 
art. 2.4 does not impose conformity to international standards, the EC considered that, 
in any event, the French authorities used the texts referred to by Canada “as a basis” for 
their Decree, within the meaning of the said provision. 
After recalling that the object and purpose of the TBT agreement are to monitor the 
adoption and application of “standards” and “technical regulations” which cover the 
detailed characteristics of products or their methods of production, the EC considered 
that such object and specific purpose are bound to have an impact on the meaning to be 
given to the term “standards” mentioned in article 2.4 TBT, this impact being moreover 
recognized by the agreement itself at article 1.1 and 1.2. As Annex 1 contains a 
definition of “standard”, according to the EC, the drafters of the TBT Agreement must 
have wished to use a specific definition of “standard” for the purposes of the 
Agreement's application. This specific definition appears in Annex 1 and it follows 
                                                                                                                                          
context. Academic publications were mentioned which demonstrated a net excess of mesotheliomas in 
women living near chrysotile asbestos mines in Quebec, seven times higher than the level found among 
other women in Quebec. According to the Community, all these scientific findings were taken into 
account in the France's INSERM (Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale) report 
“Effects on Health of the Main Types of Exposures to Asbestos”, issued in June 1996, which preluded to 
the adoption of the Decree. 
25 WT/DS26, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate 
Body, WT/DS26/DS48/AB/R, adopted on 13 February 1998, in particular para. 99-109. 
26. The EC indicate that equally relevant, by analogy, is the position of the Appellate Body in WT/DS76, 
Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R, 19 March 1999, para. 126, 
according to which the complaining member must show that the contested measure is more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective taking into account the risk which non-fulfilment 
would create. 
CHAPTER II – THE EU AS A RESPONDENT IN SPS AND TBT DISPUTES  
 92 
from this definition that the TBT Agreement encourages the use of international 
standards, but solely those which can provide rules, guidelines or characteristics for 
products or related processes and production methods. In the asbestos dispute, 
international texts referred to by Canada27 did not satisfy the definition contained in 
Annex 1 and could not therefore be used “as a basis” for technical regulations. More 
precisely, consistently with its previous reasoning on the definition of technical 
regulation on which ground it claimed the exclusion of the Decree from the scope of the 
TBT agreement, the EC considered that neither the ILO and WHO documents nor the 
ISO standards could be considered as laying down the characteristics of asbestos fibres 
or an ordered set of rules for the manufacture of this product. Even less could they have 
been considered as laying down the characteristics of asbestos-containing products or an 
orderly set of rules for the manufacture of those products28. At best, they could be 
treated as assessments of the risks created by asbestos and asbestos-containing products 
rather than as establishing international technical standards or conformity assessment 
procedures. 
In the alternative, should the Panel have considered that the texts cited by Canada are 
standards within the meaning of the TBT agreement, the Community demanded the 
Panel to recognise that these texts were used “as a basis” for the adoption of the Decree. 
The EC’s line of reasoning consisted in pointing at the different legal implications of 
the terms “based on” as opposed to “conform to”. The Community opposed that he 
phrase “as a basis for” could be compared with the term “on the basis of” used in the 
SPS agreement, a term for which the Appellate Body (Hormones) indicated: 
“ […] we disagree with the Panel’s interpretation that ‘based on’ means the same thing as 
‘conform to’ […] A thing is commonly said to be ‘based on’ another thing when the 
former ‘stands’ or is ‘founded’ or ‘built’ upon or ‘is supported by’ the latter”.29 
The EC concluded that this definition entails that international texts quoted by Canada 
served “as a basis” for the Decree30. The EC concluded in fact from these texts that: 
                                                
27 ILO, Convention concerning Safety in the Use of Asbestos (Convention 162), 24 June 1986, 
International Labour Conference; ILO, Recommendation concerning Safety in the Use of Asbestos 
(Recommendation 172), 24 June 1986, International Labour Conference, Geneva; International Labour 
Conference; IPCS Environmental Health Criteria (203) on Chrysotile, WHO, Geneva, 1998. 
28 The EC’s assertion that the ILO and ISO texts are not relevant standards within the meaning of Article 
2.4 of the TBT Agreement was based on the analysis of the object and purpose, as well as of the actual 
content, of these international texts. The EC point out, for example, that the preamble to the Constitution 
of the ILO specifically provides for “the protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury 
arising out of his employment”. As for the Philadelphia Declaration concerning the aims and objectives 
of the ILO, article III-g provides for “adequate protection for the life and health of workers in all 
occupations”. The ISO texts are conceived in the same spirit.  Similarly, article 3 of ILO Convention 162 
of 1986 states that “National laws or regulations shall prescribe the measures to be taken for the 
prevention and control of, and protection of workers against, health hazards due to occupational exposure 
to asbestos”. According to point 1(i) of the scope and definitions of ILO recommendation 172 of 1986, 
“The provisions of the Asbestos Convention, 1986, and of this Recommendation should be applied to all 
activities involving a risk of exposure of workers to asbestos in the course of work”. 
29 WT/DS26 and WT/DS48, EC-Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), AB report, 
WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R, 13 February 1998, para. 166 and 163 respectively. 
30 The EC indicated that, as early as 1986, ILO Convention 162 stated: “Where necessary to protect the 
health of workers and technically practicable, national laws or regulations shall provide for one or more 
of the following measures: (a) replacement of asbestos or of certain types of asbestos or products 
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first, the banning or replacement of asbestos fibres or asbestos-containing products may 
be decided in cases where this is necessary to protect the health of workers and is 
technically feasible; second, where substitute materials are considered safer, they must 
be used to replace asbestos; third, control of the use of asbestos, including chrysotile, in 
the construction industry is difficult to introduce. According to the EC, this conclusion 
by the WHO contradicted Canada's statements that the “safe” use of asbestos would 
avoid any risk connected with its use. 
A further point in support of the claim that the Decree was actually compatible with 
article 2.4 TBT stemmed from the EC’s understanding that the said provision foresees 
that international standards must be ignored when they are “ineffective or 
inappropriate” and that this was the case in relation to the Decree. The ISO standard 
provides a perfect illustration of this point. At the time it was published in 1984, this 
standard represented a major step forward in relation to the arrangements prior to that 
date, but it did not guarantee sufficient levels of protection in the light of the health 
objective adopted by the vast majority of countries, and by France in particular. 
Spelling out the circumstances in which a standard might be considered ineffective or 
inappropriate within the meaning of this provision, the EC considered that the level of 
protection deemed appropriate by the member could be a factor in making international 
standards ineffective or inappropriate. An international standard is only effective or 
appropriate if it enables the member to achieve the legitimate objective it has set. 
Moreover, advances in scientific knowledge can also lead to the application of obsolete 
standards being ruled out. The Community put forward a systematic comparison 
between he TBT and the NAFTA agreement, which also deal with trade-related effects 
of technical regulations, to support the argument of the ineffectiveness and 
inappropriateness of international standards that became obsolete as a result of advances 
in scientific knowledge31. 
                                                                                                                                          
containing asbestos by other materials or products or the use of alternative technology, scientifically 
evaluated by the competent authority as harmless or less harmful, whenever this is possible. (b) total or 
partial prohibition of the use of asbestos or of certain types of asbestos or products containing asbestos in 
certain work processes”; ILO, Convention concerning Safety in the Use of Asbestos (Convention 162), 24 
June 1986, International Labour Conference. Similarly, ILO Recommendation 172 also indicated in 1986 
that: “[…] asbestos should be used only when its risks can be prevented or controlled; otherwise, it 
should be replaced, when technically feasible, by other materials or the use of alternative technologies, 
scientifically evaluated as harmless or less harmful.” Recommendation concerning Safety in the Use of 
Asbestos (Recommendation 172), 24 June 1986, International Labour Conference. The EC noted that, 
more recently, a WHO report specifically dealing with chrysotile was even more categorical in stating 
“Exposure to chrysotile asbestos poses increased risks for asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma in a 
dose dependent manner. No threshold has been identified for carcinogenic risks. […] Where safer 
substitute materials are available for chrysotile, they should be considered for use. […] Some asbestos 
containing products pose particular concern and chrysotile use in those circumstances is not 
recommended. These uses include friable products with high exposure potential. Construction materials 
are of particular concern for several reasons.  The construction industry work force is large and measures 
to control asbestos are difficult to institute. In-place building materials may also pose risk control to those 
doing alterations, maintenance and demolition. Minerals in place have the potential to deteriorate and 
create exposures”; IPCS Environmental Health Criteria (203) on Chrysotile, WHO, 1998, p. 144. 
31 The NAFTA Agreement provides as follows: 
“1. Each Party shall use, as a basis for its standards-related measures, relevant international 
standards or international standards whose completion is imminent, except where such standards would 
be an ineffective or inappropriate means to fulfil its legitimate objectives, for example because of 
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The EC therefore interpreted article 2.4 TBT so as to allow scientific reasons or the 
level of protection deemed appropriate by the member to affect the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of an international standard. In the case at issue, the EC considered 
indeed that the standards cited by Canada did not make it possible to achieve the level 
of protection deemed appropriate by France insofar as: first, chrysotile asbestos was a 
proven carcinogen; second, there was no exposure threshold for chrysotile asbestos and 
asbestos-containing products under which exposure can be considered safe; third, the 
so-called “safe” use was not applicable in all circumstances nor to every type of person 
who may come in contact with asbestos or asbestos-containing products and, moreover, 
did not eliminate every risk; finally, there were substitute products that are at least safer 
than chrysotile asbestos. 
France having chosen, as the level of protection deemed appropriate, to halt the spread 
of the risk associated with the use of asbestos, the ISO standard and the ILO texts did 
not make it possible to achieve such legitimate objective precisely for the above-
mentioned reasons.  According to the EC, the only texts that might have been relevant 
are those of the WHO and the IARC but only to the extent that they may be defined as 
assessments of the risks posed by asbestos and asbestos-containing products. All in all, 
France was complying fully with the WHO rules and had chosen to make no further use 
of asbestos and to replace such products with substitutes.  Moreover, the ban provided 
for waivers that make it possible to take into account certain specific situations in which 
the use of asbestos remained necessary because there was no substitute that would 
ensure equivalent performance while being less of a threat to health. 
 
2.3.e Contentions under article 2.8 TBT 
 
Finally, with regard to Canada’s claim of violation or article 2.8 TBT, beside restating 
the denial of the technical regulation nature of the Decree, which entails the 
inapplicability of the provision thereto, the Community contended that the said 
provision applies to a sub-category of technical regulations, namely technical 
regulations based on product requirements. According to the EC, the purpose of the 
provision is to ensure that technical rules that aim to ensure a given quality or minimum 
performance are, as far as possible, technically neutral and do not therefore prescribe a 
particular process or technology but simply set objectives to be achieved. In other 
words, the Community interpreted article 2.8 TBT as meaning that, wherever 
appropriate, the technical regulation shall be based on the performance of the product in 
question (i.e. based on requirements connected with the performance of the product, for 
example, “the product must be safe, watertight and non-flammable”), and not based on 
the design or on descriptive characteristics of the product (i.e. not specify in detail how 
                                                                                                                                          
fundamental climatic, geographical, technological or infrastructural factors, scientific justification or the 
level of protection that the Party considers appropriate. 
2. A Party's standards-related measure that conforms to an international standard shall be presumed 
to be consistent with Article 904(3) and (4). 
3. Paragraph 1 shall not be construed to prevent a Party, in pursuing its legitimate objectives, from 
adopting, maintaining or applying any standards-related measure that results in a higher level of 
protection than would be achieved if such measure were based on an international standard”. 
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these requirements of safety, water-tightness and non-flammability are to be attained). 
The EC considered that, even if the Decree were considered to be a technical regulation, 
under the instances of the asbestos dispute, a technical regulation that aims to prohibit 
the “use” of a product cannot set out the circumstances or conditions in which asbestos 
or asbestos-containing products are to be used, let alone pointing out what the product 
expected performances are. 
 
 
Section III – Trade Description of Sardines 
 
3.1 Introduction to the dispute: EC Regulation 2136/98 and Codex Stan 94 
 
An almost unstudied case involving the EC and Peru, this dispute32 concerns the trade 
description of two species of fish scientifically know as Sardina pilchardus Walbaum 
(Sardina pilchardus) and Sardinops sagax sagax (Sardinops sagax), which respectively 
are found mainly around the coasts of the Eastern North Atlantic, in the Mediterranean 
Sea and in the Black Sea, and in the Eastern Pacific along the coasts of Peru and Chile. 
Despite various morphological differences33, the two species display similar 
characteristics and living habits34. Above all both fish, as well as other species of the 
Clupeidae family, are used in the preparation of preserved and canned fish products. 
The measure in relation to which Peru, a producer and manufacturer of Sardinops 
sagax, claimed the nullification or impairment of its right under the WTO agreement is 
Regulation (EEC) 2136/89 laying down common marketing standards for preserved 
sardines, adopted on 21 June 198935. Such Regulation defines the standards governing 
the marketing of preserved sardines in the European Communities, now Union. The 
contested provision was in particular article 2 of the EC Regulation providing that only 
products prepared from Sardina pilchardus may be marketed as preserved sardines36 
                                                
32 WT/DS231, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines; Panel report, WT/DS231/R, 29 
May 2002, and WT/DS231/R/Corr.1, 10 June 2002; AB report, WT/DS231/R/AB, 26 September 2002. 
33 Differences concern the head and length, the type and number of gillrakes or bone striae and size and 
weight. 
34 They both live in a coastal pelagic environment, form schools, engage in vertical migration, feed on 
plankton and have similar breeding seasons. 
35 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2136/89 of 21 June 1989 laying down common marketing standards for 
preserved sardines, OJ L 212, 22.7.1989, p. 79–81, subsequently amended by Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 1181/2003 of 2 July 2003 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 2136/89 laying down 
common marketing standards for preserved sardines, OJ L 165, 3.7.2003, p. 17–18, and by Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1345/2008 of 23 December 2008 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 2136/89 
laying down common marketing standards for preserved sardines and trade descriptions for preserved 
sardines and sardine-type products, OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 76–78. 
36 Article 2 reads as follows: 
“Only products meeting the following requirements may be marketed as preserved sardines and under the 
trade description referred to in Article 7: 
− they must be covered by CN codes 1604 13 10 and ex 1604 20 50; 
− they must be prepared exclusively from the fish of the species "Sardina pilchardus Walbaum"; 
− they must be pre-packaged with any appropriate covering medium in a hermetically sealed 
container; 
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and therefore not allowing any other product, including those made out of Sardinops 
sagax, to be named and marketed under a description containing a reference to 
preserves sardines. For instance, the Regulation prohibited, although not explicitly, the 
use of the term "sardines" combined with the name of the country of origin (“Peruvian 
Sardines”), the geographical area in which the species is found (“Pacific Sardines”), the 
species (“Sardines — Sardinops sagax”) or the common name of the species Sardinops 
sagax customarily used in the language of the EC member State in which the product is 
sold (“Peruvian Sardines” in English or “Südamerikanische Sardinen” in German). 
Concerning also the very same issue of sardines naming, in 1978 the FAO and the 
WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission had adopted a standard, named Codex Stan 94, 
for canned sardines and sardine-type products37. Article 1 of Codex Stan 94 stated that 
this standard applied to canned sardines and sardine-type products packed in water or 
oil or other suitable packing medium and that it did not apply to speciality products 
where fish content constitutes less than 50% m/m of the net contents of the can. Article 
2.1 Codex Stan 94 provided that canned sardines or sardine-type products were 
prepared from fresh or frozen fish from a list of 21 species, amongst them Sardina 
pilchardus and Sardinops sagax. With regard to the issue of labelling, article 6 Codex 
Stan 94 specifies that the name of the products shall be “sardines” to be reserved 
exclusively for products containing Sardina pilchardus38. For the remaining 20 species 
to which it applied, the standard established the name “X sardines”, where X stands for 
a country, a geographic area, the species, or in the alternative the common name of the 
species in accordance with the law and custom of the country in which the product is 
sold, and in a manner not to mislead the consumer. 
 
3.2 Main claims by the parties 
 
The complaining party, Peru claimed in the first instance the inconsistency between the 
EC Regulation prohibiting the use of the term “sardines” in relation to species other 
than Sardinas pilchardus and article 2.4 TBT on the ground that the EC did not use the 
naming standard set out in paragraph 6.1.1(ii) of Codex Stan 94 as a basis for its 
Regulation even though that standard would be an effective and appropriate means to 
fulfil the legitimate objectives pursued by the Regulation. 
                                                                                                                                          
− they must be sterilized by appropriate treatment.” 
37 Codex Alimentarius Commission, Codex Stan 94 –1981 rev.1 – 1995. Codex Stan 94 was amended in 
1979 and 1989 by adding more species and revised in 1995. A further revision occurred in 2007, when 
the dispute at issue had long been decided. 
7.1 38 Article 6 of Codex Stan 94 reads as follows: 
“6. LABELLING 
In addition to the provisions of the Codex General Standard for the Labelling of Prepackaged Foods 
(CODEX STAN 1-1985, Rev. 3-1999) the following specific provisions shall apply: 
6.1 NAME OF THE FOOD 
 The name of the products shall be: 
6.1.1 (i) "Sardines" (to be reserved exclusively for Sardina pilchardus (Walbaum)); or 
 (ii) "X sardines" of a country, a geographic area, the species, or the common name of the 
species in accordance with the law and custom of the country in which the product is sold, and in a 
manner not to mislead the consumer.” 
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A number of alternative claims were submitted by Peru. If the Panel were to find that 
the Regulation was consistent with article 2.4 TBT, Peru requested it to find that the 
Regulation was inconsistent with article 2.2 TBT because it was more trade-restrictive 
than necessary to fulfil the legitimate objective of market transparency that the EC 
claimed to pursue. 
In the alternative, if the Panel were to find that the EC Regulation were consistent with 
articles 2.2 and 2.4 TBT, Peru requested the Panel to find that the measure is 
inconsistent with article 2.1 TBT because it is a technical regulation that accords 
Peruvian products prepared from fish of the species Sardinops sagax a less favourable 
treatment than that accorded to like European products made from fish of the species 
Sardina pilchardus. 
As the very last resort, if the Panel were to find that the measure at issue were consistent 
with the TBT agreement, Peru alleged the inconsistency of the measure with article III:4 
GATT on the ground that it put forward a requirement affecting the offering for sale of 
imported sardines that accords Peruvian products prepared from fish of the species 
Sardinops sagax a less favourable treatment than that accorded to like 
European products made from fish of the species Sardina pilchardus. 
As for it, the Community rejected Peru’s claims altogether. 
 
3.3 The EC defence on TBT-related claims39 
 
3.3.a Allocation of the burden of proof 
 
The Community rejected Peru's interpretation of article 2.5 TBT agreement intended to 
make it relevant for the allocation of the burden of the proof. It did so by comparing 
article 2.5 TBT with article parallel article 5.8 SPS and relevant case-law40 thus 
contending that the scope of article 2.5 is solely to enhance the transparency that a 
central government body has to follow when preparing, adopting and applying a 
technical regulation and that therefore the provision is not intended, as Peru alleged, to 
establish a higher threshold of explanation. 
Also, the EC contended that the burden of proving that article 2 of the EC Regulation 
was not in conformity with paragraphs 4, 2 and 1 of article 2 TBT and with article III:4 
                                                
39 The ensuing considerations on the EC line of defence are partially based on the comparative analysis of 
the following documents presented by the EC before the AB, and available on the website of the 
Commission DG Trade: European Communities – Trade Descriptions of Sardines (WT/DS231), First 
Written Submission by the EC, Geneva, 12 November 2001; Second Written Submission by the EC, 
Geneva, 11 January 2002; European Communities – Trade Descriptions of Sardines (AB-2002-3), 
Appellant’s Submission of the EC pursuant to Rule 21 of the Working Procedure for Appellate Review, 
Geneva, 8 July 2002. 
40 I particular, the EC used the interpretation of art.5.8 SPS given by the AB in EC — Hormones: “Article 
5.8 of the SPS Agreement does not purport to address burden of proof problems; it does not deal with a 
dispute settlement situation.  To the contrary, a Member seeking to exercise its right to receive 
information under Article 5.8 would, most likely, be ina pre-dispute situation, and the information or 
explanation it receives may well make it possible for that Member to proceed to dispute settlement 
proceedings and to carry out the burden of proving on a prima face basis that the measure involved is not 
consistent with the SPS Agreement.” 
CHAPTER II – THE EU AS A RESPONDENT IN SPS AND TBT DISPUTES  
 98 
GATT rested entirely with Peru. Accordingly, the complaining party had to present all 
the elements of article 2.4 TBT  that must be demonstrated to establish a prima facie 
case, which are, first, that a technical regulation has been prepared; second, that a 
relevant international standard was in existence or that its adoption was imminent; and 
finally, that the defender did not use such relevant standard as a basis for the technical 
regulation41. 
Moreover, according to article 2.2 TBT , Peru had to demonstrate trade-restrictive 
effects; identify correctly the legitimate objectives pursued; and finally, establish that 
these restrictive effects had been more trade-restrictive than necessary. 
With regard to article 2.1 TBT and article III:4 GATT 1994, reiterating the similitude 
between those provisions already put forward in its submission during EC-Asbestos, the 
Community claimed that, in line with the consolidated WTO jurisprudence on the 
matter, Peru was required to present evidence and argument sufficient to establish a 
presumption that article 2 of the EC Regulation is inconsistent with its obligations under 
those articles. More specifically, Peru must prove that, first, EC Regulation was a law, 
regulation or requirement affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
distribution or use; second, that the imported and domestic products affected by it are 
"like"; finally, that the treatment accorded to the imported products is less favourable. 
 
3.3.b Whether the EC Regulation is a technical regulation 
 
This time the EC had not marge to argue on the measure not falling within the scope of 
the TBT agreement. The Community accepted indeed that its Regulation was a 
technical regulation for the purposes of the TBT agreement and that it laid down 
marketing standards for preserved Sardina pilchardus42. Referring to the Appellate 
Body's statement in EC — Asbestos that "the proper legal character of the measure at 
issue cannot be determined unless the measure is examined as a whole", the Community 
however did not accept that article 2 of the Regulation, taken in isolation, was a 
technical regulation and argued that the said provision could only be interpreted in the 
context of the entire Regulation. The European Communities supported this claim by 
stating that the Regulation provided that the name specified for preserved Sardina 
pilchardus cannot be used for other products but that this did not mean that it laid down 
mandatory labelling requirements for products other than preserved Sardina pilchardus 
and therefore it was not to be considered as a technical regulation for preserved 
Sardinops sagax or any other product except Sardina pilchardus. 
The European Communities further submitted that article 2 of the Regulation was not a 
technical regulation because the definition thereof refers only to labelling, not naming. 
                                                
41 Curiously, the EC mentioned as a fourth component of the demonstration of the disregard had for 
relevant international standards that the use of the standard was ineffective or inappropriate for the 
fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued. This appears not to be an element necessary for the 
demonstration of a violation of article 2.4 but rather one that is functional to the justification of such a 
violation. As such it would be for the defendant, not for the complainant to bring to the attention of the 
Panel. 
42 The EC notified the Regulation at issue in 1989 under the Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (the "Tokyo Round Standards Code"). 
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The names of the products of interest to Peru were set out in various measures of the EC 
Member States which had not been identified by Peru. In particular, it was EC Directive 
2000/1343, in conjunction with the various Member States’ measures that constituted the 
technical regulation for the products against which Peru should have addressed its 
complain. 
 
3.3.c Application of the TBT Agreement to measures adopted before 1 January 1995 
 
An interesting but poorly devised argument of the EC defence, the Community argued 
against the retroactive application of article 2.4 TBT in general and against its 
application to the maintenance of technical regulations which entered into force prior to 
the adoption of relevant international standards. Criticisms can be raised with regard to 
the confusion operated by the EC on such two distinct components of the non-
retroactivity argument: the non-retroactivity of article 2.4 TBT, which is a matter to be 
decided under the law of the Treaties, and the non-retroactivity of adopted international 
standards, which in turn solely depends on the interpretation given to article 2.4 TBT. 
The EC claimed first that article 2.4 TBT is not applicable to measures that were drawn 
up before its entry into force. The provision requires WTO Members to use existing 
relevant international standards as a basis for drawing up their technical regulations. 
The EC therefore concluded that the obligation exists prior to the adoption of the 
measure, but not afterwards. 
In the EC’s view, the language of article 2.4 TBT makes clear that it does not apply to 
the existence or maintenance of technical regulations.  In support of this argument, it 
opposed article 2.4 TBT to the relevant provision of the SPS Agreement such as 
considered by the Appellate Body in EC — Hormones. In that case, the AB based its 
view on the wording of articles 2.2, 3.3 and 5.6 SPS agreement, all of which include the 
word "maintain" which is absent from article 2.4 TBT. 
The EC therefore based its defence bottom line on the argument that article 2.4 TBT 
only applies to the preparation and adoption of technical regulations because, in 
contrast to the maintenance, preparation and adoption are "acts or facts which took 
place, or situations which ceased to exist, before the date of [the] entry into force" of the 
TBT Agreement within the meaning of article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, on  "Non-Retroactivity of Treaties"44. 
Going back to the non-retroactivity of international standards, the Community further 
argued that it is only possible to use relevant international standards as a basis for the 
                                                
43 The system of rules concerning the labelling of foodstuffs in the European Communities is established 
by Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 on the 
approximation of the laws of the member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of 
foodstuffs, OJ L 109 of 6.5.2000, p. 29-42. EC Directive 2000/13 sets out the basic framework and is 
designed to be complemented by more detailed European Communities rules or, in their absence, more 
detailed member States rules. 
44 Article 28 reads as follows: 
“Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind 
a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the 
date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.” 
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technical regulation when the technical regulation is being drafted or when it is 
amended. However, this particular question was not before the Panel because the 
EC Regulation had not been amended.  In its view, the question was whether, after the 
WTO Agreement entered into force, WTO members are under an obligation to revise 
their existing technical regulations to ensure that they could be considered to have used 
international standards “as a basis”. From the text of article 2.4, especially the words 
“where technical regulations are required”, it was clear to the EC that such an obligation 
had not been created. 
Again on the non retroactivity of international standards, the EC argued that article 
XVI:4 WTO created an obligation to ensure that WTO obligations are complied with, 
but the precise scope of the obligations depends on the language of each specific 
provision under the covered agreements. In the Community’s view, article XVI:4 does 
not render WTO obligations applicable to acts performed before the entry into force of 
the WTO Agreement where this does not result from the terms of the provision itself. In 
an quite obscure synopsis in which it tried to link the two component of the argument, 
the EC concluded that there must be an obligation somewhere in the covered 
agreements before article XVI:4 can have effect and the wording of article 2.4 TBT  
makes clear that there is no obligation to revise existing technical regulations to bring 
them into conformity with international standards. Although it is still possible to 
divorce the two components of the argument, better would have been to treat them 
separately from the beginning on charge to weaken the respective relevance. 
 
3.3.d Article 2.4 of the TBT agreement 
 
(i) Whether Codex Stan 94 is a relevant international standard 
On the relevance of Codex Stan 94, the EC made the preliminary observation that this 
standard contains 20 very different “sardine-type” species belonging to 11 genera, the 
common name for some of these species not being sardines and other species that are 
called “sardines” in other parts of the world not being included in Codex Stan 94.  In its 
view, the policy of species inclusion within Codex Stan 94 was influenced by the 
concern that the list set out therein would end up including a too high number of 
species, the consequence being that the Codex standard would include so many 
“sardine-type” species that it would be more misleading than informative for the 
consumer.  To illustrate the difficulties involved in determining the coverage of the 
species under Codex Stan 94, the EC referred to the fact that Peru was exporting 
Sardinops sagax to more than 20 countries under the trade description of “sardines” 
rather than “Pacific sardines” even though Codex Stan 94 does not permit Sardinops 
sagax to be called “sardines” without any further qualification. 
With regard to the relevance of Codex Stan 94 as an international standard, the 
European Communities contended against it in the first place by using yet again the 
argument of the non-retroactivity of international standards. The obligation contained in 
Article 2.4 is to use relevant international standards as a basis for the technical 
regulation where they already exist or their completion is imminent. Hence, Codex Stan 
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94 was not a relevant international standard within the meaning of article 2.4 TBT 
because it did not exist and its adoption was not imminent when the EC Regulation was 
adopted. It was obvious, in the EC’s understanding of the TBT provision at issue, that a 
1994 standard cannot be a relevant standard for a Regulation adopted in 1989 
Being there no obligation to use a draft international standard as a basis for a technical 
regulation if its adoption is not imminent, drafters of the TBT agreement cannot have 
intended that an already existing technical regulation could become inconsistent with 
article 2.4 thereof when the adoption of the draft international standard becomes 
imminent or when it is actually adopted and becomes existing. Peru would have had to 
invoke non-conformity with the predecessor standard in order to make its case. In any 
case, the European Communities points out that it did comply with the requirements of 
the Tokyo Round Standards Code when it adopted its Regulation and notified it to the 
GATT. 
The second argument put forward by the EC to counter the alleged relevance of Codex 
Stan 94 concerned the modalities of its adoption, which failed to feature consensus. 
Codex Stan 94 was not adopted in accordance with the principle of consensus set out by 
the TBT Committee45. In support of its claim, the EC submitted that according to rule 
VI:2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, decisions can 
be taken by a majority of the votes cast. Even if it is not recorded whether Codex Stan 
94 was elaborated and adopted by means of a formal vote, it is clear – the Community 
contented - that it was adopted in circumstances in which dissenting members could 
have been outvoted and, therefore, may have decided not to express their disagreement, 
i.e., by not insisting on a vote.  This is especially so, in the EC’s view, since the General 
Principles of the Codex Alimentarius make clear that Codex standards are 
recommendations that need to be accepted by governments and that their acceptance 
can be unconditional, conditional or with deviations. Secondly, Codex Stan 94 had been 
accepted by only 18 countries, of which only four accepted it fully, whereas none of the 
EC member States, and not even Peru, had accepted it. Finally, to the EC, the available 
records of the discussions relating to Codex Stan 94 demonstrated that members held 
diverging views on the appropriate names for preserved sardines and sardine-type 
products. 
Moreover, with regard to the elaboration procedure of Codex Stan 94, Community 
submitted that an editorial change, and not a substantive one, had occurred at step 8 of 
the procedure. If a substantive amendment had been made at this stage, it would have 
been necessary to refer the text back to the relevant committee for comments before its 
adoption. However, if a substantive change had nevertheless been made at step 8 of the 
Codex elaboration procedure, the European Communities claims that Codex Stan 94 
would, in this case, be rendered invalid and could not, therefore, be considered a 
relevant international standard within the meaning of article 2.4 TBT. 
Finally, European Communities contended that paragraph 6.1.1(ii) Codex Stan 94 is 
was not relevant since the EC Regulation did not regulate products other than preserved 
                                                
45 Decision of the Committee on Principles for the Development of the International Standards, Guides 
and Recommendations with Relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the Agreement 
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Sardina Pilchardus, for whose name the relevant part of Codex Stan 94 is paragraph 
6.1.1(i). 
 
(ii) Whether Codex Stan 94 was used “as a basis” for the EC Regulation 
In order to counter the allegation that EC Regulation was not based on Codex Stan 94, 
the EC pointed out that it affords quite some flexibility. To start with, in the EC’s view, 
under paragraph 6.1.1(ii) thereof, each country has the option of choosing between “X 
sardines” and the common name of the species. It argues that “the common name of the 
species in accordance with the law and customs of the country in which the product is 
sold” is intended to be a self-standing option independent of the formula “X sardines”46. 
The European Communities was of the view that the French47 and Spanish48 versions of 
Codex Stan 94 made it clear that there was no choice to be made but that there was an 
express indication that, irrespective of the formula used, accordance should have been 
granted with the law and custom of the importing country and in a way that did not 
mislead the consumer. 
In the Community’s view under paragraph 6.1.1(ii) of Codex Stan 94 importing 
Members can choose between “X sardines” or the common name of the species49. The 
                                                
46 According to the EC, this interpretation is evidenced by the fact that the phrase “the common name of 
the species in accordance with the law and customs of the country in which the product is sold” is found 
between commas, whereas there is no comma between “species” and “in accordance with”, and there is a 
comma before “and in a manner not to mislead the consumer”. 
47 The French text reads:  
“6.1.1 (ii) “Sardines X”, “X” désignant un pays, une zone géographique, l'espèce ou le nom 
commun de l'espèce en conformité des lois et usages du pays où le produit est vendu, de manière à ne pas 
induire le consommateur en erreur.” 
48 The Spanish text reads:  
“6.1.1(ii)  “Sardina X” de un país o una zona geográfica, con indicación de la especie o el nombre 
común de la misma, en conformidad con la legislación y la costumbre del país en que se venda el 
producto, expresado de manera que no induzca a engaño al consumidor.” 
49 In support of its interpretation that Codex Stan 94 allows Members to choose between “X sardines” and 
the common name of the species in accordance with the law and custom the country in which the product 
is sold, the Community referred to the negotiating history of Codex Stan 94, where the text of paragraph 
6.1.1 submitted to the Codex Alimentarius Commission by the technical Committee was divided into 
three paragraphs, with “the common name of the species” being a third and separate option, and also with 
the phrase “in accordance with the law and custom of the country in which the product is sold, and in a 
manner not to mislead the consumer” separate from the three paragraphs. The text of paragraph 6.1.1 
submitted to the Commission by the technical Committee reads: 
“The name of the product shall be: 
(i) "Sardines" (to be reserved exclusively for Sardina pilchardus (Walbaum)); or 
(ii) "X sardines", where "X" is the name of a country, a geographic area, or the species; or  
(iii) the common name of the species; 
in accordance with the law and custom of the country in which the product is sold, and in a manner not to 
mislead the consumer.” 
The minutes of the meeting of the Codex Alimentarius Commission at which Codex Stan 94 was 
definitively adopted show that the text of paragraph 6.1.1, prepared and discussed in steps 1 to 7 of the 
elaboration procedure, was amended editorially at the meeting. This change is described in the minutes as 
"editorial". Thus, the EC claimed that it was not intended to change the substance of the provision but to 
reconcile the fact that the word “sardines” by itself was reserved exclusively for Sardina pilchardus with 
the last paragraph requiring that any name must be in accordance with the law and custom of the country 
in which the product is sold. The EC therefore concluded that the text as proposed to the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission is a good guide to the intended meaning of the standard. 
The European Communities added that interpretative criteria contained in the Vienna Convention were 
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fact that the name for products other than Sardina pilchardus could not be harmonized 
and had to defer to each country is reflected in the language “in accordance with the law 
and customs of the country in which the product is sold”. The EC noted that there is an 
additional element contained in Codex Stan 94 that is not applicable to Sardina 
pilchardus but applicable to other species, namely that the trade description of the latter 
group of species must not mislead the consumer in the country in which the product is 
sold. 
The Community argued that Article 2 of its Regulation followed the guidance provided 
by Codex Stan 94 in that the use of the word “sardines” for products other than 
preserved Sardina pilchardus would not be in accordance with the law and customs of 
the EC Member States and would mislead European consumers in so far as the term 
“sardines” has historically been known as referring to Sardina pilchardus. Moreover, 
the EC asserted that there was a uniform consumer expectation throughout the EC the 
term “sardines” refers only to preserved  Sardina pilchardus50. 
Whereas the first argument used by the EC with regard to the compatibility to the 
Regulation with the codex standard pertains to the interpretation of the latter, a second 
argument used by the EC is more general and concerns the interpretation of article 2.4 
TBT as such. The Community argued that even if Peru's interpretation were valid in that 
the term “sardines” must be used with a qualification for species other than Sardina 
pilchardus, article 2.4 TBT would still not require that such name be used on the ground 
that the said provision requires a relevant international standard to be used as a basis for 
drawing up members’ technical regulations when they decide that these are required and 
not as the basis for the technical regulation51. In other word, according to the EC’s view, 
article 2.4 does not require members to follow these standards or comply with them, an 
interpretation that the Community had already tried to put forward in the asbestos 
dispute but which was not confirmed not rejected because no decision was taken on the 
merit of TBT-related claims52. Furthermore, the EC argued that article 2.4 allows a 
selective use of international standards in that it expressly states that a member may 
                                                                                                                                          
not applicable to the interpretation of Codex standards. The relatively low importance attached to 
preparatory documents under the Vienna Convention is due to the fact that treaties are legal texts which 
are considered and adopted by formal ratification procedures and preparatory documents are not. This 
rationale does not apply to Codex standards. Should the Panel have had any doubt on the interpretation of 
paragraph 6.1.1(ii) of the Codex Stan 94, the Panel should have asked – in the EC’s view - the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission to provide its view of the meaning of this text. 
 
50 The names for preserved Sardinops sagax that are in accordance with the law and custom of the 
United Kingdom and Germany are Pacific pilchard and Sardinops or pilchard, respectively. 
51 Just as in its submission in the asbestos dispute, the EC recalled the Appellate Body’s decision, in the 
context of the SPS agreement, that “based on” cannot be interpreted as meaning "conform to" and 
therefore reversed a panel ruling that was based on such an interpretation and that found that a 
European Communities' measure was not “based on” a Codex standard because it did not conform to it.  
The AB reasoned in particular that “specific and compelling language” would be needed to demonstrate 
that sovereign countries had intended to vest Codex standards, which were “recommendatory in form and 
language”, with obligatory force. According to the EC, there is no such intention expressed in article 2.4 
TBT. In fact, the text of this provision indicates an even weaker requirement to take a standard into 
account than was the case with the SPS Agreement. 
52 See section II in this chapter. 
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only use the relevant parts of the international standard, that is the parts that are related 
to the objective pursued by the required technical regulation. 
Therefore, the European Communities claimed that it has “complied with” the text of 
the Codex Stan 94, because article 2 of the EC Regulation follows the guidance it 
provided. According to the EC, Article 2.4 TBT allows in fact WTO members 
flexibility and requiring preserved sardine-type products to use the names under which 
they are known in the Member States falls within this margin of flexibility.  
 
(iii) Whether Codex Stan 94 is ineffective or inappropriate to fulfil the legitimate 
objectives pursued by the EC Regulation 
 
a. Whether the EC Regulation fulfils a legitimate objective 
The EC argued that the separate but interdependent objectives pursued by article 2 of 
the Regulation are consumer protection, market transparency and fair competition. It 
further explained that the legitimate objectives of the entire EC Regulation are the 
following: first, to keep products of unsatisfactory quality off the market; second, to 
facilitate trade relations based on fair competition; third, to ensure transparency of the 
market; fourth, to ensure good market presentation of the product; and finally to provide 
appropriate information to consumers53. According to the European Communities, the 
first objective only relates to preserved Sardina pilchardus and it is pursued through the 
prohibition of the marketing of products of substandard quality. 
The European Communities argues that all objectives of WTO Members can be 
presumed to be legitimate and that this is a corollary of the principle that States must be 
presumed to act in good faith. As in the asbestos dispute, the EC underlined that, as 
long as the objective is legitimate, WTO members have the right to choose the level of 
protection they consider appropriate54. 
Concerning the objective of market transparency for instance, the European Community 
contended that, contrary to Peru's argument, it was obvious that there is a “rational 
connection” between the legitimate objective of market transparency (and that of 
consumer protection) and the need to ensure that products are sold under their correct 
trade descriptions. The Community argued that the provisions of its Regulation laying 
                                                
53 The EC argued that its Regulation must be examined in the framework of its own system of rules 
concerning labelling of foodstuffs.  The objectives of EC Directive 2000/13 are to protect consumers and 
prevent distortions of competition. These objectives are fulfilled by laying down detailed and precise 
requirements as to how products should be labelled.  The European Community pointed out that EC 
Directive 2000/13 states that labelling must not mislead purchasers and establishes the principle that there 
should be a single correct name for a given foodstuff.  The hierarchy of rules for determining the correct 
name for a foodstuff is therefore: the name laid down in EC legislation; the name provided for in the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions applicable in the member States in which the product is 
sold; the name customary in the Member State in which the product is sold; and a description of the 
foodstuff, and if necessary, of its use which is clear enough to let the purchaser know its true nature and 
distinguish it from other products with which it might be confused. 
54 Quoting a passage in the preamble to the SPS agreement similar to that in the TBT agreement, the 
Community reiterated the example that the Appellate Body interpretation in  EC — Hormones, according 
to which “this right of a Member to establish its own level of sanitary protection under Article 3.3 of the 
SPS Agreement is an autonomous right”. The Appellate Body made similar statements in EC — Asbestos, 
Korea — Various Measures on Beef, and Australia — Salmon. 
CHAPTER II – THE EU AS A RESPONDENT IN SPS AND TBT DISPUTES  
 105 
down minimum quality standards, harmonizing the ways in which the product may be 
presented and regulating the indications to be contained on the label, all serve to 
facilitate comparisons between competing products ant that this is particularly true of 
the name. 
According to the EC, Peru misinterpreted the second recital of the preamble to the 
Regulation at stake by reading a protectionist objective therein. While the objectives of 
the Regulation are expressed in clear terms by using the expression “in order to …”, the 
second recital simply indicates what the legislator thought could be one of the 
consequences of the Regulation (“…is likely to…”). In the view of the EC, it seemed 
obvious that, as regards preserved sardine products, a law that ensures market 
transparency and fair competition, that guarantees the quality of the products and that 
appropriately informs the consumer of this, will most likely result in an improvement of 
the profitability of sardine production in the European Community. 
 
b. Whether Codex Stan 94 is ineffective or inappropriate to fulfil the legitimate 
objectives pursued by the EC Regulation 
Even if deemed relevant, the EC considered that the use of Codex Stan 94 would be 
inappropriate to fulfil the legitimate objectives pursued by its Regulation. The 
prohibition on the use of the term “sardines” for species other than Sardina pilchardus 
was necessary to allow different products to be distinguished. In this regard, the EC 
noted that one of the legitimate objectives recognized by article 2.2 TBT is the 
prevention of deceptive practices. Furthermore, the need to prevent deceptive practices 
is also a requirement of the Codex Stan 94, which requires that whichever formula is 
used for sardine-type products, it has to be drafted in such a way so as not to mislead 
the consumer. The Community therefore argued that, quite to the contrary, the use of 
the term “X Sardines” where X indicates the name of a country or geographic area 
would not achieve these objectives since the use of the word "sardines" would suggest 
to the EC consumer that the products are the same but simply originate from different 
geographic areas.  
In most parts of the European Communities, especially in the producer countries, the 
term "sardines" has historically made reference only to Sardina pilchardus.  Therefore, 
the European Communities claims that the use of the term "sardine-type" demonstrates 
that "sardines" is not considered a generic term. 
The European Communities contended that the Regulation at issue does not exist in a 
vacuum, but is part of its legitimate policy to ensure precision in the names of 
foodstuffs so as to preserve quality, product diversity and consumer protection. This is a 
system in which each food product must bear a precise trade description on which the 
consumer can rely as a guarantee of the nature and characteristics of the product. One 
result of its legitimate policy is to prevent the names of foodstuffs becoming generic, 
that being why “sardines” cannot be used ad a generic term in the European 
Community. This framework, in the EC’s view, has now created uniform consumer 
expectations throughout the European market, the term "sardines" referring only to a 
preserved product prepared from Sardina pilchardus. Therefore, the EC argued that an 
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unrestricted use of the term "sardines" would create confusion as to the nature of the 
product being sold55. 
Moreover the EC maintained that under a system where names are more flexible and a 
greater range of foodstuffs can be sold under each name, there is a natural tendency for 
all producers to use the cheapest ingredients that qualify for the name and allow the 
associated reputation to be exploited. This would lead to a levelling down of both 
quality and choice. 
The EC also recalled that, even before the EC Regulation entered into force, relevant 
European legislation law required the products to be sold under the trade names 
determined by the laws of the relevant Member States, and these laws did not allow the 
use of the trade description "prepared sardines" to be used for what Peru terms "all 
species of sardines"56. The European Communities refers to Council Directive 
79/112/EEC of 18 December 1978, the predecessor to EC Directive 2000/13 which 
states. In conclusion, the EC argued that any name for what are considered “sardine-
type products” that contains the word “sardines” would not be in accordance with the 
law and the custom of its member States and would mislead the European consumers. 
 
3.3.e Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement 
 
(i) Whether the EC Regulation is "more trade restrictive than necessary" 
 
a. Trade-restrictive effects 
The EC claimed the inexistence of trade restrictive effects resulting from the 
Regulation. It submitted that, in order to establish that article 2 of the EC Regulation 
violates article 2.2 TBT, the complaining party limited itself to analysing one of the 
many recitals of the EC Regulation and to asserting that this Regulation, having a clear 
protectionist intent, constitutes an obstacle to trade. The EC deemed this unacceptable 
                                                
55 The EC maintained that consumers in most of its Member States have always associated the word 
“sardines” exclusively with Sardina pilchardus. They have also come to know canned Sardinops sagax 
under trade descriptions such as “Pacific pilchards” (in the UK) or “Sardinops Pilchard” (in Belgium). 
The EC therefore rejected Peru's assertion that European consumers associate Sardinops sagax with the 
trade description “sardines” and claimed, to the contrary, that its consumers associate Sardinops sagax 
with trade descriptions such as “Pacific pilchards” and changing these trade descriptions would have 
cause disruption and confusion. This would have not been an effective or appropriate means for the 
fulfilment of the three legitimate objectives mentioned above. 
56 The name under which a foodstuff is sold shall be the name laid down by whatever laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions apply to the foodstuff in question or, in the absence of any such name, the name 
customary in the member state where the product is sold to the ultimate consumer, or a description of the 
foodstuff and, if necessary, of its use, that is sufficiently precise to inform the purchaser of its true nature 
and to enable it to be distinguished from products with which it could be confused. In France for instance, 
article 1 of the “Arrêté Ministériel du 16 mars 1982 pour les poissons marins” prescribed the name 
“Sardine commune” for the Sardina pilchardus, and the name “Sardinops du Chili” or “Sardinops” for 
the Sardinops sagax. Similarly, in Spain, the name “Sardina” has been reserved for Sardina pilchardus 
since at least 1964. In 1984, Article 30.1 of “Real Decreto 1521/1984” of 1 August 1984, in combination 
with its Annex I, reiterates the attribution of the name “Sardina” to the Sardina pilchardus. Moreover, the 
European Communities notes that UK’s regulations have required the name “Pacific pilchards” for  
Sardinops sagax since at least 1980, well before the adoption of the EC Regulation. 
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in a legal proceedings where the complainant has the burden of proving a prima facie 
case. In order to establish that article 2 of the EC Regulation is applied "with a view to 
or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade", according to 
the EC, Peru would have to demonstrate trade-restrictive effects, identify correctly the 
legitimate objectives pursued and, finally, establish that these restrictive effects were 
more trade-restrictive than necessary, taking into account the benefits to be expected 
from the realisation of the legitimate objectives. The European Communities claimed 
that Peru failed to establish any of these requirements. 
According to the European Communities, contrary to Peru claims that article 2.2 is 
concerned with conditions of competition rather than unnecessary restrictions on trade, 
it is not possible to derive from the decisions of the AB a principle “under GATT and 
WTO jurisprudence that the basic provisions governing international trade protect 
expectations on conditions of competition, not on export volumes”. 
In India — Patents, the case cited by Peru in support of its original contention, the 
Appellate Body chided the panel for pronouncing a “general interpretative principle” 
according to which “legitimate expectations” concerning in particular the protection of 
conditions of competition must be taken into account in interpreting the 
TRIPS agreement. The European Communities referred to the AB’s statement that 
“[t]he legitimate expectations of the parties to a treaty are reflected in the language of 
the treaty itself” and notes that, just as in the case of the TRIPS, there is no basis for 
importing into the TBT regime concepts that are not there. The Comunity recalled that 
the TBT agreement expressly recognises the right of WTO members to adopt the 
standards they consider appropriate to protect, for example, human, animal or plant life 
or health, the environment, or to meet other consumer interests. It therefore argued that 
all technical regulations inevitably affect conditions of competition and claimed that if 
such an effect were sufficient to establish an “obstacle to trade” contrary to article 2.2 
TBT, there would have been no need for the members to refer, in the TBT agreement, to 
unnecessary obstacles to trade. 
 
b. More trade-restrictive than necessary 
The Community reasoned that even if Peru were to demonstrate that the Regulation was 
trade restrictive, it would still have to show that it is more trade restrictive than 
necessary in the light of the risks addressed by article 2 of the EC Regulation. 
With regard to the concept of necessity, the EC made here a step back in comparison to 
the interpretation put forward in EC-Asbestos, in that it maintained that necessity is not 
used in the same context under article 2.2 TBT and under article XX(d) GATT. First, it 
argued that article XX(d) GATT defines an exception and article 2.2 TBT an obligation 
and, second, article XX(d) GATT requires the measure to be “necessary to secure 
compliance” and article 2.2 TBT , on the other hand, provides that the effects of the 
measure shall be “not more trade-restrictive than necessary”. According to the EC, 
article 2.2 does not strictly require that the measure is “necessary” to fulfil the 
legitimate objective – only that its effects not be more trade restrictive than necessary. 
Such a measure could be merely a helpful measure that helps in achieving the objective 
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that the government pursues, even if possibly this objective could as well be 
accomplished in other ways. Accordingly, the only requirement in its view is that the 
measure should not be more trade restrictive than necessary, meaning that between two 
equally effective measures, the less trade restrictive should be chosen. 
The European Communities consequently submitted that the first criterion set by the 
Appellate Body in Korea — Various Measures on Beef for Article XX(d), namely the 
contribution made by the measure to the realisation of the end pursued, is not relevant 
for the analysis under article 2.2 TBT, except that, if one measure is more effective in 
achieving the objective than another measure, it can be chosen, even if the less effective 
measure is less trade-restrictive. 
With regard to the second criterion, namely the importance of the common interest, the 
EC suggested that the degree of permissible trade restriction would vary according to 
the importance of the objective pursued. According to the EC, however, this criterion is 
used by the AB to determine whether the measure is “indispensable” to fulfil the 
objective or whether it is simply “making a contribution”. The Community considers 
that this does not seem relevant for an analysis under article 2.2 since this provision 
simply requires a comparison of the trade effect of one measure with that of an 
alternative one that also achieves the same objective, at least at the same level of 
protection. In providing a non-exhaustive list of legitimate objectives, the 
TBT agreement deliberately refrains –in the EC’s view- from setting out any choices as 
to the relative importance of one objective compared to another. 
The EC argued that it was only the third criterion of the AB in Korea — Various 
Measures on Beef, namely the impact of the measure on imports or exports, that could 
be relevant to the analysis under article 2.2. In its view, this follows from the very 
concept of not more trade restrictive than necessary. However, the AB uses this 
criterion for a purpose that it is not relevant under article 2.2 for the reasons seen above.  
The European Communities argued that under article 2.2, one has to compare the trade 
effects of two measures, not the necessity of one measure. 
The European Communities disagreed with Peru's assertion that a less restrictive 
measure would be to provide that preserved Sardinops sagax be called Peruvian or 
South American sardines. The European Communities considered that there was no 
answer to its argument that such a provision would not achieve its legitimate objective 
at the level of protection that the it sought and that the EC Regulation, including its 
rules on names, did not create an obstacle to trade. 
 
(ii) Taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create 
The European Communities considered that, under the words “taking account of the 
risks non-fulfilment would create”, the question of whether measures are alternatives or 
not can only be assessed once it has been established whether the alternative, allegedly 
less trade-restrictive measure, achieves the legitimate objectives of a level of protection 
at least as high as that achieved by the contested measure. In its view, the downside of 
not meeting the chosen level of protection is clearly an essential element in this 
consideration. It argued that the quoted words are thus an integral part of the test set out 
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in article 2.2 TBT, which it considers to be more a “comparison test” than a “necessity 
test” and that they were intended to preserve, not reduce, the right of WTO Members to 
determine their appropriate level of protection. The EC submits that the reason why 
these words do not occur in article XX(b) or (d) GATT is the fact that the tests to be 
applied in article XX(b) or (d) 1994 are not the same as in article 2.2 TBT. 
 
3.3.f Article 2.1 TBT and article III:4 GATT 1994 
 
(i) The relationship between article 2.1 TBT and article III:4 GATT 1994 
The European Communities contended that Peru's arguments under article 2.1 
TBT refer to its arguments under Article III:4 GATT 1994. It explained that it would 
therefore deal with them in its discussion of Peru's claim under article III:4. 
 
(ii) Whether domestic products prepared from Sardina pilchardus and imported 
products prepared from Sardinops sagax are "like" products 
The European Communities submitted that, account being taken of the AB’s 
interpretation of the procedure for the establishment of likeness in EC-Asbestos57, with 
regard to living organisms, different species cannot be regarded as “like” for the 
purposes of being granted the same name because species represent the basic units of 
biological classifications outside which organisms cannot interbreed and produce viable 
offspring.  European consumers do not consider different species to be so "like" that 
they should bear the same name.  It also submitted that from a scientific and biological 
point of view there is currently only one species of the genus Sardina, which is Sardina 
pilchardus, and Sardinops sagax belongs to another genus, the genus Sardinops.  
According to the European Communities, both genera belong to the same family 
Clupeidae as do other genera. Therefore, all of these species belong to the same family 
but to different genera. 
The European Communities also contested Peru’s argument that consumers’ tastes and 
habits can be inferred from the fact that two products are “similar”. If this were the case, 
the Appellate Body would indeed not have considered this as a separate criterion.  
Consumers’ tastes and habits need to be proved with reference to the market concerned, 
namely the European market. The EC was of the opinion that, although not bearing the 
burden of proof, it had provided the Panel with evidence that European consumers do 
have the habit of choosing among different, although similar products to satisfy their 
varied tastes. If Peru's logic was adopted, namely that two fish can be considered “like” 
on the basis that they are “physically very similar” and that they are capable of serving 
                                                
57 The AB pointed out that the determination of “likeness” has to be made on a case-by-case basis, 
employing four criteria: first, the properties, nature and quality of the products; second, the end-uses of 
the products; third, consumers' tastes and habits – more comprehensively termed consumers' perceptions 
and behaviour – in respect of the products;  and finally, the tariff classification of the products.  The AB 
noted that these four criteria comprise four categories of “characteristics” that the products involved 
might share: first, the physical properties of the products;  second, the extent to which the products are 
capable of serving the same or similar end-uses; third, the extent to which consumers perceive and treat 
the products as alternative means of performing particular functions in order to satisfy a particular want or 
demand;  and fourth, the international classification of the products for tariff purposes. 
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the same or similar end-uses, then, not only the 216 fish belonging to the family 
Clupeidae could be called sardines, but also all preserved sea food. 
Finally, the Community considered that the “likeness” required of products for the 
purposes of naming them is much more stringent than it would be for the same products 
for the purposes of, for example, taxation. For the purposes of naming a product, not all 
products which are in a competitive relationship are “like” under article III GATT. In 
other words, identical products can have the same name, like products must not. 
 
(iii) Whether the prohibition to market products prepared from Sardinops sagax 
under the name "sardines" accords a less favourable treatment  
The European Communities argued that within its territory, each different fish of the 
family Clupeidae is sold under its proper correct name, thus benefiting from the specific 
market and reputation that each of them has developed. It stated that it did not 
understand how this could amount to a measure that accords to the group of like 
imported products a treatment less favourable than the one it accords to the group of 
like domestic products. The EC submitted that the product canned sardines has to meet 
the standards contained in the EC Regulation whether imported or domestically 
prepared. Similarly, all other prepared fishes are subject to the same rule whether 
imported or domestically produced. 
The European Communities argued in particular that according national treatment 
means according a product its correct name, not granting to a different product a 
competitive opportunity represented by the use of another product's name. 
 
 
Section IV – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuff 
 
4.1 The contested 1992 EC Regulation on geographical indications and the 
parties' allegations 
 
The measure at issue in the dispute raised by both the Unites States and Australia58 was 
EC Regulation n. 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the protection of geographical indications 
and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs59, any amendments 
thereto and related implementing and enforcement measures. Whereas the main claims 
                                                
58 WTO, DS290, European Communities - Protection of trademarks and geographical indications for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs; request for the Establishment of a Panel by Australia, 
WT/DS290/18 of 19 August 2003; report of the Panel, WT/DS290/R of 15 March 2005. 
59 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the protection of geographical indications 
and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs, OJ L 208 of 24.7.1992, p. 1, amended 
by Council Regulation (EC) n. 535/97 of 17 March 1997, OJ L 83 of 25.3.1997, p. 3; Commission 
Regulation n. 1068/97 of 12 June 1997, OJ L 156 10 of 13.6.1997; Commission Regulation n. 2796/2000 
of 20 December 2000, OJ L 324 of 21.12.2000, p. 26; Council Regulation n. 692/2003 of 8 April 2003, 
OJ L 99 of 17.4.2003, p. 1; Council Regulation n. 806/2003 of 14 April 2003, OJ L 122 of 16.5.2003, p. 
1, and repealed by Council Regulation (EC) n. 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 on the protection of 
geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs, OJ L 93, 
31.3.2006, p. 12. 
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by both complainants concerned the violation of specific obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement, only Australia raised two claims under the TBT Agreement, what brings the 
dispute within the sample of those that must be analysed for the purpose of the present 
study. 
In particular, according to Australia, on the one hand, article 12(2)60 of the Regulation 
was incompatible with article 2.1 TBT Agreement and, on the other, articles 461 and 
1062 thereof were incompatible with article 2.2 TBT. Australia requests, inter alia on 
                                                
60 Article 12(2) of the contested Regulation reads as follows: “If a protected name of a third country is 
identical to a Community protected name, registration shall be granted with due regard for local and 
traditional usage and the practical risks of confusion. Use of such names shall be authorized only if the 
country of origin of the product is clearly and visibly indicated on the label.” 
61 Article 4 of the contested Regulations reads as follows: “1. To be eligible to use a protected designation 
of origin (PDO) or a protected geographical indication (PGI) an agricultural product or foodstuff must 
comply with a specification. 
2. The product specification shall include at least: 
(a) the name of the agricultural product or foodstuffs, including the designation of origin or the 
geographical indication; 
(b) a description of the agricultural product or foodstuff including the raw materials, if appropriate, and 
principal physical, chemical, microbiological and/or organoleptic characteristics of the product or the 
foodstuff; 
(c) the definition of the geographical area and, if appropriate, details indicating compliance with the 
requirements in Article 2 (4); 
(d) evidence that the agricultural product or the foodstuff originates in the geographical area, within the 
meaning of Article 2 (2) (a) or (b), whichever is applicable; 
(e) a description of the method of obtaining the agricultural product or foodstuff and, if appropriate, the 
authentic and unvarying local methods; 
(f) the details bearing out the link with the geographical environment or the geographical origin within the 
meaning of Article 2 (2) (a) or (b), whichever is applicable; 
(g) details of the inspection structures provided for in Article 10; 
(h) the specific labelling details relating to the indication PDO or PGI, whichever is applicable, or the 
equivalent traditional national indications; 
(i) any requirements laid down by Community and/or national provisions.” 
62 Article 10 of the contested Regulation read as follows: “1. Member States shall ensure that not later 
than six months after the entry into force of this Regulation inspection structures are in place, the function 
of which shall be to ensure that agricultural products and foodstuffs bearing a protected name meet the 
requirements laid down in the specifications. 
2. An inspection structure may comprise one or more designated inspection authorities and/or private 
bodies approved for that purpose by the Member State. Member States shall send the Commission lists of 
the authorities and/or bodies approved and their respective powers. The Commission shall publish those 
particulars in the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
3. Designated inspection authorities and/or approved private bodies must offer adequate guarantees of 
objectivity and impartiality with regard to all producers or processors subject to their control and have 
permanently at their disposal the qualified staff and resources necessary to carry out inspection of 
agricultural products and foodstuffs bearing a protected name. 
If an inspection structure uses the services of another body for some inspections, that body must offer the 
same guarantees. In that event the designated inspection authorities and/or approved private bodies shall, 
however, continue to be responsible vis-à-vis the Member State for all inspections. 
As from 1 January 1998, in order to be approved by the Member States for the purpose of this Regulation, 
private bodies must fulfil the requirements laid down in standard EN 45011 of 26 June 1989. 
4. If a designated inspection authority and/or private body in a Member State establishes that an 
agricultural product or a foodstuff bearing a protected name of origin in that Member State does not meet 
the criteria of the specification, they shall take the steps necessary to ensure that this Regulation is 
complied with. They shall inform the Member State of the measures taken in carrying out their 
inspections. The parties concerned must be notified of all decisions taken. 
5. A Member State must withdraw approval from an inspection body where the criteria referred to in 
paragraphs 2 and 3 are no longer fulfilled. It shall inform the Commission, which shall publish in the 
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such grounds, that the Panel recommend that the EC brought its measures into 
conformity with its obligations under the WTO Agreement, including in respect of the 
TBT Agreement. The EC in turn requested the Panel to reject all claims within its terms 
of reference, including those related to the TBT provisions. 
 
4.2 The EC defence on TBT-related claims 
 
Much as in the Asbestos case, the EC legal strategy in Geographical indications was 
aimed at rejecting the applicability of the TBT Agreement altogether by denying the 
technical nature of the contested Regulation on the ground that the contested provisions 
did not meet the requirements previously set forth by the AB for a technical regulation 
qualification, namely the identification of the specific product concerned, the 
specification of the latter’s characteristics and the mandatory nature of compliance with 
those63. Also consistently with previously adopted stances, in case of failure of such 
attempt, the EC aimed at demonstrating that the measure at issue abided by article 2.1 
and 2.2 TBT by showing that it did not deny national treatment to products originating 
from other WTO members and that it was not more trade-restrictive than necessary in 
view of the achievement of its objective to protect geographical indications. 
 
4.2.a The denial of the technical nature of Regulation 2081/92 
 
Australia argued that Regulation 2081/92 was in part a technical regulation within the 
meaning of Annex 1 to the TBT Agreement. In this respect, it referred on the one hand 
to Article 12(2) of Regulation 2081/92, and on the other hand to Article 4, in particular 
4 (2) (g), and 10 thereof. In this respect, the EC tried to demonstrate that none of these 
provisions constituted a technical regulation within the meaning of the TBT Agreement. 
Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement imposing obligations on WTO members 
with respect to their technical regulations, the EC recalled on the one hand what the 
Appellate Body had affirmed in the Asbestos report, i.e. that whether the measure is a 
technical regulation is a threshold issue which determines whether the obligations 
contained in article 2 TBT are applicable64 and, on the other, that Annex 1 to the TBT 
Agreement defines a technical regulation as a: 
                                                                                                                                          
Official Journal of the European Communities a revised list of approved bodies. 
6. The Member States shall adopt the measures necessary to ensure that a producer who complies with 
this Regulation has access to the inspection system. 
7. The costs of inspections provided for under this Regulation shall be borne by the producers using the 
protected name.” 
63 The ensuing considerations on the EC line of defence are partially based on the comparative analysis of 
the following documents presented by the EC before the AB, and available on the website of the 
Commission DG Trade: European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs (WT/DS174 and WT/DS290), First Written 
Submission of the European Communities, Geneva, 25 May 2004; Oral Statement of the European 
Communities, Geneva, 23 June 2004; Second Written Submission of the European Communities, Geneva, 
22 July 2004; Second Oral Statement of the European Communities, Geneva, 12 August 2004. 
64 Appellate Body report, EC – Asbestos, para. 59; similarly Appellate Body report, EC – Sardines, para. 
175. 
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“Document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and 
production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which 
compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, 
process or production method.” 
Furthermore, the EC recalled the interpretation of the above definition given by the 
Appellate Body in EC-Asbestos and subsequently applied in EC – Sardines, whereby it 
affirmed the three criteria that must be fulfilled cumulatively in order for a measure to 
be considered a technical regulation: 
We interpreted this definition in EC – Asbestos. In doing so, we set out three criteria that 
a document must meet to fall within the definition of "technical regulation" in the TBT 
Agreement. First, the document must apply to an identifiable product or group of 
products. The identifiable product or group of products need not, however, be expressly 
identified in the document. Second, the document must lay down one or more 
characteristics of the product. These product characteristics may be intrinsic, or they may 
be related to the product. They may be prescribed or imposed in either a positive or a 
negative form. Third, compliance with the product characteristics must be mandatory.65 
 
(i) Article 12(2) of Regulation 2081/92 is not a technical regulation 
In the EC’s view, article 12(2) was not a technical regulation within the meaning of the 
TBT Agreement because, first of all, it did not apply to identifiable products; secondly, 
it did not lay down product characteristics and, finally, it did not impose mandatory 
requirements. 
The EC replied to Australia’s assertion that Regulation 2081/92 applied to agricultural 
products and foodstuffs and that these are identifiable product by recalling that the 
requirement to indicate the country of origin contained in the second subparagraph of 
article 12(2) only applied to the names in the situation referred to in the first 
subparagraph of article 12(2), i.e. if a protected name of a third country is identical to a 
Community protected name. The above requirement would therefore not apply to all 
agricultural products and foodstuffs for which a registration is obtained under the 
Regulation, but only to cases of homonymous protected names from the EC and a third 
country. Moreover, as the EC also explained, the requirement in article 12(2) could 
apply both to geographical indications from a third country or from the EC, depending 
on which name has been protected earlier. 
The EC thus concluded that, since the Regulation itself did not allow to identify the 
products which might be affected by this requirement, article 12(2) did not apply to 
identifiable products. 
Second, in the EC’s view, article 12(2) did not lay down product characteristics. 
Whereas Australia’s assertion that the provision did set out a specific labelling 
requirement falling within the meaning of a technical regulation as defined in Annex 1, 
the EC pointed out that the complainant overlooked that the provision at stake did not 
contain a specific labelling requirement for any specific product but merely set out the 
                                                
65 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 176. 
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conditions under which a geographical indication would be registered in a situation 
where there are homonyms from the EC and a third country. The requirement to 
indicate the country of origin was a condition for the registration of the geographical 
indication for which protection would be sought later. 
However, in the EC’s view, it was not article 12(2) itself which imposed a labelling 
requirement. The application for the registration of any geographical indication, 
whether from the EC or a third country, must be accompanied by a product 
specification. In accordance with article 4(2)(h) of the contested Regulation, the product 
specification was meant to contain the specific labelling details relating to the 
geographical indication. In the situation envisaged by article 12(2), the requirement to 
indicate the country of origin would be among the labelling details which must be 
indicated in the product specification. 
Moreover, the EC noted that the definition of technical regulation in Annex 1 
encompasses labelling requirements only as they apply to a product, process or 
production method and that, in the discussed case, the labelling requirement did not 
relate to any such element but merely to its geographic origin. 
The EC therefore set out that this question of origin marking was covered by the special 
disciplines of article IX GATT and consequently concluded that article 12(2) did not lay 
down product characteristics within the meaning of the definition of a technical 
regulation. 
Finally, article 12(2) did not impose a mandatory requirement. Regulation 2081/92 
established in fact a system for the registration and protection of geographical 
indications whereby the possibility to apply for registration of a geographical indication 
was a right and not an obligation. In particular, registration under Regulation 2081/92 
was not a precondition for the marketing of products. 
With regard to article 4(1) providing that, in order to be eligible to use a geographical 
indication, a product must comply with a specification, the EC argued that this 
compliance referred only to the specifications in article 4(2) and not to the Regulation 
itself. Similarly, article 12(2) was a condition for the registration of a geographical 
indication but, since the registration process was voluntary, compliance with 
article 12(2) was not a mandatory condition for the placing of products on the market. 
 
(ii) Articles 4 and 10 of Regulation 2081/92 are not a technical regulation 
The EC requested the Panel to dismiss the Australia’s claims concerning article 4 and 
10 of Regulation 2081/92 partially on account of the same reasoning applied to article 
12(2), i.e. that the provisions at issue did not fulfil the requirement of a technical 
regulation within the meaning of the TBT Agreement since they did not lay down 
product characteristics. 
According to the Community, article 4(g), to which Australia had referred specifically, 
merely provided that the product specification shall include the details of the inspection 
procedures provided for in article 10, whereas the latter provided in turn the basic 
criteria with which such inspection structures must comply. These provisions could not 
therefore be regarded as laying down product characteristics. 
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First, article 10(1) defined that the function of inspection structures was to ensure that 
agricultural products and foodstuffs bearing a protected name met the requirements laid 
down in the specifications. Accordingly, the purpose of article 4(g) in conjunction with 
article 10 was not to lay down product characteristics, but to ensure conformity with the 
product specification. 
In the EC’s view, the TBT Agreement makes a clear distinction between measures 
laying down product characteristics, and measures ensuring conformity with technical 
regulations. Namely, articles 2 to 4 TBT deal with technical regulations and standards, 
whereas articles 5 to 9 TBT are concerned with the assessment of conformity with 
technical regulations and standards. In this respect, point 3 of Annex 1 to the TBT 
Agreement defines a conformity assessment procedure as follows: 
Any procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine that relevant requirements in 
technical regulations or standards are fulfilled. 
Even if the product specification were to be considered a technical regulation, the 
inspection structure ensuring conformity with the specification would not be a technical 
regulation, but a conformity assessment procedure. Accordingly, Australia's claim 
regarding the inspection procedure did not concern a technical regulation and did not 
fall under article 2 TBT66. 
Secondly, article 4 of the contested Regulation did not lay down product characteristics 
in that it simply set out the requirements with which a product specification must 
comply in order to permit the registration of a geographical indication. Not did 
article 4(2) itself set out the product characteristics for specific products. Rather, these 
characteristics were contained in the application for registration of a geographical 
indication in accordance with article 5(3) of the Regulation. 
The Community further pointed out that it was not exceptional that the definition of 
product characteristics was required as a condition for the acquisition of certain 
intellectual property rights. In particular, the system of certification marks which was 
used by certain countries required that products bearing the mark comply with certain 
product characteristics67. However, such trade mark laws had not to date been 
considered as falling under the TBT Agreement. 
Finally, the EC recalled the above reasoning concerning the non-mandatory nature of 
the system for the registration and protection of geographical indications established by 
the Regulation. The requirement that inspection structures must exist was in fact a 
necessary requirement for the registration of geographical indications but the 
registration itself was not a precondition for the placing of products on the market. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
66 The EC added that Australia's claim would rather fall under articles 5 to 9 TBT but also underlined that 
since Australia did not refer to these provisions in its Panel request, any such claim would have been 
outside the terms of reference of the Panel. 
67 Cf. e.g. US Trademark Act, 15 US para. 1127. 
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4.2.b The compatibility of article 12(2) of Regulation 2081/92 with article 2.1 TBT 
 
In case the Panel had opined in favour of the applicability of the invoked TBT 
provisions on account of the ascertained technical nature of the article 12(2) of the 
Regulation, the EC put forward, in the alternative, that the contested provision was fully 
compatible with article 2.1 TBT, containing a national treatment provision applicable to 
goods in respect of technical regulations. 
Recollecting the absence of WTO jurisprudence on this provision, the EC did not 
consider it necessary to define the meaning of each of the elements of article 2.1 TBT. 
Nonetheless, the EC did recall the systematic criteria for the interpretation of provisions 
contained in international agreements and, on this ground, it rejected the Australian 
claim that the jurisprudence concerning article III GATT could be transposed to 
article 2.1 TBT, for instance with respect to the likeness of products. In the EC’s view, 
such an approach would have overlooked important structural differences between the 
GATT and the TBT Agreement, in particular, the absence of a provision corresponding 
to article XX GATT in the latter Agreement. The EC argued that such structural 
differences between the two agreements must be taken into account when interpreting 
the requirements of article 2.1 TBT. 
With regard to this very point, it is worth noting that, just as it had done in its 
submission during the sardines’ case, the EC continued to operate a revirement with 
respect to the line of reasoning proposed in the asbestos case, whereby it claimed that, 
in the absence of WTO jurisprudence on the point, the necessity test under art. 2.2 TBT 
was to be deemed equivalent to that one provided for in art. XX GATT and thus had to 
be interpreted accordingly. In the submission in exam, the EC went even further in 
affirming the absence in the TBT Agreement of a provision equivalent to art. XX 
GATT, thus entirely disavowing the claim made in the asbestos case. 
Nonetheless, the EC reasoned around the compatibility of art. 12(2) with TBT 
prescription by, first, setting out that the said provision merely defined the conditions 
under which a geographical indication would be registered in a situation where there 
were homonyms from the EC and a third country and did not therefore apply to all 
geographical indications. The requirement to indicate the country of origin would be a 
condition for the registration of the geographical indication for which protection is 
sought later. Accordingly, art. 12(2) did not treat foreign and EC geographical 
indications differently. On the contrary, it treated them exactly alike.  
The EC further claimed that Australia’s allegation that a less favourable treatment 
existed to the extent that a requirement to indicate the country of origin did not exist in 
the case of two homonyms from the EC was equally unfounded. The EC contended that 
in fact such a difference of treatment would also affect EC geographical indications, 
which were equally covered by article 12(2) and that therefore no issue of national 
treatment could arise in this respect68. Moreover, article 6(6) of Regulation 2081/92 
required a clear distinction in practice also where conflicts between homonyms arose 
                                                
68 In this respect, the EC also added that the relevant point of comparison would have been the treatment 
of two homonyms within Australia, this however not being a question falling within its responsibility. 
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within the EC. Where the two homonyms were from different Member States, this may 
in practice have required the indication of the country of origin. The only reason why 
the last indent of article 6(6) did not explicitly require the indication of the country of 
origin was that this provision dealt with a wider set of conflicts than article 12(2). In 
particular, article 6(6) also applied to conflicts between homonyms from the same EC 
Member State. In such a situation, in the EC’s view, the indication of the country of 
origin would not have been a meaningful way of achieving the necessary clear 
distinction. 
Finally, the EC claimed for the non-incompatibility of art. 12(2) with the NT provision 
contained in the TBT Agreement by contending that national treatment obligations do 
not apply to requirements to mark the country of origin. In this respect, it recalled that 
marks of origin are specifically dealt with in article IX:1 GATT, which excludes the 
applicability of the national treatment obligation under article III:4 thereof. According 
to the EC, should article 12(2) of be considered as a technical regulation, then this 
should not have the effect of rendering the specific provision of article IX:1 GATT 
useless. Accordingly, in this case, the national treatment obligation contained in 
Article 2.1 TBT Agreement could not have been applied to origin marking 
requirements. 
 
4.2.c The compatibility of articles 4, 10, and 12(1) of Regulation 2081/92 with 
article 2.2 TBT 
 
Whereas Australia had explicitly recognised that Regulation 2081/92 pursued a 
legitimate objective, namely the protection of geographical indications69, it however 
argued that articles 4, 10 and 12(1) of Regulation 2081/92 are incompatible with 
article 2.2 TBT, which forbids technical regulations whose effect is creating 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade and prescribes that the former shall not be 
more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of 
the risks non-fulfilment would create. Australia contended that the contested provisions, 
when read together, required that another WTO member have in place inspection 
arrangements equivalent to those laid down in the Regulation and that this was more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil the legitimate objective. Based on a three-fold 
reasoning, the EC considered instead that the requirements regarding inspection 
structures were not more trade-restrictive than necessary. 
First of all, the EC explained that article 12(1) was not applicable to WTO Members 
and that the registration of a geographical indication from another WTO country did not 
require the existence of equivalent inspection structures for all products in that country. 
Rather, articles 12(1), 10 and 4(2)(g) required the existence of equivalent inspection 
structures only with respect to the specific product for which protection was sought. 
Secondly, the EC rejected Australia’s allegations that article 10(1) of the Regulation set 
out detailed requirements for the inspection structures and therefore provided no leeway 
                                                
69 Geographical indications within the meaning of article 22.1 TRIPS relate to goods that have “a given 
quality, reputation or other characteristic” essentially attributable to their geographical origin. 
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for regard to be had to the existing arrangements of another WTO Member instead 
imposing an EC model and ruling out the acceptability of other types of inspection 
mechanisms. The EC explained that article 10 provided considerable flexibility as to the 
specific design of inspection structures insofar as it limited itself to setting out the basic 
functions and principles applicable to inspection bodies, without regulating their design 
in detail. Moreover, in the EC’s view, articles 10(2) specifically allowed a choice 
between public and private elements in the design of the inspection bodies. Finally, for 
bodies outside the EC, article 10 did not mandate compliance with EC standards, but 
also allowed3 compliance with equivalent international standards. 
Finally, the EC maintained that, even in the event that trade-restrictive effects were to 
be recognised to the Regulation, those effects as produced by the existence of inspection 
structures were to be deemed necessary in the light of the legitimate objectives pursued 
by the Regulation, in that the requirements regarding inspection structure are an 
indispensable part of the EC system for the protection of geographical indications. 
The objective of the inspection procedures foreseen in Regulation 2081/92 was indeed 
to ensure that products using a protected geographical indication did comply with the 
product specifications, and therefore have the "quality, reputation or other 
characteristic" justifying this protection, just as prescribed by the TRIPS Agreement70. 
In this respect, the EC maintained that even where there is only one producer, the 
expectations of consumers should still be protected and that a monopolistic situation 
might in fact require even more stringent control then where several producers produce 
a good protected by a geographical indication. 
Finally, the EC countered Australia’s argument that other systems of protection of 
geographical indications might have achieved the same objective, in particular the 
application of unfair competition law. By establishing a specific system for the 
protection of geographical indications, the EC intended to establish a system which 
granted more extensive protection, in respect of geographical indications, both to 
consumers and producers. It argued that such discretion as it is left to the WTO 
members under article 1.1 TRIPS cannot be limited on the basis of article 2.2 TBT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
70 The EC noted that, as regards certification marks, also the United States had recognised that some form 
of control of the proper use of the name may be necessary, and that this cannot be simply left to the user 
of the mark: “When a geographic term is used as a certification mark, two elements are of basic concern: 
first, preserving the freedom of all persons in the region to use the term and, second, preventing abuses or 
illegal uses of the mark which would be detrimental to all those entitled to use the mark. Normally a 
private individual is not in the best position to fulfil these objectives satisfactorily. The government of a 
region would be the logical authority to control the use of the name of the region.  The government, either 
directly or through a body to which it has given authority, would have power to preserve the right of all 
persons and to prevent abuse or illegal use of the mark”; cfr. IP/C/W/117/Add.3, p. 10, 1 December 1998. 
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Section V – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
(GMOs) 
 
5.1 The contested EC regime for approval of biotech products and the Member 
States’ safeguard measures restricting the marketing of biotech products 
 
The biotech dispute71 concerned two distinct matters: on the one hand, the operation and 
application by the EC of its regime for approval of biotech products and, on the other, 
certain measures adopted and maintained by EC Member States prohibiting or 
restricting the marketing of biotech products. Argentina, Canada and the United States 
initiated a dispute settlement procedure with a view to challenge what they allege to be 
a general moratorium in the EC concerning the approval of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) and products derived therefrom, the alleged failure to approve a 
number of specific applications for the placing on the market of certain GMOs, and 
certain temporary measures adopted by six EC Member States concerning GMOs that 
have already been authorized by the EC. 
In the midst of the dispute, the very basic assumption put forward by the EC was that is 
was not plausible to argue that GM products are or should be treated as equivalent to 
non-GM products. Since the first commercialisation of GMOs in the early nineties, 
governments around the world have in fact started to address the question of how to 
regulate GMOs. Regulatory approaches range from complete bans to regulatory 
inaction. Most, however, consist in setting up an approval system specific to GMOs, 
based on a case-by-case detailed risk assessment. Often such systems are based on a 
precautionary approach, and decisions are sometimes made dependent on considerations 
other than scientific factors, such as, for instance, socio-economic considerations. 
With a view to seeking international consensus governments have also addressed the 
issue in various international fora. In 2000, they came to adopt the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety72, whose 103 signatories parties include Canada and Argentina. The 
Protocol addresses the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms that 
may have adverse effect on biodiversity and, what was particularly important in the 
EC’s view. Based on the understanding that the inherent characteristics of GMOs 
require them to be subject to rigorous scrutiny so as to ensure that they do not cause 
harm to the environment or human health, or cause socio-economic disruptions, the 
Protocol does incorporate the precautionary principle. In addition, work on specific 
issues related to GMOs is still on-going in specialized agencies and other international 
bodies or organisations such as Codex Alimentarius, FAO, WHO, UN, OECD, ASEAN 
and the African Union. The guidance documents established by these fora, in particular, 
                                                
71 WTO, DS291, DS292 and DS293, European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products; requests for the establishment of a Panel by the United States, 
WT/DS291/23, Canada, WT/DS292/17, and Argentina, WT/DS293/17, of 8 August 2003; Panel report 
WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R of 29 September 2006. 
72 Cartagena protocol on biosafety to the convention on biological diversity, reported in OJ L 201, 
31.7.2002, p. 50. 
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recognize the need for a case-by-case decision on individual GMOs based on a 
scientific risk assessment and on risk management considerations. 
The EC’s regime for approval of biotech products consisted of two primary legal 
instruments: Directive 2001/1873 (and its predecessor, Directive 90/22074) governing the 
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and 
Regulation 258/9775 regulating novel foods and novel food ingredients. The objective of 
the EC regime was to protect human health and the environment, for whose 
achievement the above legislation required the European institutions to conduct a case-
by-case evaluation of the potential risks biotech products could pose. On the basis of 
that evaluation, the marketing of a particular biotech product was either approved or 
not. The contested EC measures outlined the administrative procedure to be conducted 
in the event a company sought to obtain approval to place a biotech product on the 
market and the standards by which an application for approval was to be evaluated76. 
The measures maintained by EC member States were linked to the EC regime in that the 
above EC legislation under certain conditions allowed Member States to adopt 
safeguard measures in respect of biotech products that had obtained approval for EC-
wide marketing. More particularly, individual Member States may provisionally restrict 
or prohibit the use and/or sale of an approved biotech product in their own territory if 
they had detailed grounds for considering, based on new or additional information or 
scientific knowledge, that the particular product posed a risk to human health or the 
environment.  In cases where a member State adopted such a safeguard measure, it had 
to inform other Member States and the Commission and a decision on the adopted 
safeguard measure had then be taken at Community level within a prescribed time 
period. 
                                                
73 Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the 
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council 
Directive 90/220/EEC, OJ L 106 of 17.4.2001, p. 1–39. 
74 Council Directive 90/220/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the deliberate release into the environment of 
genetically modified organisms, OJ L 117 of 8.5.1990, p. 15–27, preamble, as amended by Commission 
Directive 94/15/EC of 15 April 1994 adapting to technical progress for the first time Council Directive 
90/220/EEC on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms, OJ L 103 
of 22.4.1994, p. 20–27, and Commission Directive 97/35/EC of 18 June 1997 adapting to technical 
progress for the second time Council Directive 90/220/EEC on the deliberate release into the environment 
of genetically modified organisms, OJ L 169 of 27.6.1997, p. 72–73. 
75 Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 1997 
concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients, OJ L 43 of 14.2.1997, p. 1–6. 
76 An assessment procedure was foreseen which took place at two levels and in two stages. Once an 
application was lodged in an EC Member State, its authorities made an initial assessment. If it was 
positive, the dossier was sent up to the Community level from where it was circulated to all other 
Member States. If all agree with the initial assessment, the lead Member State granted final consent. If 
objections were raised, and no agreement could be found, a decision had to be taken at Community level. 
The Commission consulted a scientific committee, nowadays the European Food Safety Authority, before 
presenting a proposal for a decision to the Council Regulatory Committee. If the proposal did not get a 
qualified majority in this Committee, the Commission presented a proposal to the Council of Ministers 
for adoption (or rejection) by qualified majority. If the Council did not act within three months the 
Commission adopted the decision. While approval was valid throughout the European Union, the 
legislation provided for the possibility for member States to adopt safeguard measures prohibiting the 
release and marketing in their own territory. 
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US, Canada and Argentina in their request for establishment of a panel, requested the 
Panel to find that the measures at issue were inconsistent with a number of WTO 
provisions. First, the complainant parties claimed the violation of the SPS provisions 
concerning the prohibition to adopt unnecessary SPS measures which are not based on 
scientific evidence and produce unduly restrictive effects on international trade77; of 
provisions concerning the assessment of the risk and the determination of the 
appropriate level of protection78; of provisions concerning transparency79 and control, 
inspection and approval procedures80; finally, of provisions contained respectively in 
Annex B81 and C82 to the SPS Agreement. Secondly, the complaining parties lamented 
the breach of TBT provisions concerning the preparation, adoption and application of 
technical regulations83 and the procedures for conformity assessment84. Moreover, they 
also maintained that EC and Member State’s adopted measures were in breach of 
articles I:1, III:4, X:1 and XI:1 GATT and of article 4.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. 
The EC in turn requested the Panel to reject the complaining parties' claims and to find 
that, first of all, the delays in the examination of the applications as well as the Member 
States’ national measures were not in violation of the SPS Agreement, the 
TBT Agreement or the GATT and that there was no general suspension of the process 
of authorizing GMOs and GM products on the part of the Community. 
 
5.2 The EC defence on SPS and TBT-related claims 
 
The European Communities sought to underline from the very beginning that it had not 
adopted any general position either in favour or against GMOs85. Whereas not seeking 
to impose its prudent approach on other countries, the final aim of the EC’s defense was 
to shield its regulatory autonomy from external incursions by impeding the complaining 
parties to impose their own approach on the European marketplace. Moreover, the EC 
tried to stress the whole socio-political, legal, factual and scientific complexity of the 
case, including the process that led to the conclusion of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. In this respect, the EC underlined that the aims of its policies on GMOs was 
                                                
77 Articles 2.2 and 2.3 SPS. 
78 Articles 5.1, 5.2, 5.5 and 5.6 SPS. 
79 Article 7 SPS. 
80 Article 8 SPS. 
81 Paragraphs 1, 2 and 5. 
82 Paragraphs 1(a), 1(b), 1(c) and 1(e). 
83 Articles 2.1, 2.2, 2.8, 2.9, 2.11 and 2.12 TBT. 
84 Articles 5.1, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.6 and 5.8 TBT. 
85 The ensuing considerations on the EC line of defence are based on the comparative analysis of the 
following documents presented by the EC before the Panel, and available on the website of the 
Commission DG Trade: European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products (DS291, DS292, DS293) First Written Submission by the EC, Geneva, 17 May 2004; 
Oral Statement by the EC at the First Meeting of the Panel with the Parties, Geneva, 2 June 2004; Second 
Written Submission by the EC, Geneva, 19 July 2004; Final Position of the EC on the Need to Seek 
Scientific or Technical Expert Advice, Geneva, 22 July 2004; Supplementary Rebuttal Submission by the 
EC, Geneva, 15 November 2004; First and Second Oral Statements of the EC at the Second Meeting of 
the Panel with the Parties, Geneva, 22 February 2005. 
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reaching further beyond the protection against the specific risks covered by the 
SPS Agreement. 
More specifically, the EC’s overall approach to the biotech dispute consisted of six 
macro arguments. First, GMOs do display characteristics which were recognized by the 
international community to pose potential threats to human health and the environment, 
and they could not be treated as like or equivalent to their non-GMO counterparts. 
Second, the Community regulatory framework for the marketing of GMOs operated on 
a case-by-case basis and there had been no de jure or de facto moratorium in respect of 
the authorization process. Third, the EC’s approach to the identification, assessment and 
prevention of risks to human health and the environment had been fully consistent with 
applicable international standards. Fourth, the measures which had been taken to protect 
the environment and to conserve biodiversity were reasonable and legitimate, were not 
necessarily sanitary or phytosanitary in character, and fell in whole or in part outside the 
scope of the SPS Agreement. Fifth, to the extent that any such measure could be said to 
be subject to the SPS Agreement, there had been no undue delay or breach of any part 
of that Agreement on the part of the EC or of the Member States, and in any event such 
measures were provisionally justified on the basis of the insufficiency of scientific 
evidence. Finally, all measures taken by the EC and its Member States were also 
consistent with the TBT Agreement and the GATT, and in any event were justified in 
accordance with article XX GATT. 
 
5.2.a Preliminary and horizontal issues 
 
The EC’s defence was based on certain preliminary remarks that are directly related to 
the macro arguments just outlined. As regards the identification of the contested 
measures, whereas the three complaining parties alleged the existence of a general 
moratorium affecting all GMOs, as well as the existence of a separate measure 
consisting in the suspension of approval procedures affecting certain specific GMOs, 
the EC maintained not to have imposed any moratorium, let alone a ban. 
As the complaining parties' case concerned the conduct of approval procedures, namely 
the delay in completing such procedures, the EC considered that the relevant WTO rules 
should be those obligations that concern procedural aspects rather than those that deal 
with the adoption of substantive measures. 
As regards the applicable law, the EC did not agree that the SPS Agreement was the 
only relevant applicable law inasmuch as its scope is limited to measures adopted to 
prevent an exhaustive list of narrowly defined risks. In the EC’s view, to the extent that 
a domestic measure is aimed at the protection against other risks, or that it pursues other 
different objectives, the SPS Agreement is not applicable. 
Finally and in connection to the latter point, the EC underlined that issues arising from 
the existence of GMOs go far beyond the risks envisaged and regulated by the 
SPS Agreement. Since the EC aimed at the fulfilment of objectives that go beyond the 
specific situations determining the applicability of the SPS Agreement, such Agreement 
did not provide, in its view, a sufficient legal framework for the examination of the 
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EC’s behaviour. The EC was of the view that the SPS Agreement is relevant in relation 
to some of the issues that are examined by EC authorities in the course of GMO 
approval procedures. However, it cannot exclude the applicability of other WTO rules 
to different non-SPS aspects of the challenged measures. GATT 1994 and, where 
relevant, the TBT Agreement, could be used to examine those other aspects of the EC’s 
behaviour. In this regard, the EC noted that the effect of article 1.5 TBT is to exclude 
the cumulative application of the TBT and the SPS Agreements to measures that 
squarely fit in the definitions of Annex A.1 of the SPS Agreement. In its view, in the 
case of a composite measure that is only partly pursuing SPS aims, article 1.5 certainly 
does not imply that the TBT Agreement is entirely irrelevant and that a narrow 
examination of one single element of the measure under the SPS Agreement can lead to 
a conclusion on the WTO-consistency of the measure as a whole. Quite to the contrary, 
any measure or part of any measure adopted for reasons that fall outside the scope of the 
SPS Agreement cannot be inconsistent with that agreement. The EC therefore claimed 
that the contested measures had to be revised separately under more than one WTO 
agreement, according to their nature and aims, before reaching a conclusion on their 
overall consistency with WTO obligations. Furthermore, the EC claimed that the 
general exceptions contained in articles XX and XXI GATT also apply to the 
TBT Agreement. 
 
(i) The issue of party bearing the burden of proof 
In the EC’s view, a correct allocation of the burden of proof was fundamental for the 
dispute and the EC itself was not to be expected to bear it. In turn, is asserted that the 
complaining parties had to prove for each application that the absence of risk had been 
established and that no useful further investigation into the risks was underway. The EC 
assertion was based on what it considered a consistent case-law on the burden of proof 
under the WTO Agreements, whereby the party invoking the existence of a certain 
situation bears the burden of proving it and, in order to shift the burden, a prima facie 
case must be established. The establishment of the prima facie case could not however, 
according to the Community, be reduced to a mere assertion, standing the absence of 
supporting evidence. In its view, the Panel first had to verify if the complainants had 
established a prima facie case in relation to each of their claims, before ascertaining 
whether the EC had refuted it. 
 
(ii) Risk assessment and the role of scientific opinion 
In the EC’s view, the term “risk assessment” in the SPS Agreement had to be 
understood in the broad sense of “risk analysis” as defined by the Codex Alimentarius 
and other international instruments. Based on the definition of risk assessment given in 
paragraph 4 of Annex A as well, risk assessment encompasses three different aspects: 
first, the risk assessment in the narrow sense, i.e. as a “scientifically based process”; 
second, the management of risk; and, thirdly, the communication thereof. The 
interpretation purported by the EC was also based on paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 5 
SPS, which makes clear that in making an assessment of the risks, WTO members must 
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take into account not only scientific but also economic and regulatory considerations, 
where such list of factors to be taken into account was not, in the EC’s view, to be 
considered as exhaustive. 
The EC disagreed in particular with Canada’s position that management considerations 
may only apply with regard to risks that are identified based on relevant scientific 
evidence. Particular risks can only be assessed and potentially identified in the risk 
assessment process on the basis of the available scientific information at the time of the 
assessment as scientific knowledge may not be sufficient to clearly identify the risks 
and the latter may become known or relevant at a later stage. Against this background, 
the precautionary approach adopted by the Community becomes highly relevant: 
prudent governments as risk managers and regulators are entitled to develop and apply 
appropriate safeguards to protect citizens and the environment. They are entitled to 
adopt risk management options, such as an appropriate general surveillance scheme, 
which are able to detect and identify any negative impact that was unforeseen or 
unidentified in the initial process of risk assessment. 
Moreover, the EC countered the complaining parties’ argument that the Community 
was bound to authorize GMOs for which scientific committees had issued favourable 
scientific opinions on three different grounds. 
First, in the EC’ view, scientific opinions are only part of the risk assessment in a 
narrow sense, i.e. the scientifically based process of hazard identification, hazard 
characterisation, exposure assessment and risk characterisation. On the other hand, 
contrary to the usual practices in North America, risk management and risk 
communication considerations are assessed by the regulator itself and not by those who 
deliver a scientific opinion. A complete risk assessment, within the meaning of the 
SPS Agreement, includes also these latter aspects. 
Second, the scientific opinions by EC committees are not binding. There are several 
scientific committees with different mandates and at different levels in the European 
Communities and, in case of scientific disagreement, the opinions of the European 
Communities' scientific committees do not overrule other scientific opinions, such as 
those issued by member States' scientific bodies. The EC saw no obligation in SPS law 
or indeed in any WTO law for a regulatory power to effectively delegate to a single 
scientific committee only. 
Third, scientific opinions are limited in scope and, therefore, often do not conclude the 
risk assessment process, even in a narrow sense. The science on GMOs being in 
constant evolution, new risk considerations sometimes arise spontaneously and change 
the scope of the risk assessment, as in this case. The process of addressing risk and 
scientific issues which are unresolved, may require the authorities to go back for a 
further assessment by an independent scientific body that had issued an earlier positive 
opinion, much later in the process of analysing a particular application. 
 
(iii) The SPS Agreement 
Concerning the scope of the SPS Agreement, the EC tried to contrast the complainants’ 
attempt at stretching it by pointing out that the list of risks or matters subject to the 
CHAPTER II – THE EU AS A RESPONDENT IN SPS AND TBT DISPUTES  
 125 
SPS Agreement is exhaustive, as it is clear from the text of Annex A.186. In determining 
the material scope of the SPS Agreement, the EC deemed it necessary to rely on 
internationally accepted definitions of the terms in Annex A.1. It also maintained that 
the “common and ordinary” meaning approach advocated by complaining parties, to the 
exclusion of the international definitions, would not be sufficient since the common 
language definitions of SPS terms are often so vague and broad as to deprive of any 
meaning the categories and distinctions set out in Annex A.187. 
A measure can only fall within Annex A.1 if it is applied to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health88. Therefore, the effects of the relevant GMO on non-living 
components in the environment clearly fall outside the scope of the SPS Agreement. 
The same comment may be made with respect to micro-organisms or micro-flora which 
do not affect human, animal or plant life or health, but which are nevertheless part of 
the ecological equilibrium. The negotiating history confirms that the SPS Agreement 
was intended to have a precisely limited scope. Of particular note are the discussions 
that took place on whether environmental risks should be covered. Those that opposed 
this stressed that environmental risks were of a different nature and that rules designed 
for SPS measures would not necessarily be appropriate for environmental risks. This 
view ultimately prevailed, and consequently the SPS Agreement does not cover 
measures for the protection of the environment as such or based on consumer concerns, 
moral grounds etc.). 
Throughout its submissions, the EC attached great importance to the issue of how to 
deal with mixed acts, i.e. measures that protect against the risks defined in the 
SPS Agreement but that also pursue other legitimate objectives not covered thereby, 
which it deemed to be a relevant threshold issue. According to the Community, nothing 
obliges WTO members to refrain from adopting single indivisible acts, incorporating 
two or more measures pursuing multiple legitimate objectives and therefore regulated 
by more than one WTO Agreement or provision. In such case, the member adopting the 
                                                
86 In turn, a more flexible approach taken with regard to the form of the measures subject to the 
agreement is put forwards at Annex A.1, second paragraph, which contains the word “includes”, absent in 
turn from the first paragraph. 
87 The EC’s position with regard to the reliance on internationally accepted definitions was also based on 
the strong relationship between the SPS Agreement and the texts of specialised international 
organisations and bodies. Article 3 contains obligations on Members with regard to international 
standards, guidelines or recommendations. Some of the key terms in Annex A.1 are themselves 
international standards (the Codex definition of contaminant is a “standard”, namely Codex Standard 193, 
rev 1, 1995). Furthermore, article 12(3) refers to the objective of securing from the relevant international 
organisations the best available scientific and technical advice for the administration of the 
SPS Agreement. In the EC’s opinion, this must include advice on the technical concepts that those 
organisations have developed and that were adopted by the drafters of the SPS Agreement. 
88 The Community lamented that in their attempt to stretch the scope of the SPS Agreement, complaining 
parties also paid little attention to the literal wording of Annex A.1, which defines the specific 
circumstances in which the Agreement is to be applied. For instance, complaining parties assumed that it 
would be sufficient for them to establish that a measure concerned a “toxin” or an “additive” or a 
“contaminant” for that measure to fall within the scope of the SPS Agreement, whereas the EC 
considered this assumption to be wrong as a matter of law. According to the EC, Annex A.1(b) referring 
to toxins “in foods, beverages and feedstuffs”, the toxic characteristics of seeds or crops do not therefore 
fall within that provision, just ad the GMOs does not fall within the concept of “food, beverage or 
feedstuff”. 
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contested act cannot be directed to withdraw or revise its measure unless it is found to 
be inconsistent with all relevant agreements. 
In the case of a mixed act, the challenged act is not itself an SPS measure tout court, 
insofar as it contains an SPS measure but also, for instance, a TBT measure. According 
to the EC, to find that the TBT measure, because it is in the same act as an SPS 
measure, is itself transformed into an SPS measure, would be an error of reasoning and 
of law. Nor does article 1.5 TBT change this conclusion. It is a jurisdictional conflict 
rule. Since a “technical regulation” could fall within the SPS Agreement, article 1.5 
means that such a measure needs to be examined only under the said Agreement, to the 
exclusion of the application of the TBT one. This situation is however different, in the 
EC’s view, from the case in which a “technical regulation” pursues not only SPS 
objectives, but also other types of legitimate objectives. 
Concerning another aspect of the application of the SPS agreement, namely the relation 
between invoked articles 2.2 and 5.7 SPS, the EC read the cross-reference to latter 
contained in the former as implying that the text in article 5.7 sets out basic rights and 
obligations of equivalent status to the other basic rights and obligations set out in article 
2 and that, in this way, the drafters saw article 5.7 as excluding the application of the 
substantive obligations in article 2.289. In the EC’s view, a concept of “necessity” is 
already referred to in article 2.1 and is in any event built into the text of article 5.7, 
because a WTO member may only act on the basis of available pertinent information, 
and only provisionally in order to allow sufficient time for sufficient scientific evidence 
to be collected. 
According to the EC, the relationship between article 2.2 and 5.7 SPS is therefore one 
of exclusion, not of exception. If it were true that there is sufficient scientific evidence, 
as the complainants sustained, the provisional measure would be inconsistent with 
article 5.7, not fall within the scope of article 2.2. The exclusionary demarcation line 
between articles 2.2 and 5.7 is based on whether or not the measure is provisional. The 
provisional nature of the measures must be motivated by the insufficiency of the 
scientific evidence, but an article 5.7 measure is still provisional. 
Provisional measures in turn continue to be subject to the requirements of article 2.3. 
They may not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between members where identical 
or similar conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of other 
members; and they may not be applied in a manner that would constitute a disguised 
restriction on international trade. 
Concerning the relation between article 5.7 as special regime applying to provisional 
measures and the rest of article 5 SPS, the EC claimed for the irrelevance of the 
reminder of the article once the applicability of art. 5.7 has been established. In the EC’s 
view, provisional measures are still subject to a full set of controls under the SPS 
Agreement since they must comply with the requirements of article 5.7, as well as with 
articles 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4. These provisions contain rules and obligations that are 
analogous to those set out in articles 5.1 to 5.6, adapted appropriately to the provisional 
                                                
89 From the textual view-point, the EC came to this conclusions by considering that the comma after the 
word “evidence” means that the words that follow exclude all the words up to the word “evidence”. 
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measures scenario. Thus, articles 5.1 to 5.6 are irrelevant: provisional or temporary 
measures, whether the Member States’ measures or the alleged temporary moratoria, 
fell therefore to be considered under article 5.7, and product specific delays were to be 
considered in accordance with Annex C. Even if Article 5.1 would have been 
considered relevant, the words “as appropriate to the circumstances” enshrine, in the 
view of the Community, an important degree of flexibility, whether in relation to the 
Member States’ measures or in relation to the alleged product specific delays. The 
obligation under article 5.1 is only that measures be “based on” an assessment. This 
does not mean that the assessment itself necessarily automatically dictates the terms of 
the legislative measure to be adopted. 
More specifically on art. 5.7 SPS, the EC disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument that 
there was no relationship between the acceptable level of risk – or the analogous 
concept in the context of provisional measures – on the one hand, and the question of 
whether or not relevant scientific evidence was insufficient on the other. In the context 
of provisional measures, a full risk assessment has yet to be completed and the level of 
acceptable risk may yet to be finally determined by the legislator. However, for the 
Community, the concept of sufficiency in article 5.7 is relational, and must therefore 
refer to the matters of concern to the legislator. Members may not necessarily react 
identically with regard to potential risks and uncertainty. Depending on the specific 
circumstances prevailing in each country, scientific information may or may not be 
deemed sufficient to decide appropriate measures. Nor is there for the EC a 
predetermined moment at which the available science becomes sufficient for all 
purposes. Rather, the actions of a legislator, whether definitive or provisional, in 
response to the available science, are a function of what that legislator is concerned 
about. 
Finally, the EC rejected the relevance of article 2.3 altogether not only in relation to any 
consideration of alleged delay since the provision applies to measures, but also on the 
ground that GMOs were being dealt with in an even-handed way, without 
discrimination and that the dispute concerned the on-going discussions within the EC 
about how to respond to the risks posed by GMOs, whatever their origin, this being a 
basic right of the EC under the SPS Agreement, any trade effects being entirely 
incidental. 
 
5.2.b The product-specific delays 
 
In relation to the SPS Agreement, the EC construed the SPS Agreement as containing 
two types of provisions, those disciplining the development of the sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures and those dealing with their application. Against this 
background, the Community contended that challenging the way in which applications 
for authorization are dealt with is a challenge against the application of a sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure. 
The EC submitted therefore that among the various provisions which the complaining 
parties alleged to have been violated under the SPS Agreement only article 8 thereof 
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together with Annex C thereto could be applied to the biotech dispute. Articles 2.2, 2.3, 
5.1, 5.5 and 5.6, on the contrary, all contain obligations concerning the development of 
a sanitary or phytosanitary measure (i.e. the SPS measure itself). 
The distinction between provisions on development and on application of measures 
addresses two different regulatory needs arising at two different points in time: the need 
to ensure the creation of procedures which respect certain parameters and the need to 
ensure the management of these procedures according to other parameters. In the EC’s 
view, this was confirmed by article 8, which contains two distinct legal provisions. In 
its first part, it submits “the operation of control, inspection and approval procedures” to 
the provisions of Annex C. In the second part, it provides that the procedures 
themselves must be in conformity with all other provisions of the SPS Agreement. 
The alleged failure to deal with certain product applications was in fact not an SPS 
measure, the nature of the latter as defined in Annex A point 1 requiring the existence of 
an act, however formal or informal. The EC maintained that the alleged failure to reach 
a final decision on certain product applications, therefore, could only be challenged as 
the application of an SPS measure, but not as an SPS measure itself, with the latter 
being in turn the approval system as established by the EC’s GMO legislation. All other 
alleged violations relating to an SPS measure as such and given that the alleged failure 
to act does not constitute an SPS measure, most of the provisions invoked by the 
complaining parties were not applicable, to the exclusion of article 8 and Annex C SPS 
which solely address issues of application of an SPS measure. 
In this respect, the EC maintained that there was no violation of article 8 and of the 
various provisions of Annex C and, in particular, there had been no any “undue delays” 
within the meaning of Annex C point 1(a). The EC rejected Argentina’s and the United 
States’ argument that undue delays within the meaning of the above provisions could be 
inferred from the fact that procedural delays set out in the EC legislation had possibly 
not been respected. According to the EC, the concept of undue delays as set forth in the 
SPS regime is to be interpreted in accordance with the general rules of international law 
on treaty interpretation and can be understood to be referring to a period of time lost by 
inaction or inability to proceed which is unjustifiable. In this light, the meaning of the 
words undue delay could in no case be inferred from the domestic legislation of WTO 
members. 
Moreover, the EC claimed that the approval process for individual GMOs applications 
had not been generally suspended, as the complaining parties alleged and that, where 
delays have occurred in individual instances due to requests for additional information, 
such delays were justified by the nature of such requests. On a level of principle, the 
European Communities submitted that it was legitimate to request additional 
information necessary for the completion of a risk assessment, risk management or risk 
communication as they have been established by a regulator. That principle applies 
generally to any product that goes through an approval or inspection procedure designed 
to ensure that this product is safe and it applies a fortiori when the product in issue is 
based on a new technology which is generally untried and untested and which is 
recognized by the international Community to have characteristics which inherently 
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require prudence and caution. In the EC’s view, such requests do not become 
"illegitimate" if and because they are not expressly set out in the legislation applicable 
at the time of the application nor do they become "illegitimate" where they are put in 
the form of a legislative requirement to re-submit an up-dated dossier, a requirement 
that had not however been challenged by the three complaining parties. 
 
 
5.2.c The general suspension (moratorium) 
 
The EC countered the complaining parties allegation that the EC had been operating a 
practice of suspending the consideration of applications and approvals by maintaining 
that such an alleged practice was not proved by the existence of any document, even 
informal or non-binding in nature. 
The EC claimed instead that there had not been any general suspension and that there 
was no consistent practice in respect of all the applications, each having been taken into 
account on its own merits. First, the EC dismissed the evidence put forward by the 
complaining parties regarding the absence of final approvals in the previous five years 
as incorrect, inconclusive and inconsistent90. Moreover, the evidence of various 
statements from different sources presented by the complaining parties was mostly 
irrelevant and otherwise inconclusive. On the basis of WTO jurisprudence on 
statements as evidence, only official EC statements could at all be relevant. Those EC 
statements which come closest to being official ones did not however announce nor 
confirm a suspension of the approval processes. 
Even assuming that on the basis of that evidence and in spite of the actual facts, it could 
be said that there was in the past a systematic suspension of the approval process, 
according to the Community such a pattern or practice would not as such constitute a 
challengeable measure under the WTO Agreement. 
In the EC’s view, if it was to assess the consistency with WTO rules of the so-called 
moratorium, the Panel needed first to define with absolute precision what the 
moratorium consisted of and what the measure at issue was. A measure that is a 
"moratorium" must therefore have been shown to be a plan or course of action to 
suspend a procedure, or a decision not to decide. On the other hand, the EC contended 
that the absence of a decision, such as the one occurred in the case at issue, is not the 
same thing as a decision not to decide. There may have been expressions of individual 
opinion associated with specific persons, or views of individual Member States. But the 
European Communities itself has not taken any such decision. 
Finally, if the Panel was to take the view that there was a measure, the EC underlined 
that it would have had to consider the following issues: first, whether the measure 
                                                
90 According to the EC, evidence presented by the complainants was incorrect because GM products had 
been authorized to be put on the market during the previous 5 years. It was inconclusive because the 
absence of an approval did not mean that an approval process had been suspended. It was inconsistent 
because , on the one hand, the United States only referred to a limited number of products instead of all 
and only to an alleged situation in the past and not to the current circumstances of the case and, on the 
other, Canada could not reconcile its presentation of processes being stalled with the plain fact that 
dossiers were moving through the different instances of the approval process. 
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existed when the Panel was established and if so, whether it still existed at the time of 
proceedings; second, to what extent that measure came within the scope of the SPS 
Agreement; third, whether the measure was inconsistent with article 5.7, as the measure 
would have had to be considered to be of a provisional nature applied for reasons of 
insufficiency of scientific evidence; fourth, to the extent that the measure did not fall 
under the SPS Agreement, whether it was a technical regulation falling under the TBT 
Agreement or whether article III:4 GATT 1994 would have been applicable; and finally, 
the possible justifications under article XX GATT. 
 
5.2.d The EC member State safeguard measures 
 
As regards the measures taken by the EC Member States which affected GMOs already 
authorized in by the EC, these were provisional measures pending a full assessment at 
the EC’s level which would eventually have lead either to a modification of the 
Community-wide authorization or to a termination of the national safeguard measures. 
The safeguard measures were therefore provisionally and temporary in their character. 
This was confirmed by the measures themselves, by the explicit terms of the legal 
provisions on which they were based91 and finally by the ECJ92. 
Consequently, according to the EC, to the extent that they were falling under the 
SPS Agreement, these measures should have been reviewed under article 5.7 SPS, the 
latter provisions being specifically designed to discipline temporary SPS measures to 
the exclusion of other SPS provisions, such as article 5.1, which the complaining parties 
had wrongly invoked. All three complaining parties having failed to assert the 
inconsistency of the Member States’ measures with article 5.7 SPS, however, the EC 
opined that their claims on the safeguard measures should have been dismissed. 
Moreover, even if there was no burden of proof on the EC concerning the four 
conditions set forth in article 5.7, the European Communities nonetheless pointed out 
that the latter were met in that, first, the scientific evidence was insufficient; second, the 
Member States based their measures on available pertinent information; third, Member 
States and the EC were engaged in an process aimed at obtaining the additional 
information necessary for a more objective assessment of the risk; and fourth, the 
measures were subject to a review within a reasonable period of time. 
In the alternative, the EC contended that, should article 5.1 SPS be considered relevant, 
the importance of the terms “appropriate to the circumstances” that qualify the 
obligation to base measures on a risk assessment should have been taken into due 
consideration. For the Community, those terms implied a certain degree of flexibility, 
especially under circumstances where scientific knowledge was still developing and the 
potential risks being assessed were important. 
Furthermore, the EC resorted to its classic argument of SPS (and TBT) measures 
needing to be “based on” and not “conform to” a risk assessment. On this ground the 
                                                
91 Article 16 of Directive 2001/18 and article 12 of Regulation 258/97. 
92 ECJ, case C-236/01, Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA and Others v Presidenza del Consiglio dei 
Ministri and Others, judgment of the Court of 9 September 2003, [2003] ECR I-08105, para. 107-109. 
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EC concluded that there is no obligation for WTO members to follow mainstream 
scientific opinions. 
The EC also rejected under articles 5.6 and 5.5 SPS. As regards the former article, the 
complaining parties' arguments were based only on a wrong assumption about the 
appropriate level of protection that the Member States’ measures sought. Furthermore, 
in the EC’s view, the necessity of those measures had to be judged by reference to the 
insufficiency of scientific evidence and the reasonable period of time necessary. As 
regards article 5.5, its application was excluded by article 5.7 SPS and, in any event, the 
EC maintained that Member States had not behaved in an arbitrary manner or made 
unjustifiable distinctions in that the alleged differences in treatment were between 
entirely different GMOs or between GMOs and conventional products. 
Finally, the EC also asked for the dismissal of the complainants’ claims under articles 
2.2 and 2.3 SPS since the latter derived from their claims under articles 5.6 and 5.5. 
With regard to the alleged TBT violations, here again resorting to a classic argument, 
the EC considered that the Member States’ measures could not be qualified as technical 
regulations within the meaning of the TBT Agreement. Each safeguard measure was in 
fact an individual administrative  - and not normative - act relating to a specific product 
from a specific applicant or manufacturer – and not to a generality thereof. Each of 
those measures amounted to a simple ban on a product in its natural state, and they did 
not therefore contain product characteristics in the general and abstract sense in which 
that term is used in point 1 of Annex 1 to TBT Agreement. 
In any event, according to the Community, neither article 2.1 nor article 2.2 TBT as 
invoked by the complainants would have provided support to the latters’ case. On the 
one hand, even in the implausible event that non-GM products could have been 
considered to be “like” a GM products, article 2.1 TBT can only apply to differences in 
treatment between products that are, by their nature, susceptible of being covered by the 
technical regulation in question. On the other hand, the assertion that the Member 
States’ measures did not contribute to achieving their objectives was for the EC not 
sufficiently substantiated and it failed to take into account the review of the relevant EC 
legislation and the parallel review of the EC authorizations concerning the products 
affected by the safeguards measures. 
 
5.2.e Article XX of the GATT 1994 
 
Last but not least, the EC submitted that, had any of the challenged measures to be 
found inconsistent with any of the provisions invoked by the complaining parties, those 
measures had to be found to be justified under article XX GATT because, first, they 
came under one of the particular exceptions of paragraphs (b), (d) or (g) and, second, 
they did not constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail or disguised restrictions on international trade. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
The analyse of the above five disputes wich saw the EC acting as respondent before the 
DSB allows to identify some coherent patterns amongst the respective defence 
strategies which univocally point at the defence of the regulatory autonomy of the EC, 
now EU, as final target of the adopted course of action. 
With the exception of the hormones and sardines cases, the EC has tried to subtract the 
contested measure from the scope of the SPS or TBT agreement by using one or several 
of the following arguments: first, denying the technical or sanitary and phytosanitary 
nature of the measure itself; second, putting forth the non applicability of the said 
agreement to general prohibitions, as in the asbestos case; third, resorting to the 
argument concerning the non retroactivity of the invoked provisions. 
In all of the disputes analysed, the EC stood for the defence of its freedom to choose the 
appropriate level of protection. Moreover, it asserted that all contested measures aimed 
at a legitimate objective and satisfied the necessity test, albeit differently interpreted in 
respect to its GATT equivalent (art. XX GATT), on the one hand, in the asbestos case 
and, on the other, in the sardines and geographical indications cases. 
On occasions the Community put forward the argument of the irrelevance of 
international standards, on the ground of a non retroactivity argument such as in the 
sardines case, or of the inappropriateness of those to achieve the legitimate objective 
pursued. In respect of international standards, one of the recurring defensive arguments 
concerned the interpretation of relevant SPS and TBT provisions as requiring the use of 
such standards as a basis as opposed to the basis for the adoption of domestic regulatory 
measures. In other words, the EC consistently rejected the counterparts’ claims whereby 
the two Agreements require domestic measures adopted by WTO members to conform 
to adopted international standards. 
Last but certainly not least is the Community reliance of the principle of precaution as 
first put forwards in the hormones case and again invoked, albeit in a more nuanced 
version, in the GMOs case. With regard to the latter cases, in view of the reconstruction 
of the Union’s strategy, it is worth underlying once again the importance of the 
arguments put forward by the EC in relation, on the one hand, to mixed measures and, 
on the other, to the concept of sufficient scientific evidence. 
Having regard to the former, the EC claimed that any measure or part of any measure 
adopted for reasons that fall outside the scope of the SPS Agreement cannot be judged 
inconsistent with that agreement. The same for measures partially falling outside the 
scope of the TBT Agreement. With respect to the concept of sufficiency as enshrined in 
article 5.7 SPS, the EC claimed for its relational nature, whereby different WTO 
members may not necessarily react identically with regard to potential risks and 
uncertainty. Depending on the specific circumstances prevailing in each country, 
scientific information may or may not be deemed sufficient to decide appropriate 
measures and must therefore be considered as matters of concern to the national 
legislator. 
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The purpose of the present chapter is to review, first of all, the issue of the status 
conferred upon multilateral trade rules within the European Union legal order. Such a 
conferral has taken place throughout the years in the midst of the judicial activity of the 
ECJ, the result being that both GATT 1947 and WTO Agreements have been 
acknowledged a specific legal status vis-à-vis the wide majority of other international 
agreements concluded by the EU. The unique position of the GATT and of WTO 
Agreements emerges from a case law that consistently denies direct effect to those 
norms, rules out the possibility of ordinary judicial review of Community acts on the 
basis of the latter, exception being made for peculiar cases, and consequently states the 
necessity of transposition of those rules via internal legislative measures. The stance of 
the ECJ on the enforcement of multilateral trade law in the EU continues to nourish a 
lively debate in legal writing between, on the one hand, scholars who uphold its judicial 
interpretation of the value of the aforementioned agreements and, on the other, those 
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who consider such interpretation as “ a wave of mutilation”1 or “an exception to the rule 
of law”2. 
To ascertain the status of multilateral trade rules in the EC legal order is of the utmost 
importance with a view to discussing the position of the Union with regard to trade 
disputes, which amounts to the very focus of this thesis. Conclusions achieved in the 
present chapter will serve the task of outlining the legal context in which the analysis of 
the value of the DSB reports, on the one hand, and of EU’s extra-contractual liability for 
breach of multilateral trade rules, on the other, will be framed later on in this work. 
Similarly to the issue of the domestic status of WTO rules, the issue of the status and 
effects of decisions adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) within the 
EU legal order has been the object of fierce doctrinal debates. In fact, the two issues, 
however different, are intimately connected in terms of both substance and 
consequences and cannot be divorced. After some important judgements of the ECJ, 
many have wondered whether the dice were cast on the lack of direct effect of 
GATT/WTO law3 or, as far as actions for non-contractual liability under art. 235 and 
288(2) EC are concerned, whether it could be considered that a door had been opened to 
actions for breach of WTO law4. After the release of the FIAMM judgement though, the 
conclusion has been reached that at the end of the tunnel there was nothing but 
darkness5. 
This chapter therefore also aims to address the position expressed by the European 
judiciary on the issue of status and effects of the reports issued by the WTO panels and 
by the Appellate Body (AB) and adopted by the DSB, which has grown relevant for the 
EU from both the legal and the political point of view. 
The structure of the present Chapter is as follows. In the following pages a review of the 
relevant case law will first be presented (section I), followed by some reflections on a 
certain recent case-law showing the contagious potential that the Court doctrine on the 
absence of direct effect of WTO law could have towards other thematic branches of EU 
external relations law (section II). The discussion will then turn to the rank and effects 
of acts of internationally established organisations and bodies thereof within the EU 
legal order (section III) and will subsequently turn to the peculiarities of the DSB 
decisions of the WTO (section IV). It will then examine the relevance of adopted 
reports in the EU system of judicial protection, namely on the one hand in the 
                                                
1 De Mey, D., Ibáñez Colomo, P., “Recent developments on the invocability of WTO law in the EC: a 
wave of mutilation”, in European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 11, n. 1, Spring 2006, p. 63-86. 
2 Lavranos, N., “The communitarization of WTO dispute settlement reports: an exception to the rule of 
law”, in European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 10, n. 3, Autumn 2005, p. 313-338. 
3 “EC Liability for Non-Implementation of WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions – Are the dice cast?”, in 
Journal of International Economic Law, 2004, p. 483-490. 
4 Kaddous, C., “The "Biret" cases: an open door to EC liability for the non-implementation of a WTO 
dispute settlement decision? (Case C-93/02 "P. Biret International v Council" and Case 94/02 
"Etablissements Biret & Cie SA v Council", judgments of the European Court of Justice of 30 September 
2003”, in European Law Reporter, n. 2, February 2004, p. 54-59. 
5 Alemanno, A., Schmauch, M., “At the end of the tunnel there is … darkness: the ECJ denies EC liability 
for WTO non-compliance ("Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio SpA (FIAMM) and 
others v. Council and Commission ", ECJ of 9 September 2008, joined cases C-120/06P and C-
121/06P)”, in European Law Reporter, n. 10, October 2008, p. 347-355. 
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framework of judicial remedies aiming at the legality review of secondary legislation 
(section V), and on the other, in relation to action for damages (section VI). 
 
 
Section I – The ECJ case law denying direct effect to GATT 1947 and to WTO 
Agreements 
 
The ECJ consistently turned down the possibility of acknowledging direct effect to 
GATT 1947 on the basis of the very features of the normative system outlined therein. 
In the view of the ECJ, elements characterising GATT rules made them unsuitable to 
create rights and obligations upon individuals. These early case-law was already 
targeted by harsh criticisms mainly addressing the laconic nature of the Court’s 
arguments and the resulting misleading distinction between the internationally binding 
character of the General Agreement and its lack of internal effects. The latter in 
particular would result in a dualist attitude, which was considered to be strangely in 
contrast, on the one hand, with the attitude the Court usually adopted as regard the 
relation between Community and international law and, on the other, with the approach 
the Court itself has consistently recommended to the national courts on the question of 
the relationship between Community law and international law6. 
Following the reform of the GATT and the creation of the WTO, the Court did not 
modify its approach and lived on the denial of direct effect to multilateral trade rules. 
Critics of the relevant case-law came to the conclusion that the Court did not duly take 
into account the reform that the multilateral trade system had undergone. By choosing 
blindness towards those significant changes, the ECJ failed to modify its approach to 
the issue of invocability of WTO rules before European jurisdictions accordingly, so as 
to preserve the – already widely questioned - coherence of its legal reasoning. 
The belief underlying these critiques points at the fact that, starting from 1995, the 
Court should have fine-tuned its subsequent case law to the consequences proceeding 
from the reform of the multilateral trade regime enacted by the Marrakesh Agreement. 
This reform had in fact touched upon those very issues upon which the ECJ based its 
judicial reasoning, the latter encompassing both legal and political considerations. In 
other words, the debate between defenders and detractors of the Court’s approach builds 
upon the topic of how, if at all, to assess the features of the multilateral trade system 
such as enshrined first in the GATT and then in the WTO Agreements for the purpose 
of understanding the latter’s effects in the EU legal order. 
TO this aim, it is essential to first present the ECJ case-law relating to GATT 1947 and 
to WTO Agreements. This section first addresses the issues of the Court’s jurisdiction 
on and the direct effect under EU law of international treaties. It then turns to the 
analysis of the aforementioned case law, whereby the ECJ applied general principles on 
the invocability of international law to multilateral trade rules. 
                                                
6 Waelbroeck, M., “Effects of GATT within the legal order of the EEC”, in Journal of World Trade Law, 
1974, p. 614 ff, p. 623. 
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1.1 Issues of ECJ jurisdiction 
 
EU-specific challenges in relation to WTO law are related on the one hand to the status 
of the Union in the Organisation, particularly insofar as dispute settlement is concern, 
and on the other to the ECJ’s jurisdiction as it is organised by the Treaties. The first 
issue having been exhaustively addressed in Chapter I, some room is still to be devoted 
to the second. Only those aspects of the ECJ’s jurisdiction that are particularly relevant 
for the purpose of the present work are hereafter assessed. The analysis is therefore 
necessarily selective. 
 
1.1.a Overview 
 
(i) The principle of limited jurisdiction 
The ECJ has no inherent jurisdiction. Its competence exists only to the extent that the 
TFEU, and previously the TEC, and similar instruments confer jurisdiction upon it, as 
results from article 19 TEU and relevant TFEU provisions (art. 251 to 281). Such 
jurisdiction may be implied, what is the case where there is a prevailing need for it on 
order to fill a lacuna in the system of judicial remedies expressly provided for, such as 
where the complete absence of any other form of legal redress creates a serious injustice 
and is inconsistent with the principle of a law-ruled European Union7. 
The ECJ relies on the concept of rule of law to develop a general theory on which it 
based such implied jurisdiction. In Les Verts the ECJ stated that: 
“[T]he European Economic Community is a Community based on the rule of law, 
inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the 
question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic 
constitutional charter, the Treaty […]” 
and that 
“[…] the Treaty establishes a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed 
to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality of measures adopted by the 
institutions”8 
In a subsequent case, the ECJ was of the view that in order to perform the task of 
ensuring that law is observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaties, it was 
to be able to guarantee the maintenance of the institutional balance and the respect for 
the European Parliament’s prerogatives. Although the action for annulment as foreseen 
in the TEC did not provide for an application for annulment by the European 
Parliament, the ECJ concluded that it had jurisdiction in an annulment proceeding 
                                                
7 Bourgeois, J.H.J., “The European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and Challanges”, in Weiler, 
J.H.H. (ed.), The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade, Oxford, 
2000, p. 71 ff, at 71. 
8 ECJ, Case 294/83, Les Verts v European Parliament, judgement of 23 April 1986, [1986] ECR 1339, 
para 23. 
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brought by the European Parliament to the extent that the purpose of the proceeding was 
to protect the latter’s prerogatives9. 
This freedom of the ECJ to intervene in the absence of express authority allows the 
correction of shortcomings in the system of remedies created by the Treaties10. Whereas 
in the former consideration lies the justification of the ECJ implicit jurisdiction, there it 
also find its limits. 
 
(ii) Acts susceptible of judicial review by the ECJ 
Article 263 TFEU provides for an action of annulment against legislative acts, acts of 
the Council, of the Commission and the European Central Bank, other then 
recommendations and opinions, and acts of the European Parliament and of the 
European Council intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties11. 
In the era of external relations two developments in the case law are noteworthy in this 
respect. 
The first one relates to a decision of the Council to leave it to the Member States to 
negotiate an international agreement. In the ERTA case, the Commission had 
recommended to the Council that it be authorised to re-negotiate on behalf of the EC the 
Europea Road Transport Agreement to be entered into with third countries in the 
framework of the United Nations. The Council resolved that the then six EC Member 
States should negotiate on the own behalf and become parties to the ERTA on their own 
national capacities. The Commission challenged the Council proceedings before the 
ECJ, which considered that the Commission application was admissible. Referring to 
the wording of art. 173 TEC (now art. 263 TFEU), the ECJ asserted that 
“Since the only matter excluded from the scope of the action for annulment […] are 
recommendations or opinions – which by the final paragraph of Article 189 [TEC] are 
declared to have no binding force – Article 173 treats as acts open to review by the Court 
all measures adopted by the institutions which are intended to have legal force.”12 
The ECJ went on to analyse the content and purpose of the Council proceedings and 
expressed the view that 
“ It […] seems that in so far as they concerned the objective of the negotiations as defined 
by the Council, the proceedings of 20 march 1970 could not have been simply the 
expression or the recognition of a voluntary coordination, but were designed to lay down 
a course of action binding on both the institutions and the Member States, and destined 
ultimately to be reflected in the tenor of the [EC] regulation [that would have to be 
amended following the conclusion of the ERTA]. 
 
                                                
9 ECJ, Case C-70/88, European Parliament v Council, “Chernobyl case”, judgement of 22 May 1990, 
[1990] ECR I-2041. 
10 Arnull, A., “Does the Court of Justice have inherent jurisdiction?”, in Common Market Law Review, 
vol. 27, 1990,  p. 683 ff., at 701. 
11 The ius standi of natural and legal persons in such action for annulment is limited to acts adressed to 
that person or which are of direct and individual concern to it, and regulatory acts of direct and individual 
concern which do not entail implementing measures. 
12 ECJ, Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, “ERTA Case”, judgement of 31 March 1971, [1971] ECR 
263, para 39. 
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In the part of its conclusions relating to the negotiating procedure, the Council adopted 
provisions which were capable of derogating in certain circumstances from the procedure 
laid down by the Treaty regarding negotiations with third countries and the conclusion of 
agreements. 
 
Hence, the proceedings of 20 march 1970 [i.e. the position taken by the Council] had 
definite legal effects both on relations between the Community and the Member States 
and on the relationship between institutions.”13 
 
In the same vein, in Commission v Council (FAO Case) the ECJ considered that a 
Council decision according to which the EC Member States rather than the EC should 
vote in the FAO for the adoption of an agreement on fisheries conservation measures 
had legal effects.  The ECJ consequently held that the Commission application for 
annulment of that decision was admissible14. 
The second development concerns international agreements. Once the text a treaty has 
been initiated or authenticated in some form by the Commission, the Council concludes 
the agreement following either a simplified procedure or a more complex one entailing 
two or three stages. In so doing, the Council approves the content therein and decides on 
such steps as are required to express the Union’s consent to be bound by the agreement 
by whatever means are applicable. 
The practice shows that the term “conclusion” in the meaning of the Treaties provisions 
simultaneously cover two different kind of measures: the measure whereby the internal 
procedure to conclude and agreement is completed and the measure whereby the EC 
binds itself internationally. The final act of the Council takes the form of a decision or a 
regulation, to which the international agreement is appended and which is published on 
the Official Journal. A notice announcing the agreement’s international entry into effect 
may also subsequently appear in the same means. 
Article 218 TFEU procedure for the conclusion of international agreements does not 
offer much guidance on the status and effects of international agreements in the EU 
legal system. The only indication in this respect is to be found in art. 216 TFEU, which 
states that agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions and the 
Member States. 
Treaties provisions are therefore silent as to whether and how an international 
agreement concluded under the above conditions becomes part of EU law. They do not 
contain any hint on the drafters’ views on the dichotomy between `monist´ and the 
`dualist´ approach. The practice offered by the institution does not suggest much either, 
in that is inconsistently drifts from a dualist to a monist approach and back. 
The choice of a regulation, which is by definition directly applicable, rather than a 
decision for the purpose of approving an international agreement, suggests that the 
Council intends the agreement to be self-executing. It can thus be seen as the expression 
of a dualist attitude. However, that choice may also be influenced by other 
                                                
13 Ibid., para 53-55. 
14 ECJ, Case C–25/94, Commission v Council, “FAO Agreement”, judgement of 19 March 1996, [1996] 
ECR I– 1469. 
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considerations, such as the need to adopt simultaneously complementary provisions 
requiring the use of a regulation. In turn, the ECJ has shown not to attach much 
importance to the type of legal act for the purpose of determining the effect that an 
agreement is to have in the EU legal order15. 
On the other hand, in EU practice, legislation implementing an international agreement 
is considered necessary only where the agreement both entails precise legal obligations 
and requires changes of, or addition to, rules internally in force, or where the provisions 
of the agreement, in order to be implemented in a clear and effective manner, call for 
special measures of internal law. 
The question thus arises whether an international agreement concluded by the EC is an 
act of a EU institution within the meaning of art. 263 TFEU, therefore susceptible of 
legality challenges, or whether only the decision to conclude such agreement can be the 
object of a legality review by the ECJ. 
The 1994 France v. Commission case related to the 1991 Agreement on the application 
of their respective competition laws entered into by the Commission and the US 
government16. France brought an action under then art. 173 EEC to have the Court 
declaring the said agreement void on the ground of the Commission’s lack of 
competence to conclude. In its defence, the Commission raises the question whether the 
French Government should have challenged the decision whereby it authorized its Vice-
President to sign the Agreement with the United States on its behalf, rather than 
challenging the Agreement itself. 
On the admissibility of the action the ECJ took the view that in order for an action to be 
admissible under the first paragraph of then art. 173 EEC Treaty, the contested act must 
be an act of an institution which produces legal effects, as affirmed in the ERTA case. 
The Commission had argued that under art. 173 EEC the Court may review only acts of 
the institutions, which clearly cannot encompass an Agreement that, being an act that 
has come into being with the participation of a non-member country, is not nor can it be 
considered a unilateral act of a Community institution. Moreover, in the Commission' s 
view, the case-law in which the Court affirmed that it has jurisdiction to also interpret 
agreements by way of a preliminary ruling confirms that only the decision to conclude 
an agreement and not the agreement itself can be the subject of a review of legality. 
Apparently overlooking the distinction between the decision and the agreement 
proposed by the Commission for the purpose of admitting a demand for legality review, 
the Court concluded that, standing its wording, the Agreement at issue was intended to 
produce legal effects. Consequently, the act whereby the Commission sought to 
conclude the Agreement must be susceptible to an action for annulment. The exercise of 
the powers delegated to the Community institutions in international matters cannot 
indeed escape judicial review of the legality of the acts adopted thereby. The French 
                                                
15 This is apparent in the Bresciani case, where the Court allowed the applicant in the main proceeding to 
rely on the Yaoundé Convention even though it had been concluded by the ECC institutions via a 
decision and not a regulation. See ECJ, Case 87/75, Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze, 
judgement of 5 February 1976, [1976] ECR 129. 
16 ECJ, C-327/91, France v. Commission, judgement of 9 August 1994, [1994] ECR I-3641. 
 
CHAPTER III – WTO RULES AND DSB DECISIONS IN THE EU LEGAL ORDER 
 140 
government’s action was be understood precisely as being directed against the act 
whereby the Commission sought to conclude the Agreement. Consequently, the action 
was to be declared admissible17. 
The Court’s understanding of the admissibility issue is better appreciated when read in 
the light of Tesauro AG’s opinion, where he disregards the Commission’s position on 
the ground that the relevant case-law of the Court does not by any means rule out the 
possibility of challenging an agreement directly. In fact, quite the opposite is true. 
In justifying its jurisdiction to interpret by way of a preliminary ruling agreements 
concluded by the Commission with non-member countries, the Court has equated such 
agreements with acts of the institutions. In its judgment in Haegeman, the Court 
expressly stated, first, that an agreement concluded under then art. 228 of the Treaty 
constitutes, to the extent that the Community is concerned, an act of the institutions 
within the above provision and, second, that the provisions of the agreement, since the 
coming into force thereof, form an integral part of Community law. 
Since in the same judgment the Court referred to the Council decision relating to the 
conclusion of the agreement in question, the aforesaid statement has been interpreted as 
meaning that the Court' s jurisdiction to interpret provisions of international agreements 
can be exercised only because of the existence of an executive act. The fact remains, 
however, that, even in subsequent judgments, the Court reiterated, for purposes of 
interpretation, that agreements are to be treated as acts of the institutions. 
In the view of Tesauro AG, still more important in the case at issue was the fact that the 
Court' s jurisdiction to carry out an a posteriori review of legality in relation to 
international agreements concluded by the Communities had already been 
unequivocally affirmed by the Court, albeit in an obiter dictum, in Opinion 1/75. In that 
context, the Court stated that "the question whether the conclusion of a given agreement 
is within the power of the Community and whether, in a given case, such power has 
been exercised in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty is, in principle, a 
question which may be submitted to the Court of Justice, either directly, under Article 
169 or Article 173 of the Treaty, or in accordance with the preliminary procedure". 
Tesauro AG, therefore, concluded that, first of all, the possibility of legality review also 
arises from the exercise of the Community' s external powers being subject to 
compliance with the procedural and substantive rules laid down by the Treaty, and 
secondly, that the possibility of direct review of the agreements concluded by the 
Community is by no means excluded since the Court has expressly stated that it can 
review whether the power to conclude an agreement has been exercised in accordance 
with the provisions of the Treaty. 
Once admitted the possibility to exercise an a posteriori review, the question remained 
whether such review is permissible only indirectly, i.e. where it is carried out as a result 
of an action challenging the regulation or decision relating to the conclusion of the 
agreement, or also where the agreement is challenged directly. In this respect, Tesauro 
AG took the view that under the Community, now Union, legal system, which affords 
the possibility to judicially review, without exception, of all the acts and practices of the 
                                                
17 Ibid., para 13-17. 
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institutions, of individuals and of the Member States, which affect the system itself, it 
would not be reasonable to rule out the legality review of the procedure for concluding 
an agreement with a non-member country. The possibility of doing so on the basis of a 
complaint expressly directed at the agreement as such, or at the act connected therewith, 
was therefore labeled by the AG as an issue of mere form, as such secondary and 
irrelevant18. 
The ECJ however adhered to the more formalistic approach and did not annul the 
agreement but declared void the act whereby the Commission sought to conclude it. It is 
doubtful whether this proves a dualistic approach by the Court, what could nonetheless 
been conceived since it distinguished between the agreement as such and the decision to 
conclude it. Under the monist approach the domestic effect of an international 
agreement depends on the approval of the conclusion act by the competent national 
authorities. As a matter of fact, the ECJ limited itself to review the legality of such 
approval19. 
 
(iii) Acts susceptible of being interpreted by the ECJ 
Where the ECJ has jurisdiction to review the legality of an act of the institutions, it also 
may interpret such act by means of preliminary ruling, pursuant to art. 267 TFEU. 
In Haegeman, a Belgian company importing Greek wines sought repayment of 
countervailing charges exacted by it at the request of Belgian authorities20. It argued 
before a Belgian court that the imposition of those charges was unlawful having regard 
to the provision of the then Association Agreement between the EEC and Greece. The 
Belgian court stopped proceedings and referred to the ECJ for the interpretation of the 
afore mentioned agreement. 
When examining its jurisdiction under then art. 177 EEC, the Court maintained that the 
Agreement was to be considered an act of the institutions within the meaning of art. 177 
EEC, first paragraph, letter (b), whose provisions formed an integral part of Community 
law right since its entry into force. The Court concluded that, within the Community 
legal order, it had therefore jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the 
interpretation of the Agreement at issue21. 
The provision whose interpretation was sought by the Belgian court was contained in 
the agreement itself, and not in the decision approving its conclusion on the Community 
side. Agreements as such are not amongst the acts covered by the Court jurisdiction to 
deliver preliminary rulings. The ECJ therefore assimilated the Association Agreement 
to an act of the institutions, and considered that its provisions form integral part of 
Community law, on the ground that the Council through its Decision had approved it. 
The Court confirmed such approach also in relation to mixed agreements, to which the 
EU and Member states have long resorted to conclude agreement falling partially within 
the Community competence and partially on that of the Member States. The advantage 
of such device is that it allows fudging the issue of demarcation of EU competence, 
                                                
18 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro of 16 December 1993, in Case C-327/91, France v Commission. 
19 Bourgeois, J.H.J., “The European Court of Justice and the WTO […]”, op.cit., at 80. 
20 ECJ, Case 181/73, R. & V. Haegeman v Belgian State, judgement of 30 April 1974, [1974] ECR 449. 
21 Ibid., para. 3-6. 
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whose resolution upon the conclusion of each international agreement would have 
endlessly postponed the very end of the procedure22. Nor does the reforemed Treaty put 
an end to the question, being as the inclusion of lists of exclusive and shared 
competences respectively in art. 3 and 4 TFEU does not really help clarifying the 
boundary between EU and Member States competences in so far as shared competences 
are concerned. 
Concerning the scope of the ECj’s jurisdiction with respect to mixed agreements, 
various doctrinal views have been put forward. According to some the ECJ may 
interpret mixed agreements in their entirety, whereas others take the view that the 
Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the provisions covered by the EU competence. 
The ECJ faced this issue in Demirel, in which a Turkish national challenged her 
expulsion which was ordered on the grounds that her visa, which was only valid for a 
visit, had expired23. Mrs Demirel wanted to remain in Germany with her husband who 
there resided. In order to challenge the measure ordering the expulsion, Mrs Demirel 
relied on certain provisions of the Association Agreement between the EEC and Turkey. 
The German and British governments intervened in the proceedings before the Court 
and challenged the latter’s competence to interpret the agreement. They took the view 
that in the case of mixed agreements, the Court' s interpretative jurisdiction does not 
extend to provisions whereby Member States have entered into commitments with 
regard to the third state in the exercise of their own powers, which was the case of the 
provisions on freedom of movement for workers in the Demirel dispute. 
The Court rejected such argument by stating that in the instance at stake the question 
whether the Court has jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of a provision in a mixed 
agreement containing a commitment which only the Member States could enter into in 
the sphere of their own powers simply did not arise. Since the agreement in question 
was an Association Agreement creating special, privileged links with a non-member 
country which must, at least to a certain extent, take part in the Community system, then 
article 238 EEC must necessarily empower the Community to guarantee commitments 
towards non-member countries in all the fields covered by the Treaty. Since freedom of 
movement for workers is one of the fields covered by Treaty, the Court concluded that 
commitments regarding freedom of movement fall within the preliminary review 
conferred on the Community by then art. 238 EEC. 
Furthermore, the Court ruled out the possibility to call its jurisdiction into question on 
the ground that in the field of freedom of movement for workers, as Community law 
stood at the time, it was for the Member States to lay down the rules which were 
necessary to give effect in their territory to the provisions of the Agreement or to the 
decisions of the Association Council24. 
                                                
22 Dashwood, A., “Why continue to have Mixed Agreements at all?”, in Bourgeois, Dewost, Gaiffe (eds), 
La Communauté européenne et les accords mixtes. Quelles perspectives?, P.I.E., Bruxelles, 1997, p. 93-
98, at 94. 
23 ECJ, Case 12/86, Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, judgement of 30 September 1987, [1987] ECR 
3719. 
24 Ibid., para. 8-10. 
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Recalling the position previously expressed in Kupferberg25, the Court finally held that 
in ensuring the respect for commitments arising from and agreement concluded by the 
Community institutions, the Member States fulfill and obligation in relation to the 
Community, which has assumed responsibility for the bona fide performance of the 
agreement. Consequently, the Court stated that it had jurisdiction to interpret the 
provisions on the freedom of movement for workers contained in the EEC-Turkey 
Association Agreement and in the annexed Protocol26.  
Again on the issue of the scope of the ECJ’s competence to interpret mixed agreements, 
Bourgeois’ scepticism in relation to an overstretched jurisdiction is sharable in that, as 
he notes, in Demirel the clauses of the agreement for whose interpretation the Court 
claimed jurisdiction came within the competence of the EC anyway. The situation 
would be arguably different with respect to the interpretation of those provisions of 
mixed agreements falling squarely within the competence of the Member States27. 
 
1.1.b The Court’s jurisdiction in relation to WTO law 
 
(i) Jurisdiction in relation to the GATT 
The question on whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings on the 
interpretation of the GATT 1947 was first raised by the Corte Suprema di Cassazione in 
SPI and SAMI, a dispute between several importers and the Italian Treasury concerning 
duties for administrative services levied on imports from GATT contracting parties28. 
Under Italian law the provisions of the GATT were held to create subjective rights for 
private parties. However, being aware of the previous case-law by which the ECJ had 
interpreted EC law in the light of the GATT, the Corte Suprema di Cassazione wanted 
to avoid a conflict between its own interpretation and that of the ECJ. Therefore, it 
made a reference for a preliminary ruling demanding the ECJ to clarify whether the 
latter had the final say in the interpretation of the GATT provisions also where the 
Member States courts were asked to rule on the compatibility of national measures with 
the GATT. In other words, the Italian court asked the ECJ as to what consequences for 
the interpretative jurisdiction were to be drawn from the substitution of the Community 
for the Member States in relation to the fulfilment of GATT obligations with effect 
from the entry into force of the common customs tariff (1 july 1968)29. 
Being as differences in the interpretation and application of GATT provisions, which 
bind the Community vis-à-vis non-member countries, would not only jeopardize the 
unity of the commercial policy but also create distortions in trade within the 
Community, the Court underlined the importance that GATT provisions receive 
uniform interpretation and application. The jurisdiction conferred upon the Court in 
order to ensure the uniform interpretation of Community law must therefore include a 
                                                
25 ECJ, Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Maiz v Kupferberg, judgement of 26 October 1982, [1982] ECR 3641, 
para. 13 and 14. 
26 ECJ, Case 12/86, Demirel, cit., para. 11 and 12. 
27 Bourgeois, J.H.J., “The European Court of Justice and the WTO […]”, op.cit., at 83. 
28 ECJ, Joint Cases 267 to 269/81, SPI and SAMI, judgements of 16 March 1983, [1983] ECR 801. 
29 Ibid., para. 11. 
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determination of the scope and effect of the rules of GATT within the Community. In 
conclusion, the answer given by the Court was that, being as in relation to the 
fulfillment of commitments laid down in GATT the Community has been substituted 
for the Member States, starting from the moment of such substitution the provisions 
therein have been amongst those which the Court of justice has jurisdiction to interpret 
by way of a preliminary ruling. With regard to the period prior to the substitution, such 
interpretation was a matter exclusively for the national courts to cope with. 
Whilst confirming the admissibility of the request and thus its competence to give 
interpretation to GATT provisions, the ECJ did not qualify the Agreement as an act of 
the Community institutions within the meaning of then art. 177 EEC conferring the 
Court a preliminary competence. It rather relied on the purpose of the latter Treaty 
provision, which is to ensure the uniform application of Community law, and on the 
substitution of the EC for its Member States in relation to GATT commitments. 
The Court’s approach received positive reviews but was also harshly criticised. The ECJ 
could in fact hardly have come to a different conclusion in SPI and SAMI, given the 
proved assumption of the substitution of the EC for the Member States within the 
GATT regime. Nor does any loophole results from the Court failing to qualify the 
GATT as an act of the Community institutions, what is confirmed from the extensive 
construction of the Court’s jurisdiction to interpret international obligations binding 
upon the Community which has been mentioned above. 
 
(ii) Jurisdiction in relation to the WTO 
Issues of shared competences confer a peculiar character to the question of the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction in relation to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In its 
Opinion 1/94 on the EC competence to conclude the GATS and the TRIPS Agreements, 
the ECJ rejected the European Commission view that the EC had exclusive competence 
to conclude these agreements. The Court also rejected the view of Member states that a 
number of clauses of the TRIPS Agreement (i.e. those relating to judicial remedies) fell 
within their exclusive competence. The ECJ expressed the opinion that the EC and its 
Member States are jointly competent to conclude both the GATS and the TRIPS 
Agreements30. 
The issue of the ECJ’s jurisdiction has been put to the ECJ in Hermès International, a 
request for preliminary ruling concerning article 50, paragraph 6, TRIPS dealing with 
procedural rules applying to judicial remedies afforded by the Agreement. 
In his opinion, Tesauro AG concluded that the ECJ had jurisdiction to interpret the 
above provision of the TRIPS. He relied on the fundamental requirement of a uniform 
interpretation and applicat5ion of all provisions of mixed agreements, on the EC’s 
international responsibility, the duty of the EC and the Member States to co-operate 
implying the duty to endeavour to adopt a common position, and the EC legal system 
that seeks to function and to represent itself to the outside world as a unified system31. 
                                                
30 ECJ, Opinion 1/94, [1994] ECR I-5267, para. 105. 
31 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Tesauro of 13 November 1997, in Case C-53/96, Hermès 
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When adjudicating the matter, the Court pointed out that the WTO Agreement was 
concluded by the EC and its Member States without any clear-cut allocation of 
competences, if not in terms of macro- policy areas. In other words, no distribution 
occurred between them with regard to their respective obligations towards the other 
contracting parties. When the Agreement was signed an EC Regulation on the 
Community trade mark, which contained provisions on the safeguard of such trade mark 
by means of the adoption of provisional measures, had been in force for one month 
already. Being as the EC is a party to the TRIPS, the latter agreement also applied to the 
Community trade mark policy. Therefore, national courts are required, when applying 
the remedies contained in the EC Regulation on Community trade mark, to do so in the 
light of the wording and purpose of art. 50 TRIPS, to the extent that this proves 
possible. From this argument the conclusion has been drawn that it is for the ECJ to 
interpret art. 50 TRIPS. 
In Hermès the ECJ thus managed to elude the thorniest issues connected to jurisdiction. 
It is however bound to face sooner or later such matter with respect to clauses of mixed 
agreements that cannot be regarded as coming within the EC’s powers. The 
consequences that would result from the absence of a uniform interpretation throughout 
the Union of GATS and TRIPS provisions are undoubtedly undesirable, artificial and 
perhaps unworkable32. One might add that if the EU or, in the absence of guidance by 
political institution, the ECJ fails to rule on whether and how GATS and TRIPS 
provisions are to be interpreted uniformly within the EC, a WTO panel or the Appellate 
Body might very well be called upon to do so. 
The challenge of the ECJ is to devise a theory to justify its jurisdiction to interpret the 
whole of WTO law and not just those provisions that can be regarded as coming within 
the EC’s powers. It seems fairly obvious that such clauses can hardly be assimilated to 
an act of the institutions within the meaning of current art. 267 TFEU. 
In Hermès, Tesauro AG noted that the EC was a party to the TRIPS Agreement vis-à-
vis the other WTO members and hat an international agreement concluded by the EC 
was, pursuant to then art. 228 EC, binding on both the EC institutions and its Member 
States. This holds true after the Lisbon reform. From this, Tesauro AG concluded that 
the EC is responsible for each part of the agreement in question. He inferred the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling in order, on the one hand, to ensure the uniform 
interpretation and application of the international obligations at issue within the EC and, 
on the other, to protect the Community interest not to be held internationally liable for 
breaches caused by one or several of the EC Member States. 
In the relations with third countries, Tesauro’s concerns are very well founded. The EC, 
now EU, is a rather anomalous phenomenon in international law, being as it displays all 
the features of an international actor without however possessing the entirety of the 
external powers that traditional international actors, namely states, usually enjoy. 
Except where upon the conclusion of a mixed agreement third parties have insisted on, 
                                                                                                                                          
International, para. 20 and 21. 
32 Eeckhout, P., “The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting legal systems”, in 
Common Market Law Review, 1997, p. 11 ff, at 20. 
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and the EU has accepted to include, some declaration clarifying the allocation of 
obligations between the EU and its Member States, third parties will be in a position to 
call to account the EU, rather than one or more Member States. Being in part 
responsible for the uncertainty surrounding who had the power to bind itself for which 
parts of the mixed agreement, in line with art. 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of the Treaties, the EU would be probably estopped from claiming that under its 
“constitution” Member States rather than itself are bound by a given clause of a mixed 
agreement33. 
In the relation between the EU and its Member States, the ECJ’s jurisdiction over 
provisions of a mixed agreement that fall outside the scope of the Union’s competence 
is more difficult to justify. 
In Hermès the Commission had argued that there is no perfect and necessary parallelism 
between the EC’s power to enter into an international agreement and the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction over the latter’s interpretation. Whereas this assertion seems to be well 
founded, it is also subject to limitations. While recourse to current art. 19 TEU34 may 
justify the ECJ’s jurisdiction to interpret an international agreement, or provisions 
thereof, that is not binding on the EU35, such jurisdiction would be anyway not more 
than incidental in that it depends whether such agreement or clauses are relevant for the 
sake of the Court’s answer to a question of interpretation or validity of a EU law 
provision. 
Such jurisdiction would not be incidental where a national court requests a preliminary 
ruling by the ECJ on a clause of a mixed agreement that is squarely outside the scope of 
the EU competence in a case in which no EU law provision is at issue36. This case 
would rather raise the issue of the legal basis of the Court’s competence. 
Rosas distinguishes between different types of mixed agreements. He differentiates 
between parallel and shared competences of the EC and the Member States. The first 
term refers to cases where the EC may adhere to an international agreement with full 
rights and obligations as any other contracting parties, alongside its Member States. An 
example would be the Agreement establishing the European Bank of reconstruction and 
Development, open to the States and to the EC alike and obliging each contracting party 
                                                
33 Article 46 on Provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties reads as follows:  
“1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in 
violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its 
consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental 
importance.  
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in 
accordance with normal practice and in good faith.” 
34 Art. 19 TEU draws on ex art. 220 TEC and provides that the Court of Justice is entrusted with the task 
to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed. 
35 This was the case in Burgoa and in Poulsen and Diva Navigations. Cfr. ECJ, Case 812/79, Attorney 
General v Juan C. Burgoa, judgement of 14 October 1980, [1980] ECR 02787; ECJ, Case C-286/90, 
Anklagemyndigheden v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp, judgement of 24 November 
1992, [1992] ECR I-06019. 
36 Eeckhout does not rule out this hypothesis, but specifies that the extension of the Court’s jurisdiction to 
such non-EU law related cases could in no way affect the allocation of competences between the EC and 
the Member States. See Eeckhout, P., “The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement […]”, op. cit., 
at 23-24. 
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to provide financial assistance to third States or international funds. Shared competence 
refers to some necessary division of rights and obligations, resulting from an 
international agreement, between the EC and the Member States. Rosas cites as an 
example of this category an agreement containing one chapter o trade in goods and 
another on military defence. One can further distinguish between mixed agreements 
built on coexistent competences, i.e. containing clauses that fall under the exclusive 
competence of Member States, or on concurrent competences, entailing that the 
agreement as a whole cannot be separated into parts covered alternatively on the EC’s 
or on the Member States’ competence. According to Rosas, the ECJ could claim 
jurisdiction to interpret the agreement to the extent that it relates to either parallel or 
concurrent competences37. 
Bourgeois expressed the view that difficulties are likely to arise in relation to 
agreements built on the latter competence category in so far as Member States might 
insist on the identification of those parts of the agreement that are covered by the EC 
competence or, alternatively, as the EC accepts request of third countries to that effect38. 
The absence of identification of the parts of the agreement that are covered respectively 
by the EC and the Member States competence may indicate that the latters’ participation 
is more symbolic than real. In that event no serious objections to the ECJ’s jurisdiction 
seem to stand. Alternatively such omission may indicate that the Council could not 
agree on where to draw the line between Community and national power, which would 
arguably mean that ultimately it is incumbent on the Court to resolve this issue and by 
the same token to define on a case by case basis whether it has jurisdiction. 
The author suggests that quite to the contrary, whereas the different sections of the 
agreement to be ascribed to either the Community or the national competence are 
clearly identified, the ECJ could conceivably justify its jurisdiction to interpret the parts 
of the agreement covered by Member States via the duty of loyal cooperation. It would 
not be unconceivable to infer from such duty that Member States are required to apply 
provisions of mixed agreements consistently in view of the consequences which would 
result from ununiformed national interpretations and that, to favour the attainment of 
such end, the Court is to be granted interpretative jurisdiction over all clauses of the 
agreement39. 
Bourgeois’ reasoning to some extent contradicts its very assumptions, in that the clear 
identification of the agreement sections pertaining to either the Community or the 
Member States entails that a content-related distinction is actually possible and that 
therefore the mixity underpinning the agreement displays a shared - rather than 
concurrent - nature.  
Classifications and terminology aside, Bourgeois’ opinion that the duty of loyalty can 
play a significant role in backing up the Court’s allegations of interpretative jurisdiction 
over non-Community sections of a mixed agreement is a sharable one. However, the 
                                                
37 Rosas, A., “Mixed Union – Mixed Agreements”, in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.), International Law Aspects 
of the European Union, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, London, Boston, 1998, p. 125 ff, at 129-
131. 
38 Bourgeois, J.H.J., “The European Court of Justice and the WTO […]”, op.cit., at 88. 
39 Ibid. 
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main reason seems to rest not so much in the above loyalty requirement but rather in the 
Court’s role as guarding of the rule of law within the EU. 
 
1.1.c The mandate of article 19 EU Treaty and WTO obligations 
 
In International Fruit, the first case in which it was called upon to rule on an alleged 
conflict between an EC measure and the GATT, the ECJ had to examine whether the 
validity of the said measure was to be assessed, pursuant to then art. 177 EEC, also in 
the light of international law. 
Whilst Mayras AG had referred to then art. 164 EEC (now art. 19 TEU) in his opinion, 
the Court failed not to mention the task to ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of the Treaties the law is observed which is entrusted upon it. Rather, it 
declared that the ground for annulment consisting of the infringement of any rule of law 
relating to the application of the Treaty extends to all grounds capable of invalidating a 
EC measure. The Court thus declared to be obliged to examine whether the validity of 
the Community measure at issue was affected by reason of incompatibility with a rule 
of international law, provided that the EC was bound by that rule. 
Kapteyn maintains that there is an implicit assumption in the reasoning of the Court, 
which is that the rule of international law is part of EU law and may thus be interpreted 
and applied by the ECJ as a parameter of legality or validity40. What in the end makes 
possible the review of EU measures in the light of such rule, without this being at odd 
with the provision of art. 263 TFEU. 
Another interpretation is however possible in the light of current art. 19 TEU. When 
interpreting and applying EU law, the Court is called upon to review it by reference to 
“the law” latu sensu. This law may be the EU Treaty itself or general principles 
common to the laws of the Member States, which are considered by the ECJ to 
integrated the European legal system. In other words, the law to be observed may not 
necessarily coincide with the Treaty. Art. 19 TEU does not in fact require that the law to 
which it refers be part of EU law in order to be relied upon by the Court when 
interpreting and applying EU law provisions. 
The above reasoning is corroborated by the fact that in certain judgements the Court 
interpreted EC law by reference to international law and reviewed EC measures against 
international law as a matter of course without examining whether the international 
provisions taken into account were incorporated in EC law41. This interpretation holds 
                                                
40 Kapteyn, P.J.G., “Quelques réflexion sur les effets des accords internationaux liant la Communauté 
dans l’ordre juridique communautaire”, in González, P., Hacia un nuevo orden internacional y europeo. 
Estudios en homenaje al Profesor Don Manuel Díez de Velasco, Technos, Madrid, 1993, 1007-1016, at 
1009. 
41 In the Radio Tubes case, for the purpose of interpreting then art. 234 TEC (now art. 351 TFEU), the 
ECJ referred to principles concerning the application of successive treaties relating to the same subject 
matter, such as codified in art. 30 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties; see ECJ, 
Case 10/61, Commission v Italian Republic, judgement of 27 February 1962, [1962] ECR 00001. In the 
Woodpulp case, the Court relied on the territoriality principle as universally recognized in public 
international law to assess the territorial scope for the application of Community competition rules; see 
ECJ, Joined cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v 
Commission, judgement of 27 September 1988, [1988] ECR 05193. Finally, in Opel Austria, the Court of 
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true all the more in relation to international obligations the Union chose to subscribe to, 
such as those contained in the WTO legal corpus. 
 
1.2 Direct effect of international agreements under EU law 
 
When used in relation to a rule of international law, the notion of direct effect refers to 
the quality of a provision that allows parties to a judicial dispute to invoke it in court for 
the purpose of backing up alleged pleads42. Direct effectiveness is one of the possible 
consequences resulting form the conclusion of an international agreement and should 
therefore not be confused with the most immediate effect of the entry into force of the 
latter, which is binding its contracting parties and having them to be hold internationally 
responsible vis-à-vis other contracting parties to the same agreement. From the point of 
view of signatory states, direct effect of international rules pertains to the domestic 
reflection of the agreement and is therefore a consequence of the binding force of the 
latter. Direct effect, compliance and international liability are nonetheless related 
insofar as the first favours the second, thus allowing to avoid the third. 
However, the acknowledgment of direct affect to international agreements and 
provisions contained therein is not to be taken for granted. It depends on whether the 
agreement contains express provisions as to its direct effectiveness, on contracting 
parties’ domestic rules concerning the status of international rules under national law 
and, possibly, on the very nature of the agreement at issue. 
The notion of direct effect is deemed one of the most distinctive features of the Union 
legal system, whose origin can be traced back to the judicial courage showed by the 
ECJ in the early stages of its jurisdiction as regard the relation between Community and 
Member States law. In fact direct effect significantly contributed to the evolution of EU 
law and to the vertical integration of the EU and national legal orders by allowing 
parties to a national judicial proceeding to invoke Community rules before Member 
States’ jurisdictions. The legality of national legislation can thus be reviewed against 
Community law. Should the former be declared incompatible with the latter, it is set 
aside to the advantage of the application of EC law. However, the notion of direct effect 
is not exclusively applicable to EU domestic law, be it primary or secondary legislation. 
Also provisions of international agreements to which the EU is a contracting party can 
be granted direct effect. 
As previously mentioned, the question whether or not a conventional rule is directly 
effective can be settled by the treaty itself, namely by means of a provision that 
expressly acknowledges direct effect to the norms contained therein or at least to some 
of them. In this case, parties to the agreement are bound to recognise the invocability of 
the norm within their national legal systems. The reverse holds equally true. Should the 
                                                                                                                                          
First Instance considered that the principle of good faith, a rule of customary international law, was 
binding on the Community and may be relied upon by private parties; see ECJ, Case T-115/94, Opel 
Austria GmbH v Council, judgement of 22 January 1997, [1997] ECR II-00039. 
42 Manin, P., “A propos de l’accord instituant l’Organisation mondiale du commerce et de l’accord sur les 
marchés publics: la question de l’invocabilité des accords internationaux conclus par la Communauté 
européenne”, in Revue Trimestrelle de Droit Européen, n. 3, 1997, p. 399 ss, p. 401, where the terms 
«direct effect» and «invocability» are used as synonyms, just as they are in the present work.
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treaty not lay down any explicit attribution of direct effect, contracting parties are not 
obliged to allow for the invocation of conventional norms before national jurisdictions. 
In this case, each State is entitled to autonomously determine the internal status of those 
international provisions. They may explicitly grant or deny direct effect to the 
international norm they are bound to, for instance through an act of secondary 
legislation. 
However, States may not express themselves on the matter. In case of State inaction, a 
judicial appraisal becomes the sole way to sort out the matter of the domestic effects of 
supranational norms. It is thus for national judges to ascertain whether or not a treaty 
provision can be invoked in court. In other words, in the absence of express treaty 
provisions and legislative clarifications, national jurisdictions are entitled to interpret an 
international agreement so as to confer or deny direct effect to provisions contained 
therein. 
It is worth emphasising here the relevance of the issue for the State. In the vast majority 
of national legal orders international norms are reserved a top-ranked placement in the 
hierarchy of legal sources. Where no such obligation is foreseen in an international 
agreement, States that voluntarily acknowledge direct effect to a given provision submit 
national legislation to the possibility of legality review in the lights of those 
international rules. As a consequence, they run the risk to see their own legislation 
repealed following a declaration of illegality on the ground of incompatibility with the 
provisions of the agreement that had been declared directly effective. It has therefore 
been observed that the issue of invocability of conventional rules represents a sort of 
“Pandora box”, a self-executing treaty being an element of potential destabilisation for 
the national legal system43. This accounts for the reluctance shown by States when 
confronted with the choice on whether to grant direct effect to international rules under 
their national law. 
Faced to the dilemma concerning judicial recognition of direct effect of conventional 
rules within the Union legal order, in the vast majority of cases the ECJ had no 
difficulties admitting the invocability of an international agreement. The reasoning of 
the Court mirrors the aforementioned scheme and is based on the assumption that, if in 
principle an international agreement is not designed to directly confer rights and impose 
obligations upon individuals, this can nonetheless occur should the contracting parties –
including the EU- decide to derogate from such general principle. In this case, the 
willingness of the parties must be clearly expressed. 
Should this not be the case, the judicial appraisal of the agreement comes into play. In 
the Kupferberg case, the ECJ expressed precisely this view by ruling that «in 
conformity with the principles of public international law Community institutions which 
have power to negotiate and conclude an agreement with a non-member country are free 
to agree with that country what effect the provisions of the agreement are to have in the 
internal legal order of the contracting parties. Only if that question has not been settled 
by the agreement does it fall for decision by the courts having jurisdiction in the matter, 
                                                
43 Licková, M., La Communauté européenne et le système GATT/OMC. Pespectives croisées, Paris, 2005, 
p. 113-114. 
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and in particular by the Court of Justice within the framework of its jurisdiction under 
the Treaty, in the same manner as any question of interpretation relating to the 
application of the agreement in the Community»44. 
The Court bases its assessment of the invocability of an agreement on the ground of its 
very features. The ECJ did so when ruling in cases such as International Fruit 
Company45, Bresciani46, Kupferberg and further confirmed it Chiquita Italia47. In these 
cases the Court came to different conclusion by applying the same reasoning scheme. 
In International Fruit Company, the Court was asked to deliver a preliminary ruling as 
to the validity of certain Community Regulations in the light of GATT 1947 provisions. 
Prior to that, and in order to justify the deliverance of such a validity ruling, the Court 
had to settle two preliminary issues, closely related to each other and both essential for 
the purpose of ascertaining what effects international agreements produce within the EU 
legal order. 
The first problem is of procedural nature insofar as it concerns the admissibility of the 
referred question of validity. The Court had to consider its own jurisdiction under art. 
177 TEC (now art. 267 TFEU) and ascertain whether international law comes within the 
grounds of invalidity of Community secondary law. In this respect, the Court affirmed 
that its power to decide on the validity of acts of the institutions is not limited as to the 
grounds upon which such validity may be challenged under the above mentioned article. 
Since its jurisdiction extends to all grounds of invalidity which may vitiate such acts, 
the Court is obliged to examine whether their validity may by affected by reason of 
contradiction with a rule of international law. 
Secondly, the Court had to take a stand on the substantial issue of when to admit the 
review of validity of EC measures under international law. In other words, in which 
circumstances can Community measures be reviewed in the light of international rules? 
The Court thus fixed the conditions under which international provisions are to be 
considered a parameter of legality of EC secondary law.  
Two are the conditions for validity review that are pointed out in International Fruit 
Company. First, the review of validity of EC measures in the light of the provisions of 
an international agreement is possible insofar as the Community is bound by those 
provisions in the first place48. Agreements signed and ratified by the Community 
become an integral part of its legal system, as stated by the Court in Haegeman49. 
Consequently, the Community must fulfil international obligations contained therein 
also through the adoption of secondary law which is compatible with the provisions of 
the agreement at issue.   
                                                
44 ECJ, Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v Kupferberg, 26 October 1982, [1982] ECR 3641, para 17, 
confirmed in subsequent ECJ, Case C-280/93, Germany v Council, 5 October 1994, [1994] ECR, para 
110. 
45 ECJ, Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en 
Fruit, 12 December 1972, [1972] ECR 1219, para 21. 
46 ECJ, Case 87/75, Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze, 5 February 1976, [1976] ECR 
129, para 15. 
47 ECJ, Case C- 469/93, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Chiquita Italia SpA, 12 December 
1995, [1995] ECR I-04533, para 24 ff. 
48 ECJ, Case International Fruit NV, cit., para 7. 
49 ECJ, Case 181/73, Haegeman v. Belgian State, [1974] ECR 449. 
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Second, when the invalidity is invoked before a national court, before invalidity can be 
relied before the national court, that provision of international law must be capable of 
conferring rights on citizens of the Community which they can assert in court50. This 
means that the provision of an agreement must be directly effective, in order for 
individuals to invoke it before national courts for the purpose of having the validity of 
an EC measure reviewed in the light of its content. It is appropriate to note that, at an 
early stage of the Court’s case law, this condition must be fulfilled in case of indirect 
proceedings before the Court, namely in case of preliminary rulings whereby the 
national judge asks for a review of validity at the request of one of the parties to a 
domestic proceeding. The possibility of review the EC measures are under these 
circumstances depends on the capability of the provision invoked to demonstrate the 
alleged invalidity to directly create rights upon the party to the proceeding that pleas for 
the invalidity. As it will be discussed, direct effect looses ceases to be a requirement in 
case of direct proceedings before the Court, namely in case of actions for annulment. 
The Court developed a two-tier approach to the analysis of the direct effectiveness of 
international agreements. It first considers the features that globally characterise the 
agreement. Should they demonstrate that contracting parties intended the agreement 
suitable to produce direct effects, the Court then proceeds with the analysis of the 
specific provisions supposedly capable to affect the juridical position of the individual. 
This second step is not only chronologically follows the first but is also logically 
subsequent. As a result, the Court may give up to undertake the second tier of the 
analysis as the fulfilment of this second requirement depends in the first place by the 
fact that the first on is met, as the Court made clear in the International Fruit Company 
case. Following this scheme, the Court concluded in this judgement that the recognition 
of direct effect to GATT 1947 was hampered by the principles of reciprocity and mutual 
advantage upon which the agreement itself was based. The “general features” test 
having turned negative, the Court rejected in toto the direct effectiveness of the whole 
Agreement and did not undertake the analysis of the single GATT provisions invoked in 
the proceeding51. 
The contrary occurred when ruling on the Bresciani case, even though the reasoning 
applied was exactly the same. The Italian judge referred the question as to whether Art. 
2(1) of the Yaoundé Convention conferred on Community citizens an individual right, 
which the national courts must protect, not to pay a charge having equivalent effect on 
importations from non-EU Members parties to the Convention, so that citizens may rely 
on this provision to challenge the Italian legislation imposing such duty52. Contrary to 
                                                
50 Idid., para 8. Someone has found it was worth noting that in more recent cases the ECJ has developed 
its reasoning by first looking at the specific provision. The global analysis only comes thereafter in order 
to see whether it prevents the provision from having direct effect. See Castillo de la Torre, F., “The status 
of Gatt in the EEC law: some new developments”, in Journal of World Trade, 1992, p. 35 ff., p. 37. 
However this inversion in the sequence of the stages does not change the ration behind the reasoning of 
the Court, which is to make the analysis of the general scheme, spirit and wording of the agreement 
globally considered as a substantial condition for the acknowledgement of direct effect to specific norms 
contained therein. 
51 See para. 1.2.a for a more detailed appraisal of the reasoning carried out by the Court in the case at 
issue. 
52 ECJ, Bresciani, cit., para 15-16. 
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International Fruit Company, the Bresciani case was not a preliminary ruling for 
validity but one for interpretation, aiming at clarifying the content of the norms of the 
Convention to be subsequently applied by the national judge to assess the compatibility 
of the Italian law with the EC law. The Court ascertained that the Yaoundé Convention 
is indeed binding upon the Community, being the latter a party to it, and that, after 
Haegeman, it came to be an integral part of Community law and thus a parameter for 
legality of Member States’ legislation. Therefore, in this judgement, the Court included 
also preliminary rulings for interpretation amongst those cases in which the direct effect 
of the norm to be interpreted is a substantial requirement that the norm must fulfil in 
order to be invoked as a ground of incompatibility of the national law with EU law 
before national judges53. 
The ECJ thus addressed the issue of the effects produced by the Convention upon the 
legal sphere of individuals under Community law. It first paid regard to the spirit, the 
general scheme and the wording of the Convention. It excluded that its peculiar feature 
consisting in the unbalance of obligations between the Community and the other parties 
to the agreement could justify the denial of direct effect. As a consequence, the Court 
went on to verify whether the specific provision at stake, separately considered, was 
suitable to produce direct effects. During this stage of the analysis the Court applies the 
same criteria used to ascertain whether provisions of Union law have direct effect in the 
legal systems of the Member States. Therefore, exigencies of clearness and precision 
come to the fore and serve as the litmus paper for the Court to assess whether parties 
can invoke a specific norm. 
In this paragraph an attempt has been tried to give account of the reasoning applied by 
the Court in relation to the invocability of conventional provisions under EU law. The 
next step is to consider how the aforementioned reasoning scheme has progressively 
been applied to GATT 1947 first and to WTO Agreements afterward. On occasions, 
comparisons between the GATT or WTO case law and other rulings concerning the 
invocability of different international treaty rules will serve the purpose of 
understanding the stance of the ECJ and other EU institutions towards the application of 
multilateral trade rules in the Union legal order. 
 
1.3 Effects of multilateral trade rules in the EU legal order 
 
Individuals have most frequently argued that WTO has direct effect and, more recently, 
that it provides criteria for evaluating the legality or validity of EC, now EU, law. They 
have also sought to use WTO law to control EC breaches of WTO law. 
Notwithstanding such attempts, the increasing normative integration of WTO law into 
EU law has not resulted in a greater empowerment of individuals, whose position may 
                                                
53 Whereas at the beginning the Court deemed direct effect to be a substantial requirement of the 
international norm only in the context of indirect cases, namely preliminary rulings be them for validity 
or interpretation, it will later discussed that, starting with Germany v. Council, the ECJ subsequently 
came to assume the same attitude also in the context of direct cases, such as actions for annulment. This 
stance prompted the critics of many scholars, who contested the betrayal of the very notion of direct , 
both in its  scope and purpose, by the Court. 
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have been weakened vis-à-vis the one of the European institutions. Since its early case-
law, the ECJ has steadfastly maintained that GATT 1947 first and WTO Agreements 
afterwards do not have direct effect in EU law. No legal action has ever been successful 
on this ground. Though the case law remains controversial, European courts have 
consistently decided that the issue of direct effect was not relevant to the case before it 
or have expressly rejected the direct effect of the above agreements.  
The ECJ has however tried to elaborate a more convincing and coherent justification of 
its long-standing position. As case-law stands, the position of individuals towards WTO 
law in the EU legal system thus consists a rule of denial of direct effect, which however 
comes alongside two exceptions and a further duty of consistent interpretation. 
 
1.3.a The “rule”: the ECJ case-law denying direct effect to GATT 1947 
 
In 1972 the ECJ was for first time enquired as on the issue of invocability of the GATT 
1947. By ruling in the aforementioned case International Fruit Company, the Court 
started a judicial course whereby GATT was systematically denied direct effect under 
Community law. Ever since, principles expressed in the relevant case law followed the 
same course, even after the creation of the WTO and the subsequent reform of the 
general scheme of multilateral trade commitments. 
In International Fruit Company the ECJ was demanded to deliver a preliminary ruling 
on the domestic effect of rules of international law within the European legal system 
and, incidentally, on the issue of direct effect of GATT rules. The first question posed 
by the Dutch judge concerned the interpretation of the art. 177 EEC. The judge asked 
whether that article was to be read in such a way as to allow for the review of 
Community measures also in the light of international law provisions. The Court stated 
that its jurisdiction extends under art. 177 EEC to all grounds capable of invalidating 
Community legislation, including provisions contained in international agreements. It 
thus declared itself obliged to examine the validity of Community measures in the light 
of rules on international law. It thus clarified that international norms represent a further 
parameter of legality for Community measures, alongside primary law and general 
principles of law54. 
That being the case, the Court went on to answer the second preliminary question, 
whereby the national judge enquired as on to the compatibility of three Commission 
regulations, laying down measures of trade protection in the form of restrictions to 
apple importation from third countries, with art. XI GATT. For the purpose of 
reviewing the legality of a Community act in the light of an international norm, the 
Court mentioned two conditions which must be fulfilled. First, The Community must be 
bound by the conventional provision under which the review of the measure is to be 
carried out. Second, before invalidity can be relied on before a national court, the 
conventional provision must be capable of conferring rights upon individuals, which 
                                                
54 ECJ, Case International Fruit Company, cited, para 6. 
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they may invoke before courts. In other word, the international norm must have direct 
effect55. 
In the case at issue, the Court considered that the Community was bound by GATT 
provisions. Although from the formal point of view the EC was never a contracting 
party to the Agreement, art. 111 and 113 EEC operated a transfer of powers from the 
Member States towards the Community in the field of tariff and trade policy. As a 
consequence, the Community took up the role played by Member States in relation to 
the GATT regime, even thought within the boundaries of powers conferred upon it by 
the TEC. It then started to act as a proper GATT party on the basis of then art. 114 EEC 
-subsequently repealed- under which commercial agreements had to be concluded on 
behalf of the Community56. GATT provisions thus bind the Community insofar as such 
a willingness was made clear by the Member States in the relevant provision of the EEC 
Treaty and was mirrored in the subsequent behaviour of the Community in trade related 
matters. 
The second condition makes the viability of legality review in the light on international 
law subject to the circumstance that relevant conventional provisions enjoy direct effect. 
The Court assessed therefore «whether the provisions of the […] agreement confer 
rights on citizens of the community on which they can rely before the courts in 
contesting the validity of a Community measure»57. To this end, the Court maintains, 
attention must be paid to the purpose, spirit, general schemes and terms of the 
agreement58. The Court finally considered that GATT provisions did not meet the 
requirement of direct effect. It then concluded that the validity of the Commission 
regulations on restrictions to apple importations was not affected by the General 
Agreement. 
It is apparent from the wording of the ruling that the main argument in favour of the 
denial of direct effect resided in the weak nature of the General Agreement. The ECJ 
qualifies the latter as an «agreement […] based on the principle of negotiations 
undertaken on the basis of "reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements", […] 
characterized by the great flexibility of its provisions»59. Such flexibility results from 
three elements featuring the Agreement and explicitly mentioned in the ruling: the 
possibility of derogation, the measures to be taken when confronted with exceptional 
difficulties and the settlement of conflicts between the contracting parties. These 
characteristics made the GATT a far too supple agreement, whose provision lacked both 
clearness and precision and did leave a margin of discretion to the authorities by whom 
they were to be applied. Following these considerations, GATT provisions were 
therefore deemed unreliable for the purpose of challenging –and assessing- the validity 
of Community legislation. 
                                                
55 Ibid., para 7-8. 
56 Ibid., para 14-18. 
57 Ibid., para 19. 
58 Ibid., para 20. 
59 Ibid., para 21. 
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This reasoning has been subsequently confirmed in the Schluter60, SPI and SAMI61 and 
SIOT62 cases 
 
1.3.b The confirmation of the ECJ’s GATT 1947 case-law after the entry into force of 
the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation 
 
The jurisprudence constante of the Court remains such after the entry into force of the 
WTO agreement, which occurred on the 1st of January 1995. Right from the start, the 
ECJ dismissed as irrelevant the argument that WTO provisions had direct effect in two 
subsequent cases. The 1995 T. Port63 case concerned post-clearance recovery of 
customs duties payable on bananas imported from Ecuador. The applicant relied on the 
Framework Agreement on Bananas. However, Ecuador was not a contracting party to 
GATT 1947 and did not become a member of the WTO, and therefore a party to GATT 
1994, until 1996. Consequently, without taking into account possible issues of direct 
effect, the ECJ simply concluded that then art. 235 TEC did not apply to cases 
involving imports of bananas from a third country that was not a party to an 
international agreement concluded by the Member States before the entry into force of 
the Treaty. Similarly, in Hermès64 the Court recognised that the direct effect of art. 50 
TRIPS had been argued. However, it stated that it was not required to give a ruling on 
that question, but only to answer the question of interpretation submitted to it by the 
Dutch court so as to enable the latter to interpret Netherlands procedural rules in the 
light of that article. 
Forcefully but indirectly, the ECJ affirmed this position, against the Opinion of its 
Advocate General, in the leading case Portugal v Council65. This was an action for 
annulment of a Council decision concerning the conclusion of Memoranda of 
understanding between the EC and respectively Pakistan and India on market access for 
textile products. Portugal argued that the Council Decision was in breach of WTO law, 
especially of GATT 1994, of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and the one on 
Import Licensing Procedures. Its argument was not based on the claim that the WTO 
Agreements had direct effect. In fact, it sought to distinguish the issue of direct effect 
from its main point, namely that a Member State should be permitted to assert WTO 
law as a criterion for evaluating the validity of EC law. Rejecting this argument, the 
Court did not state expressly that WTO law did not have direct effect in EC law. 
However this conclusion emerged very clearly, albeit implicitly, from the way in which 
the ECJ uses the same or similar language as in its previous judgements concerning 
direct effect, as well as from the grounds on which it rejects WTO law as a criterion for 
validity. 
                                                
60 ECJ, Case 9/73, Carl Schlüter v Haupzollamt Lörrach, 24 October 1973, [1973] ECR 1135, para 27-31. 
61 ECJ, Joint Cases 267 to 269/81, SPI and SAMI, 16 March 1983, [1983] ECR 801, para 14 and 23. 
62 ECJ, Case 266/81, SIOT v Ministero delle Finanze, 16 March 1983, [1933] ECR 731, para 28. 
63 ECJ, Joined cases C-364/95 and C-365/95, T. Port GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, 
judgement of 10 March 1998, [1998] ECR I-01023. 
64 ECJ, Case C-53/96, Hermès, cited. 
65 ECJ, Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v Council of the European Union, judgement of 23 
November 1999, [1999] ECR I-08395. 
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The European courts have expressly rejected the direct effect of TRIPS. In Dior66, the 
ECJ stated that TRIPS does not have direct effect in Community law. Similarly, in 
Groeneveld67, the Court followed its longstanding case law and Jacobs AG by holding 
that the procedural requirements of art. 50 TRIPS, and in particular art. 50(6), are not 
such as to create rights upon which individuals may rely directly before the Community 
and the national courts. 
Case T-52/99 T.Port68 concerned the potential direct effect of GATT, GATS and the 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. One of the many banana cases and also 
one of the several brought by T. Port, it was an action for damages allegedly resulting 
from the allocation of annual import quantities. The CFI rejected the argument that 
WTO rules were directly effective. It reached the same result in Bocchi69 and Cordis70, 
both decided on the same day. OGT71 was another banana case decided less than two 
months later. A reference for a preliminary ruling, it concerned the interpretation of art. 
I and XIII GATT regarding the levy of customs duty on importation of bananas from 
Ecuador. A WTO panel set up at the request of Ecuador had already found that the new 
system of trade with third countries under Regulation 1637/98 continued to infringe the 
above GATT provisions72. By making reference to the existing case-law73, the Court 
held that the latter were not directly effective. 
 
1.3.c WTO law and the legality of EU law 
 
Related to the issue of direct effect of WTO law is the one concerning its possible 
function as parameter of legality for EU secondary legislation. Litigants have 
increasingly argued that WTO law provides criteria for the assessment of the legality of 
EU law. However, exception being made for specific circumstances which will be dealt 
with in the following paragraph, the European courts have consistently rejected this 
claim by stating the general principle whereby WTO provisions are not apt to provide 
criteria for assessing the lawfulness of EU legislation. 
                                                
66 ECJ, Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98, Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and 
Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV, judgement 
of 20 December 2000, [2000] ECR I-11307. 
67 ECJ, Case C-89/99, Schieving-Nijstad vof and Others v Robert Groeneveld, judgement of 13 
September 2001, [2001] ECR I-05851. 
68 CFI, Case T-52/99, T. Port GmbH & Co. KG v Commission of the European Communities, judgement 
of 20 March 2001, [2001] ECR II-00981. 
69 CFI, Case T-30/99, Bocchi Food Trade International GmbH v Commission of the European 
Communities, Judgement of 20 March 2001, [2001] ECR II-00943. 
70 CFI, Case T-18/99, Cordis Obst und Gemüse Großhandel GmbH v Commission of the European 
Communities, judgement of 20 March 2001, [2001] ECR II-00913. 
71 ECJ, Case C-307/99, OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen, Order 
of 2 May 2001, [2001] ECR I-03159. 
72 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (Recourse to 
Article 21.5 by Ecuador), Report of the Panel, WT/DS27/RW/ECU, circulated on 6 May 1999, DSR 
1999: II at 803. 
73 Ibid., para 23. 
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The European courts have done so only sparingly being as the they did not address the 
issue unless absolutely necessary, preferring to rely exclusively on the general denial of 
direct effect whenever possible. 
As mentioned, a litigant cannot normally challenge the legality of Union legislation on 
the ground that it is contrary to WTO law. This was first stated also in relation of action 
for annulment brought by Member States in Germany v Council, with regard to GATT 
1947 provisions, and further confirmed in Portugal v Council and in Netherlands v 
Council, with reference to WTO law. 
Usually referred to as the - first - bananas case, the action brought by Germany sought 
the annulment of Title IV and of art. 12(2) of EEC Council Regulation 404/93 of 13 
February 1993 on the common organisation of the market in bananas. The German 
government challenged the legality of the said Regulation on the ground that it allegedly 
infringed certain basic provisions of the GATT 1947. German arguments relied on the 
assumption, which the government submitted to the Court, that compliance with GATT 
rules was a condition of lawfulness of EEC legislation irrespectively of any question as 
to the direct effect of the agreement at issue74. 
The reasoning was based on the understanding, on the one hand, of the German 
government’s position as privileged applicant in an action for annulment and, on the 
other, of the principle of direct effect as a judicial devise aimed at directly connecting 
EU law provisions and legal and natural persons, thereby overcoming the limitation to 
these subjects’ capability to rely on such provisions before national and European 
courts. According to such understanding direct effect should not come to the fore for the 
purpose of admitting a challenge of legality bought by a Member State. 
Nonetheless, in its judgement, the Court based its argument on the confirmation of the 
previous case-law on the denial of direct effect of GATT provision. It took the view 
that, in order to challenge EEC measures, GATT provisions should have direct effect. It 
is interesting to see how the ECJ did not explicitly mention the issue of direct effect of a 
given provision as a requirement for legality review right from the start. The Court 
jumped to direct effect suddenly and, given the above understanding of such principle, 
rather unexpectedly. The appropriateness of the Court’s choice to divert the matter to 
one of direct effect was at best questionable and, actually, very debated by scholars. 
Once the issue of direct effect introduced, the Court simply restated its traditional 
analysis of the scheme and general terms of the GATT. It thus inevitably came to the 
conclusion that features such as the principle of negotiation and the imbedded flexibility 
of the agreement, from which the Court had already concluded that an individual within 
the Community could not invoke provisions contained therein to challenge the validity 
of a Community act, would also preclude the Court from taking GATT provisions into 
consideration in order to decide on an action for annulment. The special features 
mentioned above precisely show that GATT rules lack an unconditional character and 
that an obligation to recognise them as rule of international law which are directly 
applicable could not result from the spirit, general scheme and terms of the agreement 
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as it stood. In the absence of such an obligation following from GATT itself, the Court 
concluded that it is only if the Community intended to implement a particular obligation 
entered into within the framework of GATT, or if the Community act expressly refers to 
specific provisions of GATT, that it can review the lawfulness of the Community act in 
question from the point of view of the GATT rules, as stated in cases Fediol and 
Nakajima75. Accordingly, the Court refused Germany the possibility to invoke the 
provisions of GATT to challenge the lawfulness of certain provisions of the Council 
Regulation on the common market in bananas76. 
In the second of the above actions for annulment, the ECJ justified the rejection of 
Portugal’s claim inter alia on the basis that, here again, having regard to their nature 
and structure, the WTO Agreements are not in principle amongst the rules in the light of 
which the Court is to review the legality of measures adopted by the Community 
institutions77. 
Building on the principles expressed in the Kupferberg case-law, the Court pointed at 
three main elements which made WTO provisions unsuitable to be taken unto account 
as parameter of legality: first, the WTO system is mainly based on negotiation; second, 
allowing the legality review of EC secondary legislation in the light of WTO law would 
amount to a deprivation of the political institutions of their scope for manoeuvre; third, 
the lack of reciprocity on the part of the Community’s trading partners with regard to 
the domestics effects of WTO law is such as to result in a disuniform application of 
WTO rules. 
It is evident that the Court reaffirmed, although in a more complex and articulated 
fashion, its earlier position with regard to GATT 1947, specifically concerning the two 
instances in which GATT/WTO law could be used as a criterion for legality review. 
Reiterating the position taken in the 1994 Germany v Council judgement, the ECJ stated 
that “it is only where the Community intended to implement a particular obligation 
assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the Community measure refers expressly 
to the precise provisions of the WTO agreements, that it is for the Court to review the 
legality of the Community measures in question in the light of the WTO rules”. 
However, the lack of clear reasoning in the judgement and the sharp difference between 
the latter and the opinion of Saggio AG78 suggest the existence of differences of opinion 
within the Court itself. Besides criticisms and divergent view, and however ill-founded 
in terms of legal logic, the basic reasons of the Court’s decisions are straightforward. 
From the legal point of view, the European judiciary stressed the idea of reciprocity and 
the EC constitutional principle of institutional balance. From the political standpoint, 
the issue was ensuring the defence of the Community position in international trade 
negotiations. 
                                                
75 For an analysis of the exceptions to the rule of denial of direct effect see following paragraph 1.3.d. 
76 Ibid., para. 105-112. 
77 ECJ, Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v Council of the European Union, judgement of 23 
November 1999, [1999] ECR I-08395, para 47. 
78 Ibid., opinion of Advocate General Saggio, delivered on 25 February 1999, para. 14-35. 
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As a matter of fact, the ECJ took a judicial realpolitik approach to the relationship 
between EC and WTO law79. More directly than ever before, it confronted the 
international political context, in which WTO law potentially has a wide variety of 
effects vis-à-vis the legal system of the members of the Organisation. From this 
perspective, the issue of the criterion of legality review simultaneously involves the 
normative relation between EC - now EU - law and WTO law, the institutional balance 
within the EC – now EU – and the relation between the EU and its major trading 
partners. As mentioned, the judgement can easily be criticised on logical positivist 
foundations, in particular because it failed to distinguish clearly between direct effect 
and invocability80, and between an action brought by an individual and one brought by a 
Member State81. Nonetheless, it represents a striking effort on the part of the European 
courts to balance the requirement of deciding individual cases with the necessity of 
taking account of the wider context in which they operate. Whether such effort was for 
the European judiciary to make, whether it rested in its very provinces or whether by 
doing so the Court has jeopardised the institutional balance it intended to protect is 
debateable. 
Still a plea for illegality was the 1997 action brought by the Dutch government against 
EC Council Regulation 1036/97 of 2 June of the same year, introducing safeguard 
measures in respect of imports of rice originating from Overseas Countries and 
Territories (OCT)82. The Netherlands demanded the annulment of the said measure on 
the ground of inter alia the breach of certain provisions contained both in the WTO 
Agreement of Safeguards and in the EC Treaty. 
The Dutch government claimed that in adopting the contested Regulation a few months 
after the expiry of the previous one (Regulation 304/97) imposing safeguard measures 
on rice imports, the Council failed to comply with both art. 7(5) of the WTO Agrrement 
on Safeguards, which imposes a two year break between two subsequent sets of 
safeguard measures, and consequently with art. 228(7) of the EC Treaty concerning the 
binding nature of concluded agreements upon both the European institutions and the 
Member States. The applicant tried to overcome the obstacle of the lack of direct effect 
as put forward by the Court in Portugal v Council, by maintaining that, since the 
obligation laid down in art. 7(5) Safeguard Agreement was clear, precise and 
unconditional, it was for the Court to review compliance with it on the part of the 
challenged Regulation. 
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The Court upheld the Commission and the Council’s rebuff and ruled again along the 
lines of the 1999 judgement. Provided that neither the Fediol nor the Nakajima case law 
could be applied in order to have the Regulation review in the light of the Safeguards 
Agreement83, the Court concluded that the Netherlands could not rely on the latter’s 
provisions to demand a declaration of illegality of Regulation 1036/97 and rejected the 
Dutch plea accordingly. 
It has been noted that the European courts did their best to avoid the issue of legality 
and addressed it only sparingly and when absolutely necessary84. This stems partly from 
the practice of economy in judicial decision-making. It also forms part of a sensible 
judicial strategy, which signals to potential litigants that arguments about legality must 
be solidly based and essential to the case if they are to be taken seriously. In this way, 
the Courts can concentrate in cases where the point is of fundamental importance, both 
in articulating the basic principle and in dealing with its exceptions. 
In preliminary rulings, on occasions it was the national judge who decided not to refer 
the question of legality to the Court. In DADI, for instance, the plaintiff argued that 
certain provisions of an EC directive laying down health rules for milk products were 
contrary to the SPS Agreement85. The national court however did not refer the issue to 
the ECJ, which then concluded that it was not necessary to examine the validity of the 
EC legislation in the light of the SPS. 
Nor do the ECJ address the issue of legality if no breach of WTO law has previously 
been established. In CEFS86, the applicant sought interim measures in an action for 
annulment and suspension of a Council Regulation fixing intervention prices and 
compensation for storage costs in the sugar sector. The CFI found that there was no 
evidence of a breach of the Community’s WTO obligations and that the sugar export 
ceiling had not been reached. A similar result was reached in Chemnitz87. 
A third situation in which the European courts do not address the issue of legality 
concerns the effects of time. Joined cases C-364 and 365/95, T. Port88, were action for 
post-clearance recovery of customs duties payable on bananas imported from Ecuador 
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in 1995, before Ecuador, which was not a party to GATT 1947, joined the WTO. The 
applicants pleaded the issue of legality but the ECJ decided the case only on the bases 
on the EC principle of non-discrimination. Similarly, in Acme89, an action for 
annulment of definitive anti-dumping duties on microwaves ovens from China, the CFI 
maintained that the legality of the contested Regulation could not be challenged inter 
alia in the light of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, but it was to discuss primarily 
in the light of the basic Regulation, of general principles and all relevant rules in force 
at the time when the facts of the case occurred. Finally, in Atlanta the ECJ excluded a 
plea of invalidity on the ground that 
“to admit the plea based on the WTO decision would be tantamount to allowing the 
appellant to challenge for the first time at the stage of the reply the dismissal by the Court 
of First Instance of a plea which it had raised before that court, whereas nothing 
prevented it from submitting such a plea at the time of its application to the Court of 
Justice ” 90 . 
 
1.3.d The exceptions to the denial of direct effect 
 
Rulings issued in cases FEDIOL91 and Nakajima92 slightly softened the case law 
presented so far, inasmuch as the Court therein allowed for the legality check of EC 
secondary legislation in the light of the GATT. 
In FEDIOL, the plaintiff contested the legality of a Commission decision whereby the 
latter rejected a request to open an inquiry procedure aimed at verifying the lawfulness 
of commercial practices put in place by Argentina. In the view of the plaintiff, such 
decision was incompatible with Council regulation n. 2641/84 on the strengthening of 
the common commercial policy. To back up its allegations, the FEDIOL insisted on a 
particular aspect, namely on the fact that Argentinean commercial practices were to be 
deemed contrary to several GATT provisions. The Commission in turn rebuff such 
thesis by sustaining that the counterpart’s argument deriving from the alleged violation 
of the GATT was not receivable on the ground that the said agreement did not confer 
rights directly upon individuals, as the Court had previously stated in the International 
Fruit Company case law. Betraying expectations, the ECJ did not follow the reasoning 
of the Commission. On the contrary, it first observed that regulation n. 2641/84 in its 
function of legal basis of the challenged decision contained itself an explicit reference to 
relevant GATT provisions. By doing so, the regulation did confer upon « the economic 
agents concerned [the right] to rely on the GATT provisions in the complaint which 
they lodge with the Commission in order to establish the illicit nature of the commercial 
practices which they consider to have harmed them, [therefore] those same economic 
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agents are entitled to request the Court to exercise its powers of review over the legality 
of the Commission' s decision applying those provisions»93. In other words, the review 
of the challenged decision in the light of the GATT was possible by virtue of the 
reference to the GATT contained in the regulation, whereby the Council had somehow 
transposed a GATT provision in the Community legal order. 
In Nakajima, the Court was confronted with the issue of declaring inapplicable several 
provisions of the Council anti-dumping and anti-subsidies regulation on the ground that 
the latter was allegedly incompatible with some provisions contained in the GATT anti-
dumping code. The Council expressed the view that the anti-dumping code was not apt 
to entitle individuals with rights to be called upon in court. Once again, the ECJ did not 
follow the institution. It ruled that, since the Community regulation was designed to 
implement provisions of the GATT which amounted to international obligations for the 
Community, the Court was obliged to « assurer le respect des dispositions de l’Accord 
general et de ses mesures d’exécution » as well as to verify whether the Council had 
possibly exceeded the legal framework set forth therein94. 
The FEDIOL and Nakajima rulings nourished the belief that the Court had somehow 
opened the door to a more wide interpretation of the theory on invocability such as 
stated in the International Fruit Company case law. In truth, what the Court had 
allowed for was in fact the review of Community acts in the light of GATT provisions 
in just two cases: either when the act contains an unambiguous reference to a GATT 
provision, or when it is designed to implement one within the Community legal order. 
In fact, the above belief turned wrong when the Court ruled in the subsequent Germany 
v. Council case95. On that occasion, Germany asked for the annulment of a part of the 
Council regulation on the organization of the bananas common market on the ground of, 
inter alia, a violation of the GATT. Basing its reasoning on the model solution offered 
by the Court in Nakajima, Germany considered the issue of direct effect of the GATT as 
already worked out and directly asked for a legality test of the Community act in the 
light of the General Agreement. The Council opposed Germany’s allegations by 
affirming that the use of GATT provisions as a parameter of legality to test a 
Community act was not to be allowed but under the very narrow circumstances 
described above. In this case, the Court uphold the Council’s argument by ruling that 
«[i]n the absence of [an obligation to acknowledge direct effect] following from GATT 
itself, it is only if the Community intended to implement a particular obligation entered 
into within the framework of GATT, or if the Community act expressly refers to 
specific provisions of GATT, that the Court can review the lawfulness of the 
Community act in question from the point of view of the GATT rules» 96. 
In the light of these judicial developments, it would have been easy to conclude that, in 
order to avoid triggering the mechanism of legality review, European institutions just 
had to refrain from mentioning any reference to the GATT or - from 1995 on - to WTO 
Agreements while drafting Community legislation. However, the issue turned to be 
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more complicated than it appeared. Under article 253 CE, regulations, directives and 
decisions must contain a motivation justifying their adoption. The Council recently 
adopted a regulation imposing a restrictive legal regime to be applied to aircrafts 
deemed noisy. Following the strategy mentioned above, in drafting the act the Council 
omitted any reference to the two relevant international agreements, namely the Chicago 
Convention on international civil aviation and the WTO agreement on technical 
obstacles to trade. Asked for a preliminary ruling by a British jurisdiction, the Court 
found itself in the position to ascertain whether the regulation at stake was to be 
declared void under then article 253 EC for lack of motivation97. The Court found itself 
in an awkward position since it had to shield Community legislation from two 
interconnected risks: on the one hand, in case of express reference, the risk of 
annulment of the Community act due to incompatibility with trade rules on the ground 
of what decided in the FEDIOL case; on the other, in case of omission of such 
reference, the risk of a declaration of invalidity due the lack of motivation. The Court 
eventually found a way-out, thus allowing for the preservation of its earlier case-law, by 
ruling that «It is not necessary for details of all relevant factual and legal aspects to be 
given. The question whether the statement of the grounds for an act meets the 
requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but 
also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. If the 
contested measure clearly discloses the essential objective pursued by the institution, it 
would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons for the various technical 
choices made. The statement of reasons in a regulation of general application cannot be 
required to specify the various facts, frequently very numerous and complex, on the 
basis of which the regulation was adopted, nor a fortiori to provide a more or less 
complete technical evaluation of those facts. That is particularly the case where the 
relevant factual and technical elements are well known to the circles concerned»98. 
To sum up, the reasoning developed by the Court in its case law denying direct effect to 
multilateral trade rules entails the following conclusion as to the effect of such rules in 
the EU legal order. The circumstance whereby a treaty is acknowledged direct effect 
does not represent a conditio sine qua non for the Court to be able to interpret such an 
agreement. Nonetheless, the above condition must be fulfilled in order for the Court to 
review the legality of Community acts in the light of the provisions contained in the 
agreement. This requirement must be met in every case, be the plaintiff either an 
individual or a Member State or a European institution. Generally speaking, in the 
absence of direct effect of the whole agreement or of the specific relevant provision no 
legality check is possible, unless the Community act explicitly refers to the General 
Agreement or is designed to implement it. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
97 ECJ, Case C-27/00, Omega Air and others, 12 March 2002, [2002] ECR I-2569. 
98 Ibidem, point 1 of the summary. 
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1.3.e Towards further elaboration? 
 
More recently the European courts have begun to articulate a more coherent rationale 
for their position that, as a matter of principle, the WTO Agreements do not have direct 
effect in EC law. Portugal v Council was a deeply unsatisfactory judgement, because of 
the inconsistency of argument, gaps in reasoning and the ECJ’s failure to come to grips 
with a strong opinion by Saggio AG. Nevertheless, compared to the previous cases, it 
did articulate a view of the relationship between WTO law and EC law which was less 
legalistic, more politically cognisant and therefore more realistic vis-à-vis both the 
current international setting and the objectives whose pursuance it imposes. It began to 
point the way towards a much more coherent conception of the relation between the two 
sites, notably with regard to who should make the basic decisions about the impact of 
WTO law in the EC legal order and how such decisions should be made. 
Recent cases have been more an elaboration than a proper reorientation. Making use of 
thir special judicial role in the EC judicial system, the advocates general have taken the 
lead, starting precisely from Saggio AG opinion in Portugal v. Council99. The AG 
provided a stimulating analysis of direct effect and criterion of legality, though the ECJ 
did not fall his opinion on either points. In Netherlands v European Parliament and 
Council100, AG Jacobs argued that, as a matter of policy, it was desirable for the Court 
to review the legality of Community secondary legislation in the light of WTO law. 
Finally, in Omega Air101, AG Alber placed the earlier case law about the direct effect of 
GATT and WTO law in a new context, what could represent the way out from the 
current empasse. 
Omega Air was a reference for a preliminary ruling on an EC regulation concerning 
noise emissions from airplanes. Omega claimed that the Regulation was invalid, inter 
alia because, contrary to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (ATBT), it 
replaced existing international standards by a new criterion. It argued that the ECJ, even 
excluding direct effect in principle, should review specific provisions of WTO law to 
see if they met the EC law tests for direct effect. 
This argument seems to be based on a distinction between the general principle that 
WTO law does not usually have direct effect and the possibility that specific WTO law 
provisions may exceptionally be acknowledged direct effect on a case-by-case basis. 
Rejecting this argument the AG stated that the decisive point is that legal disputes on 
the content of WTO law are based on negotiations between the Governments. In his 
view, the Community’s position in those negotiations would be seriously affected if 
Community law recognised a unilateral direct effect of obligations resulting from WTO 
law102. Thus he drew on two strands in the analysis of GATT/WTO law in previous ECJ 
case law: first, the importance of negotiation and reciprocity in GATT/WTO dispute 
                                                
99 ECJ, Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v Council of the European Union, cited, opinion of AG 
Saggio. 
100 ECJ, Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union, judgement of 9 October 2001, [2001] ECR I-07079, and opinion of AG Jacobs. 
101 ECJ, Case C-27/00, Omega Air and others, judgement of 12 March 2002, [2002] ECR I-2569, and 
opinion of AG Alber. 
102 Ibid., opinion of AG Alber, para. 93-95. 
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settlement, and second, ideas about how to maintain the balance among EC institutions 
so as to preserve and possibly strengthen the role of the EU on the international scene, 
especially concerning foreign trade. 
The AG went further by making two most original contributions to the debate on direct 
effect. First, he broadened the terms of the debate beyond the EC sphere by expressly 
taking account of the standpoint of the WTO. He argued that direct reliance on rules of 
WTO law as against measures taken by WTO members appears inappropriate from the 
point of view of WTO law as well. Regardless of their wording, all provisions of WTO 
law are subject to a general reservation which accords the States concerned various 
possibilities of reacting to breach. The substantive point is not new: it merely repeats the 
long-standing ECJ view about the flexibility of the GATT/WTO system. What is 
important is that, in analysing the relation between the EU and the WTO, the Advocate 
General purports to express the perspective of the other side. Whether this conception of 
the WTO perspective is accurate, whether there is in fact any single WTO perspective, 
or whether the perspective of the two sides are commensurate, is beside the point here. 
The views of highly respected scholars in the field of international trade, as seen below, 
replicate the same controversy. 
Second, Alber AG suggested that the basic decision about the possible direct effect of 
WTO law in the legal system of WTO members should be taken, not by each member 
unilaterally, but instead on a multilateral basis. He argued that: 
“ It is therefore not for the Court but for the WTO, or the members of the WTO, to ensure 
that WTO law is observed in the legal systems concerned. Direct effect of WTO rules is 
clearly not part of their legislative content. Such content may not be ascribed, at 
Community level, to WTO law in its original form but at most in the form of 
transposition measures. In that context WTO law may be (indirectly) significant.”103 
The AG admitted that the relevant provisions of the ATBT were perhaps sufficiently 
precise and unconditional in their wording to be amenable to direct application. 
However, this did not mean that they were directly effective, or that they provide 
criteria for evaluating the legality of Community law. On the contrary, the AG argued 
that they are subject to the general condition of WTO law that the members of the 
Organisation are to comply with the obligations thereof not by direct effect of WTO 
provisions in their legal systems but exclusively by specific transposition of those 
obligations104.  
This represents an important clarification of the view of the European courts in four 
different respects105. First, it explicitly recognises the international political and 
economic context, in which the Unites States in particular do not recognise WTO law as 
having direct effect. EC law operates in this context, which informs the judgements of 
the European courts. While it is true that EC law also helps to shape the international 
setting, and potentially change it, an ECJ judgement recognising the direct effect of 
                                                
103 Ibid., para 95. 
104 Ibid., para 96. 
105 Snyder, F., “The Gatekeepers: The European Courts and WTO Law”, in Common Market Law Review, 
vol. 40, 2003, p. 313 ff, at 331. 
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WTO law in EC law might have unpredictable and unintended consequences, both 
within the EU and outside it. 
Second, it recognises that the consequences for EC’s institutional balance and thus 
balance of powers106 constitute one of the criteria for deciding whether WTO law has 
direct effect in EU law. Akin to a political question doctrine107, it is based on the 
premise that the executive and the legislature, not the judiciary, must play the dominant 
roles on the field of international trade. Direct effect empowers courts, the 
administration and private actors. The basic strategy of the EU, as of its main trading 
partners, is one of “combining the utmost effect of WTO law abroad with a view to 
foster market access rights while leaving traditional constitutional allocations of power 
at home as unimpaired as possible”108. This concern is explicit in the AG’s discussion 
of the importance of maintaining the EC’s position in international negotiations. It is 
implicit in his concern as to who should decide whether WTO law has direct effect in 
EU law, as distinct from the explicit discussion of this point by the Court in Portugal v 
Council. Both these issues embody important constitutional arrangements. Seen from 
this standpoint, AG Alber’s opinion is a plea for judicial restraint. 
Third, the opinion at issue places the issue of institutional choice on another level by 
focusing not merely on EC institutions inter se but also on relations between sites. It 
identified the key issue of whether a single site or legal system, acting unilaterally, or 
the totality of WTO members acting on a multilateral basis, should decide whether 
WTO law has direct effect. The AG’s opinion represent a plea for multilateralism, 
instead of unilateralism or even bilateralism, as for example if the EU and the United 
States, or the EU and China, were to decide on a bilateral basis that they would 
recognise WTO law as directly effective in their respective legal orders. 
Fourth, the opinion contributes to changing the terms of the debate about what impact 
WTO law should have in EU law and how. More specifically, by referring to 
transposition measures, it aims at posing the basic issue in terms of the Fediol clear 
reference exception, the Nakajima transposition or implementation exception and the 
indirect effect made possible via consistent interpretation, instead of in terms of direct 
effect. In other words, various types of indirect effect might prove to be more 
significant than direct effect itself. 
Whereas the analysis put forward in the AG Alber’s opinion is a contribution to a 
clearer articulation of European judicial policy, the Court overlooked the points made 
therein and simply restated the views expressed in Portugal v Council. 
 
                                                
106 Cf. Cheyne, I., “International agreements and the European Community legal system”, in European 
Law Review, vol. 19, 1994, p. 581-598; Cottier Cottier, T., “International Trade Law: The Impact of 
Justiciability and Separation of Powers in EC Law”, in European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 5, n. 2, 
2009, p. 307-326.  
107 Cf. Mengozzi, P., “I diritti e gli interessi delle imprese, il diritto dell’Organizzazione Mondiale del 
Commercio e le prerogative delle Istituzioni dell’Unione europea: verso una dottrina comunitaria delle 
political questions?”, in Contratto e impresa/Europa, 2006, p. 150 ff. 
108 Cottier, T., Schefer, K., “The relationship between World Trade Organisation law, national and 
regional law”, in Journal of International Economic Law, n. 1, 1998, p. 83-122, at 111. 
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Section II – Legal status and effect of decisions adopted by international 
organisations and bodies in the EU legal order 
 
Some international agreements concluded by the EU establish bodies endowed with the 
power to adopt legally binding decisions. This circumstance raises the question of the 
internal effects that such decisions are to have in the EU legal system. Generally 
speaking, depending on the respective constitutional rules of the parties of the 
agreement, these decisions can produce their effects either without a specific act of 
receptions or through a specific internal act of reception. 
As regard the European Union, the EC Treaty first and now the Treaty on the 
Functioning deal with the decisions of bodies established by international agreement 
only in relation to the procedural aspects of their adoption and not with regard to the 
domestic effects they are to produce once adopted. More precisely, the TFEU lays down 
a specific internal procedure with reference only to cases where a position has to be 
adopted by a body set up by international agreement binding upon the Union, and where 
there is a need to act on behalf of the EU. This procedure is however not related to the 
adoption of internal acts of approval or transposition of the decision taken by the 
international body in the EU legal order. Rather, it defines the rules the Council and the 
Commission are to follow when declaring the position of the Community in the midst of 
debates within the body at issue109. 
Accordingly, as there is no specific provision on the domestic status and effects of acts 
adopted by internationally established bodies, it has been concluded that the provisions 
of art. 216 TFEU para 2, whereby agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon 
the institutions of the Union and on its Member States, can be extended to decisions of 
bodies therein established110. 
Nevertheless, the ECJ has developed an extensive case-law on such issue, mainly with 
reference to decisions issued by the Council of Association established by the 
Association Agreement between the EC and Turkey, which is tasked with the 
implementation of the Agreement and with the attainment of objectives and goals 
contained therein. 
As to the moment when the decisions of the EC-Turkey Council of Association enter 
the EC legal order, the Court, called upon to ruled on the legality of a Commission 
decision implementing decision 2/80 of the above Council on financial aid for Turkey 
in case Greece v. Commission, stated that “since it is directly connected with the 
Association Agreement, Decision 2/80 forms, from its entry into force, an integral part 
                                                
109 Art. 218 TFEU para 7 and 9 provide respectively that “ […] 7. When concluding an agreement, the 
Council may, by way of derogation from paragraphs 5, 6, and 9, authorise the negotiator to approve on 
the Union’s behalf modifications to the agreement where it provides for them to be adopted by a 
simplified procedure or by a body set up by the agreement. […] 9. The Council, on a proposal from the 
Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall adopt 
a decision suspending application of an agreement and establishing the positions to be adopted on the 
Union’s behalf in a body set up by an agreement, when that body is called upon to adopt acts having legal 
effects, with the exception of acts supplementing or amending the institutional framework of the 
agreement. […] ”. 
110 Timmermans, C.W.A., “EU and Public International Law”, in European Foreign Affairs Review, 
1999, p. 181-194, at 189. 
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of the Community legal system”111. It has been pointed out that the words “directly 
connected” relate to the fulfilment of the substantive and procedural requirement laid 
down in the agreement with regard to the adoption of decisions112. 
Having regard to the internal effects of such decisions, the EC analysed the issue in the 
Sevince case, concerning the interpretation of certain decisions of the EC-Turkish 
Association Council, particularly decisions 2/77 and 2/80113. 
The court took the view that the Council’s decisions can be declared to have direct 
effect if meeting the same requirements indicated by the ECJ itself in its case-law on the 
direct effect of international agreements. More precisely, the Court stated that “in order 
to be recognised as having direct effect, the provisions of a decision of the Council of 
Association must satisfy the same conditions as those applicable to the provisions of the 
agreement itself”114.  Accordingly, the Court recalled what stated in Demirel, namely 
that a provision of an international agreement binding upon the Community is directly 
effective when, regard being had to its wording and to the purpose and the nature of the 
agreement it self, the provision at issue contains a clear and precise obligation, not 
subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure115. 
In the Sevince case, the Court confirm that the same criteria apply in the determination 
of whether the provisions of a decision of the Council of Association can have direct 
effect116. 
Coming to the judicial application of the view expressed in Sevince, the Court 
recognised the direct effect to various provisions of the EC-Turkey Association 
Council, particularly some conferring the right to legitimately expect an act or a 
concrete behaviour from the national administration, to the renewal of a work permit117, 
to respond to any employment offer in the host country118, to social security benefits119 
                                                
111 ECJ, Case 30/88, Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities, judgment of 14 
November 1989, [1989] ECR 03711, para 13. The first case on the matter was however ECJ, Case 
204/86, Hellenic Republic v Council of the European Communities, judgment of 27 September 1988, 
[1988] ECR 05323. 
112 Martennczuk, B., “Decisions of Bodies Established by International Agreements and the Community 
Legal Order”, in Kronenberger, V. (ed.), The European Union and the International Legal Order: 
Discord or Harmony?, Cambridge, 2001, p. 141 ff, at 157. See also Gilsdorf, P., “Les organs institués par 
les accords communautaires: effets juridiques de leur decisions”, in Revue du marché commun, 1992, p. 
328 ff.  
113 ECJ, Case C-192/89, S. Z. Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, judgment of 20 September 1990, 
[1990] ECR I-03461. 
114 Ibid., para. 14. Cf. ECJ, Case C-277/94, Z. Taflan-Met, S. Altun-Baser, E. Andal-Bugdayci v Bestuur 
van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank and O. Akol v Bestuur van de Nieuwe Algemene Bedrijfsvereniging, 
judgment of 10 September 1996, [1996]   ECR I-04085. 
115 ECJ, Case 12/86, Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, judgement of 30 September 1987, [1987] ECR 
3719, para. 14. 
116 ECJ, Case C-192/89, Sevince, cited, para. 15. See also ECJ, Case C-171/01, Wählergruppe 
Gemeinsam Zajedno/Birlikte Alternative und Grüne GewerkschafterInnen/UG and Others, judgment of 8 
May 2003, [2003] ECR I-4301, paras. 54 and 55. 
117 ECJ, Case C-237/91, Kazim Kus v Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden, judgment of 16 December 1992, 
[1992] ECR I-06781, para 27. 
118 ECJ, Case C-355/93, Hayriye Eroglu v Land Baden-Württemberg, judgment of 5 October 1994, 
[1994] ECR I-05113, para. 17. 
119 ECJ, Case C-262/96, Sema Sürül v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, judgment of 4 May 1999, [1999] ECR I-
02685, para. 55. 
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and to see one’s residence granted for the purpose of allowing the recently unemployed 
worker to see a new paid occupation120. 
 
 
Section III – Legal nature of WTO Panels or Appellate Body reports 
 
3.1 Judicial nature of WTO Panels and Appellate Body 
 
Amongst the annexes to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation, 
Annex 2 contains the understanding on the rules and procedures regulating the 
settlement of disputes. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) established a 
litigation resolution-oriented system whose core element is represented by the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB). The latter consists of the WTO General Council which, acting 
as DSB as prescribed by art. IV(3) WTO, can adopt the reports issued by the panels and 
by a standing body, the Appellate Body (AB), both charged with the task of 
adjudicating alleged violations of WTO law committed by the members of the 
organisation. 
The panels and the AB are both conceived as independent organs. As regards panel, 
members have to be qualified individuals, who cannot be nationals of the member 
countries whose government are party to the litigation121 and who shall serve in their 
individual capacities and not as government agents, nor as representative of any other 
organization122. 
A standing body made of seven members, the Appellate Body is competent to judge 
appealed panels decisions but only to the extent that issues of law and of legal 
interpretations contained therein are raised123. This is why AB members cannot 
participate in the adjudication of any dispute at the panel level, what would obviously 
generate a direct or indirect conflict of interests124. 
The procedure before the panel and, possibly, the AB consists of a few stages. The 
panel is established at the request of a complaining party, unless the DSB decides by 
consensus not to establish the panel125. Once produced, the panel report is adopted by 
the DSB, unless a party to the dispute appeals126. Should the dispute get to the appealing 
phase, the AB report is in turn adopted by the DSB, unless it decides by consensus not 
to adopt it, and it shall be unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute127. 
                                                
120 ECJ, Case C-171/95, Recep Tetik v Land Berlin, judgment of 23 January 1997, [1997] ECR I-00329, 
para. 48. As this kind of acts adopted by bodies established by international agreements bear considerable 
importance for individuals, art. 17(5) of the Rules of Procedure of the Council provides for the possibility 
for the institution to affirm, at the moment of the conclusion of an agreement, the principle of publication 
of the acts adopted by the bodies established by the concluded agreement. See Council Decision 
2009/937/EU of 1 December 2009 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure, OJ L 325/35 of 11.12.2009. 
121 Art. 8(1) and (3) DSU. 
122 Art. 8(9) DSU. 
123 Art. 17(1)(2) and (6) DSU. 
124 Art. 17(3) DSU. 
125 Art. 6(1) DSU. 
126 Art. 16(4) DSU. 
127 Art. 17(14) DSU. Adinolfi noted that the fact that the DSU does not use the word “unconditionally” 
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Throughout the procedure a negative blockage by the DSB consisting in a decision not 
to either establish the panel or adopt the latter’s or the AB report, is highly unlikely 
since, under the rule of consensus, such decision would anyway require the approval of 
the plaintiff or of the party which won the case before the panel or the AB. 
The panels and, above all, the AB are ultimately responsible of the interpretation of 
WTO provisions. Nor do art. IX(2) WTO and 3(9) DSU contradict such assertion in that 
the power to give authoritative interpretation of the WTO Agreement and of the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements that they confer upon the General Council and the 
Ministerial Conference is nothing but a peculiar form of interpretative power, which 
does not derogate to the general competence of the panels and AB. It does not indeed 
cover the object of the mandate of the latters, which expressly consists in interpreting 
WTO provisions, pursuant to art. 3(2) and 17(6) DSU128. The minor relevance of the 
competence conferred by art. IX(2) WTO is further apparent when taking into account 
the circumstance, however procedural, that the exercise of it is contingent upon a 
positive deliberation of the three-fourths of the members, which is in any case an uneasy 
threshold to reach129. 
As to the rules of procedure to be followed by the AB, they have standing and objective 
nature. Together with the financial autonomy of the organ, all the elements considered 
so far are considered to point to the jurisdictional nature of an international body, in this 
case of the WTO DSB130. It has thus been concluded that the dispute settlement 
proceedings laid down in the DSU have almost a judicial nature131. This is confirmed 
                                                                                                                                          
for the adopted panel reports does not mean that they are not binding. In fact, their binding nature is 
confirmed not only by the practice under art. XXIII GATT 1947, but also by the very existence of 
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globalizzazione e frammentazione, Milano, 2003, at 193-193; Mosler, H., “Supra-National Judicial 
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Journal of World Trade, 2002, p. 605 ff; Id., “Reflections on the Appellate Body of the WTO”, in 
Journal of International Economic Law, 2003, p. 695 ff.; Vellano, L’Organo di Appello dell’OMC, 
Napoli, 2001; Andrianarivony, M.K., “L’Organ d’appel de l’OMC une institution orginale invstie d’une 
mission constituionelle et normative (ou de la structuration d’un droit international de la concurrence)”, in 
Revue belge de droit international, 2000, p. 276 ff., who at 281 underlines the exclusion of a power of 
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Mengozzi, P. (ed.), International Trade Law in the 50th Anniversary of the Multilateral Trade System, 
Milan, 1999, p. 3 ff. 
131 Eeckhout, P., “The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting legal systems”, in 
Common Market Law Review, 1997, p. 11 ff., at 35; Cottier, T., “Dispute Settlement in the World Trade 
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inter alia by the fact that it is uncommon in international litigations to give a right of 
appeal against decisions of a judicial or quasi-judicial body132. 
The above consideration, namely the determination of the judicial nature of the DSB 
decisions, is essential for the purpose of understanding what kind of effects the adopted 
WTO reports can have in the EU legal system and whether and how they can be relied 
upon by individuals having recourse to the judicial remedies afforded by the EU 
Treaties. 
 
3.2 The absence of direct effect of DSB decisions 
 
As pointed out by Von Bogdandy, however judicial in nature, international bodies’ 
decisions are usually not directly effective. This is because, although they entail a 
general obligation of compliance, it is up to the respondent state to decide how to 
implement the decision of the international judicial body133. In other words, with some 
exceptions134, decisions of international judicial bodies contain nothing more than an 
obligation of result135. 
Adopted reports issued by WTO panels and AB do not contain the kind of clear and 
precise obligations which is required by the ECJ in the Demirel and Sevince case-law 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether provisions contained in the decision issued by 
an internationally established body confer rights and obligations directly upon 
individuals136. 
Accordingly, WTO adopted reports do not share the internal status which the Court 
acknowledged to the decisions adopted by, for instance, the EC-Turkey Council of 
Association and, consequently, they cannot be relied upon by individuals in order to ask 
the EU institutions to adopt an act or to issue a decisions whose content mirrors the one 
of the adopted report. 
However, notwithstanding the lack of direct effect, WTO adopted reports entail an 
unquestionable obligation of compliance, by virtue of which they are binding upon the 
parties to the dispute137. This is confirmed by both the WTO Agreement and the DSU 
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the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Seas for the enforcement of the decisions of 
the Seabed Disputes Chamber, quoted in Von Bogdandy, ibid., at 59 and 60. 
135 This is indicated as the traditional opinion on the effects of these acts by Giardina, “La mise en oeuvre 
au niveau national des arrest et des decisions internationaux”, in Recueil des Cours, vol. 165, 1979-IV, p. 
248 ff. 
136 For a different position see Lavranos, N., Decisions of International Organisations in the European 
and Domestic Legal Orders of Selected EU Member States, Maastricht, 2004, at 146 and 147. 
137 See the AB report WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages of 4 October 1996. 
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which, as cleared by Jackson138, show an evident preference for compliance with panels 
and AB reports. Art.3(5) DSU specifically provides that all the settlements reached by 
the litigant parties which are related to compensation and suspension of concessions or 
of other obligations under the WTO regime, however still possible when the adopted 
reports are not complied with by the loosing party139, must nonetheless comply with 
WTO agreements. Pursuant to art. 22(1) DSU, compensations and suspensions are sure 
enough nothing but temporary measures. In this respect, the GATT jurisprudence 
offered guidance also for WTO matters. According to the former, once the General 
Council adopted a panel report, there was an international law obligation to respect this 
report, as confirmed by art. XVI(1) WTO. Each member country has to ensure the 
compatibility of its relevant legal apparatus with its obligations (art. XVI(4) WTO). 
Furthermore, it is precisely by virtue of the binding nature of the outcome therein 
produced that the Organisation’s dispute settlement system is a central element in 
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. 
Finally, according to the ECJ, in order for decisions of international jurisdictional 
bodies to be binding upon the EU there is no need to prove that they are also directly 
effective. In Opinion1/91, the Court stated that the Community’s duty to comply with 
decisions of internationally established bodies stems from the legal capacity of the EC 
to enter into international agreement and from the choice to do so, thereby consenting to 
be bound by the whole range of provisions therein contained140. The Court did not make 
the obligatory nature of the decisions at issue depend on their direct effect141. 
Therefore, WTO adopted reports are binding upon the European Union and they 
represent an integral part of its legal order since their adoption by the DSB142. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
138 Jackson, J.H., “International law status of WTO dispute settlement reports: obligation to comply or 
option to “buy-out”? ”, in American Journal of Internal Law, 2004, p. 109 ff. 
139 Within the reasonable period of time possibly fixed under art. 21(3) DSU. 
140 ECJ, Opinion 1/91, Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of 
the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic 
Area, opinion of 14 December 1991, [1991] ECR I-06079, para 39 and 40. 
141 Zonnekeyn, G.A., “The Status of Adopted Panel and Appellate Body Reports in the European Court of 
Justice and the European court of First Instance – The Banana Experience”, in Journal of World Trade, 
2000, p. 93 ff, at 101. 
142 A different solution has been proposed after considering Council Regulation (EC) n. 1515/2001 of 23 
July 2001 on the measures that may be taken by the Community following a report adopted by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body concerning anti-dumping and anti-subsidy matters, OJ L 201/10 of 26.7.2001, 
by Blanchard, D., “Les effets des rapports de l'organe de règlement des différends de l'OMC à la lumière 
du règlement (CE) 1515/2001 du Conseil de l'Union européenne”, in Revue du Marché commun et de 
l'Union européenne, n. 464, janvier 2003, p. 37-48; Zonnekeyn, G.A., “The "Bed Linen" case and its 
aftermath: some comments on the European Community's "World Trade Organization Enabling 
Regulation" ”, in Journal of World Trade, Vol. 36, No. 5, October 2002, p. 993-1003; Mengozzi, P., 
“L’invocabilità in giudizio delle regole dell’Organizzazione Mondiale del Commercio e la giurisprudenza 
comunitaria”, in Francioni, F., Lenzerini, F., Montini, M. (a cura di), Organizzazione Mondiale del 
Commercio e Diritto della Comunità Europea nella prospettiva della risoluzione delle controversie, 
Milano, 2005, p. 155 ff. 
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3.3 The relevance for the EU of DSB decisions 
 
The divorce of the concept of legal compulsoriness from the one of direct effect 
operated by the ECJ in Opinion 1/91 and, perhaps more significantly, lessons learned 
from the Court case-law on the internal effects of GATT 1947 and WTO provisions 
allow the scholar to get to understand that from the obligatory nature of the DSB reports 
does not automatically result their domestic enforceability. It is therefore essential to 
understand what are the consequences of the binding force of such decisions before the 
European courts. 
First, as pointed out by the CFI in the Shanghai case143, the lack of direct effect of WTO 
adopted reports does not prevent the applicant from relying on the interpretation and 
clarification of the Agreements provisions contained therein. Hence, the CFI, or the 
ECJ, can interpret and thus apply WTO rules at least in the light of what the panel of the 
AB found in the adopted report. 
Secondly, applying the reasoning of the ECJ in the Sevince and Deutsche Shell cases, 
measures emanating from bodies which have been established by an international 
agreement, and which have been entrusted with responsibility for its implementation, 
are directly linked to the agreement which they implement, form part of the Community 
legal order144. Since the DSB reports are to be regarded as measures required for the 
application of the WTO Agreement, they are directly linked to the said accord, which is 
why they form part of Community law. Furthermore, it is settled case-law that the fact 
that a measure of Community or Union law has no binding effect does not preclude the 
Court from ruling on its interpretation in proceedings for a preliminary ruling145. 
Although the DSB reports cannot confer rights upon individuals which they may 
enforce before national courts, the latter are nevertheless obliged to take them into 
consideration in order to resolve disputes submitted to them, especially when, they are 
of relevance in interpreting the WTO provisions146. 
The issue of spelling out the effects and relevance of the DSB decisions in the EU legal 
order had grown important after the issue of several reports that found the EC in breach 
of WTO rules. The adopted panels and AB reports have subsequently been invoked in 
many domestic judicial proceedings before the ECJ and the CFI, now General Tribunal. 
The first WTO dispute concerned the common regime for trade in bananas with third 
countries as laid down in EC Regulations n. 404/93147 and 1442/93148. This regime was 
                                                
143 CFI, Case T-35/01, Shanghai Teraoka Electronic Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union, judgment 
of 28 October 2004, [2004] ECR II-03663, para. 140 and 165. For a diversification of the forms of 
internal relevance of WTO law within the EC legal system beyond issue of direct effect, see Eeckhout, P., 
External Relations of the European Union. Legal and Constitutional Foundations, Oxofrd, 2004, at 275. 
144 See ECJ, Case C-192/89, Sevince, cit., para. 10. 
145 See ECJ, Case 113/75, Giordano Frecassetti v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, judgement 
of 15 June 1976, [1976] ECR 983; Case 90/76, S.r.l. Ufficio Henry van Ameyde v S.r.l. Ufficio centrale 
italiano di assistenza assicurativa automobilisti in circolazione internazionale (UCI), judgment of 9 June 
1977, [1977] ECR 1091; and Case C-322/88 Grimaldi v Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles, judgement 
of 13 December 1989, [1989] ECR 4407, paragraph 9. 
146 ECJ, Case C-188/91, Deutsche Shell AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg, judgment of 21 January 
1993, [1993] ECR I-00363, para. 17 and 18. 
147 Council Regulation (EEC) n. 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organization of the market 
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based, inter alia, on an allocation of tariff quotas shares fro the importation into the 
European Community of bananas and on an allocation to different categories of 
operators of an amount of licences allowing this importation limited for each category. 
On 25 September 1997, the DSB adopted the AB report of 9 September 1997149 and the 
panel reports, as modified by the AB, of 22 May 1997150. In its report, the AB found 
some provisions of the above Community Regulations incompatible with artt. I(1), 
XIII(1) and (2) GATT 1994 and with artt. II and XVII GATS. 
In order to comply with the DSB decision, the Community modified Regulation n. 
404/93 by adopting Regulation n. 1637/98151 and the implementing Regulation n. 
2362/98152, which set up a new tariff quota scheme based on an evaluation of the 
interests of the principal supplier countries with a consideration of traditional trade 
flows (“traditional/newcomers” system). 
The United States took the view that changed foreseen in the 1998 Regulations did not 
remove the incompatibility of the EC common market in bananas with WTO 
obligations. Accordingly, the US were granted the authorisation to suspend concessions 
through higher duties on Community imports by an arbitrators’ ruling of 9 April 1999, 
i.e. once the reasonable period of time granted to the EC for letting it comply with the 
DSB decisions had elapsed. 
On 6 May 1999, the DBS adopted a panel report issued at the end of a proceeding 
requested by Ecuador pursuant to art. 21(5) DSU and regarding the alleged lack of 
implementation by the EC of the previous DSB decisions. In such report, the panel had 
found, inter alia, that the incompatibilities of the EC measures with art. XIII(1) and (2) 
GATT and with art. II and XVII GATS persisted153. Ecuador was accordingly 
authorised to suspend concessions under GATT 1994, GATS and TRIPs, up to the 
amount fixed by the arbitrators. 
In 1999 and 2001, in order to comply with the panel report, the EC once more modified 
Regulation n. 404/93, by adopting Regulations n. 102/99154 and 608/99155, and 
subsequently Regulation n. 216/2001156 and its implementing Regulation n. 
                                                                                                                                          
in bananas, OJ L 47/1 of 25.2.1993. 
148 Commission Regulation (EEC) n. 1442/93 of 10 June 1993 laying down detailed rules for the 
application of the arrangements for importing bananas into the Community, OJ L 142/6 of 12.6.1993. 
149 WT/DS27/AB/R 
150 WT/DS27/R/USA 
151 Council Regulation (EC) n. 1637/98 of 20 July 1998 amending Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 on the 
common organisation of the market in bananas, OJ L 210/28 of 28.7.1998. 
152 Commission Regulation (EC) n. 2362/98 of 28 October 1998 laying down detailed rules for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 regarding imports of bananas into the 
Community (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 293/32 of 31.10.1998. 
153 WT/DS27/RW/ECU of 6 April 1999. 
154 Commission Regulation (EC) n. 102/1999 of 15 January 1999 on the issuing of import licences for 
bananas under the tariff quotas and for traditional ACP bananas for the first quarter of 1999 (second 
period) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 11/16 of 16.01.1999. 
155 Commission Regulation (EC) n. 608/1999 of 19 March 1999 on the issuing of import licences for 
bananas under the tariff quotas and for traditional ACP bananas for the second quarter of 1999 and on the 
submission of new applications, OJ L 75/18 of 20.03.1999. 
156 Council Regulation (EC) No 216/2001 of 29 January 2001 amending Regulation (EEC) n. 404/93 on 
the common organisation of the market in bananas, OJ L 31/2 of 2.2.2001. 
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896/2001157. Finally, on 11 April 2001, the EC concluded a memorandum of 
understanding on bananas with the US, whereby the two parties identified the means by 
which the long-standing dispute over the EC’s banana import regime could be resolved. 
Such means included the introduction by the Community of a tariff-only regime for 
imports of bananas no later than on 1 January 2006 and the provisional suspension of 
the authorised imposition of higher duty by the US. Nevertheless, the United States 
declared to the DSB that this memorandum did not in itself constitute a mutually agreed 
solution pursuant to art. 3(6) DSU and that it would be premature to take the item off 
the DSB agenda158. On 30 April 2001 the EC also concluded an extra-legem agreement 
with the Republic of Ecuador. 
The second WTO dispute ending up with an adverse ruling for the EC concerned the 
prohibition of importing hormone treated meat into the Community market, as will be 
discussed in more details in the second part of the present work. The Council had 
adopted the prohibition to import and to use of certain substances having a hormonal 
component in livestock farming through two Directives, 81/602 and 88/146159. On the 
basis of Directive 96/22160, the import ban was maintained even after the entry into 
force, on 1 January 1995, of the WTO Agreement and its annexes, including the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). 
On 18 August 1997 two panels, set upon request of Canada and the US, issued their 
respective reports161, which ascertained the EC’s breach of the SPS Agreement and 
which the Community appealed against. On 16 January 1998, the AB delivered its 
report, ruling that the EC had enacted the import ban on hormones inconsistently with 
art. 3(3) and 5(1) SPS, on the ground that it had not given evidence of cancer risks 
associated with the use of certain hormones resulting from sufficiently precise scientific 
analysis162. On 13 February 1998, the DSB adopted the AB report and those of the two 
panels, as amended by the AB. 
At the EC request to be granted a reasonable period with a view to comply with WTO 
obligations as interpreted in the DSB decisions, a period of 15 months was approved163. 
Such period expired on 13 May 1999. Only on 3 July 2000, the Commission submitted 
a proposal for amendment of Directive 96/22 to the European Parliament and to the 
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Council164, proposal that was subsequently adopted in September 2003 as Directive 
2003/74165. 
 
 
Section IV – DSB decisions and the judicial control of legality of EU law 
 
4.1 The doctrine of limited judicial enforceability of WTO law applied to DSB 
decisions: the Van Parys case 
 
The analysis of the leading cases carried out in the second chapter has showed the ECJ 
diehard position on the domestic legal status of WTO law. The denial of direct effect of 
such rules before European and national courts and the exclusion of legality review of 
EU measures in the light of those – also in case of direct action before the ECJ - are the 
core outcomes of a reasoning based on the flexible nature of the WTO provisions, 
including those regarding dispute settlement. However, according to the same case-law, 
this rule of judicial unenforceability has two exceptions, because the ECJ can review the 
legality of EU law in the light of WTO rules if, by the challenged measures, the Union 
intended to implement a particular WTO obligation or if the legal basis of the 
challenged EU measure contains expressed reference to a WTO rule. 
The lack of judicial enforceability of WTO law has thus generated a sort of “internal 
immunity” of European law that is inconsistent with WTO law166. Since Portugal v 
Council, the ECJ has also followed the above reasoning in cases where the applicant 
raised the issue of incompatibility of EU measures with TRIPS provisions, regardless of 
the reference therein contained to several rights, often procedural, afforded to private 
parties167. However, the Court has developed a useful tool in order to ensure that EU 
secondary law respects WTO law, that is the principle of interpreting EU measures in 
light of the wording and purpose of WTO provisions168. 
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ECJ’s Petrotub Judgement: towards a Revival of the “Nakajima Doctrine”?”, in Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration, 2003, p. 249 ff; Case C-61/94, Commission of the European Communities v Federal 
Republic of Germany, judgment of 10 September 1996, [1996] ECR I-03989, para. 52, with a note by 
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The chance to clarify the issue of direct effectiveness in relation to DSB decisions came 
from a reference for preliminary ruling on the validity of some EC Regulations in the 
Van Parys case169. In this case a Belgian banana importer challenged before the national 
administrative court (Raad van State) certain domestic acts, by which competent 
national authorities had refused to grant him import licenses beyond the limits permitted 
under Regulation n. 404/03, as amended. Van Parys also claimed that the latter 
Regulation was invalid. The Raad van State referred the question to the ECJ, demanding 
to review the validity of the Regulation in the light of art. XIII:1 and 2(d) GATT 1994, 
the principle of protection of legitimate expectations and the principle of good faith in 
international public law and international customary law. This inasmuch as, in the 
applicant’s view, the Community did not fulfil its obligations under GATT 1994 and, 
inter alia, did not take account the outcome of the international dispute settlement 
proceeding before the DSB on the incompatibility of the EC banana trade regime with 
WTO rules. 
To start with, the Court ruled that, despite the modifications to the EC banana regime 
undertaken in 1998, after the DSB decision declaring the inconsistency of the EC 
measures establishing such regime with WTO law, these measures did not reveal that 
the Community intended to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of 
the WTO in the meaning of the Nakajima doctrine170. Moreover, despite the divergent 
opinion of Tizzano AG171, the Court also referred to the Portugal v Council and to art. 
21(6) and 22(8) DSU in order to point out that the issue of implementation of its 
decisions remains on the agenda of the DSB until it is resolved through the removal of 
the EC measures concerned or by a mutually satisfactory solution, which is the reason 
why the settlement of the dispute could not be considered concluded as asserted by the 
applicant172. The ECJ also emphasised that, where no agreement on the compatibility of 
the EC measures with WTO is reached, the dispute shall be decided precisely through 
recourse to the dispute settlement procedures pursuant to art. 21(5) DSU, including by 
attempts by the parties to reach negotiated solutions173. 
According to the ECJ, if the Community judicature refrained from applying its domestic 
law due to alleged - but not yet established – inconsistency with WTO law, the Court 
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would then deprive the legislative or executive organs of the possibility afforded by art. 
22 DSU to reach a negotiated settlement, if nothing else, on a temporary basis174. 
The ECJ then mentioned all the legislative changes made by the EC in order to bring the 
relevant domestic legislation into conformity with WTO provisions, as well as the 
memoranda of understanding concluded with the US and Ecuador175. In the view of the 
Court, the effort of the Community 
“to reconcile its obligations under WTO law with those in respect of the ACP states, 
and with the requirements inherent in the implementation of the common agricultural 
policy, could be compromised if the Community courts were entitled to judicially 
review the lawfulness of the Community measures in question in the light of the WTO 
riles upon the expiry of the time-limit.”176 
Still on the same note and consistently with the Portugal v Council ruling, the Court 
stated that the expiry of the reasonable period of time for compliance 
“does not imply that the Community had exhausted the possibilities under the 
Understanding of finding a solution to the dispute between it and other parties. In those 
circumstance, to require the Community courts, merely on the basis that the time-limit 
has expired, to review the lawfulness of the Community measures concerned in the light 
of the WTO rules, could have the effect of undermining the Community’s positions in 
its attempt to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the dispute in conformity with 
those rules”.177 
Consequently, even after the expiration of the reasonable period of time provided by art. 
21(3) DSU for implementation, the contested EC Regulations could not yet be 
considered by the ECJ as measures intended to ensure the enforcement within the 
Community legal order of a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO 
agreements within the meaning of the Nakajima exception178. Therefore, no legality 
review in the light of those obligations would be possible. 
Furthermore, the Court restated the argument concerning the lack of reciprocity by 
maintained that the direct responsibility of the Community courts for ensuring 
compliance of EC legislation with the WTO law would lead to an anomaly in the 
application of WTO rules primarily caused by the judicial authorities of the 
Community’s commercial partners not applying WTO law to review the legality of their 
domestic legislation. 
Finally, the Court excluded the possibility for Van Parys to plead before the national 
court for a declaration of invalidity of EC legislation on the ground of the inconsistency 
of the latter with certain WTO rules, even if the DSB has stated that the legislation at 
issue is incompatible with WTO rules179. 
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Section V – DSB decisions and actions for damages 
 
5.1 DSB decisions and the EU courts’ case-law: the Biret cases and their 
precedents 
 
As far as an action for damages under article 268 TFEU is concerned, attention must be 
devoted to the conditions for obtaining reparation. The latters are three: an unlawful act 
or omission performed by the Community institutions, a damage suffered by the 
applicant and a causal link between the unlawful act or omission and the damage180. 
However, as to first condition, namely the unlawful act or omission, the case-law of the 
ECJ and of the CFI required that a sufficiently serious breach of a rule intended to 
confer rights on individual is established181. Moreover, as regards the requirement that 
the breach be sufficiently serious, the decisive test is whether the Community institution 
concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits of its discretion182. Finally, 
where that institution has only a considerably reduced or even no discretion at all, the 
mere infringement of Community law may be still sufficient to establish the existence 
of a sufficiently serious breach. 
As regards EU non-contractual liability for breach of WTO law, the CFI established two 
further elements. First, it has interpreted the condition of the “rule of law intended to 
confer rights on individuals” as meaning that such rule has to be directly effective. 
Second, the CFI has applied the Nakajima doctrine since it has held that the reasoning 
of the ECJ in Portugal v Council was not only applicable to case of legality review of 
EC secondary legislation, but also to actions for damages. 
In particular, in Cordis, Bocchi and T. Port, the CFI rejected applications for 
compensation of losses suffered by the introduction of Regulation 2362/98 on the 
banana import regime. The Tribunal took the view that, even when dealing with an 
action for damages, the principle of the lack of direct judicial enforceability carved out 
by the ECJ in Portugal v Council had to be applied. Being as the Court has several 
times ruled out that WTO agreements are such in nature and purpose as to confer rights 
upon individuals which they can rely upon before European and national courts, the 
Tribunal saw no reason to divorce the two circumstances of potential invocation of 
WTO law, namely judicial review of EC measures and action for damages. 
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In the three cases mentioned above, the adopted AB report establishing the 
incompatibility of the Community Regulation with WTO law was brought about by the 
applicants in order to back up their demands for compensation. However, again by 
virtue of the application of the Nakajima doctrine, the CFI rejected the relevance of it as 
well, on the ground that it did not create particular obligations that the EC intended to 
implement through the adoption of the contested Regulation. 
In the Chemnitz case, the CFI dealt with the internal relevance of the same adopted AD 
report at issue in Bocchi, Cordis and T. Port, which was invoked by the applicant in 
order to prove that Regulation 404/93, allowing the applicant to import bananas into the 
Community market only up to a certain quota, was inconsistent with WTO law and 
consequently unlawful. The CFI ruled that the application should be rejected because 
the DSB decision has not direct effect. 
The same AB report had been invoked in Atlanta, an appeal against the judgement of 
the CFI which rejected the application on an individual demanding compensation of 
damages allegedly suffered because of the introduction and application of Regulation 
404/93. The Court declared the plea non admissible, on the ground that it was 
inescapably linked with the issue of direct effect of GATT, which the applicant had 
raised before the CFI but which it had conveniently not maintained in the argument 
brought before the Court of Justice. 
It was however only in the Biret cases that the CFI was clearly faced with the issue of 
non-contractual liability of the European Community for perpetuating a breach of WTO 
law after the expiry of the reasonable period of time set up by art. 21(3) DSU. The Biret 
companies, that is Établissement Biret et Cie and its subsidiary Biret International, 
active in trade of various agri-foodstuffs (particularty meat) claimed damages allegedly 
suffered by the import ban established by the Council on beef and veal treated with 
hormone products. In order to give evidence of the unlawfulness of the Council’s 
behaviour, the applicants argued that the institution acted in breach of WTO law since it 
omitted to adopt whatsoever measure with a view to comply with the DSB decisions, 
despite the expiry of the reasonable period of time afforded by the DSU. 
The CFI held that WTO Agreements could not be interpreted as rules having direct 
effect and, consequently, individuals could not invoke them in an action for damages 
before Community courts. It also pointed out that the purpose of those agreements is to 
govern relations between sovereign states and, possibly, regional organisations for 
economic integration, and not to protect individuals. The Court finally referred to 
Portugal v Council to underline that WTO law was grounded on the principle of mutual 
advantageous negotiations. The Court then turned to the issue of the relevance of 
adopted panels and AB reports and stated that no different conclusion could have been 
drawn with regard to the DSB ruling being as the latter had an inescapable and direct 
link with the plea regarding the alleged breach of the WTO rules at issue, namely those 
contained in the SPS Agreement. Consequently it could have been take into 
consideration by the CFI only if the direct effect of this Agreement had previously been 
established. 
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In the appeal proceedings before the ECJ, AG Alber questioned the holding of the well 
established case-law denying direct effect to WTO rules by noting that the restatement 
of principles expressed therein also in relation to domestic effects of DSB decisions 
would prevent an individual from invoking the those even after their formalisation via 
the adoption of the relevant reports by the DSB. The Advocate General observed first 
that the possibility to invoke the DSB decisions had to be considered as a distinct issue 
from that of direct effect of WTO law. He also argued that the expiry of the reasonable 
period of time marks the point at which the obligation which stems from the relevant 
WTO obligation become concrete. He consequently concluded that WTO law is directly 
applicable where DSB recommendations or rulings have found a Community measure 
to be inconsistent with WTO law and the Community has failed to implement the 
recommendations or rulings within the prescribed period. He arrived at this conclusion 
after a thorough analysis of the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO, where he 
considered the nature of the procedure before the panels and the AB, the only temporary 
nature of compensations and countermeasures provided by art. 22 DSU as well as the 
fact that they are less preferable than the prompt compliance to the DSB decisions, and 
the binding force of those for the parties to the disputes. Finally, the AG considered the 
need to ensure a uniform application of the WTO Agreements, referred to by the Court 
in Portugal v Council in order to justify the lack od direct judicial enforceability, as an 
argument more of trade policy nature than a legal one, and he drew a parallel between 
the principle affirmed by the Court in the Francovich case as to Member States liability 
for breach of EC law ad the EC non-contractual liability fore breach of EC law and the 
EC non-contractual for breach of WTO law. He observed that if non-contractual 
liability of Member States was necessary to supersede their non-compliance with EC 
obligations, which entailed the impossibility for the individuals to exercise the rights 
conferred upon them by the EC legal order, then the same reasoning should apply to the 
European Community, because its non-compliance with WTO law entailed the 
impossibility for the applicant to fully exercise its right to the pursuing of an economic 
activity. 
In turn, the ECJ upheld the two judgments of the CFI thus rejecting the action for 
damages for breach of the SPS Agreement. The Court, however, stated that the CFI 
should have analyzed how the DSB decisions could have called into question the 
conclusions concerning the denial of direct effect. Nonetheless, according to the Court, 
the appealed judgement of the CFI could not be annulled. This was because a judicial 
liquidation in favor of the applicant has been open and a consequent cessation of 
payments had been set up long before the adoption of the reports by the DSB and the 
expiry of the reasonable period of time for compliance with the DSB decisions. A 
contrario, it would then be possible to lodge an application for damages occurred after 
the expiry of the reasonable period of time, where granted. 
The Biret cases gave the clear impression that it was still possible to overcome the 
hurdles related to the reasoning of Portugal v Council in order to affirm the judicial 
enforceability of WTO rules through DSB decisions in the framework of an action for 
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damages. Nevertheless, the CFI followed a different position the subsequent Chiquita 
Brand International case. 
 
5.2 The Chiquita Brand International case 
 
In Chiquita Brands International three companies belonging to the Chiquita group, 
producers and distributor of bananas, lodged an application for compensation in respect 
to the loss allegedly suffered because of the adoption and maintenance in force of 
Regulation 2362/98, which they claimed to be in violation of WTO rules and, inter alia, 
of the principle of good faith and of the protection of legitimate expectations in 
international law. 
The CFI first clarified in a very succinct fashion the meaning of the Nakajima doctrine. 
It focused on the particular context in which it had been applied by the Community 
courts, namely the indirect judicial review of antidumping basic Regulation in the light 
of 1979 and 1994 WTO Antidumping Codes, that is the agreements respectively 
adopted within the GATT and WTO regimes in order to implement art. VI GATT. 
According to the CFI, in the field of antidumping, there is a direct obligation on the 
WTO members to fine-tune their domestic legislation with a view to comply with WTO 
law that stems from artt. 16(6) of the 1979 Antidumping Code and 18(4) of the 1994 
Antidumping Code. 
However, the CFI has admitted that, eves though outside the particular context of 
antidumping the CJ and the CFI gave generally ruled out the application of the 
Nakajima doctrine, the latter could still be applied to other fields of WTO law, provided 
that both the WTO rules and the Community provisions have the same nature ad that of 
the WTO and EC rules involved in the field of antidumping law, and the relevant EC 
measures transpose the prescriptions arising from the WTO agreements into 
Community law. According to the CFI, this would be confirmed by the “Rice case”, 
where an EC Regulation, adopted pursuant to bilateral agreements concluded with third 
countries following negotiations on the basis of art. XXIV(6) GATT, was considered by 
the ECJ to fall within the scope of the Nakajima doctrine. 
The CFI stated that it would not enquire as to what consequences on compensating 
individuals would possibly result from non-implementation by the EC of adverse DSB 
decisions, a question not raised by the applicant, but it made some important points on 
the issue. 
The CFI first of all pointed out that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism cannot be 
compared with the judicial activity carried out by national courts of the EC Member 
States. It then referred to the ECJ Portugal v Council judgement, where the ECJ 
indicated inter alia that the DSU gives WTO members which become parties to a 
dispute the opportunity of pursuing negotiations in order to reach an acceptable 
compensation where the opposing party fails to fulfil its obligations to implement 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB within a reasonable period of time. 
According to the CFI, this scope for manoeuvre still exists after the end of the 
reasonable period of time foreseen in art. 21(3) DSU. In the view of the Court, this 
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would follow from artt. 21(6) and 22(8) DSU. Consequently, the CFI held that, as the 
dispute was still pending, i.e. was on the agenda of the DSB when the action by 
Chiquita Brands International was brought, the Community judicature could not review 
the legality of the EC measures without depriving art. 21(6) DSU of its effectiveness. 
This as long as the question of implementation of DSB decisions and recommendations 
remains unsolved, including where compensation has been provided or concessions or 
other obligations have been suspended without implementation of the DSB rulings. 
In light of this on-going negotiation, the CFI considered that EC Regulation 2362/98, 
despite its preamble, had been adopted by the EC to comply with its WT obligations but 
not to implement them within the meaning of the Nakajima doctrine. 
 
5.3 EU non-contractual liability for lawful acts 
 
It is still to be pointed out that, as far as actions for damages are concerned, the 
Community courts have held admissible an action for damages for non-fault liability. 
The conditions to condemn the EC to make good of damages under this type of action 
are particularly restrictive. The EC may incur liability for a lawful act inly if the damage 
alleged, if still deemed to constitute a still subsisting injury, affects a particular circle of 
economic operators in a disproportionate manner by comparison with others (unusual 
damage) and exceeds the limits of the economic risks inherent in operating in the sector 
concerned (special damage), without the legislative measure that gave rise to the alleged 
damage being justified by a general economic interest. 
Notwithstanding the restrictive conditions of application, this particular form of action 
for non-contractual liability has the great value if allowing compensation for damages 
despite the lawfulness of the Community conduct. 
In this regard, such form of liability has been invoked in some cases related to damages 
allegedly suffered by economic operators fro breach of WTO law by the European 
Community. In particular, it has been invoked in the FIAMM case, as well as in other 
proceedings, all related to the non-contractual liability of the EC for the 
countermeasures adopted by the US in the framework of the banana litigation within the 
WTO. 
In the FIAMM case, the CFI rejected the action for damages for non-contractual liability 
in the absence of unlawful conduct on the ground that the damage suffered by the 
applicants was not unusual, because the possibility of retaliatory measures had to be 
considered as a normal risk, due to the provisions of the WTO agreements related to the 
suspension of concessions as well as to the normal hazards of international trade as 
currently organised. 
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1. A EU strategy towards SPS and TBT disputes? 1 
 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the nature of the EU’s stance vis-à-vis 
the settlement of WTO disputes relating to sanitary and phytosanitary measures and 
technical barriers to trade. Based on the notion of strategy as a set of decisions, actions 
and means put in place in order to pursue one or more predetermined objectives as well 
as on the state of the art concerning the relationship between EU and WTO law, an 
initial hypothesis has been put forward that the course of action taken by EU institutions 
in this regard formed part of a coherent EU strategy towards commercial litigation. 
Such strategy would apply particularly – although not exclusively – when the EC, now 
EU, acted as defendant, with a view to, first, protecting vested Union interests and, 
second, insulating the EU commercial policy and legal order from the influence of 
WTO law by avoiding actual compliance with WTO obligations. 
Findings presented so far allow to partially correct the above assertion and to present 
a thesis whereby the Union’s policy and judicial decisions in relation to SPS and TBT 
disputes respond to a ratio that goes beyond the immediate objective of avoiding that 
the CCP and the functioning of the Union’s legal system be over-constrained by WTO 
                                                
1 This conclusion has been presented within the following publication: Bonavita, V., "The EU Strategy 
Towards WTO Commercial Disputes After the Lisbon Reform", in Moraru, M., Larik. J. (eds.), Closer in 
Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU External Action after the Lisbon Treaty, EUI Working Paper 
Law 2011/10, p. 41. 
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obligations. This rationale concerns in part the protection of vested Union interests and, 
most importantly, the issue of internal and international standard setting. The latter 
relates in particular to the preservation of the EU regulatory autonomy. 
In part I a comparison between the EU and the WTO approach to the regulatory 
autonomy of the respective member states highlighted the concept of mutual recognition 
as the gateway to the preservation of such autonomy. However, whereas it represents 
the cornerstone of the Union’s internal market, mutual recognition is not a principle 
under the WTO legal order. Nor dared the DSB go as far as to affirm it, just as the ECJ 
had done. This being the case, the EU is left with two viable options to defend its 
regulatory autonomy in the multilateral commercial forum: either bilateral negotiation 
of mutual recognition with trade partners or litigation on the compatibility of Union’s 
internal measures with SPS and TBT obligations. 
The analysis of seven agreements concluded by the EU has shown that the 
negotiation of mutual recognition is affected by several limits. First, MRAs have been 
concluded only in relation to technical barriers to trade, leaving SPS measures aside. 
Second, mutual recognition obligations have been established only with regard to 
conformity assessment procedures, thus leaving the mutual recognition of internal 
standards and regulations unspoken. Finally, a survey of the Union’s counterparts 
shows that the EU tends to negotiate MRAs only with commercial partners who afford 
high guarantees with regards to theirs own standards and regulations or in any case a 
high degree of similarity with those of the EU. This excludes the conclusion of MRAs 
with countries other than developed ones. 
Limits inherent to the practice of concluding MRAs leave room to litigation as an 
alternative means for the EU to preserve its regulatory autonomy. In order to establish a 
connection between dispute settlement and the defence of the EU regulatory power, 
submissions presented by the Union in relation to five SPS and TBT disputes which saw 
the EU acting as defendant have been analysed. It turned out that legal arguments put 
forward by the Union served the purpose of regulatory autonomy, first, by excluding the 
applicability of the SPS and TBT provisions invoked by the applicant; second, by 
affirming the existence of a legitimate objective that the contested EU measure was 
mean to pursue and the satisfaction of the necessity test by the latter; third, by excluding 
the invokability of relevant international standards on the ground of the 
inappropriateness of those or of the lack of a legal obligation to conform to those. A 
high degree of coherence has been found in the EU approach to such disputes inasmuch 
as submissions presented in different cases can be ascribed to either one or more than 
one of the above three categories of argumentations. 
Is this enough to claim for the existence of a proper EU strategy in SPS and TBT 
disputes? This might not necessarily be the case. The coherence of legal argumentations 
only points at the existence of a single objective, namely the defence of the EU 
regulatory autonomy. Against this background however, and coupled with it, the prove 
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of a strategy lies in the way in which the EU manages its role of defendant and the 
aftermath of such disputes. 
In part II, the internal means that the Union has puts forwards to defend its regulatory 
autonomy in the midst of WTO litigation have been pointed out. Such means amount 
first of all to the procedural circumstance whereby the Unions advocates the right to set 
up a course of action also in cases where party to the dispute is not the UE as such but 
one of the member states. With regard to the aftermath to the disputes that have been 
taken into account and to the effects of relevant DSB decisions, the ECJ’s case-law 
denying direct effect to the latter and excluding EU extra-contractual liability for breach 
of WTO law is not necessarily a way to escape abidance by WTO obligations. Instead, 
it can be read as a means for the Union to defend its prerogative to set its own standards 
in relation to the characteristics of traded products in the sanitary and technical domain. 
Having had regard to the practice established so far, it can be concluded that a EU 
strategy towards SPS and TBT disputes does exist in so far as the objective to preserve 
the Union’s regulatory autonomy is served by the above-mentioned internal means. The 
idea of the EU strategically planning its response to challenges brought about by other 
WTO members vis-à-vis its internal regulation certainly owes to the theory of the 
political question inasmuch as it represents yet another example of deference towards 
political objectives, to the ultimate detriment of legal obligations. In this light, further 
research efforts are to be foreseen with a view to either exhaustively enquiry as to the 
role that the idea of a strategy thinking of SPS and TBT disputes could play within the 
theory of the political question as applicable to the EU external action and thus to the 
CCP, or to further elaborate the thesis presented herein in order to possibly 
acknowledge it the dignity of an autonomous theoretical contribution to the study of the 
relation between the legal order of the European Union and the international obligations 
which it is bound to. 
This being so, it is moreover worth spending the very last section of this research 
work by looking at possible future developments of such strategy. An overhaul of a 
given course of action is needed when one of the following circumstances arises: first, 
the previous strategy becomes obsolete as result of a change in the background 
conditions; secondly, a reshuffle of the objectives that the strategy was designed to 
pursue occurs, so that a swift adjustment of the means becomes necessary; thirdly, 
means employed prove to be unsuitable to achieve the final aims or, more generally, the 
cost/benefit ratio of the strategy proves to be unbearable. Will the Lisbon reform lead to 
a revision of the EU strategy towards commercial disputes in the SPS and TBT domains 
by inducing a rethinking of the relation between objectives and means? What follows 
aims to verify whether at least one of the above three conditions which may prompt a 
strategy revision has been met following the recent changes undergone by the EU’s 
trade policy and more generally by the Union external relations. 
For the purpose of answering this question, one is forced to tackle the issue from a 
broader perspective. In fact, no specific mention of dispute settlement in the WTO can 
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be found in the reformed Treaty at all, just as it was the case in the previous Treaty 
regime. The lack of direct connections requires that the analysis focus, on the one hand, 
on the ways in which the Lisbon reform indirectly impacts on the Union’s strategy in 
the settlement of commercial disputes and, on the other, on commercial disputes in 
general, not limited to the SPS and TBT domains. To this end, three issues must be 
taken into account: firstly, the broader framework of objectives that the Lisbon Treaty 
sets for the CCP2; secondly, the role of fundamental rights following the 
acknowledgment of binding force to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) and 
the Union’s prospective accession to the European Convention of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms; thirdly, the subsidiary element of discussion represented by the 
possible creation of mechanisms for coordination between the CCP and other EU 
external policies. It is submitted that both the first and the second element might have a 
significant impact on the EU strategy in commercial disputes since, even if to different 
extents, they will both affect the context and the objectives of CCP policy-making, 
eventually influencing the cost/benefit ratio of adhering to the strategy devised so far. 
The need to coordinate trade and other external policies, which appears to be more 
pressing than before Lisbon, will equally play a crucial role in developing the EU’s 
strategy towards commercial disputes.  
 
 
2. The CCP in the broader framework of the Union’s external action 
 
The CCP is now placed under the overall heading “External Action” and its objectives, 
as laid down in art. 206 TFEU, artt. 205 TFEU and Art. 3(5) TEU and 21(2) TEU, 
particularly points (d) to (f) and (h), appear to be broader than in the past. Will this new 
set of CCP objectives place any real constraint on the considerably wide scope for 
manoeuvre so far enjoyed by the institutions in the conduct of the CCP, particularly 
insofar as compliance with WTO is concerned? For the purpose of this study the term 
‘objective’ has been employed in relation to different contexts, which should however 
not induce any ambiguity as to the argument presented hereinafter. It is therefore 
appropriate to clarify that the term ‘objective’ points at both the aims that the Union’s 
strategy towards commercial disputes is designed to pursue and the goals that the CCP 
as such is intended to achieve according to the relevant Treaty provisions. Whereas the 
Lisbon reform touches upon CCP goals, particularly by changing their nature, the same 
cannot be said with regard to the aims of the Union’s strategy. The latter, which have 
been identified earlier as the protection of European key economic interests and of the 
Union’s regulatory autonomy, remain in fact largely unmodified. It is interesting to note 
that the two sets of objectives, those of the EU strategy on the one hand and of the CCP 
on the other, do not necessarily point in the same direction and are not easy to organise 
                                                
2 On the necessity to make a distinction between the objectives of the CCP and those of the Union’s 
strategy towards WTO disputes, see infra, para. 1.. 
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in a consistent course of action, in that often the objectives of protecting economic 
interests and regulatory autonomy can only be pursued at the expenses of further 
liberalisation. 
 
2.1 CCP principles and objectives under the Community Treaty 
 
2.1.1 The uniformity principle 
 
Aiming to protecting the uniformity of the common market by avoiding distortions in 
competition and risks of trade deflection that could arise if Member States pursued their 
individual external trade policies3, the principle of uniformity required the adoption of 
common rules throughout the EC in the field of the CCP4. Besides the need to 
accommodate internal market concerns also beyond Community frontiers, the ECJ 
considered that uniformity was necessary to preserve the unity of the EC’s position with 
respect to third countries in order to enhance the Community’s ability to defend 
common interests5. 
The a priori exclusive nature of the Community competence in the field of trade 
arose as a result of the application of the principle of uniformity. However, uniformity 
comes to the fore only in areas of the internal market where full harmonisation has 
already been achieved, so that common external rules are necessary for the functioning 
of the market itself. The fact that the need for uniformity results from internal 
harmonisation is clearly apparent in areas such as trade in services and trade related 
aspects of intellectual property rights, where internal harmonisation existed to a limited 
extend. Uniformity not being an imperative, such trade areas fell within shared EC-
Member States competence for the purpose of concluding the Marrakech agreement 
establishing the WTO. 
The relation between internal harmonisation and the need to ensure uniformity of 
external trade policies did not entail that the CCP was meant to pursue externally the 
same objectives of the internal market, namely non-discrimination and elimination of all 
trade barriers. The Court clearly recognised the lack of a community obligation under 
EC law to grant non-Member States equal treatment in all respects. As a consequence, 
the Community was allowed to discriminate, firstly, between domestic and third 
country products, producers and service providers; secondly, between products coming 
from different third countries. Although the latter kind of discrimination was to be 
driven by the Community interest6, its application by the EC was nonetheless subject to 
                                                
3 Opinion 1/78 [1979] ECR 2871, para. 45 ff. See also Joined Cases 37 and 38/73, Social Fonds voor de 
Diamantarbeiders v. NV Indiamex et Association de fait De Belder [1973] ECR 1609. 
4 M Cremona ‘The External Dimension of the Internal Market’ in C Barbard and J Scott (eds), The Law of 
the Single European Market (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2002) 354. 
5 A Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Principles and Objectives of the Common 
Commercial Policy’ (2010) 15 European Foreign Affairs Review 153, 154. 
6 M Cremona, ‘Neutrality or Discrimination? The WTO, the EU and External Trade’ in G de Búrca J 
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the requirements enshrined in WTO and other international obligations applicable to the 
Community. 
Therefore, the principle of uniformity had only instrumental value, since the 
uniformity of trade policies was only required for the sake of protecting internal 
harmonisation. Where this was not the case, uniformity was only an additional tool for 
Community institutions (see shared trade competences)7. 
Finally, the instrumental nature of such a principle is also highlighted by its 
neutrality in terms of content8. Uniformity explains how the EC trade policy should be 
but not what it should include. It did not provide any substantial orientation to the CCP, 
thus leaving the Community institutions with a quasi-absolute discretion for shaping 
trade policy so as to best serve the Community interest. 
 
2.1.2 The objective of liberalising trade and non-trade aims 
 
Art. 131 TEC contained the only substantive objective to be ascribed to EC trade policy 
and, therefore, capable of affecting CCP policy making, namely the liberalization of 
world trade through the progressive abolition of restrictions to international commerce. 
Although substantial, such aim was also nothing more than aspirational in nature9. In 
fact, the Court stated the non-binding character of the liberalization objective, 
emphasizing that the provision at issue should be confined to establishing an objective 
rather than imposing an obligation10. In other words, the EC might adopt trade measures 
pursuing liberalisation but it was not compelled to do it: trade measures adversely 
affecting such objective were not to be deemed incompatible with art. 131 TEC. 
That being so, the concept of the Community interest has long been pivotal in shaping 
the CCP. Whereas liberalization represented a guideline to Community institutions in 
charge of trade policy-making, they enjoyed considerable discretion in assessing 
whether a liberalising policy would be suitable to advance the Community interest. 
Should the Community interest not coincide with the prospected outcomes of 
liberalisation, the former would nonetheless take precedence over the latter. This 
allowed policy objectives other than liberalisation as such to influence the content of the 
CCP. 
From an international point of view, while pursing non-trade objectives, CCP-related 
actions occasionally resulted in restrictions of international trade, thus openly 
contradicting the aim of liberalisation and possibly giving rise to commercial disputes. 
                                                                                                                                          
Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO – Legal and Constitutional Issues (Oxford-Portland: Hart Publishing 
2001) 165 ff. 
7 Cremona, ‘The External Dimension’, 374. 
8 Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’, 156. 
9 Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’, 156. 
10 Case C-150/94 United Kingdom v. Council (Chinese Toys, [1998] ECR I-7235, para. 67; Case C-
112/80 Dürbeck v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt [1982] ECR 1251, para. 10 ff; see also Case C-51/75 EMI v. 
CBS United Kingdom LtD [1976] ECR-811. 
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Internally, the Treaty lacking a clear-cut definition of the content of the CCP, the 
circumstance whereby trade measures pursued objectives other than trade liberalisation 
gave rise to numerous disagreements regarding the scope of such a policy and the types 
of measures that could fall under the Community trade competence. As a matter of fact, 
when a more specific legal basis was lacking in the Treaty, the CCP has been used for 
the adoption of trade measures which pursued objectives other than regulation of trade 
flows and trade restrictions, which were linked for example to environmental protection 
and development cooperation. 
When specific legal bases allowing the Community to undertake external actions in 
the above-mentioned fields were eventually inserted into the Treaty, legal battles 
concerning the choice of the most appropriate legal basis ensued. The Court reaffirmed 
in most instances the role of the CCP in the adoption of measures pursuing non-trade 
objectives, particularly in cases where Community measures had more than one purpose 
or a twofold component. As it is well known, the choice of the legal bases upon which 
to found a prospected policy measure profoundly affects the exercise of the relevant 
competence. Within this framework, the Court recognised the possibility to adopt trade 
measures pursuing other objectives without however clarifying the interaction between 
trade and non-trade objectives, their respective legal value and criteria for prioritisation. 
In this way, the Court avoided interfering with the substantive policy choices made by 
legislative and executive Community institutions. 
 
2.2 CCP principles and objectives under the reformed EU Treaty 
 
The Lisbon Treaty has modified the scope and nature of the CCP and has reformed 
the principles and objectives governing it. To start with, the Lisbon Treaty groups all 
EU external policies, including the CCP, under a common heading (arts. 3(5) and 21 
TEU) containing principles and objectives of general application. Moreover, specific 
attention being paid to the CCP, the reform touches upon the nature and the role of the 
objective of liberalisation, as shown in art. 206 TFEU (ex art. 131 TEC). 
Will such changes also affect the EU’s strategy towards commercial disputes within 
the WTO? Various considerations can be advances in this respect, particularly 
concerning a possible narrowing of the scope for manoeuvre enjoyed by EU 
institutions. The different nature of the objective of liberalisation and the broader 
framework of CCP goals will make EU positions regarding, first, the effect of DSB and 
AB reports and, second, the EU extra-contractual liability for breach of WTO law more 
difficult to bear. 
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2.2.1  Uniformity principle 
 
The principle of uniformity remains of utmost importance for the nature and exercise 
of the EU competence in external trade and has undergone no substantial modifications. 
Art. 207 TFEU reiterates that ‘the CCP shall be based on uniform principles’. 
Moreover, uniformity seems to continue having a mere instrumental interest for trade 
policy-makers. In fact, it has correctly been noted that the extension of the Union’s 
exclusive competence to all areas of the CCP, including trade in services, trade aspects 
of IP and FDI, somehow diminished the instrumental function of the principle of 
uniformity and its role as a link between internal harmonisation and the nature of the 
external competence11. As a matter of fact, not all aspects of trade in services, trade 
aspects of IP and FDI have already been subject to harmonisation. Whereas in the past 
this would have led to the maintenance of a shared competence, the extension of the 
EU’s exclusive competence to cover such trade sectors softens the link between 
harmonisation in the internal market and the nature of the trade competence. It follows 
that the uniformity principle may be vested with more than a mere instrumental 
function. 
However, such rethinking must be balanced by further considerations. Even though 
the EU becomes a single trade actor in the abovementioned fields, different national 
interests remain sheltered from undesired policy actions. When deciding on issues 
concerning trade in services, commercial aspects of intellectual property rights and FDI, 
the Council will continue acting according to the unanimity rule as long as unanimous 
actions are still required for the adoption of internal rules12. Unanimous decision-
making is also required for the adoption of trade measures pertaining to trade in cultural 
and audio-visual services, on the one hand, and trade in social, education and health 
services, on the other13. The lasting pivotal role played by Member States in these trade 
areas is probably not sufficient to bring the instrumental role of uniformity back into the 
spotlight, as in fact Member States can no longer adopt different approaches to trade 
with third countries in such areas14, but surely makes the assessment of the new degree 
of exclusivity of the EU’s trade competence more nuanced. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’, 159. 
12 Art. 207(4) TFEU, second alinea. 
13 Art. 207(4) TFEU, third alinea. Provisions contained in both the second and third alinea justify the need 
for unanimous action in the respective trade fields in the light of the imperative to defuse any risk of 
prejudicing Member States’ cultural and linguistic identities on the one hand, and national peculiarities 
with regard to the organisation of social, education and health services, which Members States are solely 
responsible to deliver, on the other. 
14 Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’, 159. 
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2.2.2 The reformed objective of liberalisation 
 
The Lisbon Treaty alters the role of liberalisation as an objective of the CCP. In terms 
of scope, art. 206 TFEU adds a reference to foreign direct investments (FDI) and to 
other barriers to trade in order to mirror the substantive expansion of the EU’s 
exclusive trade competence. 
The main change, however, stems from the new wording of the provision. Whereas 
prior to the Lisbon reform liberalisation enjoyed just an aspirational value on the ground 
that, according to art. 131 TEC, the Member States only aimed to contribute to such 
objective, art. 206 TFEU uses a more assertive language and states that the EU as such, 
not just its Members, shall now contribute to the liberalisation of international trade, 
namely to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of 
restrictions to international trade and on FDI, and the lowering of customs and other 
barriers. 
What used to be an option now seems to have turned into a proper legal obligation. 
In fact, the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty did not reiterate the qualification of 
liberalisation as a non-binding objective of the reformed Treaty, whose pursuance lies in 
the hands of the EU institutions and depends on their assessment of the Community 
interest15. On the contrary, they have opted to upgrade the objective of trade and FDI 
liberalisation to the rank of compulsory aims, as the true and main target of all CCP 
measures, to which other – both commercial and non-commercial – objectives must 
give way. 
The mandatory nature of the objective of liberalisation becomes even more apparent 
if art. 206 TFEU is compared to other provisions having a similar wording and which 
the Court has already interpreted. In Portugal v. Council16, for example, the ECJ 
confirmed the compulsory nature of the objective of promoting democracy and the rule 
of law in the Community competence in the field of development cooperation (as 
enshrined in then art. 177(2) TEC). The binding character of the relevant provision was 
acknowledged based precisely on its wording17. Applying such reasoning to art. 206 
TFEU, would make it difficult to deny the mandatory nature of the objective of 
liberalisation. Consequently, proven incompatibilities of EU trade measures with such 
an objective may compromise their very lawfulness and could result in them being 
declared void. 
Nor does the commitment to a gradual liberalisation of international trade lessen the 
binding nature of the obligation contained in art. 206 TFEU. On the contrary, such a 
                                                
15 M Cremona, ‘A Constitutional Basis for Effective External Action? An Assessment of the Provisions 
on EU External Action in the Constitutional Treaty’ (2006) 30 EUI Working Paper Law, 29. See also 
Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’, 160. 
16 Case C-268/96 Portugal v. Council [1996] ECR I-6177, para. 23. 
17 The Court interpreted the expression “shall contribute” contained in art. 177(2) TEC as conferring 
binding force upon the objectives at issue, the result being that the Treaty would compel EU institutions 
and Member States to their attainment. See case C-268/96 above. 
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commitment may be interpreted as precluding any step back from the achieved level of 
liberalisation and as prohibiting the adoption of restrictive measures18, which would in 
practice disregard the mandatory objective of pursuing progresses, however gradual, in 
liberalisation. 
It should be noted that EU institutions retain discretion as regards the determination 
of the timeframe and means for fostering liberalisation. However, the Lisbon Treaty 
narrows their margin of appreciation as it forbids the adoption of commercial measures 
that might hamper the aim of further reducing barriers to trade and, possibly, that 
negatively affect the existing levels of liberalisation. 
 
2.2.3 The CCP under a common constitutional framework of EU external relations 
 
Previously placed under different and autonomous headings of the Community Treaty,19 
external policies are now found under a single framework of principles and objectives 
governing EU external action as a whole. Mainly consisting of arts. 3(5)20 and 21 TEU21 
and later reiterated in art. 205 TFEU,22 such a single framework encompasses a set of 
common rules which are intended to provide guidance in the exercise of EU external 
competences, irrespectively of their nature and of whether they have been conferred by 
the TEU or the TFEU. 
                                                
18 Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’, 161. 
19 Cremona has noticed that the current list of principles and objectives of EU external action incorporates 
principles and objectives that were found in specific policy fields under the TEC. See Cremona, ‘A 
Constitutional Basis’, 5. 
20 While providing an overall glimpse at the final aims of the European integration process, Art. 3 TEU 
acknowledges an autonomous role to some general external goals. Paragraph 5 thereof points at ‘peace, 
security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and 
fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights […] as well as […] the strict 
observance and the development of international law’ as the objectives that the Union is called upon to 
pursue while acting on the international scene. 
21 Art. 21 TEU complements and further specifies Art. 3(5) TEU by indicating both the principles 
inspiring EU external action (para. 1) and the specific objectives it is intended to pursue (para. 2). 
22 Art. 205 TFEU creates a functional linkage between the General Provisions on the Union’s External 
Action contained in the TEU and the specific external competences laid down in the TFEU in that it 
prescribes that the Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles, pursue the 
objectives and be conducted in accordance with the general provisions laid down in Art. 21 TEU. 
Moreover, it is to be noted that the drafters of the Treaty took care of establishing a one-to-one functional 
linkage between the relevant provisions of the two Treaties. The requirement that the development and 
implementation of the different areas of the Union’s external action covered both by the CFSP, by Part 
Five of the TFEU and by the external aspects of its other policies respect the principles and pursue the 
objectives contained in the first two paragraphs of Art. 21 TEU can already be detected in the third 
paragraph of the same provisions. Finally, the reference to external aspects of the Union’s internal 
policies extends the scope of Art. 21 TEU principles and objectives to yet another dimension of EU 
governance, not touched upon by the Treaty provisions on external action but certainly relevant for the 
definition of the overall EU international conduct. In particular, in the light of the practice whereby 
virtually all EU policies have acquired an external dimension, it could be inferred that Art. 21 has a 
significantly wider scope than expected. Decision and treaty-making practice - and possibly judicial 
control operated by the ECJ - will tell to which extent EU institutions and Member States will be willing 
to acknowledge such a scope. 
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The Union’s trade policy is henceforth to be conducted according to the principles 
and objectives of the EU’s external action. On the one hand, this raises the question as 
to whether there will be any increased tendency for the EU to use trade policy as an 
instrument for the achievement of other external policy objectives, such as the ones 
inherent to the CFSP, environmental or development policy.23 On the other hand, one 
might wonder if such broader range of objectives, besides offering new opportunities to 
enhance the consistency of external relations, will also pose major legal constraints to 
trade policy-making as such. 
Art. 3(5) TEU mentions free and fair trade as one of the basic objectives of the 
Union’s international action. Therefore, the creation of a single constitutional 
framework for EU external relations affects the CCP given that the latter is not only 
bound by the principles and objectives expressed in trade-related provisions of the 
Treaty but also by the general ones applicable to the Union’s external actions, as 
enshrined in art. 21 TEU. In other words, the new normative setting indirectly imposes a 
general need to coordinate the CCP with other external policies, whilst at the same time 
formally allowing the pursuit of non-trade objectives through the adoption of CCP 
measures24. The new framework determines what can and what cannot be painted on the 
canvas, by imposing additional constraints to the exercise of the EU trade competence, 
while at the same time affording previously unexpressed opportunities for the 
employment of CCP measures. The legal logic enshrined in such provisions is hardly 
questionable, particularly if looked at from the point of view of consistency advocates. 
Whereas art. 3(5) TEU gives a glimpse of the principles governing the Union’s 
external action, art. 21 TEU contains a detailed list of principles and objectives that are 
relevant for the exercise of the Union’s external competences, including the CCP. 
The Treaty emphasizes the application of those general principles in the field of the 
CCP more than once. The connection between art. 21 TEU and the CCP is reaffirmed in 
the TFEU, particularly in arts. 205 and 207, with the former providing a functional link 
between art. 21 TEU and the external policies under the TFEU and the latter explicitly 
incorporating the general principles and objectives of art. 21 into the CCP25. 
In other words, under the Lisbon Treaty, objectives and means previously applicable 
to more distinct external competences become of general and interchangeable 
application. Specifically referring to trade concerns, they are to be extended to all areas 
of EU external action, so that trade objectives are to be duly taken into account when 
drafting both CCP and non-CCP measures. Similarly, CCP measures are to be designed 
with a view to serve, or at least not to hamper, both trade and non-trade objectives. 
                                                
23 S Woolcock, The Treaty of Lisbon and the European Union as an actor in international trade, ECIPE 
Working Paper No. 01/2010, at 13. For an assessment of the recent practice of concluding bilateral Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs), concluding that this focus on trade liberalization leaves other objectives on 
the sidelines, see the contribution by Boris Rigod in this volume. 
24 Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’, 161. 
25 The last sentence of Art. 207(1) TFEU provides that ‘The common commercial policy shall be 
conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action’. 
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Arts. 3(5) and 21 TEU emphasise that general trade objectives such as liberalisation 
of international commerce, which art. 206 TFEU defines as being the only CCP aim, are 
not to be served only by the Union’s commercial policy but must be taken into account 
also when other competences are exercised. In other words, also non-trade policies are 
to contribute to the achievement of trade-related objectives. 
In art. 3(5) TEU, free trade is identified as a general objective of the EU external action 
alongside with fair trade. Social concerns therefore become part of European trade 
policy, and apply in parallel to the more obvious economic ones. 
This is confirmed by a close reading of Art. 21(2)(e) TEU, which explicitly 
recognises the progressive abolition of restrictions to trade as an objective of EU 
external action, but also puts the aim of commercial liberalisation in perspective, 
making it instrumental to the promotion of international economic development. The 
constitutional relevance of liberalisation comes to the fore insofar as such a goal is 
designed to be the basic tool for the achievement of the broader objective of integrating 
third countries into the world economy. 
As mentioned earlier, EU external action principles and objectives incorporate values 
and goals that were previously ascribed to specific Community policies. Following the 
Lisbon reform, these principles and objectives not only apply to their specific policy 
field of origin but also to all other fields of the Union’s external action, including the 
CCP. Therefore, both trade and non-trade related aims guide the exercise of the Union’s 
trade-related powers. Although the use of CCP measures in order to achieve non-trade 
objectives was practiced by EU institutions and recognised by the ECJ prior to the 
Lisbon Treaty26, art. 21 TEU represents nonetheless an important legal innovation as it 
provides the legal foundations for the non-commercial use of CCP measures. 
More specifically, the operative value of this provision lies in the clarification it 
provides that the orientation of the CCP will now also depend on non-trade principles 
and objectives, such as the promotion of democracy, rule of law, respect of human 
rights, the Union’s security and the preservation of international peace and security. Art. 
21 TEU thus legitimises the practice of inserting conditionality clauses in trade 
agreements and granting trade preferences to virtuous third countries which show 
deference to such values.27 Besides the objectives mentioned above, art. 21 TEU also 
recalls the preservation and improvement of the quality of the environment and the 
sustainable management of natural resources. This reference enhances the role of 
environmental goals as non-trade objectives, with which trade measures are nonetheless 
required to comply. Moreover, the Union’s contribution to the achievement of 
                                                
26 See L Bartels, ‘The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union’ in M Cremona (ed), New 
Developments in the EU's External Relations Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), 128-171; J 
Larik, ‘Much More Than Trade: The Common Commercial Policy in a Global Context’ in P Koutrakos 
and M Evans (eds), Beyond the Established Legal Orders: Policy Interconnections between the EU and 
the Rest of the World (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2011), 13-46. 
27 On the practice see L Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU's International Agreements 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005). 
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sustainable economic, social and environmental development of third countries is also 
meant to occur, inter alia, via EU trade policy. Finally, the CCP must be conceived and 
implemented so as to favour the advancement of multilateralism and good governance. 
The Union shall therefore be committed to multilateral trade negotiations and shall 
actively play a role in organisations such as the WTO, also by promoting the 
enhancement of their effectiveness. In this respect, the Union will need to abide by 
international commercial rules and to avoid unfair trade practices. 
 
2.2.4 Legal consequences 
 
The teleological scope of the EU’s trade policy has undergone a twofold reform. On the 
one hand, the specific goal of liberalisation has gained strength by shedding its 
aspirational nature and acquiring the character of a legal obligation. On the other hand, 
the Lisbon Treaty has placed the CCP eventually under the single heading on EU 
external action, thus including non-commercial concerns in the range of purposes and 
principles that the Union’s trade policy is to serve. The reformed Treaty affects the 
Union’s management of commercial disputes by narrowing the array of CCP policy-
options at the disposal of EU political institutions. As a result, a strategy based on the 
adoption of measures which does not comply with the new CCP constraints becomes 
internally unbearable, because unconstitutional, in the first place. 
Whereas it is apparent that the objective of liberalisation will herein act as a proper 
constraint on the formulation of the CCP content, the assessment of the legal 
implications of the reshuffle and ‘generalisation’ of external action principles and 
objectives is not so straightforward. 
There is indeed no doubt that the strong language used in arts. 3 and 21 TEU 
suggests that the values and goals therein contained oblige the Union to implement its 
external action within the framework they create. Moreover art. 206 TFEU, if read in 
conjunction with art. 205, which in turn refers to the afore-mentioned general 
provisions, also confirms that the CCP should not only serve the specific objective of 
liberalisation but should also aim to achieve the general objectives of the EU external 
action, i.e. political, social and economic development, environmental protection and 
the promotion of multilateralism. Undoubtedly these are all justiciable obligations 
which measures adopted by the EU must comply with, on pain of incurring in 
annulment procedures should they fail to do so. 
However, it has been noted that the mandatory nature of the provisions contained in 
arts. 3 and 21 TEU, and therefore of the obligations deriving therefrom, is somehow 
softened by their broad formulation28. Both articles leave a great deal of discretion to 
policy-making institutions, which therefore still enjoy a considerable leeway in 
                                                
28 Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’, 165. See also Cremona, ‘A Constitutional Basis’, 5-6. 
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choosing the appropriate course of action, both in terms of means and content, to pursue 
the prescribed objectives. 
Moreover, consistency problems may arise from interactions between the trade and 
non-trade objectives which the reformed CCP is bound by. The reason lies in the 
absence of a prioritisation rule which could be applied whenever different objectives 
point in opposite directions as regards the content of a trade measure. As mentioned, the 
aim of liberalisation as redefined in the Lisbon Treaty contains a no-step-back 
obligation regarding the abolishment of commercial and non-commercial barriers to 
trade. Therefore, conflicts between trade and non-trade objectives could arise should the 
latter be pursued by means of restrictive measures. Such a scenario is perfectly 
conceivable. For instance, restrictive measures could be used on the ground that they 
serve the objective of fair trade – i.e. equitable trade as opposed to lawful trade – 
contained in art. 3(5) TEU. The promotion of equitable trade conditions could be used 
to justify the adoption of protectionist measures. Whereas this would not be compatible 
with the prohibition of adoption of new restrictions resulting from the liberalisation 
objective, it is arguable that the pursuance of other and more general objectives makes 
trade restrictions a viable policy option. The contrary would entail that the 
acknowledgement of the EU external action general objectives be de facto disregarded 
to the extent that the pursuance of them would be severely limited when it comes to 
commerce29. 
Of course, the limit of such use of trade restrictions lies in the demonstration, on the 
basis of elements amenable to justice, of the functional connection between the 
restrictive trade measure and the general objective that it is intended to pursue. In this 
respect, the requirements of a two-tier test must be fulfilled in order for a protectionist 
measure to be justified and declared lawful: it must not only pursue a general – and 
forcibly legitimate – objective but also be proportional to the achievement of the 
declared aim30. In the case of equitable trade, the EU can adopt protectionist measures 
insofar as the link with the goal of promoting socio-economic development is 
sufficiently proven and the proportionality test is satisfied. 
 
 
3. Commercial disputes and fundamental rights: a real constraint? 
 
In the FIAMM judgment31, the ECJ suggested the possible contrast between non-
compliance with WTO obligations and the respect of fundamental rights related to 
private business. With a fully binding Charter of Fundamental Rights in force, the 
                                                
29 Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’, 167. 
30 Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’, 167. 
31 Joined cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P, Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio SpA 
(FIAMM) and Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio Technologies LLC (C-120/06 P), 
Giorgio Fedon & Figli SpA and Fedon America, Inc. (C-121/06 P) v Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities, (2008) ECR I-06513. 
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respect of rights such as the freedom to conduct a business (art. 16 CFR) and the right to 
property (art. 17 CFR) bind EU institutions in the conduct of the CCP, including the 
shaping of the EU’s strategic approach to commercial disputes. How and to what extent 
will this affect the EU’s approach to inter alia direct effect of DSB and AB reports and 
to EU liability for breach of WTO obligations? 
In the FIAMM case the Court was confronted with the need to balance the scope for 
manoeuvre of the EC institutions in the settlement of commercial disputes within the 
WTO with the protection of fundamental rights, such as the right to property and the 
right to pursue a trade or profession, as general principles of law applicable within the 
EU legal order. Having been victims of the retaliation enacted by the United States 
following EC non-compliance with the WTO DSB adverse ruling in the Hormones 
case, FIAMM and others asked the Court to declare the EC liable for the losses they had 
incurred and demanded compensations thereof on the ground of, inter alia, an alleged 
breach of certain general principles of EC law. In the 2008 judgment issued on a request 
for the cross-appeal, the Court affirmed that a Community measure whose application 
leads to restrictions that impair the substance of the right to property and the freedom to 
pursue a trade or profession in a disproportionate and intolerable manner, could give 
rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the Community32. The ruling of the Court 
in this case is on the fact that no provision has been made for compensation to avoid or 
remedy the aforementioned impairment. In other words, a right to compensation might 
arise if the omission of the Community to balance the loss incurred by individuals as a 
consequence of the EC’s continued WTO infringement was in breach of general 
principles, including property-related rights33. 
The Court recalled its previous case-law whereby property-related rights do not 
constitute absolute entitlements, but must be viewed in relation to their social 
function34. It thus held that the exercise of the right to property and to pursue a trade or 
profession freely may be restricted on condition that those restrictions correspond to 
objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and that, with regard to the 
aim pursued, they do not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference 
which infringes the very substance of the rights guaranteed35. Called upon to assess 
FIAMM’s request, the Court would have needed to address the questions as to whether 
the temporary acceptance of retaliation was in the general interest and whether the 
resulting restriction of trade for retaliation victims constituted a proportionate and 
tolerable interference. 
                                                
32 FIAMM (C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P), para. 184. 
33 A Thies, ‘The impact of general principles of EC law on its liability regime towards retaliation victims 
after FIAMM’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 889, 899. 
34 Case 4-73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission [1974] ECR 491, pt. 2 and 3 of 
the summary; Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, para. 17-20; Case 
265/87 Schräder HS Kraftfutter [1989] ECR 2237, pt. 3 of the summary. 
35 FIAMM (C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P), para. 183 and, inter alia, Case 265/87 Schräder HS Kraftfutter 
[1989] ECR 2237, para. 15; Case C-295/03 P Alessandrini and Others v Commission, [2005] ECR 
I‑5673, para. 86 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
 
 200
Earlier in its judgment, the Court did recognised the potential right to compensation 
where no provision has been made for compensation to avoid or remedy the impairment 
of the very substance of those rights in a disproportionate and intolerable manner. 
However, it concluded that Community law as it stood did not provide for a regime 
enabling the liability of the Community for its legislative conduct to found an action in 
a situation where, account being taken of the denial of direct effect to WTO rules within 
the EU legal order, any failure of such conduct to comply with the WTO agreements 
cannot be relied upon before the Community courts36. Besides the analysis of the 
existence and applicability of the liability regime37, the Court based its founding on 
settled case-law whereby an economic operator cannot claim a right to property in a 
market share which he may have held at any given time, since such a market share 
constitutes only a momentary economic position which is exposed to the risks of 
changing circumstances38. Moreover, the guarantees accorded by property-related rights 
cannot be extended to protect mere commercial interests or opportunities, the 
uncertainties of which are part of the very essence of economic activity39. The Court 
stated that an economic operator whose business mainly consists in exporting goods to 
the markets of non-Member States must be aware that the commercial position which he 
has at a given time may be affected and altered by various circumstances, including the 
possibility that one of the EU’s trading partners may adopt measures suspending 
concessions within the framework of the WTO as a result of EU non-compliance with 
WTO decisions and may for this purpose select in its discretion the goods to be subject 
to those retaliatory measures, as provided for in arts. 22(3)(a) and (f) of the DSU40. 
Some time after the much debated FIAMM judgment, the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights entered into force, thus allowing for a possible change in the 
Court’s attitude vis-à-vis the possibility to rely on fundamental rights when challenging 
the Union’s conduct in the context of international trade disputes and when demanding 
compensation in case of losses resulting therefrom. 
Art. 6(1) of the reformed Treaty confers upon the CFR the same legal value as the 
founding Treaties. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the rights codified in 
the Charter therefore acquire constitutional value within the European legal order. Even 
though the Court of Justice had consistently stated that fundamental rights form an 
integral part of the general principles of Community law whose observance the Court 
must ensure already before the entry into force of a binding Charter41, the provision 
above entails the obligation for European institutions to respect the rights, freedoms and 
prohibitions contained therein. A breach of such obligations will in turn result in the 
                                                
36 FIAMM (C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P), para. 188. 
37 FIAMM (C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P), para. 162-176. 
38 FIAMM (C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P), para. 185. 
39 FIAMM (C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P), para.185; see also Nold (case 4/73), para. 14. 
40 FIAMM (C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P), para. 186. 
41 FIAMM (C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P), para. 182. 
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annulment of the relevant acts by the Court42. Therefore, the Charter acts as a parameter 
of legality also in relation to measures adopted under the CCP43. 
Art. 17 CFR recognises the right for everyone to own, use, dispose of and bequeath 
his or her lawfully acquired possessions. Deprivations of possessions are prohibited, 
except if operated in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions 
provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. 
This article is based on art. 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Notwithstanding the slightly updated wording, in accordance with art. 
52(3) CFR, the meaning and scope of the right are the same as those guaranteed by the 
ECHR and the limitations may not exceed those provided for therein. Moreover, this is 
a fundamental right common to all Member States’ constitutions which has been 
recognised on numerous occasions and which is part of settled ECJ case-law having its 
origins in the Hauer judgment44. 
Whereas art. 17 CFR specifically protects the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s 
possessions, it nonetheless affords Member States – and EU institutions - considerable 
scope to interfere with individual property rights, as resulting from the aforementioned 
conditions for a lawful State-operated deprivation of a person’s possession. Moreover, 
States are responsible only for interferences affecting the economic value of property45. 
A ‘fair balance test’ will be applied in order to determine whether a fair balance has 
been struck between the demands stemming from the general interest of the Community 
and the need to protect individual’s fundamental rights46. The level of justification 
required will depend on the extent of the interference on the individual’s enjoyment of 
the right in each case. The precise weight to be given to the different interests will, in 
most cases, involve a wide range of policy considerations and, indeed, matters of 
political judgment. Accordingly, courts are likely to afford States and institutions a wide 
margin of appreciation47 when determining whether the Community interest outweighs 
individual interests in any particular case involving the right to property. 
As it should be recalled, the State is required to demonstrate that the deprivation of 
property under art. 17 CFR is in the public interest. In particular, the State must identify 
the interest in question, how the deprivation is rationally connected to it, and show that 
the interference is proportionate. However, it seems difficult to conceive circumstances 
in which the Court would dispute the purpose alleged by the government or contest its 
                                                
42 LS Rossi, ‘Il Rapporto tra Trattato di Lisbona e Carta dei Diritti Fondamentali dell'UE’ in G Bronzin, F 
Guariello, V Piccon (eds), Le Scommesse dell'Europa. Istituzioni, diritti, politiche (Rome: Ediesse 2009). 
43 V Bonavita, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the social dimension of international trade’ in 
G Di Federico (ed), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. From Declaration to Binding Instrument 
(Berlin: Springer 2011). 
44 Hauer (case 44/79), para. 17-20. 
45 Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden, ECHR Series A no. 52, (1983) 5 EHRR 35. 
46 Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden, ECHR Series A no. 52 (1983) 5 EHRR 35; Stran Greek Refineries 
and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, ECHR Series A no. 301-B, (1994) 19 EHRR 293. 
47 Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden, ECHR Series A no. 52 (1983) 5 EHRR 35; James and Others v. 
United Kingdom, Series A no. 98, (1986) 8 EHRR 123; Edoardo Palumbo v. Italy (2000) ECHR 640. 
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assertion that a measure pursued a public interest. Moreover, the requirement that 
conditions provided by law must be respected means that the State must have a basis in 
national law for its act of deprivation and that the law concerned must be both 
accessible and sufficiently certain. In particular, the law should contain sufficient 
safeguards against arbitrariness. Finally, art. 17 CFR clearly states that individuals are 
entitled to fair compensation in good time for their loss, except when the deprivation is 
in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law. The 
payment of compensation will be a highly relevant factor determining whether a ‘fair 
balance’ has been struck between the community at large48 and the rights of the 
individual in question49. 
Art. 16 CFR acknowledges the freedom to conduct a business in accordance with 
Community law and national laws and practices. This provision is based inter alia on 
the ECJ case-law recognizing the freedom to exercise an economic or commercial 
activity50. In line with such case-law, the enjoyment of such right is subject to the 
limitations provided for in art. 52(1) of the Charter. In particular, the freedom to run a 
business includes protection for one of the essential principles of free-market 
economics, which is the freedom of competition. This requirement means that the 
activities of the EU should include a system ensuring that competition in the internal 
market is not distorted. On this basis, art. 16 CFR protects the right of each person 
within the EU to start-up or continue a business without being subject to either 
discrimination or unnecessary restriction. 
Besides the restrictions to the above rights provided by the Charter itself, the impact 
of such provisions on the FIAMM case-law is to also be considered in the light of their 
very nature and origin. The issue is whether acknowledging a legally binding value for 
the Charter makes a substantial difference. CFR rights are mainly a codification of 
obligations previously recognised by the ECJ as being part of the EU legal order and/or 
derived from the ECHR. From the start, the Charter has been conceived as a catalogue 
that formally recognises rights de facto already in force through different sources of the 
Union’s legal order, such as international law, the constitutional traditions common to 
all Member States, the European Convention on Human Rights, Community and Union 
acts and judgements of the Court of Justice, rather than an instrument codifying new 
rights and prohibitions51. Therefore, it is debatable whether the Charter will be a real 
watershed52 vis-à-vis the ECJ’s approach to the relation between the protection of 
                                                
48 Holy Monasteries v. Greece, ECHR Series A no. 301 (1994) 20 EHRR 1; Stran Greek Refineries and 
Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, Series A no. 301-B (1995) 19 EHRR 293; Joined cases C-20 and 64/00, 
Booker Aquacultur Ltd. and Hydro Seafood GSP Ltd. v The Scottish Ministers, [2003] ECR Page I-7411. 
49 Jahn and Others v. Germany, ECHR, 22 January 2004. 
50 Nold (case 4/73), para. 14; Case 230/78 SpA Eridania-Zuccherifici nazionali and SpA Società Italiana 
per l'Industria degli Zuccheri v. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Minister for Industry, Trade and 
Craft Trades, and SpA Zuccherifici Meridionali [1979] ECR 2749, para. 20 and 31. 
51 Rossi, ‘Il Rapporto’. See also P Craig, ‘Rights, Legality, and Legitimacy’ in P Craig (ed.), The Lisbon 
Treaty. Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
52 Bonavita, ‘The EU Charter’. 
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fundamental property rights and the Union’s scope for manoeuvre in the management of 
commercial disputes. 
Although it adds further pieces to the puzzle of fundamental rights protection within 
the EU, the Union’s prospected accession to the ECHR does not clarify the issues in so 
far as the protection of property-related rights under the Convention suffers from the 
same constraints highlighted in relation to the CFR given that, as mentioned above, the 
latter is inspired to the former. 
 
 
4. The impact of the External Relations institutional reform on the strategic 
management of commercial disputes and the need for coordination 
 
The extent to which the Lisbon reform will affect the management of the CCP and of 
trade disputes will also depend on what use the institutions and institutional figures 
directly – or indirectly – involved will make of the new opportunities afforded by the 
Treaty itself. Are organisational arrangements in the management of the CCP and trade 
disputes foreseen in order to better accommodate the institutional reform that EU 
external relations has undergone? Is there a need to establish a mechanism of 
coordination with the HRVP and the EEAS? 
On the one hand, from the point of view of specific trade-related provisions, art. 207 
TFEU confirms the consolidated practice whereby, in relation to trade, the core of EU 
policy-making has been the relation between the Commission and Member States, 
sitting either in the Council or in its ‘Article 133 Committee’, now renamed as ‘Trade 
Policy Committee’53. The latter institution remains formally charged with the legislative 
responsibility in the field of trade. However, one of the main novelties put forth by the 
recent reform consists in the fact that the Council is now joined by the Parliament, 
which, as co-legislator in the ordinary legislative procedure, for the first time enjoys 
equal decision-making powers in trade-related matters. 
On the other hand, and more in general, the inclusion of trade policy under the 
common heading of EU external action and the applicability to the CCP of the general 
objectives and principles contained therein, raises questions as to the role that other 
institutions and bodies may play in relation to trade matters. 
First and foremost, there is room for a possible involvement of the High 
Representative/Vice-President in his/her dual role of head of European diplomacy (High 
Representative for the CFSP), assisted by the European External Action Service, and 
coordinator of European external policies (Commission Vice-President in charge of the 
extended “relex” portfolio). 
Moreover, given the acknowledged instrumental value of commercial measures for 
the attainment of non-trade objectives, a role in the management of the CCP, however 
                                                
53 S Woolcock, ‘EU Trade and Investment Policymaking After the Lisbon Treaty’ (2010) 1 
Intereconomics 22, 24. 
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non-pivotal, can be envisaged also for the EEAS. The need for the EU to be represented 
either in multilateral fora or in bilateral negotiations inter alia for the sake of dispute 
settlement may result in coordination issues arising. 
Finally, looking at the judicial aspect of EU governance, it is submitted that both the 
Union’s renewed commitment to fundamental rights and the broader orientation of the 
CCP towards general objectives create new parameters for the ECJ to apply when 
reviewing the legality of trade measures. 
 
4.1 The HR/VP, the EEAS and the need for coordination 
 
The HRVP is in a position to influence the conduct of the CCP by virtue of his/her 
institutional ubiquity. The dual function of Vice President of the Commission charged 
of external affairs and of the institutional figure responsible for the conduct of the CFSP 
enables the HRVP to influence policy making in trade-related matters both by 
participating in the work of the Commission and by taking autonomous actions. 
It has been maintained that Art. 18(4) TEU prioritises between the two roles of the 
HRVP so that, in case of conflict of interests, his/her role as head of the Union’s 
diplomacy and director of the CFSP must prevail. The question could therefore be 
raised as to whether this may cause the CCP to be more CFSP-oriented because of the 
HRVP’s influence. In this respect, a reasonable position is that the High Representative 
should not be expected to affect the focus of the CCP more than is necessary for the 
sake of ensuring coherence with the CFSP54. Avoiding inconsistencies between 
different external policies and turf battles amongst different services in charge of 
external relations is precisely the aim of endowing the HRVP with a ‘double hat’. The 
possibility of autonomous action foreseen by arts. 215(1) and 218(9) TFEU does not 
affect this evaluation. Arguably, he/she will therefore not interfere with the tasks of the 
remaining ‘relex’ Commissioners, such as for instance the Trade Commissioner, who 
keep their posts and their prerogatives over the competence portfolio they are entrusted 
with. 
As regards the role the HRVP will need to play in striking the balance between trade 
and non-trade objectives, much will depend on how the relationship develops between 
the HRVP, the EEAS, the Commission and the Council. One indicator of how things 
might develop is where Commission staff dealing with trade issues will sit. As it is 
known, this is not going to be in the EEAS, which will thus not have autonomous know-
how in trade matters. DG Trade will stay where it has been for decades, therefore 
retaining – arguably with limited intention to share55 – the institutional memory and the 
technical expertise that is central to trade policy56. 
                                                
54 Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’, 168. 
55 Such reluctance acquires particular relevance if looked at in the light of the concept of ‘institutional 
jealousy’, which is extensively employed in institutional regimes-related literature, including in studies 
regarding intra and inter-institutional relations at the EU level. See for instance, A Vitorino, ‘Steering the 
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The conclusion that could been drawn is that the High Representative and the 
Council will continue to make key-political decisions, concerning for instance trade 
negotiations (who? where? when? with whom?), but DG Trade is likely to continue to 
develop the content of trade policy measures for the foreseeable future57. However, such 
a conclusion is nuanced by the fact that, following the Lisbon Treaty, trade is not just 
about trade. Before the reform the equation applied by Community trade policy-makers 
was the following: depending on the community interest, reduction of trade barriers 
equals achievement of liberalisation objectives, which is to say that liberalisation is 
affordable to the extent that it does not conflict with Community interests. The relation 
between the content of a trade measures and its objectives is now much more complex. 
For the sake of ensuring the legality of trade measures, DG Trade is now obliged to 
stick to the objective of liberalisation without declining it according to the Community 
interest and to consider other variables, i.e. the other general objectives of EU external 
action. In order to fulfil these uneasy tasks, institutional memory and technical expertise 
may not be sufficient. However time-consuming, coordination efforts with other 
Commission services, the HRVP and the EEAS might become a crucial instrument. 
It has been argued that the exclusion of DG Trade from the EEAS is a result of the 
exclusive nature of EU competence in this policy-area58. It is to be noted that under the 
current legal framework – or better, legal network – of EU external policies, exclusivity 
is not in itself a gateway to consistency. Moreover, consistency is not an end in itself. 
Consistency as absence of contradictions between trade measures and non-trade 
objectives becomes crucial under the reformed Treaty because the very legality of trade 
measures is at stake. Legality in this respect can be achieved only through a trade 
policy-making exercise that takes a variety of objectives into account by means of 
coordination mechanisms. 
Once again the challenge of coordination is of utmost importance, even more so 
insofar as trade disputes are concerned. Employed in the past as powerful instruments of 
foreign policy lato sensu, trade disputes involving the EC have represented battles of 
standards and interests, particularly when the EC was summoned as defendant before 
the DSB. The question today is who will dispose of the power to use such a powerful 
instrument? Who will decide what purposes the EU strategy in commercial disputes is 
to serve? Who will be determine such strategy? 
So far, the Commission has been the unchallenged authority in this filed. In 
particular, the legal service of DG Trade has to date been entrusted with WTO dispute 
settlement and the TBR. They possess the technical expertise to assess interests and set 
positions in the midst of a controversy. They retain historic memory of past and 
ongoing WTO disputes involving the EC and now the EU. It should therefore be 
                                                                                                                                          
right course through unchartered waters’ in The next Commission: doing more and better (2009) 19 EPC 
- Challenge Europe 10, 10. 
56 Woolcock, ‘EU Trade’, 25. 
57 Woolcock, ‘EU Trade’, 25. 
58 S Duke, ‘The Lisbon Treaty and External Relations’ (2008) 1 Eipascope 13, 16. 
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concluded that they represent the more qualified institutional subject and, arguably, they 
will retain their monopoly over dispute settlement management. 
Whereas it appears to be the most reassuring option, two problems may arise in 
relation to path-dependency in the management of commercial disputes. First of all, 
trade disputes would remain a field of self-referential policy-making, where priorities 
are autonomously set by Commission. DG Trade may fail to take into account what are 
the current non-commercial objectives that trade measures, including those relating to 
the settlement of disputes, must pursue. The need for coordination comes to the fore 
once again. 
One may argue that the problem of ensuring coordination and consistency is not 
really new, particularly when it comes to EU external relations. Such a need has always 
been perceived at the policy level. The difference between the present and the past, 
namely between the pre- and post-Lisbon era, lies precisely in the governance sphere to 
which such coordination needs can be ascribed. During the pre-Lisbon era, coordination 
and consistency were desirable for the sake of policy effectiveness. The reformed 
Treaty adds a further dimension by indirectly making them crucial for the legality of 
policy measures. Should a trade measure, for instance the decision to suffer retaliation 
or to pay compensations as result of an adverse DSB report, be at odds with other 
“relex” objectives, such as environmental protection or development cooperation, it can 
be now formally sanctioned by the ECJ. 
Secondly, as discussed below, a further potential inconvenience of path-dependency 
may derive from the reinvigorated role of the European Parliament in trade policy. 
 
4.2 The European Parliament 
 
The role of the European Parliament in trade policy is formally enhanced by the Lisbon 
reform. Firstly, art. 207 TFEU confers upon the EP and the Council the power to adopt 
the measures defining the framework for implementing the CCP, in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure. The EP now shares co-decision powers with the Council 
to adopt measures relating to anti-dumping, safeguards, the Trade Barriers Regulation 
and the EU’s GSP scheme. Secondly, the EP is granted a greater – however not crucial 
– say in trade negotiations. Although the EP is not given powers to be directly involved 
in negotiations or to authorize them, the Commission is now obliged (art. 207(3) TFEU) 
to regularly report to the specialised EP International Trade Committee and to provide it 
with information concerning the conduct of negotiations. Finally, the EP will have an 
enhanced role in ratifying trade agreements through its power to consent to their 
adoption. Art. 218(6)(a) TFEU lists the cases in which the consent of the EP is a 
mandatory requirement for the conclusion of an agreement by the Council. Since such 
cases include inter alia the conclusion of agreements covering fields to which the OLP 
applies, the EP is granted the power to consent to practically all trade agreements by 
virtue of the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure to trade matters. 
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In view of the above, questions arise concerning possible EP attempts to be involved 
in the management of trade disputes, particularly since trade disputes may relate to 
issues that are sensitive to public opinion. Consumer health and environmental 
protection, for example, are of particularly important for democratically elected 
institutions such as the EP, whose members inevitably tend to work for their own re-
election throughout their mandate. 
Moreover, the enhanced role of the Parliament via the application of the OLP for the 
revision of trade measures might add new means to the EU strategy in commercial 
disputes. As in most two-level games59, the EP veto can be used as a bargaining tool 
during the diplomatic phase of WTO dispute settlement procedures or during the 
negotiation of extra-legem agreements with complainant WTO members. The subtle 
threat of an uncooperative Parliament, that retains a power of veto over ongoing 
negotiations, could be used by EU negotiators as a device to obtain a softening of the 
counterparts’ requests. 
 
4.3 The Court of Justice 
 
The broader perspective in which the CCP is placed under the reformed Treaty might 
also affect the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Indeed, the latter could now be called 
upon to apply additional new parameters when reviewing the legality of trade and non-
trade measures, in what could be defined as ‘cross-policy’ judicial control. Different 
scenarios can result in such a judicial control. On the one hand, the content of a trade 
measure could be such as to hamper the achievement of further liberalisation of the 
world market, which is a stated objective of the CCP. This is likely to result in the 
annulment of the measure by the Court. Moreover, still concerning trade measures, 
legality review can now be conducted also in the light of general external objectives 
such as the promotion of political and social development, the enhancement for 
multilateralism and so on. On the other hand, non-trade measures might in turn 
negatively affect trade objectives, namely liberalisation. 
As it has been shown earlier60, the incompatibility between trade and non-trade 
concerns enshrined in the last two scenarios is a perfectly conceivable ground for a 
legality challenge. Particularly relevant for the evolution of dispute management by the 
EU is the case of alleged inconsistencies of a CCP measure with objectives of the 
Union’s external action other than those inherently related to the commercial policy – 
i.e. liberalisation. In this case, the Court would plausibly adopt a three-step approach61. 
It would establish the alleged incompatibility in the first place. The Court would then 
clarify whether a legitimate justification to such incompatibility exists. In other words, 
                                                
59 For a compherensive theory of multilevel games, see R Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: 
The logic of Two-Level Games’ (1988) 42 International Organization 427. 
60 See above paragraph I.4. 
61 It mirrors the two-fold reasoning mentioned in para. I.4 regarding the case of a non-trade measure 
negatively affecting liberalisation. 
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the existence of a necessary functional relation between, on the one hand, the 
challenged measure’s content, which had been previously established as detrimental to 
some other external action objective and, on the other, the pursuance of a declared 
objective of the challenged measure itself must be proven. The Court would eventually 
apply a proportionality test in order to ascertain whether or not the content of the 
measure does exceed what is necessary for the pursuance of its declared objective. 
Should this be the case, the measure would result disproportionate with respect to its 
aim, however justified, which would lead the Court to declare the measure void. 
The question remains as to whether the Court has got the technical expertise to assess 
the adverse impact of trade actions on other ‘relex’ objectives, account being taken of 
the technical nature of such measures, whose non-commercial side effects are not 
always easy to detect. 
A further limit might arise in relation to those subjects, both institutional and not, 
who might at once be legally capable of and politically interested in challenging a trade 
measure on the ground of its incompatibility with other external action objectives. As 
regard the institutions’ position as privileged applicants in actions for annulment, the 
issue is whether they retain a political interest in challenging a trade measure, be it an 
agreement concluded under art. 207(3) TFEU or a piece of CCP-implementing 
secondary legislation adopted under art. 207(2) TFEU, whose coming into being they 
have contributed to in the first place. Having regard to this aspect, the major change 
with respect to the TEC regime can be found in the different relative positions of the 
institutions involved in trade-related decision-making. Both applicable to the conclusion 
of trade agreements and to the adoption of implementing legislation, the ordinary 
legislative procedure put the EP on an equal footing with the Council, which makes the 
two institutions equally responsible for the content of the act and therefore unlikely 
inclined to challenge it before the ECJ. As for the Commission, its position is more 
nuanced in that, although it holds a right to initiate the procedure, it does not share 
legislative responsibility with regard to the content of the eventually adopted measure62. 
The same can be stated with regard to the Member States. The fact that each of them 
                                                
62 From the legal point of view, this consideration holds true even in the light of the Commission’s right 
to modify the legislative proposal at any stage of the procedure and in the light of its role as negotiator on 
behalf of the Council. On the one hand, the Commission’s right to modify the proposal is said to confer to 
the institution a significant bargaining power during the procedure, particularly vis-à-vis the Council; see 
R Adam and A Tizzano, Lineamenti di Diritto dell’Unione Europea (Torino: Giappichelli 2010) 177. The 
existence of such power of modification of the proposal might actually induce the Commission to make 
use of it for the purpose of obtaining the desired content of the measure before the end of the legislative 
procedure, instead of resorting to the ECJ afterwards. However plausible, this scenario does not in fact 
hamper the capacity of the Commission to challenge the legality of the measure after its adoption. On the 
other hand, the same can be said with regard to the role of negotiator of trade agreements enjoyed by the 
Commission. As foreseen in Art. 207(3) TFEU, second and third alinea, such role is played on behalf of 
the Council, within the framework of the directives issued by the latter and under the strict control of its 
specialised committee (formerly known as ‘Article 133 Committee’). Therefore the Commission’s 
discretion is not unlimited and the Council is ultimately responsible for the conclusion of the agreement. 
This leaves some room for disagreement with the Commission as regards the content of the agreement 
itself. 
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sits in the Council does not prevent possible disagreements to arise with respect to the 
adopted measures to the extent that the rule of qualified majority voting is applicable, 
with the result that dissenting opinions within the Council might be disregarded. 
Finally, having regard to non-privileged applicants, judicial actions are obviously the 
sole possibility for legal and physical persons to challenge trade measures whose 
content is deemed to hamper the achievement of other external goals. In this respect, not 
only political reluctances resulting from decision-making are of no concern since 
individuals are the recipient and not the actors of the legislative procedure, but also the 
reform of the admissibility requirements for annulment proceedings brought about by 
the Lisbon Treaty points in the direction of an enhancement of the chances for non-
privileged applicants to resort to legality actions63. 
The above shows how concrete the hypothesis of judicial review being conducted by 
the Court is for the purpose of assessing the legality of trade measures in the light of 
their compatibility with non-commercial external objectives. Notwithstanding the wide 
margin of discretion enjoyed by political institutions in striking the balance between 
trade and non-trade objectives of the CCP, the potential for ECJ intervention should not 
be underestimated on the ground that the Court has so far chosen to interfere only 
marginally in trade-related matters for the sake of not tying the hands of political 
institutions. After all, it was the Court itself that suggested that the incompatibility of 
EU trade measures with objectives other than commercial ones, such as the protection 
of fundamental rights, could serve as ground for alleging the illegality of such 
measures. 
Although the initiation of an action for annulment based on the above grounds is 
both conceivable from the theoretical point of view and actually likely to occur in 
practice, attention must nonetheless be paid to the difference between the action in 
itself, and the grounds thereof, as well as the solution that the Court could devise in 
order to decide such a case. In particular, caution should be used when thinking about 
what could be expected from the Court. Since the Treaty does not contain any 
prioritisation rule to be applied to different and potentially conflicting external 
objectives, the Court would not be in a position to do much more than acknowledging 
that a trade measures might negatively affect other “relex” objectives. Striking the 
balance between those must be left to the political institutions. The Court is therefore 
unlikely to go as far as to criticise the balance that the latter have chosen, simply 
                                                
63 Under Art. 263 TFEU, fourth alinea, natural and legal persons who intend to initiate an action for 
annulment can do so to the extent that the contested measure is an act addressed to them or is of direct 
and individual concern to them or that the measure consists of a regulatory act which directly concerns 
the applicant and which does not entail implementing measures. This is different from the previous 
admissibility regime, in which individuals were required to prove their interest in the annulment of the 
challenged measure by means of a demonstration that the latter was of both direct and individual concern 
to them. The requirement of the individuality of the measure was particularly cumbersome, all the more 
in relation to trade measures whose scope is often too general to accommodate such condition for 
admissibility, which therefore represented a concrete constraint on individuals’ actions against the 
legality of trade measures. 
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because there is no rule of prioritisation upon which the European judicature could base 
any such condemnation. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
This last section attempted to assess whether innovations brought about by the Lisbon 
Treaty in relation to the Union trade policy and to EU external action will cause a 
rethinking of the Union’s strategy in the management of trade disputes. The argument 
presented herein applies to the specific domain of SPS and TBT disputes, even though it 
has been made in relation to commercial disputes in general. 
The opinions presented herein lead to the conclusion that such a rethinking of the 
Union’s strategy for the management of commercial disputes is likely to take place 
insofar as the previous strategy will no longer prove suitable for the achievement of the 
current objectives of the EU trade policy. This is for three reasons. First, the objectives 
themselves have changed in number and nature, now encompassing both trade and non-
trade goals. Secondly, the circumstances of EU trade action have changed and 
additional constraints might arise to the extent that the EU constitutional architecture 
has come to encompass a legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Union 
itself is bound to eventually join the European Convention for Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. Finally, if considered in the light of both the new objectives 
and the new context of the Union’s trade policy, the current strategy appears too risky 
and therefore unbearable, as its exposure to adverse judicial review has now become 
more likely. 
What is next then? Whereas they have previously enjoyed a wide scope for 
manoeuvre, EU political institutions are now in for a quite demanding juggling exercise 
as their strategy towards commercial disputes must be fine-tuned so as to ensure full 
consideration of both trade and non-trade objectives of EU external action. The number 
of balls to throw in the air and catch again has suddenly grown. Bearing in mind the 
broader orientation of the CCP towards general and potentially conflicting external 
objectives, the task of balancing between liberalisation and other objectives acquires a 
new crucial dimension. Long established practices and orientations in policy-making are 
not likely to change overnight. Commercial strategies, particularly when it comes to 
international disputes, are no exception in this respect. Time will tell whether political 
institutions, particularly the Commission, the Council and the HRVP will be up to the 
task by means of coordination efforts, or whether the ECJ will be called to play a more 
active – although not necessarily corrective – role in strategy-making. 
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